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THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


Si^ 


mi\ 


THE 
ART  OF  FIGHTING 


THE 
ART  OF  FIGHTING 

ITS  EVOLUTION  AND  PROGRESS 
WITH  ILLUSTRATIONS  FROM 
CAMPAIGNS  OF  GREAT  COMMANDERS 


BY 
REAR-ADMIRAL  BRADLEY  A.  FISKE 

U.  S,  NAVY 

Former  Aid  for  Operations  of  the  Fleet,  President  of  the  U.  S.  Naval  Institute,  Gold 

Medalist  of  U.  S.  Naval  Institute,  the  Franklin  Institute  and  the 

Aero  Club  of  America 

Author  of  "'Electricity  in  Theory  and  Practice,'"  "War  Time  in  Manila,"  "The 

Navy  as  a  Fighting  Machine,"  "From  Midshipman  to 

Reat-Admiral,"  etc. 

Inventor  of  the  Gun  Director  System,  the  Naval  Telescope  Sight,  the  Stadimeter, 

the  Turret  Range  Finder,  the  Horizometer,  the 

Torpedoplane,  etc.,  etc.,  etc. 


NEW  YORK 
THE  CENTURY  CO. 

1920 


Copyright,  1920,  by 
The  Century  Co. 


\ 


(Xj 


PREFACE 

The  evils  of  war  are  so  heart-rending  that  every  friend  of 
the  human  race  would  greet  with  joy  the  coming  of  perma- 
nent peace,  and  would  aid  every  movement  tending  to  en- 
sure it. 

Nevertheless  until  it  is  certain  that  war  has  actually  been 
banished  from  the  earth,  armies  and  navies  must  be  main- 
tained. In  order  to  give  their  country  the  protection  needed, 
each  army  and  navy  must  be  correctly  designed,  prepared,  and 
operated. 

To  know  whether  this  is  being  done,  the  people  need  a  gen- 
eral knowledge  of  the  principles  of  the  art  of  fighting,  espe- 
cially of  strategy. 

To  impart  this  knowledge  in  simple  language  is  the  object 
of  this  book, 

Bradley  A.  Fiske. 


CONTENTS 


PART  I 
FIGHTING  AND  WAR  IN  GENERAL 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I  Fighting  Between  Individuals 3 

II  Fighting  Between  Tribes 15 

III  Gradual  Development  of  the  Art  of  Fighting    .      .  37 

IV  Principles  of  the  Art  of  Fighting 50 

PART  II 

HISTORICAL  ILLUSTRATIONS 
V    Thutmose  III  and  Ramses  II 67 

VI       MiLTIADES    AND     ThEMISTOCLES 79 

VII  Philip  of  Macedon  and  Alexander  His  Son    .     .      .96 

VIII     C^SAR 124 

IX     C^sAR   (Continued) 141 

X  Charlemagne,  William,  and  Marlborough     .     .     .  164 

XI    Frederick 177 

XII    Washington* 191 

XIII  Nelson 208 

XIV  Napoleon 220 

XV    From  Napoleon  to  Moltke 251 

XVI     Moltke 256 

XVII    From  Moltke  to  Togo 272 

XVIII    Ante  Bellum 289 

XIX    The  World  War .312 


PART  III 

STRATEGY 

XX     Strategy  in  Peace 321 

XXI     Strategy  in  War 345 

XXII     Strategy  as  Related  to  Statesmanship   ....  365 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 

Besieging-  a  City  in  Ancient  Times Frontispiece 

PAGE 

Vicinity  of  Kadesh 70 

Plain  of  Marathon 80 

Ancient  Greece  and  Asia  Minor 84 

Artemisium  and  Thermopylae 86 

Battle  of  Salamis 88 

The  Persian  Empire     .           101 

The  Battle  of  Issus 106 

Tyre         109 

Battle  of  the  Hydaspes 119 

The  Roman  Empire 127 

Central  Europe,  1789 179 

Washington's  Movements  in  1776 196 

Battle  of  Cape  St.  Vincent 209 

Central  Europe,  1810 221 

Vicinity  of  Waterloo 248 

Japan,  Korea,  and  Part  of  Manchuria 291 


PAET  I 
FIGHTING  AND  WAR,  IN  GENERAL 


THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

CHAPTER  I 

FIGHTING   BETWEEN  INDIVIDUALS 

MAN'S  earliest  method  of  fighting  was  with  his  fists. 
The  use  he  made  of  his  fists  was  to  strike  blows  upon 
the  body  of  his  antagonist,  with  the  intention  of  in- 
juring him,  and  especially  of  decreasing  his  ability  to  inflict 
blows  in  return.  In  practically  all  cases,  a  fight  was  waged  to 
accomplish  some  purpose;  and  this  purpose  was  either  offensive 
or  defensive.  This  means  that  the  intention  was  either  to 
further  some  purpose,  or  to  prevent  an  antagonist  from  carry- 
ing out  some  purpose  of  his  own.  Fighting  with  the  fists  is  in 
vogue  even  at  the  present  day,  not  only  among  savage  tribes, 
but  in  the  most  civilized  communities ;  and  it  is  the  prototype 
of  the  most  complicated  and  extensive  wars  ever  waged,  even 
among  nations  the  most  highly  civilized  and  numerous. 

Looked  at  from  the  standpoint  of  a  war  between  two  na- 
tions, a  fist  fight  between  two  men  seems  a  very  simple  matter. 
But  it  does  not  seem  a  simple  matter  if  one  considers  all  the 
elements  involved.  Superficially  regarded,  such  a  fight  seems 
simple,  for  the  reason  that  we  take  no  account  whatever  of  the 
wonderfully  complicated  activities  going  on  inside  the  skin 
of  each  contestant.  If  we  knew  all  that  was  going  on  inside 
of  each  skin,  we  would  realize  that  in  no  army  and  no  navy 
has  there  ever  been  such  a  perfect  adaptation  of  means  to  ends, 
such  a  thorough  system  of  coordination  among  all  the  various 
parts,  such  an  ability  to  concentrate  them  all  on  one  object. 


4  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

such  a  speedy  supply  of  reinforcements  to  threatened  points, 
such  an  admirable  system  of  reconnoitering,  and  such  a  com- 
plete power  to  move  as  a  unit  in  the  desired  direction,  and  to 
the  indicated  spot. 

If  two  untrained  men  fight  each  other  with  their  fists,  we 
do  not  see  the  same  quickness  of  attack  and  parry  as  in  the 
ease  of  two  men  who  are  highly  trained ;  but  even  in  the  case 
of  two  untrained  men,  or  even  of  two  small  boys,  we  see  such 
wonderful  efficiency  of  the  body  for  the  purpose  of  fighting  as 
almost  to  suggest  the  idea  that  the  primary  intention  of  the 
Almighty  in  designing  the  body  of  a  man  was  that  he  should 
fight.  This  would  be  a  very  extreme  position  to  assume ;  but, 
at  the  same  time,  it  may  be  pointed  out  that  in  no  other 
activity  in  which  a  man  engages  is  he  called  upon  to  exert 
his  powers  so  strenuously;  in  nothing  else  that  a  man  does  is 
there  a  demand  for  such  a  wide  range  of  effort ;  by  no  other 
activity  is  a  man's  strength — physical,  mental,  and  moral — 
taxed  so  heavily ;  after  no  other  exercise  is  a  man  so  exhausted. 
These  things  need  not  surprise  us :  why  should  it  surprise  us 
that  the  utmost  of  a  man's  possible  endeavor  should  be  called 
upon  to  save  his  life?  On  the  issue  of  many  a  fight  has  de- 
pended the  life  of  each  man  who  is  fighting ;  and,  in  many  cases 
where  life  itself  has  not  depended  on  the  issue,  something  has 
depended  on  it  of  such  importance  that,  because  of  it,  the 
risking  of  life  has  been  undergone. 

If  we  watch  two  men,  even  unskilful  men,  when  fighting, 
we  see  that  each  one  keeps  his  eye  eagerly  on  the  other,  look- 
ing first  for  an  opportunity  to  strike,  and  second  for  a  blow 
that  must  be  parried.  In  some  eases  we  see  this  condition  re- 
versed, and  note  that  at  least  one  of  the  men  is  more  intent 
on  parrying  than  on  striking.  If  we  see  one  man  intent  on 
striking  and  the  other  man  intent  on  parrying,  we  realize  that 
one  man  is  acting  offensively  and  the  other  defensively;  and 
we  realize  also  that,  unless  there  is  a  marked  disproportion  in 
strength  or  skill,  the  man  who  is  acting  offensively  will  prob- 
ably be  the  victor. 


FIGHTING  BETWEEN  INDIVIDUALS  5 

But  we  realize  also  that  he  may  not  necessarily  be  the  victor. 
We  realize  that  the  one  who  is  acting  defensively  may  be 
merely  waiting  for  an  opportunity  to  strike  effectively;  and 
that  the  man  who  is  acting  offensively  may  be  merely  using 
strength  and  effort,  with  but  little  guidance  from  reason,  and 
may  exhaust  himself  in  ill-directed  effort.  We  realize  that  the 
man  who  is  acting  defensively  may  finally  see  an  opportunity 
to  break  through  the  guard  of  his  adversary  and  inflict  a 
decisive  blow.  We  realize  all  these  things  because  from  boy- 
hood we  have  been  accustomed  to  this  kind  of  fighting,  and 
because  a  knowledge  of  its  fundamental  principles  is  so  much 
a  part  of  our  heredity  as  to  be  almost  an  instinct. 

We  realize  also  that,  unless  the  defendant  does  at  some  time 
act  offensively,  he  vdll  surely  be  vanquished.  No  fighting  in 
the  history  of  the  world,  no  matter  how  defensively  conducted, 
has  ever  obtained  a  victory  without  offensive  action  of  some 
sort,  as  by  delivering  a  blow.  In  the  simple  case  of  two  men 
in  a  fist  fight,  we  cannot  imagine  either  of  the  men  becoming 
the  victor  without  a  blow,  or  a  successful  grapple,  or  a  throw- 
down,  or  the  inflicting  of  an  injury  of  some  kind.  We  shall 
see  hereafter  that  these  facts  are  the  fundamental  principles 
underlying  all  wars ;  and  that  it  has  been  by  forgetting  them 
that  much  misunderstanding  as  to  the  nature  of  war  and  the 
purposes  of  strategy  has  been  created. 

While  the  two  contestants  are  watching  each  other  for 
chances  to  strike,  and  for  the  necessities  for  parrying,  there 
are  going  on  inside  of  each  man  things  that  we  cannot  see. 
We  cannot  see  that  system  of  independent  and  yet  dependent 
parts  by  which  all  the  members  of  the  body  act  independently 
of  each  other,  and  yet  cooperatively,  and  in  obedience  to  the 
will  that  directs  all  toward  a  common  object.  The  mind  is 
informed  by  its  reconnoitering  agency,  the  eye,  of  the  rapid 
movements  of  the  adversary,  not  only  of  his  body  as  a  unit, 
but  of  his  arms  and  his  legs  and  his  eyes:  that  is,  the  mind 
takes  note  of  the  direction  and  speed  of  movement  of  the 
enemy  main  body  and  of  its  supports  and  reconnoitering 


6  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

parties.  Apprehending  these,  the  mind  telegraphs  orders  by 
the  nerves  to  the  muscles,  and  thus  immediately  disposes  of  its 
own  main  body  and  its  supports  and  reconnoitering  parties — 
sometimes  to  parry,  sometimes  to  retreat,  sometimes  to  ad- 
vance, and  sometimes  to  launch  a  blow. 

Each  contestant  by  means  of  his  reconnoitering  parties  (his 
eyes)  watches  for  any  uncovering  of  the  enemy  main  body, 
in  order  that  he  may  strike  it,  and  also  for  any  opportunity 
of  reaching  some  weak  spot.  Each  contestant  realizes  that 
the  most  effective  blow  would  be  one  delivered  with  the  full 
power  of  the  arm  on  the  front,  but  that  such  a  blow  entails 
a  risk,  because  it  uncovers  one's  self  to  attack;  and  therefore 
he  delivers  many  comparatively  ineffective  blows  without 
uncovering  himself,  in  the  hope  of  gradually  wearing  down 
the  fighting  power  of  his  adversary  to  a  point  at  which  he 
may  launch  a  blow  with  his  full  power,  without  undue  risk. 

This,  of  course,  presupposes  that  the  two  contestants  are 
fairly  matched.  If  they  are  not  fairly  matched,  one  of  the 
contestants  may  be  able  to  deal  a  series  of  heavy  blows  without 
serious  risk  to  himself  and  bring  the  fight  to  a  speedy  end. 
Where  such  a  disproportion  of  power  exists,  however,  the 
matter  is  not  interesting  to  the  student  of  the  art  of  fighting, 
for  the  reason  that  it  is  impracticable  to  learn  the  possibilities 
of  that  art  from  occasions  in  which  the  disproportion  of  mate- 
rial forces  is  so  great  as  to  give  strategy  no  opportunity  to 
exert  its  powers. 

While  the  case  of  two  unskilled  men  in  fighting  with  their 
fists  reveals  to  the  student  a  marvelous  display  of  the  powers 
of  the  human  body,  it  is  only  in  the  contest  between  highly 
trained  pugilists  that  this  is  shown  in  its  perfection.  And 
when  one  considers  how  few  men  have  been  highly  trained 
pugilists,  and  when  he  realizes  the  marvelous  physical  strength, 
the  quickness  of  perception,  the  rapidity  of  inter-action  be- 
tween the  nerves  and  the  muscles,  and  the  amount  of  training 
required,  he  must  conclude  that,  although  he  may  consider 
such  things  very  brutal  and  demoralizing,  and  though  they 


FIGHTING  BETWEEN  INDIVIDUALS  7 

may  decrease  the  refinement  of  the  community,  yet  neverthe- 
less they  do  develop  more  highly  than  does  anything  else  the 
powers  of  the  human  body.  We  see  in  the  trained  pianist  a 
superb  coordination  between  the  eyes  and  the  fingers.  This 
coordination  is  as  great  as  that  between  the  eye  and  the  fists 
of  the  pugilist;  but  it  is  no  greater.  The  pianist  produces 
beautiful  chords  and  successions  of  chords  to  delight  an  audi- 
ence, while  the  pugilist  inflicts  blows  that  cause  physical  pain 
and  harm.  Nevertheless,  it  can  hardly  be  denied  that,  from 
the  standpoint  of  the  mechanics  of  the  human  body,  the  pianist 
or  even  the  acrobat,  is  in  a  class  inferior  to  that  occupied  by 
the  pugilist.  That  the  pugilist  should  devote  his  truly  mar- 
velous powers  to  a  purpose  that  may  be  unworthy,  or  even  bad, 
does  not  nuUif}^  the  fact  that  he  brings  the  physical  activities 
of  the  human  organism  to  a  higher  point  than  does  anybody 
else. 

The  reason  that  the  pugilist  is  able  to  accomplish  so  much, 
or  the  reason  that  any  man  is  able  to  walk  or  talk  or  do  any- 
thing else,  is  because  the  body  of  a  man  is  an  organism :  that 
is,  an  organization  composed  of  parts  that  are  independent 
of  each  other,  and  yet  interdependent,  and  that  can  all  be 
made  to  act  together  for  a  definite  purpose.  What  is  ordi- 
narily called  a  machine  is  man's  imitation  of  the  organism 
created  by  the  Almighty.  In  a  machine,  a  printing-press  for 
instance,  we  see  an  enonnous  number  of  parts,  each  working 
apparentl}'-  independentl}-  of  every  other;  and  yet  we  see  all 
working  together  to  print  a  paper.  When  one  watches  a 
printing-press,  or  when  he  watches  any  other  of  the  great  ma- 
chines invented  by  man,  he  is  filled  with  wonder  at  the  genius 
of  the  inventor  and  the  skill  of  the  mechanics  who  embodied 
the  inventor's  invention  in  steel  and  brass;  but  no  machine 
that  man  ever  invented  is  other  than  an  imitation  of  the 
mechanism  of  the  human  body.  So  far  as  men  know,  man  is 
the  most  perfect  machine  that  even  the  Almighty  has  invented. 

There  are  three  main  elements  that  determine  the  effective- 
ness of  a  pugilist,  and  they  are  the  same  elements  that  deter- 


8  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

mine  the  effectiveness  of  an  army  or  a  fleet:  strength,  skill, 
and  courage.  These  qualities  are  natural  in  a  man  originally, 
but  can  be  developed  to  a  surprising  degree. 

The  strength  is  of  two  kinds,  defensive  and  offensive,  and  is 
evidenced  by  ability  to  endure  injury  and  to  inflict  injury. 
In  a  man  the  size  of  his  frame  is  a  rough  indication  of  his 
strength ;  and  so  in  a  fleet  or  an  army  is  its  size  a  rough  indi- 
cation. The  indication  is  quite  rough,  however;  for  many  a 
large  man  is  not  strong  either  defensively  or  offensively,  and 
the  same  has  always  been  true  of  an  army  or  a  fleet.  The 
physical  strength  of  a  man  depends  not  only  on  his  size,  but 
on  the  way  in  which  his  various  elements  are  put  together, 
on  the  strength  of  his  individual  muscles,  and  on  the  effective- 
ness with  which  they  are  combined.  If  a  pugilist  should  have 
weak  legs  or  a  weak  heart,  even  if  he  had  exceedingly  strong 
arms,  he  would  not  be  a  strong  pugilist.  Similarly,  if  an 
army  or  a  fleet  that  is  large  is  composed  of  men  and  weapons 
that  are  weak,  or  if  it  has  weak  parts,  that  army  or  fleet  can- 
not be  strong.  Roughly  speaking,  the  strength  of  a  man,  or 
of  an  army  or  a  fleet,  is  the  strength  of  its  weakest  part ;  be- 
cause in  a  serious  flght  the  weak  part  is  liable  to  be  detected, 
and  so  vigorously  assaulted  as  to  be  broken  down,  and  the 
integrity  of  the  entire  structure  thereby  destroyed. 

The  skill  of  a  pugilist  is  both  natural  and  acquired ;  and  so 
is  that  of  a  fleet  or  an  army.  If  a  man  has  a  quick  mind,  in 
the  sense  that  he  apprehends  things  quickly,  every  move  of 
his  adversary  is  quickly  apprehended ;  w^hereas,  if  a  man  has  a 
sluggish  mind,  the  adversary's  moves  may  not  be  seen  quickly 
enough  to  permit  of  taking  effective  counter-measures.  Simi- 
larly, in  a  fleet  or  an  army,  if  the  reconnoitering  parties  are 
not  efficient  the  fleet  or  army  may  find  itself  attacked  before 
it  has  had  time  to  take  proper  measures  of  defense.  And  even 
if  a  man's  faculties  of  apprehension  are  good,  it  may  be  that 
the  coordination  between  his  mind  and  his  muscles  is  slug- 
gish; so  that,  even  if  he  sees  an  adversary's  threat  quickly,  his 
muscles  reply  too  slowly.    This  is  more  apt  to  be  the  case 


FIGHTING  BETWEEN  INDIVIDUALS  9 

with  heavy  men  than  with  light  men,  because  the  mass  to  be 
moved  is  greater ;  but,  as  a  rule,  a  man  who  is  quick  to  appre- 
hend is  quick  to  act.  Similarly,  in  a  fleet  or  army,  the  gather- 
ing of  information  concerning  the  enemy  may  be  effective,  but 
the  means  for  getting  the  information  to  the  main  body  and 
of  taking  effective  counter-measures  may  not  be  effective, 
especially  if  the  fleet  or  army  be  very  large.  As  a  general 
rule,  however,  the  same  foresight  that  provides  a  good  means 
of  information  provides  also  a  good  means  for  taking  action 
in  accordance  with  it. 

Skill  is  more  susceptible  of  development  in  a  pugilist  than  is 
his  physical  strength;  though,  of  course,  strength  is  suscep- 
tible of  great  development  also.  The  skill  is  developed  by 
training;  and  it  is  an  important  fact  that  this  training  is 
gained  mainly  by  actual  contests  with  an  adversary.  The 
development  of  strength  alone  may  be  gained  by  mere  physi- 
cal exercises ;  but  the  eye  cannot  be  trained  by  such  means  to 
see  an  enemy's  moves  quickly,  nor  can  the  arm  be  trained  to 
make  the  parry  or  give  the  counter-blow.  Similarly,  in  fleets 
and  armies,  mere  strength  (that  is,  the  power  to  withstand 
blows  and  to  deliver  blows)  can  be  developed  in  the  laboratory 
and  machine-shop,  and  in  target  practice  and  tactical  drills; 
but  it  is  only  in  contests  more  or  less  realistic  that  real  train- 
ing can  be  secured  in  apprehending  the  intentions  of  the 
enemy  and  in  replying  effectively. 

It  is  not  only  for  taking  counter-measures,  however,  that  skill 
is  needed :  it  is  needed  even  more  for  initiating  offensive  meas- 
ures. The  whole  aim  of  the  pugilist,  or  of  the  fleet  or  the 
army,  is  to  inflict  a  crushing  blow.  In  order  to  do  this,  the 
first  requisite  is  to  discern  the  opportunity ;  and  the  second  is 
to  act  instantly  with  all  the  force  possessed.  The  opportunity 
must  be  apprehended  instantly;  but  there  is  little  use  in  ap- 
prehending it,  unless  the  appropriate  action  follows.  A  sim- 
ple illustration  is  the  sharpshooter  with  his  musket.  He 
eagerly  watches  his  sights  as  they  sway  up  and  down  and  to 
the  right  and  left  across  the  target ;  and  his  skill  consists,  not 


10  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

in  keeping  his  sio-hls  invariably  on  the  tar^ret,  for  no  man 
can  do  that,  but  in  seeing  instantly  when  they  are  on  and 
instantly  pulling  the  trigger.  Many  a  marksman  has  failed 
to  hit  the  target  because  he  Wius  too  slow  in  pulling  the  trigger. 

Closely  associated  with  skill  is  courage;  because  without 
courage  the  nervous,  mental,  and  moral  systems  of  a  man  are 
not  at  the  correct  degree  of  tension.  Courage  does  not  mean 
merely  absence  of  fear;  for  absence  of  fear  may  be  due  to 
absence  of  a  complete  understanding  of  the  situation,  owing  to 
sluggishness  of  mind.  Courage  is  that  intense  and  yet  con- 
trolled will  to  win  which  seeks  the  objective  so  intently  that 
all  the  powers  of  the  body  and  mind  are  devoted  to  attaining 
it,  in  spite  of  danger,  discomfort,  and  fatigue.  Without 
courage,  no  pugilist  could  ever  fight  effectively,  and  neither 
could  an  army  or  a  fleet.  That  it  is  a  useful  quality  when 
devoted  to  the  purposes  of  pugilism  may  be  doubted ;  but  the 
natural  fighting  of  a  man  is  seldom  for  the  sake  of  mere  pugil- 
ism, but  for  some  purpose  that  may  be  very  fine,  such  as  the 
defense  of  his  wife  and  children.  I  have  used  the  example  of 
pugilism  merely  because  it  affords  the  best  illustration  of  the 
development  of  the  power  of  fighting  in  a  man. 

But,  whether  we  consider  that  the  use  of  courage  in  mere 
fighting  is  laudable  or  not,  we  must  admit  that,  for  the  pur- 
poses of  fighting  it  is  the  highest  personal  quality,  because 
without  it  strength  vanishes  and  skill  fails.  Many  a  fight, 
especially  against  untrained  men,  has  been  won,  not  because 
the  loser  was  dead  or  exhausted  physically,  but  because  his 
courage  or  morale  had  been  reduced  to  such  a  point  that  he 
would  not  or  could  not  fight  any  longer.  He  has  said  to  him- 
self, in  effect :  ' '  I  am  already  beaten ;  what  is  the  use  of 
fighting  any  longer?  The  longer  I  fight  the  worse  condition 
I  shall  be  in. ' '  For  this  reason,  in  the  training  of  all  fighters, 
both  individual  fighters  and  army  and  navy  men,  much  of  the 
training  is  devoted  to  developing  the  courage ;  and  much  of  the 
art  of  the  trainer  in  the  one  ease,  and  of  the  high  commanders 
in  the  other  case,  is  devoted  to  encotiraging  the  men. 


FIGHTING  BETWEEN  INDIVIDUALS  11 

In  fighting  with  unaided  fists  and  arms,  it  has  seldom  been 
possible,  in  the  case  of  a  fight  that  was  carried  on  to  attain 
some  object,  or  to  prevent  an  antagonist  from  attaining  an 
object,  to  get  a  decisive  result  with  arms  and  fists  only.  As 
long  as  this  means  only  was  employed,  the  antagonist  retained 
his  freedom  of  movement,  and  could  always  retreat,  or  move 
to  the  right  or  left,  in  such  a  way  as  to  lessen  the  force  of  a 
blow  or  to  evade  it  altogether.  For  this  reason,  one  man  or 
the  other  has  endeavored  to  grapple  his  opponent  and  reduce 
his  freedom  of  movement,  so  that  blows  could  be  neither  soft- 
ened nor  evaded.  At  some  stage  of  the  fight,  one  man  has 
usually  grappled  his  opponent  and  endeavored  to  throw  him  to 
the  ground  and  make  him  helpless  to  deliver  further  blows 
or  to  evade  blows.  An  antagonist  lying  helpless  on  the 
ground,  the  victor  has  been  able  to  administer  blows  of  the 
utmost  violence,  until  his  victim  was  subdued ;  and  in  some 
cases  to  throttle  him  and  kill  him  by  choking  him.  We  see 
the  counterpart  of  this  in  many  operations  of  fleets  and  armies, 
in  which  one  side  has  been  enabled  to  envelop  or  surround  the 
other,  or  to  force  it  into  a  position  where  its  freedom  of  move- 
ment was  so  restricted  that  it  became  practically  helpless. 

In  some  cases,  in  a  fight  between  two  men,  one  seeks  safety 
in  flight,  and  the  other  pursues  him.  If  the  fugitive  is  fleeter 
than  his  pursuer  he  may  escape ;  but  if  he  is  not  so  fleet  he  is 
doomed  to  destruction,  because  he  will  surely  be  attacked  from 
behind,  from  a  direction  in  which  he  cannot  reply,  and  thus 
forced  to  receive  blows  without  the  power  of  inflicting  appre- 
ciable damage  in  return.  Similarly,  in  fights  between  armies 
or  fleets,  one  party  usually  retreats.  If  it  is  able  to  retreat 
with  a  speed  greater  than  that  at  which  the  enemy  can  ad- 
vance, it  will  get  away  in  safety ;  but  if  it  is  not  able  to  retreat 
at  such  a  speed,  it  is  doomed  to  disaster,  because  the  pursuing 
enemy  can  inflict  great  damage  upon  it  with  little  danger  to 
itself. 

Another  reason  for  the  danger  in  retreating,  which  applies 
both  to  individual  men  and  to  fleets  and  armies,  is  that  the 


12  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

courage,  or  morale,  which  is  so  essential  to  effective  fighting, 
is  reduced  enormously  by  the  mere  fact  of  retreating,  and  by  a 
realization  of  the  comparative  helplessness  engendered.  For 
this  reason,  retreat  must  not  be  undertaken  except  for  impera- 
tive reasons;  and  yet,  if  it  is  undertaken,  it  must  be  under- 
taken so  promptly  after  the  desirability  of  retreating  is  recog- 
nized that  it  can  be  carried  out  in  an  orderly  and  deliberate 
fashion. 

Weapons. — As  far  back  as  history  goes,  we  know  that  men 
supplemented  their  fists  and  arms  with  sticks  and  clubs ;  and 
it  is  inconceivable  that,  almost  from  the  first,  men  should  not 
have  made  crude  clubs  from  branches  wrenched  from  trees. 
The  usefulness  of  the  club  was  simply  that  it  enabled  a  man 
to  reach  his  antagonist  from  a  greater  distance  than  his  arm 
could  stretch,  and  also  to  administer  a  heavier  blow.  The 
reason  that  he  could  administer  a  heavier  blow  was  twofold: 
first,  the  club  was  harder  than  his  fist;  and,  second,  it  could 
be  given  a  much  greater  velocity  than  could  be  given  to  his 
fist,  by  swinging  it  through  a  considerable  arc. 

Another  means  for  supplementing  the  arm  and  the  fist  was 
the  stone.  The  stone  was  either  held  in  the  hand  and  utilized 
to  give  a  blow,  the  effectiveness  of  which  was  due  to  the  hard- 
ness and  sharpness  of  the  stone,  or  it  was  used  as  a  projectile. 
In  the  latter  case,  its  effectiveness  was  due  to  four  things :  its 
hardness,  its  sharpness,  the  velocity  that  could  be  imparted  to 
it,  and  the  distance  over  which  it  could  be  thrown. 

The  development  of  the  club  and  the  stone  has  gone  on  for 
many  centuries  since  men  first  used  them ;  and,  as  civilization 
has  advanced,  these  crude  appliances  have  been  developed  into 
weapons  much  more  powerful.  But  every  weapon  that  the 
most  scientific  fleet  or  army  uses  now  owes  its  effectiveness 
to  the  same  four  qualities  that  made  the  club  and  the  stone 
effective :  its  hardness,  its  sharpness,  the  velocity  that  can  be 
given  to  it,  and  the  distance  over  which  it  can  be  used.^  It 
will  be  noted,  however,  that  the  more  highly  these  qualities 

1  Possible  exceptions  are  poison  gas  and  submarine  torpedoes. 


FIGHTING  BETWEEN  INDIVIDUALS  13 

have  been  developed,  the  greater  the  difficulties  and  complexi- 
ties that  have  arisen  in  the  endeavor  to  make  use  of  them. 
The  complexity  has  become  so  great  that  to  study  them  and 
applj^  them  in  practice  two  separate  professions  have  been 
required — ^the  military  profession  and  the  naval  profession. 

The  fighting  of  primeval  man,  done  with  his  fists  and  arms, 
and  supplemented  with  sticks  and  stones,  was  followed  by  the 
use  of  implements  less  crude  than  sticks  and  stones,  fashioned 
into  definite  shapes  and  used  for  definite  purposes.  These  im- 
plements were  first  of  stone,  later  of  copper,  and  later  still  of 
other  metals.  In  what  is  now  called  the  paleolithic  age  (old 
stone  age)  some  implements  were  made,  however,  from  bones 
and  horns  and  tusks.  All  were  distinguished  by  the  feature 
of  a  sharp  point  or  a  sharp  edge,  evidently  for  the  purpose  of 
effecting  penetration,  and  were  devoted  to  the  main  object  of 
all  men ;  that  is,  they  were  devoted  mainly  to  procuring  food 
and  guarding  what  had  been  procured.  We  see  here  that,  if 
used  to  guard  or  attack,  an  implement  became  a  weapon — 
that  a  weapon  is  merely  a  tool  for  a  warlike  purpose. 

In  the  old  stone  age  the  implements  were  rough  and  evi- 
dently made  by  hammering  or  chipping  with  a  hard  sub- 
stance ;  but  in  the  neolithic  or  new  stone  age,  the  implements 
were  ground  or  polished,  an  evidence  of  an  increase  in  men- 
tality that  we  cannot  measure  correctly  now.  The  smooth 
instruments  were,  of  course,  capable  of  greater  penetration 
than  were  the  rough  instruments  of  the  preceding  age;  and 
they  were,  therefore,  more  efficient  for  the  purposes  of  both 
war  and  peace.  In  fact,  in  those  days  the  interv^als  between 
war  and  peace  were  so  brief  that  no  very  great  distinction 
could  have  been  made  between  them.  This  does  not  mean  that 
there  was  more  war  in  those  times  than  now,  but  merely  that 
conditions  were  such  that  war  and  peace  succeeded  each  other 
more  rapidly.  It  did  not  require  ten  years  of  strenuous 
preparation  then  to  prepare  for  a  war,  or  even  one  year  to 
wage  it. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  the  effect  of  a  blow  from  a  fist  or  a 


14  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

club  was  to  bruise  or  crush  the  external  surface  of  the  body, 
or  to  upset. the  equilibrium,  or  to  give  such  a  shock  to  the 
internal  mechanism  as  to  make  it  less  capable  of  hostile  action ; 
while  the  effect  of  a  blow  from  a  sharp  instrument  was  to 
penetrate  the  protective  covering  of  the  skin.  We  shall  see 
later  that  the  effects  produced  on  fleets  and  armies  by  the  most 
modem  weapons  are  essentially  the  same. 

Weapons  and  Civilization. — As  one  of  the  important  ac- 
companiments of  the  advance  of  early  civilization  was  an  im- 
provement in  the  effectiveness  of  weapons,  it  would  be  inter- 
esting to  determine  how  much  the  improvement  in  weapons 
was  a  cause  of  the  advance,  and  how  much  it  was  an  effect. 
It  is  impossible  to  determine  this  absolutely ;  but,  inasmuch  as 
the  struggle  to  attain  civilization  has  always  been  extremely 
bitter,  and  necessitated  bloody  fights  against  barbarians  and 
also  against  wild  beasts,  the  probability  seems  to  be  that  the 
development  of  improved  weapons  was  a  cause  of  the  advance 
of  civilization  to  a  greater  degree  than  it  was  an  effect  of  it, 
and  that  civilization  could  not  have  been  achieved  without  it. 


CHAPTER  II 

FIGHTING   BETWEEN    TRIBES 

THE  fact  that  weapons  were  gradually  improved  indi- 
cates that  a  considerable  degree  of  cooperation  de- 
veloped among  men,  for  the  reason  that  several  dif- 
ferent kinds  of  skill  were  needed  to  improve  the  weapons ;  and 
if  several  different  kinds  of  skill  were  devoted  to  that  one 
purpose,  several  men  must  have  worked  in  cooperation.  The 
cooperation  must  have  been  caused  by  a  community  of  interest 
among  bands  of  men ;  and  as  the  most  urgent  need  then  was 
to  secure  self-protection,  it  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  this 
community  of  interest  was  in  securing  it.  In  order  that  a 
band  of  men  should  secure  self-protection,  the  first  necessary 
step  was  to  form  an  organization. 

The  earliest  organization  was,  of  course,  the  family,  at 
the  head  of  which  was  the  man,  who  was  charged  by  nature 
with  providing  food  and  shelter  for  his  wife  and  children,  and 
with  protecting  the  food  and  shelter  afterward  from  the  at- 
tacks of  beasts  and  men.  It  seems  probable  that  the  first 
fights  originated  in  the  necessity  for  providing  the  food  and 
shelter,  and  guarding  them  after  they  had  been  provided.  A 
man 's  only  ways  of  getting  food  were  to  kill  animals,  to  climb 
trees  for  fruits  and  nuts,  to  till  the  ground,  and  to  fish  in  the 
waters — or  to  steal  from  other  people.  That  stealing  was 
sometimes  resorted  to,  the  records  of  history  show ;  and  so  do 
the  doings  of  savages  now.  In  fact,  the  doings  of  people  in 
the  most  highly  civilized  Christian  nations  now  indicate  a 
similar  tendency,  if  at  any  time,  or  in  any  place,  the  law  can 
be  evaded  or  defied. 

This  point  is  more  important  than  it  might  at  first  sight 

15 


16  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

seem  to  be ;  because  the  only  way  in  which  we  can  study  the 
tendencies  of  man  per  se,  and  therefore  of  tribes  and  nations, 
is  to  study  man  free  from  the  influences  of  civilization  and  the 
restraints  of  law.  Men  have  gradually  come  to  realize  that 
it  is  better  for  men  to  be  governed  by  certain  laws :  even  the 
most  sinful  man  realizes  that  it  is  best  for  him  that  other  men 
should  be  good ;  even  a  thief  wants  other  men  to  be  honest ; 
and  even  a  conscienceless  debtor  wants  other  men  to  pay  him 
what  they  owe  him.  Municipal  laws  have  resulted  that  re- 
strain individuals  by  force;  but  there  have  never  been  inter- 
national laws  that  could  restrain  nations  and  tribes  by  force. 

If  the  earliest  cause  of  fighting  was  to  obtain  and  retain  the 
means  wherewith  to  support  the  women  and  children,  it  prob- 
ably has  been  the  fundamental  cause  ever  since,  even  though 
this  fundamental  cause  has  been  overgrown  with  others  more 
apparent.  Certain  it  is  that  the  man  has  always  done  the 
fighting ;  certain  it  is  that  he  has  never  needed  much  food  and 
shelter  for  himself;  certain  it  is  that  he  has  always  been 
charged  with  getting  the  food  and  shelter  for  the  women  and 
children;  certain  it  is  that  this  charge  has  demanded  all  the 
industry  and  labor  and  ability  that  men  could  be  induced  and 
forced  to  employ.  The  wants  of  women  and  children  have 
increased  from  age  to  age,  and  the  labors  of  men  have  in- 
creased proportionately. 

This  does  not  mean  that  the  wants  of  the  men  have  not  in- 
creased as  well ;  but  it  does  mean  that  they  have  not  increased 
in  so  great  a  ratio  as  have  those  of  the  women  and  children. 
It  also  means  that  the  wants  of  the  men,  if  carefully  ana- 
lyzed, will  be  found  to  be  so  closely  bound  up  with  those  of 
the  women  and  children  dependent  on  them  that  we  cannot 
truthfully  declare  that  what  a  man  wants  is  wanted  for  him- 
self alone.  The  wants  of  most  men,  in  so  far  as  the  men  alone 
are  concerned,  a-re  exceedingly  simple  and  easily  provided  for. 

Every  man  being  charged  with  the  feeding  and  protection 
of  his  family,  it  is  easy  to  see  how  two  m-en  agreed  together 


FIGHTING  BETWEEN  TRIBES  17 

to  cooperate  in  providing  food  and  protection,  how  three  men 
so  agreed,  and  how  tribes  came  to  be  formed.  These  tribes 
must  first  have  been  made  up  of  families  related  to  each  other, 
and  therefore  bound  together  by  the  powerful  tie  of  hereditary- 
hates  and  fears  of  hereditary  foes.  Even  at  the  present  day 
and  in  highly  civilized  countries,  one  hears  at  times  of  an 
hereditary^  family  feud.  A  tribe  having  been  formed  for  the 
advancement  of  the  common  interests,  both  in  providing  food 
and  shelter  and  in  guarding  the  food  and  shelter  after  they 
had  been  provided,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  the  methods  by  which 
the  men  of  the  tribe  could  act  together  the  most  effectively, 
both  in  attack  and  defense,  should  be  eagerly  discussed  and 
tried.  It  is  easy  to  see,  also,  how  the  desirability  of  securing 
some  valuable  fishing  waters  possessed  by  another  tribe,  or 
some  desirable  site  for  a  village  in  a  fertile  valley,  or  some 
fine  cattle,  or  some  other  possession,  should  lead  to  a  determi- 
nation to  take  them  by  force.  In  even  a  very  primitive  civ- 
ilization, however,  such  as  existed  many  centuries  ago,  and 
such  as  exists  over  a  large  surface  of  the  earth  to-day,  an  at- 
tack would  not  be  made  until  certain  plans  of  organization  and 
operation  had  been  settled,  under  some  one  man  as  leader.  In 
other  words,  a  campaign  would  first  be  laid  out  and  strategic 
plans  be  made. 

Similarly,  as  every  tribe  would  realize  that  whatever  pos- 
sessions it  had  were  always  subject  to  attack  by  a  neighboring 
tribe,  it  would  make  strategic  plans  as  to  what  it  would  do 
in  case  it  were  attacked.  Some  tribes  have  done  this  far- 
sightedly,  and  some  short-sightedly ;  and,  for  this  reason,  some 
tribes  have  prospered  and  retained  their  independence,  while 
other  tribes  have  not.  Such  differences  in  condition  prevail 
in  uncivilized  countries  now :  in  every  savage  land  we  see  some 
dominant  tribe,  like  the  Tagalos  in  the  Philippines,  who  have 
been  more  far-sighted  and  energetic  than  their  neighbors. 
We  see  the  same  thing  in  the  most  civilized  parts  of  the  world 
as  well,  at  the  highest  pitch  of  civilization  that  the  world  has 


18  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

reached:  we  see  a  few  dominant  nations  that  owe  their  domi- 
nance to  exactly  the  same  personal  attributes  as  those  which, 
in  a  lesser  degree,  characterize  the  Tagalos. 

Now,  imagine  j^ourself  the  chief  of  a  tribe  that  has  decided 
to  seize  that  village  which  lies  so  snugly  at  the  foot  of  that 
mountain,  at  the  bend  of  that  river  ten  miles  away,  and  to 
steal  the  cattle  that  look  so  fat  and  numerous.  What  would 
you  decide  to  do?  You  would  decide  to  attack  the  village  at 
the  point  where  it  could  be  attacked  with  the  greatest  proba- 
bility of  success,  at  the  point  where  it  would  be  the  most  diffi- 
cult to  defend :  that  is,  at  its  weakest  point.  You  would  also 
decide  to  attack  it  at  a  time  when  the  men  of  the  tribe  would 
be  the  least  able  to  defend  it — if  possible,  when  they  were 
absent,  or  when  they  were  asleep.  That  is,  you  would  en- 
deavor to  attack  the  weakest  point  at  the  most  favorable  mo- 
ment. So  does  the  strategist  of  the  greatest  army  or  the  great- 
est fleet,  when  planning  an  attack  at  the  present  day. 

In  order  to  ascertain  the  weakest  point  and  the  most  favor- 
able moment,  you  would  send  out  spies  who  would  keep  you 
informed,  as  far  as  possible,  of  the  movements  of  your  victims, 
and  you  would  not  launch  the  attack  until  you  felt  assured 
on  all  the  vital  points.  Meanwhile,  you  would  drill  your  men 
secretly,  taking  precautions  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  get- 
ting knowledge  of  your  intentions  and  your  preparations ;  and 
when  you  were  completely  ready,  you  would  advance  to  the 
attack,  keeping  your  men  concealed  as  long  as  possible,  and 
maintaining  spies  and  scouts,  who  would  keep  you  continually 
informed  of  the  doings  and  positions  of  the  other  tribe,  and 
prevent  them  from  getting  information,  through  spies  and 
scouts  of  their  own,  as  to  your  doings  and  position.  At  the 
instant  decided  on,  you  would  project  an  attack  of  the  utmost 
violence  of  which  your  men  were  capable  against  the  spot 
decided  on. 

If  your  plans  had  been  made  in  the  light  of  accurate  in- 
formation, and  if  they  were  cai*ried  out  to  the  moment  of 
attack  without  the  knowledge  of  the  enemy,  the  attack  would 


FIGHTING  BETWEEN  TRIBES  19 

probably  be  successful.  In  this  case,  the  enemy  would  sud- 
denly be  thrown  into  the  utmost  confusion,  panic  would  result, 
and  then  a  disorderly  retreat.  As  you  had  planned  the  attack 
for  the  purpose  of  securing  certain  material  possessions,  you 
would  take  advantage  of  the  helpless  condition  of  your  victims 
to  do  the  utmost  injury  possible  to  the  men  of  the  tribe,  and 
thereby  prevent  their  re-securing  their  possessions. 

Such  has  been  the  history  of  countless  expeditions  through- 
out the  countless  ages  of  the  past.  Sometimes  an  expedition 
has  been  undertaken  on  a  small  scale  by  a  small  tribe ;  some- 
times  on  a  grand  scale  by  a  grand  nation ;  but  usually  on  some 
intermediate  scale  by  a  tribe  or  nation  neither  very  small  nor 
very  grand.  In  all  cases,  the  method  has  been  fundamentally 
the  same. 

Now,  look  at  the  other  side  of  the  picture,  and  imagine  that 
you  are  the  chief  of  a  tribe  possessing  fine  cattle  and  occupy- 
ing a  village  in  a  fertile  plain  near  water  full  of  fish,  and  that 
you  suddenly  receive  information  that  a  neighboring  tribe  is 
making  preparations  to  attack  you,  that  the  men  of  the  tribe 
are  dancing.     What  will  you  do? 

If  you  are  a  chief  of  the  kind  that  has  always  been  the  most 
common,  you  will  fail  to  look  the  situation  in  the  face:  you 
will  persuade  yourself  that  what  was  told  you  is  not  true,  or 
that  the  other  tribe  is  not  very  strong,  or  that  you  are  well 
prepared  to  receive  their  attack,  or  that  there  is  no  use  in 
worrying.  You  will  consequently  take  such  dilatory  meas- 
ures that  the  enemy  will  strike  a  sudden  blow  at  your  weakest 
spot,  break  it  in,  put  your  whole  tribe  to  rout,  and  destroy  the 
fruits  of  their  ind.ustr3%  accumulated  by  the  work  of  many 
years. 

But,  if  you  are  a  chief  worthy  to  occupy  your  responsible 
and  honorable  post,  you  will  bestir  yourself  at  once  to  take 
measures  to  defend  the  members  of  your  tribe,  their  families 
and  possessions.  You  will  first  endeavor  to  estimate  the  situ- 
ation as  a  whole,  and  to  divine  the  probable  form  the  attack 
will  take  and  the  place  at  which  the  blow  will  fall.     You  will 


20  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

call  into  consultation  those  leading  men  of  the  tribe  whose 
advice  is  most  worth  having,  and  make  up  your  mind  as  to 
what  form  your  defense  had  best  assume.  You  will,  of  course, 
look  at  once  into  the  organization  of  the  tribe,  and  their  war- 
like equipments,  and  begin  a  series  of  drills  of  the  most 
strenuous  kind.  In  doing  all  this,  you  will  take  means  to  pre- 
vent the  hostile  tribe  from  getting  any  information  as  to  what 
you  are  doing,  and  have  a  careful  inspection  made  to  discover 
whether  there  are  any  spies  within  your  own  village  or  lurk- 
ing in  its  vicinity. 

Having  come  to  a  decision  as  to  the  probable  intentions  of 
the  enemy,  your  measures  naturally  will  be  such  as  will  op- 
pose them.  Having  come  to  an  opinion  that  a  certain  part  of 
your  village  or  its  defenses  is  the  weakest,  you  will  take  meas- 
ures to  protect  that  part.  Having  come  to  an  opinion  that 
the  enemy  will  probably  launch  his  attack  upon  you  from  a 
certain  direction,  you  will  take  measures  of  protection  against 
an  attack  from  that  direction.  You  will  probably  find  evi- 
dences of  spies ;  and  you  will  naturally  direct  your  effort 
against  these  spies,  employing  spies  of  your  own,  of  course. 
You  will  station  some  of  these  spies  within  your  own  bound- 
aries, and  direct  them  to  meet  any  efforts  of  hostile  spies 
within  those  boundaries ;  but  you  will  also  send  out  other  spies 
through  the  territory  between  your  tribe  and  the  hostile  tribe, 
and  if  practicable  send  some  to  carry  on  spy  operations  within 
their  boundaries. 

These  efforts  will  be  of  the  kind  that  we  call  strategical,  but 
they  will  include  measures  for  the  actual  handling  of  the  men 
of  the  tribe  in  the  impending  battle ;  that  is,  they  will  include 
the  ' '  tactical ' '  handling  of  those  men.  One  of  the  first  things 
you  will  realize  will  be  that  you  must  turn  the  front  of  your 
force  toward  the  probable  direction  of  the  attack:  that  is,  if 
you  conclude  that  the  attack  will  probably  come  from  north- 
east, and  you  have  a  thousand  men,  you  will  prepare  to  ar- 
range those  thousand  men  on  a  line  extending  from  northwest 
to  southeast,  so  that  the  mea  will  face  northeast.    One  reason 


FIGHTING  BETWEEN  TRIBES  21 

for  this  would  be  that  every  man  can  fight  best  in  the  direction 
in  which  he  faces,  that  he  is  weaker  on  the  sides  for  both 
offense  and  defense,  and  that  he  is  weakest  in  the  rear.  An- 
other reason  would  be  that  a  similar  statement  applies  to  a 
number  of  men  more  than  it  does  to  one  man,  because  one 
man  can  change  the  direction  in  which  he  faces  very  quickly, 
whereas  a  line  of  men  must  change  the  direction  in  which  it 
faces  comparatively  slowly,  and  to  a  degree  that  varies  with 
the  length  of  the  line.  While  a  man,  however,  is  weakest 
from  behind,  a  line  of  men  is  weakest  on  its  side  or  flank. 
This  is  because  a  line  of  men  can  be  faced  to  the  rear  by  mak- 
ing each  man  face  to  the  rear;  whereas  it  can  be  faced  to  the 
right  or  to  the  left  only  by  the  long  and  comparatively  difficult 
process  of  wheeling  the  whole  line  on  a  pivot. 

Your  first  dispositions  will  naturally  be  purely  defensive, 
and  devoted  to  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  success  of  the 
attack.  Realizing,  however,  that  a  defeat  is  possible,  you 
will  take  measures  to  lessen  the  dangers  which  retreat  always 
entails,  by  deciding  on  the  line  of  retreat  you  will  adopt,  and 
on  what  measures  you  will  take  to  protect  that  line  after  re- 
treat shall  have  been  begun.  You  will  also  arrange  that  cer- 
tain persons,  such  as  women  and  children,  and  certain  articles 
of  value,  such  as  cattle,  shall  be  ready  to  start  on  the  retreat 
in  good  season,  so  as  to  be  out  of  the  way  of  the  fighting  men, 
and  in  order  not  only  to  assure  their  safety,  but  also  to  sim- 
plify the  operation  after  retreat  shall  have  begun.  You  will 
also  arrange  that  a  rear  guard  shall  follow  the  non-combatants 
and  the  main  body  in  the  retreat,  in  order  to  keep  off  the 
assaults  of  the  enemy;  and  you  will  also  provide  guards  for 
each  side  or  flank,  in  order  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  pur- 
suits on  lines  parallel  to  your  retreat,  from  which  lines  they 
could  attack  your  retreating  forces  from  either  side.  That  is, 
you  will  do  exactly  what  every  competent  general  of  every 
army,  large  or  small,  has  done,  when  threatened  with  an  at- 
tack from  an  enemy  that  he  knew  to  be  dangerous. 

If  you  receive  your  information  in  time,  and  make  your  dis- 


22  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

positions  with  due  energy  and  foresight,  and  are  successful  in 
keeping  the  fact  of  your  preparations  a  secret  from  the  enemy, 
the  chances  will  be  that  when  he  finally  makes  his  attack,  it 
will  be  unsuccessful — for  the  reason  that  he  will  make  his 
attack  with  an  inaccurate  estimate  of  the  situation  and  on  the 
assumption  that  you  are  unprepared. 

This  discussion  assumes  that  the  two  tribes  are  fairly  equal 
in  power.  Of  course,  if  your  tribe  is  greatly  inferior  in  num- 
bers, or  in  the  position  it  holds,  or  in  the  skill  and  courage  of 
the  warriors,  or  if,  while  the  tribes  are  equal  in  these  factors, 
the  enemy  has  better  weapons,  you  cannot  prevail  in  any 
case.  Your  only  chance  for  safety  will  lie  in  undertaking  a 
retreat  in  due  time,  or  else  in  giving  such  concessions  to  the 
enemy  that  you  will  stay  his  hand.  Instances  of  situations 
like  these  are  frequent  in  history. 

In  case  the  tribes  are  fairly  equal  in  power,  the  issue  cannot 
be  predicted  in  advance,  but  will  have  to  be  decided  as  such 
issues  always  have  been  decided — by  actual  fighting.  When 
the  time  arrives,  certain  fast  scouts  of  the  enemy,  armed  with 
light  weapons,  will  probably  precede  his  main  body,  in  order 
to  ascertain  the  locality  where  your  warriors  are,  and  what 
they  are  doing;  and  in  between  these  scouts  and  the  main 
body  will  be  other  men,  who  will  run  back  to  the  main  body 
with  whatever  news  the  scouts  may  get,  and  take  orders  back 
to  the  scouts.  The  scouts  will  not  need  their  weapons  for 
scouting;  in  fact,  the  weight  of  those  weapons  would  be  a 
hindrance  to  their  speed  of  movement,  and  therefore  to  their 
effectiveness  as  scouts ;  but  the  weapons  will  be  needed  in  case 
the  scouts  meet  some  of  your  scouts,  because  without  them 
your  scouts  might  prevent  their  advance  and  even  drive  them 
back. 

The  scouts  of  the  enemy  will  probably  be  thrown  out,  not 
only  directly  in  front  of  his  advance,  but  also  laterally,  and 
in  a  fan-shaped  screen ;  because  he  will  know  that  you  might 
otherwise  appear  suddenly  on  his  flank  and  attack  him  from 
a  direction  in  which  he  would  be  almost  helpless.     Probably 


FIGHTING  BETWEEN  TRIBES  23 

the  scouts  of  both  sides  will  come  into  contact  with  each  other, 
and  a  fight  between  the  scouts  result,  in  which  case  the  side 
whose  scouts  are  the  strongest  will  be  able  to  drive  back  the 
others  and  secure  a  distinct  advantage.  The  main  bodies  con- 
tinuing, however,  will  eventually  come  together,  and  a  battle 
will  ensue. 

The  result  of  this  battle  cannot  be  predicted  in  advance  by 
either  side,  for  the  reason  that  neither  side  will  have  full 
knowledge  of  all  the  factors  in  the  case.  The  result,  however, 
could  be  predicted  by  any  one  who  knew  all  the  various 
values  of  all  the  various  factors,  and  knew  how  to  sum  them 
up.  In  other  words,  the  issue  of  the  battle  will  really  have 
been  decided  before  the  battle  begins,  although  what  the  de- 
cision will  be  no  mortal  can  foretell. 

This  declaration  may  seem  vague  and  academic,  but  really 
it  is  definite  and  practical.  As  illustrating  it,  suppose  two 
horses  that  seem  to  be  evenly  matched  were  to  race ;  but  sup- 
pose also  that  one  of  the  horses  had  had  administered  to  him 
before  the  race  a  depressing  medicine,  which  would  render 
him  incapable  of  doing  his  best.  This  has  often  been  done, 
and  the  fact  of  it  having  been  done  has  decided  the  result  of 
the  race  beforehand;  although  no  one  knew  what  the  result 
would  be  except  those  people  who  had  administered  the  medi- 
cine. 

Similarly,  in  the  supposititious  fight  between  your  tribe  and 
another,  the  main  factors  that  will  decide  the  fight  are  the 
strength,  skill,  and  courage  of  the  opposing  sides.  Neither 
side  can  evaluate  these  factors;  but  nevertheless  each  of  the 
factors  has  an  actual  and  definite  value,  though  no  one  knows 
what  it  is;  and  their  combination,  which  will  decide  victory 
for  one  side  or  the  other,  has  also  an  actual  value,  though  that 
actual  value  is  never  ascertained,  and  though  even  the  rela- 
tive values  of  the  strength,  skill,  and  courage  of  the  two  sides 
are  not  known  until  the  issue  of  the  fight  declares  them  in 
trumpet  tones. 

Our  usual  idea  of  a  battle  or  a  fight  is  that  one  side  ad- 


2i  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

vances  against  the  other  until  the  two  actually  collide,  and 
that  then  they  begin  to  fight.  Such  an  attack  on  the  front 
is  called  a  frontal  attack ;  and  if  one  side  or  the  other  believes 
that  it  has  such  an  overwhelming  advantage  in  strength  that 
it  can  overpower  the  other,  this  is  the  quickest  way  in  which 
to  gain  a  decision.  But  frontal  attacks  are  not  usually  at- 
tempted, unless  one  side  has  supreme  confidence  in  its 
strength ;  because,  unless  that  confidence  is  found  to  be  justi- 
fied, an  enormous  loss  of  men  is  apt  to  occur  without  achiev- 
ing a  decision.  The  attacker  usually  tries  to  get  some  advan- 
tage, either  by  striking  on  the  side  or  by  getting  around  the 
side  and  striking  in  the  rear,  or  by  concentrating  on  a  given 
point  of  the  enemy's  line  and  trying  to  break  through  it. 

One  side  or  the  other  usually  takes  the  offensive;  that  is, 
one  side  makes  the  attack,  while  the  other  assumes  the  de- 
fensive and  awaits  the  attack.  In  the  case  that  we  are  con- 
sidering, your  enemy  will  probably  make  the  attack,  because 
it  is  the  role  that  he  must  play  in  order  to  attain  his  ends, 
and  to  defeat  which  you  have  prepared  your  plans.  How 
far  you  will  maintain  the  defensive  is  a  matter  that  you  must 
decide.  The  offensive  and  the  defensive  have  each  their  pe- 
culiar advantages.  The  defensive  has  the  advantages  that  the 
men,  being  comparatively  stationary,  can  use  their  weapons 
with  the  greater  accuracy,  and  can  be  the  more  protected  by 
obstructions  or  defenses,  natural  or  artificial;  that  is,  the  de- 
fenders can  usually  kill  more  of  their  opponents  during  an 
attack  than  the  attackers  can,  who  must  of  necessity  expose 
themselves  the  more,  and  be  unable  to  use  their  weapons  with 
as  great  exactness. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  offensive  has  the  tremendous  advan- 
tages that  it  knows  what  it  is  going  to  do,  that  it  has  decided 
where  it  is  going  to  strike,  and  that  the  mere  act  of  initiating 
the  movement  gives  a  feeling  of  confidence  and  courage.  The 
defender,  on  the  other  hand,  not  knowing  where  the  enemy 
is  going  to  strike,  or  when,  must  await  the  actions  of  the  enemy, 
remain  in  a  state  of  continual  doubt,  and  be  unable  to  decide 


FIGHTING  BETWEEN  TRIBES  25 

what  to  do  until  the  last  moment.  Such  conditions  are  un- 
favorable to  the  maintenance  of  a  high  morale. 

In  case  the  enemy  has  been  kept  in  ignorance  in  regard  to 
the  adequacy  of  your  preparations,  you  will  probably  defeat 
him;  and,  as  in  this  case  he  will  probably  not  have  made  ade- 
quate preparations  for  retreat,  any  victory  over  him  that  you 
may  achieve  you  will  probably  be  able  to  turn  into  a  tri- 
umphant pursuit.  In  such  a  pursuit  you  will  be  able  to  inflict 
upon  him  a  disastrous  series  of  injuries,  first,  by  killing  the 
fighting  men,  and,  second,  by  destroying  certain  of  his  pos- 
sessions and  capturing  others.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  you  are 
defeated,  you,  by  reason  of  your  preparations,  will  probably 
be  able  to  retreat  in  good  order ;  so  that,  though  you  will  suffer 
a  defeat,  you  will  not  suffer  a  disaster.  Illustrations  of  all 
these  cases,  both  with  small  forces  and  with  large  ones,  are 
frequent  throughout  history. 

During  the  battle  waged  between  your  tribe  and  the  other, 
you  will  realize  that  by  merely  defending  yourself  you  will 
onlj^  postpone  disaster;  because  you  know  that  it  is  only  by 
diminishing  the  power  of  the  enemy  to  injure  you  that  you 
will  secure  safety  from  further  injury.  Therefore,  whenever 
opportunity  presents  itself,  you  will  strike  back  at  him,  even 
while  your  ultimate  object  is  merely  defensive.  In  other 
words,  you  will  carry  out  what  is  now  called  an  offensive 
defensive.  No  other  defensive  has  ever  had  any  success.  An 
exception  to  this  statement  must  be  made  in  cases  where  pe- 
culiar conditions  have  existed,  such  as  inability  of  the  enemy 
to  procure  supplies. 

But  it  may  be  that,  after  you  receive  the  news  of  the  im- 
pending attack,  your  studies  of  the  situation  will  lead  you  to 
realize  that  the  best  thing  for  you  to  do  is  to  make  a  vigorous 
attack  on  the  enemy,  that  is,  to  "launch  an  offensive,"  while 
he  is  making  his  preparations  to  attack  you.  This  has  often 
proved  to  be  not  only  the  wisest  course,  but  the  only  safe 
course.  We  see  its  analogue  continually  in  the  records  of 
murder  trials,  in  which  the  person  accused  of  murder  declares 


26  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

that  the  man  actually  killed  was  about  to  attack  him,  and  that 
he  realized  the  necessity  of  forestalling  him.  So  clearly  is  this 
situation  recognized  that  the  expressive  slang  phrase  has  come 
into  use,  "getting  the  drop"  on  a  man.  One  man  has  ''the 
drop"  on  another  when  he  can  bring  his  weapon  to  bear  the 
more  quickl3\ 

So  you  have  to  decide  whether  or  not  the  other  tribe  has 
the  drop  on  you.  If  you  conclude  that  the  other  tribe  has  the 
drop  on  you,  your  only  good  plan  is  to  adopt  defensive  meas- 
ures, such  as  have  already  been  outlined ;  but  if  you  conclude 
that  he  does  not  have  the  drop  on  you,  and  that  you  may  be 
able  to  get  the  drop  on  him,  your  best  plan  is  to  assume  the 
offensive.  To  do  this  you  must  do  exactly  what  a  man  in 
daily  life  must  do  continually,  in  carrying  out  his  undertak- 
ings; that  is,  you  must  make  your  preparations  with  the  ut- 
most celerity  and  secrecy,  and  launch  your  undertaking  before 
your  rival  can  prevent  it.  If  the  other  tribe  is  confident  of 
its  superiority,  and  if  you  can  keep  it  in  a  state  of  ignorance 
as  to  the  actual  fact  of  your  preparations,  and  if  your  tribe 
is  equal  to  the  other  in  strength  and  skill  and  courage,  you 
will  probably  be  able  to  attack  him  suddenly  at  his  weakest 
point,  before  he  expects  it  or  before  he  is  able  to  defend  him- 
self. If  you  can  do  this,  you  will  throw  him  into  a  state  of 
confusion,  the  degree  of  which  will  be  proportional  to  the 
shortness  of  time  that  intervenes  between  the  instant  when  he 
finally  becomes  aware  of  your  intentions  and  the  actual  instant 
of  attack.  If  you  should  be  able  to  attack  him  before  he  has 
received  any  information  as  to  your  intentions,  you  will  prob- 
ably score  a  victory. 

One  of  the  greatest  factors  contributing  to  success  is  sur- 
prise ;  and  this  is  due  in  a  great  measure  to  the  mental  effect 
produced  on  the  individuals  of  the  enemy;  not  only  those  in 
high  command,  but  those  even  in  the  lowest  ranks.  The  sud- 
den transition  from  a  state  of  confident  tranquillity  to  a 
realization  of  suffering  a  dangerous  attack  tends  to  confusion, 
panic,  and  ;retreat. 


FIGHTING  BETWEEN  TRIBES  27 

In  ease  you  receive  information  in  due  time  of  the  prepara- 
tions of  the  enemy,  but  decide  not  to  assume  the  offensive, 
you  will  undoubtedly  take  measures  to  protect  your  village, 
or  home  base,  by  fortifications  of  some  kind,  such  as  the  trunks 
of  trees  and  other  obstructions;  but  you  will  not  plan  that 
your  fighting  men  shall  remain  behind  those  obstructions,  un- 
less you  are  relatively  extremely  weak.  You  will  realise  that 
such  an  arrangement,  while  it  might  delay  the  advance  of  the 
enemy,  will  not  end  in  his  defeat ;  because  you  know  that  the 
only  way  in  which  to  beat  him  is  to  inflict  upon  him  positive 
injuries  of  some  kind.  You  will  not  even  draw  up  your  men 
close  outside  of  those  obstructions;  because  you  will  realize 
that  such  an  arrangement  would  enable  the  enemy  to  come 
close  up  to  your  home  without  having  suft'ered  any  losses,  and 
to  inflict  upon  3'ou  a  sudden  blow  from  any  quarter  that  he 
may  select.  You  will  also  realize  that  such  an  arrangement 
would  leave  him  free  to  work  whatever  havoc  he  wished 
against  your  fields  and  outlying  possessions,  without  any  cost 
whatever  to  himself.  For  these  reasons,  you  will  advance 
considerably  toward  his  probable  direction  of  approach,  and 
endeavor  to  get  into  touch  with  him,  as  soon  as  practicable,  by 
means  of  scouts  sent  out  in  advance. 

Since  your  enemy  will  adopt  similar  tactics,  there  will  soon 
be  two  forces  operating  in  each  other's  presence,  under  condi- 
tions similar  in  essentials  to  those  under  which  the  greatest 
armies  have  operated  in  all  the  centuries  of  history. 

You  realize  from  your  hereditary  instincts  that  the  severity 
of  any  blow  that  you  can  inflict  will  be  proportional  to  the 
force  with  which  you  deliver  it;  and  that  this  force  will  be 
somewhat  like  the  force  with  which  a  fist  or  a  club  strikes  its 
object.  You  know  that  the  severity  of  a  blow  varies  with  the 
size  of  the  fist  or  the  club,  or  with  the  number  of  the  warriors, 
and  the  velocity  which  the  fist  or  the  club  or  the  warriors 
strike. 

For  these  reasons,  you  will  realize  that,  when  the  time  comes 
for  delivering  the  final  blow,  it  would  be  best  for  you  to  hurl 


28  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

your  main  body  (which  should  be  as  many  men  as  you  can 
muster)  against  some  predetermined  point  of  the  enemy's  line, 
and  that  this  main  body  should  be  given  as  much  speed  as 
practicable.  In  other  words,  you  will  realize  that  your  final 
blow  must  take  the  form  of  a  charge,  in  which  your  main  body 
will  advance  with  the  utmost  speed  practicable  against  a  pre- 
determined point  of  the  enemy's  line. 

You  will  also  realize,  however,  that  (just  as  in  a  fight  with 
fists  or  clubs)  not  only  must  the  blow  be  powerful,  and  not 
only  must  it  be  swiftly  delivered  in  order  to  attain  the  greatest 
power,  but  it  must  be  promptly  delivered,  in  order  not  to  give 
the  enemy  time  to  parry  or  evade  the  blow.  In  other  words, 
you  will  realize  that  the  two  essential  elements  in  the  actual 
operations  of  forces  are  weight  and  speed.  You  will  also 
realize  that  both  the  power  of  the  blow  and  the  speed  with 
which  it  is  delivered  are  dependent  on  the  force  of  the  will- 
power and  courage  behind  the  blow. 

The  value  of  speed  is  somewhat  more  obvious  in  the  oper- 
ations preliminary  to  an  actual  battle — that  is,  before  the 
actual  delivery  of  the  blow — than  in  the  absolute  battle  itself ; 
because  in  the  preliminaiy  operations  speed  is  the  most  im- 
portant single  factor.  When  one  is  making  a  feint  at  an 
enemy's  communications,  or  threatening  his  flank,  or  when  he 
is  replying  to  a  threat  or  a  feint,  one  is  much  in  the  position 
of  a  boxer  who  is  making  feints,  or  who  is  repljdng  to  feints 
or  threats  of  his  antagonist.  In  such  operations,  while  it  is 
necessary  that  the  boxer  should  have  enough  strength  to  parry, 
he  does  not  need  strength  so  much  as  he  needs  quickness. 
This  quickness  is  indicated  to  the  observer  by  the  quickness  of 
the  muscular  movements  of  the  boxer;  but,  long  before  the 
arm  or  the  body  of  the  boxer  moves  in  making  a  parry,  his  eye 
must  see  the  preliminary  movements  of  his  antagonist,  and 
telegraph  the  fact  to  the  brain ;  then  the  brain  must  send  out 
orders  to  the  muscles,  and  then  the  muscles  must  obey. 

Similarly,  in  the  movement  of  two  opposing  forces,  either  of 


FIGHTING  BETWEEN  TRIBES  29 

little  tribes  or  of  enormous  armies,  the  operations  of  each 
actual  battle  must  be  preceded  by  many  operations  of  ma- 
ncBuver,  for  which  great  speed  is  necessary,  not  only  in  the 
movements  of  the  bodies  that  execute  the  manoeuvers,  but 
previously  in  the  apprehending  of  the  movements  of  the 
enemy,  and  in  taking  proper  measures  to  frustrate  them.  His 
movements  may  be  offensive  or  defensive;  but,  in  either  case, 
you  must  realize  the  necessity  of  apprehending  them  as  quickly 
as  possible,  and  adopt  swift  measures  of  frustration. 

We  see  this  similarity  of  action  on  two  opposing  sides 
throughout  all  the  operations  of  war.  Generally  speaking, 
each  side  is  endeavoring  to  do  the  same  thing  as  the  other, 
modified  only  by  practical  conditions;  because  each  side  real- 
izes that  it  is  only  by  making  attacks  of  some  kind  that  suc- 
cess can  be  secured,  and  that  the  only  advantage  of  the  de- 
fensive is  the  negative  one  of  preventing  the  enemy  from 
making  some  success.  Some  writers  seem  to  have  carried  this 
idea,  however,  to  an  undue  extreme,  and  to  have  adopted  the 
notion  that  one's  tactics  should  be  wholly  offensive.  One  has 
simply  to  imagine  what  would  happen  to  a  boxer  if  he  did  not 
attempt  to  parry  or  evade  the  blows  of  his  antagonist,  to  see 
how  untenable  this  theory  is.  It  may  be  pointed  out,  also, 
that  in  all  combats,  large  and  small,  most  of  the  time  is  occu- 
pied in  what  may  be  called  defensive  measures,  which  are  car- 
ried on  with  the  double  object  of  preventing  a  decisive  blow 
by  one's  antagonist,  and  of  making  the  way  clear  for  a  de- 
cisive blow  by  one's  self. 

In  making  your  plans  of  operation,  you  will  doubtless  take 
into  account  all  the  various  parts  of  your  little  army,  and 
realize  that  it  would  operate  at  a  great  disadvantage  if  its 
various  parts,  even  when  they  were  acting  separately,  were  not 
linked  together  by  a  system  of  communications  analogous  to 
the  nervous  system  of  the  human  body.  You  will  realize  the 
necessity  of  a  system  whereby  you  will  be  able  to  send  out 
orders  to  any  part,  and  receive  information  from  it,  and  not 


30  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

only  direct  each  part  as  to  what  that  particular  part  is  to  do 
individually,  but  also  to  direct  all  the  parts  so  that  they  can 
be  made  to  act  together  toward  a  common  object ;  and  so  that 
any  part  can  render  assistance  to  another  part  that  may  be 
placed  in  a  dangerous  position.  You  will  instinctively  realize, 
though  you  may  not  formulate  the  idea  in  words,  that  all  your 
fighting  force  should  be  capable  of  being  managed  as  a  boxer 
manages  his  own  body,  all  of  its  parts  directable  by  a  supreme 
intelligence,  and  mutually  cooperating  and  assisting. 

Reserves. — If  the  conditions  of  the  situation  are  such  as  to 
make  it  difficult  for  you  to  apprehend  exactly  where  the  enemy 
will  strike,  you  may  keep  a  considerable  force  in  reserve,  a 
short  distance  to  the  rear,  so  placed  that  when  your  advance 
guard,  or  even  the  main  body,  receives  an  attack  at  any  point, 
this  reserve  can  be  rushed  to  that  point  if  necessary.  De- 
pending on  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  the  reserve  will  bear 
a  large  or  a  small  proportion  to  your  total  force.  Whether  it 
be  large  or  small,  however,  it  will  have  to  have  a  great  fighting 
value;  because  on  it  may  depend  the  issue  of  the  battle. 

Of  course,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  reserve  should  be 
used  for  defensive  purposes  only,  and  in  case  that  a  part  of 
your  line  is  attacked;  because  it  is  obvious  that,  even  in  ad- 
vancing to  the  attack,  you  might  find  your  line  too  weak  at 
one  point  with  reference  to  the  enemy  to  take  advantage  of 
an  opportunity,  in  which  case  you  would  send  j^our  reserves 
to  that  point.  Whether  one  attacks  or  is  being  attacked,  re- 
inforcements are  occasionally  needed  at  one  point  or  another, 
to  strengthen  that  point;  in  either  case,  more  force  is  needed 
at  a  certain  point  than  is  immediately  available,  and  reinforce- 
ments are  therefore  called  for. 

In  the  operations  of  the  boxer,  the  capacity  of  the  human 
body  for  sending  reinforcements  from  one  point  to  another  is 
clearly  evident.  If  strength  is  needed  in  the  left  arm  for  a 
parry,  the  left  arm  suddenly  acquires  a  strength  utterly  lack- 
ing there  only  a  second  before :  if  the  quick  parry  of  the  left 
arm  throws  off  the  antagonist 's  guard,  the  right  arm  suddenly 


FIGHTING  BETWEEN  TRIBES  31 

becomes  endowed  with  tenfold  strength,  and  automatically 
launches  a  blow  in  which  seems  to  be  momentarily  concen- 
trated the  entire  strength  of  the  body. 

Discipline. — But,  no  matter  how  perfect  your  apprehension 
of  what  ought  to  be  done,  and  the  means  of  communication 
you  possess  between  yourself  and  the  parts  of  your  little  army, 
you  will  be  powerless  to  handle  it  effectively  unless  correct 
reports  are  sent  to  you,  and  unless  your  orders  are  obeyed. 
These  two  things  are  effected  by  what  we  call  discipline,  which 
ties  all  the  various  parts  together  somewhat  as  trusses  tie  the 
parts  of  an  engineering  structure,  and  transforms  a  number 
of  separate  parts  into  a  strong  and  coherent  body.  Some  peo- 
ple suppose  that  discipline  is  a  harsh  and  cruel  agency  for 
meting  out  punishment  to  offenders.  That  meting  out  pun- 
ishment is  one  of  the  functions  of  discipline  is  true,  but  it  is 
not  the  only  function.  If  this  were  the  only  function  of  disci- 
pline, discipline  would  be  ineffective  for  the  purpose  that  it 
actually  serves — the  purpose  of  rendering  possible  the  han- 
dling of  a  large  number  of  units ;  because,  instead  of  drawing 
tht)se  units  together,  it  would  drive  them  apart.  No  man  and 
no  body  of  men  could  be  made  to  endure  that  kind  of  disci- 
pline very  long.  What  an  organization  requires  primarily  is 
not  this  kind  of  discipline,  but  the  opposite  kind — the  kind 
that  attracts  men  to  each  other  and  to  the  cause  they  fight  for. 

This  kind  of  discipline  endeavors  to  imbue  all  the  men  with 
a  feeling  of  comradeship,  with  devotion  to  the  cause,  with 
loyalty  to  the  organization  that  fights  to  gain  the  cause',  and, 
therefore,  not  only  with  obedience  to  those  superior  in  author- 
ity, but  also  with  devotion,  and  with  consequent  unselfishness. 
Without  this  kind  of  discipline,  no  effective  work  of  any  kind 
can  be  done ;  but  with  it  the  most  amazing  deeds  are  possible. 
One  of  the  best  illustrations  was  given  b}^  the  ragged,  un- 
trained, and  half-fed  forces  that  the  young  Republic  of  France 
hastily  sent  out  to  fight  against  the  organized  armies  of  Aus- 
tria and  Prussia  in  1792.  By  sheer  force  of  patriotic  enthusi- 
asm, those  raw  levies  overcame  the  most  forbidding  obstacles 


32  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

of  weather,  bad  roads,  and  even  hunger  and  lack  of  ammuni- 
tion, and  actually  became  the  victors  in  two  battles. 

The  same  statement  may  be  truly  made  concerning  the 
French  armies  in  all  their  wars  in  the  Napoleonic  times. 
True,  they  had  a  sublime  genius  to  inspire  and  guide  them 
and  keep  alive  their  courage ;  but  before  Napoleon  took  any 
part  whatever  in  the  struggle  the  French  army  had  already 
shown  its  amazing  spirit.  It  is  true  also  that  Napoleon  was 
superbly  powerful  in  appealing  to  that  spirit ;  but  he  could 
not  have  been  powerful  if  he  himself  had  not  been  inspired 
by  the  same  spirit  as  had  the  armies  under  him,  and  if  he  had 
not  remained  under  its  stimulating  spell. 

Looked  at  from  this  point  of  view,  which  history  shows  to 
be  the  true  one,  discipline,  courage,  and  morale  are  seen  to  be 
much  alike,  and  mutually  to  cooperate.  In  the  difficult  and 
dangerous  times  of  war,  the  morale  and  discipline  cannot  be 
high  unless  the  courage  is  high ;  the  discipline  and  courage 
cannot  be  fine  unless  the  morale  is  also ;  and  the  morale  and 
courage  must  inevitably  sink  if  the  discipline  be  poor.  But 
when  all  three  are  good,  as  they  were  in  the  armies  of  Na- 
poleon, an  army  will  fight  gloriously  and  effectively,  even 
though  the  conditions  may  not  permit  them  to  fight  success- 
fully. This  is  not  only  because  of  their  direct  effect  in  giving 
impetus  to  the  army,  but  because  it  permits  the  higher  officers 
to  devote  their  time  and  efforts  to  the  main  object  that  they 
have  in  view,  without  being  perpetually  hampered  by  having 
to  overcome  the  indifference  and  inertia  of  the  people  under 
them.  An  example  of  a  great  commander  who  had  to  struggle 
against  these  difficulties  is  that  of  George  Washington  in  our 
Revolutionary  War. 

But  if  you  were  the  chief  of  a  savage  tribe,  that  is,  of  one 
of  the  savage  tribes  of  Europe  from  which  the  present  great 
nations  of  the  world  are  descended,  and  from  which  we  get 
most  of  our  ideas  of  strategy  to-day,  you  would  not  have  great 
difficulty  in  maintaining  discipline.  In  savage  tribes  of  the 
kind  with  whom  questions  of  strategy  are  concerned,  war  has 


FIGHTING  BETWEEN  TRIBES  33 

ever  been  the  main  business  of  life,  and  the  warlike  qualities 
have  been  those  most  cultivated.  The  two  principal  warlike 
qualities  are  courage  and  loyalty.  In  savage  nations  of  the 
softer  type,  which  are  not  represented  in  questions  where 
strategy  is  concerned,  the  qualities  of  courage  and  loyalty  are 
not  so  important,  and  are  not,  therefore,  so  assiduously  culti- 
vated. In  a  savage  tribe  also,  even  of  the  sterner  kind,  these 
qualities  are  apt  to  diminish  if  the  tribe  advances  in  civiliza- 
tion, because  other  qualities  have  to  be  cultivated ;  and,  while 
it  might  be  an  extreme  statement  to  say  that  the  cultivation 
of  other  qualities  tends  to  the  diminishment  of  courage  and 
loyalty,  it  can  be  truthfully  declared  that  they  tend  so  to  over- 
grow them  that  those  qualities  assert  their  existence  in  great 
emergencies  only.  In  civilized  peoples,  where  the  rights  and 
the  privileges  of  the  individual  are  matters  of  great  concern, 
individual  selfishness  and  the  promotion  of  individual  ease  and 
comfort  ait'ect  unfavorably  the  development  of  courage  and 
loyalty;  and,  although  it  is  true  that  in  any  one  man  who 
originally  possessed  them  they  will  assert  themselves  in  crises, 
nevertheless  they  are  apt  to  assert  themselves  a  little  tardily, 
and  somtimes  too  late. 

The  softening  effect  of  civilization  on  most  nations  is  evi- 
den.t  all  through  history.  "Whether  this  effect,  while  injurious 
to  the  fighting  qualities  themselves,  may  not  be  beneficial  to  the 
individual  as  a  human  being,  made  in  the  image  of  the  Al- 
mighty, it  is  not  within  the  province  of  strategy  to  discuss. 
It  is  within  its  province,  however,  to  point  out  that  it  does 
exist,  and  that  it  is  very  powerful;  so  powerful  that  it  has 
brought  about  the  destruction  of  many  a  nation  at  the  hands 
of  some  other  nation  whose  spirit  had  not  been  dulled  by  the 
effeminizing  influence  of  wealth  and  ease. 

Doctrine. — You  should  have  reason  to  expect  not  only  that 
your  men  would  obey  your  instructions,  but  that,  even  should 
they  become  separated  from  you,  they  would  endeavor  to  obey 
such  instructions  in  the  spirit  in  which  you  gave  them;  that 
is,  the  men  separated  from  you  should  be  capable  of  a  consid- 


34  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

erable  latitude  of  action,  and  not  dependent  upon  specific  and 
detailed  orders.  The  trouble  about  detailed  orders  is,  of 
course,  that  when  the  time  to  obey  them  has  arrived,  the  cir- 
cumstances may  be  different  from  what  it  was  expected  they 
would  be,  and  the  obeying  of  them  might  be  most  unfortunate. 
To  overcome  this  difficulty,  discipline  endeavors  to  bring  about 
a  community  of  understanding,  sometimes  called  "doctrine," 
so  that  each  person  will  know  in  a  measure  what  he  is  to  do 
without  being  told  specifically  in  each  case.  When  a  number 
of  men  are  thoroughly  permeated  with  this  doctrine,  discipline 
is  at  its  highest  point  of  effectiveness ;  and  it  is  possible  for  a 
commander-in-chief  to  give  the  commanders  of  separate  de- 
tachments mere  instructions  as  to  what  they  are  to  do ;  that  is, 
to  assign  them  tasks  and  leave  to  them  the  execution  of  those 
tasks. 

Subordinate  commanders,  however,  no  matter  how  free  you 
may  leave  them  as  to  their  interpretation  of  orders,  are  never- 
theless not  free  agents,  except  in  the  means  they  use  to  inter- 
pret and  execute  them.  It  is  exceedingly  difficult  sometimes 
for  a  subordinate  commander  to  know  what  to  do,  when  con- 
fronted with  a  situation  which  he  knows  to  be  different  from 
that  expected  by  his  chief.  In  such  cases,  the  highest  degree 
of  clearness  of  instructions  is  required  on  the  part  of  the  com- 
mander, and  the  utmost  of  loyalty  on  the  part  of  the  subordi- 
nates. The  commander-in-chief  must  be  able  to  impress  upon 
his  subordinates  a  very  clear  idea  of  what  his  ultimate  pur- 
pose is,  and  of  how  much  latitude  the  subordinate  is  allowed : 
and  the  subordinate,  on  the  other  hand,  must  exert  his  mental 
powers  to  the  utmost  to  apprehend  what  his  chief  would  wish 
him  to  do  under  the  actual  circumstances — inclining  toward 
strict  obedience,  however,  rather  than  to  the  opposite  extreme. 

If  the  discipline  in  your  tribe  is  good,  as  it  probably  would 
be,  the  result  will  be  merely  that  your  machine  will  be  in  good 
working  order.  You  vdll  not  be  assisted  by  this  factor  in 
making  your  plans  of  operation,  nor  will  your  personal  bur- 
den of  responsibility  be  lightened.     On  the  contrary,  the  bet- 


FIGHTING  BETWEEN  TRIBES  35 

ter  the  discipline  of  your  force,  and  the  more  loyally  and 
intelligently  your  orders  are  carried  out,  the  more  the  re- 
sponsibility for  the  planning  of  the  campaign  will  be  thrown 
upon  yourself. 

Retreat. — If  you  have  made  your  preparations  so  fully  and 
carried  on  your  operations  so  successfully  as  to  force  your 
enemy  to  retreat,  and  if  he  has  shown  a  similar  skill,  j^ou  will 
force  him  back,  but  only  gradually.  In  no  military  work  can 
skill  be  better  shown  than  in  conducting  a  retreat.  It  is  some- 
what more  difficult  to  conduct  a  successful  retreat  than  a  suc- 
cessful pursuit,  largely  on  account  of  the  effect  of  the  act  of 
retreating  on  the  morale  of  the  men :  and  the  difficulties  will, 
of  course,  be  aggravated  if  the  retreat  is  begun  too  tardily. 

In  na  department  of  life  is  foresight  so  much  needed  as  in 
conducting  military  operations,  for  the  reason  that  in  no  other 
department  of  life  is  there  an  enemy  waiting,  with  all  his 
nerves  in  tension,  night  and  day,  to  take  advantage  of  any 
error  that  you  may  commit,  or  of  any  opportunity  that  you 
may  lose.  If  your  enemy  has  been  living  off  the  country,  his 
retreat  may  be  a  comparatively  simple  matter;  but  if  he  has 
to  be  followed  by  a  train  of  supplies,  it  may  become  extremely 
complicated,  from  the  necessity  under  which  he  finds  himself 
of  sending  those  supplies  ahead  of  him,  lest  they  fall  into  your 
hands.  In  the  operations  of  modern  armies,  which  have  to 
be  followed  by  enormous  trains  of  supplies  and  also  of  muni- 
tions, the  problem  sometimes  becomes  impossible  of  solution, 
and  large  quantities  of  supplies  and  munitions  have  to  be 
abandoned,  under  the  stern  necessity  that  the  fighting  men 
escape  from  being  captured.  The  capture  of  an  army  is,  of 
course,  the  worst  disaster  it  can  suffer. 

Objective. — As  you  are  conducting  operations  that  are  es- 
sentially defensive,  although  you  carry  on  offensive  measures, 
you  will  realize  that  your  objective  is  the  fighting  force  of  the 
enemy ;  and  your  subordinate  commanders  will  realize  that 
their  objectives  are  those  parts  of  the  enemy's  fighting  force 
against  which  you  direct  their  efforts.     In  the  conditions  here 


36  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

considered,  however,  the  chief  of  the  enemy  tribe  will  not  re- 
gard your  fighting  force  as  his  main  objective;  because  his 
main  objective  is  your  village  and  other  material  possessions, 
and  your  fighting  force  merely  an  obstruction  placed  in  his 
path.  To  him  your  fighting  force  is  merely  the  immediate 
objective,  which  he  must  dispose  of  before  he  can  turn  his  at- 
tention to  his  ultimate  objective.  The  various  commanders 
of  his  fighting  force,  however,  regard  your  fighting  force  as 
their  main  objective.  The  difference  between  the  points  of 
view  of  the  chief  of  the  enemy  tribe  and  of  his  subordinate 
officers  is  that  their  point  of  view  is  purely  military,  while  his 
is  essentially  political. 

The  State  and  the  Army. — This  distinction  in  the  case  of 
two  small  tribes  would  not  be  important;  but  it  is  often  ex- 
tremely important  in  the  case  of  large  nations.  In  the  case 
of  small  tribes,  the  head  of  the  state  is  usually  the  head  of 
the  army,  and  the  political  and  military  commands  are  united 
in  one  man.  In  the  case  of  great  nations,  however,  this  is 
usually  not  the  case  at  the  present  day ;  because  the  duties  of 
the  political  head  are  so  great,  and  the  knowledge  required  so 
extensive,  that  only  a  sublime  genius,  like  Caesar  or  Napoleon, 
could  discharge  the  duties  of  the  head  of  the  state  and  of  the 
head  of  the  army  also.  The  result  has  always  been  a  consider- 
able lack  of  coordination  between  the  two.  Since  the  time  of 
Napoleon,  no  man  has  successfully  discharged  both  duties. 
The  closest  approximation  to  it  is  in  the  case  of  William  I  of 
Prussia ;  but  he  was  assisted  by  Bismarck  as  Chancellor  and  by 
Moltke  as  chief  of  staff.  Such  a  combination  as  that  of  Wil- 
liam, Bismarck,  and  Moltke  has  appeared  but  once  in  history. 


CHAPTER  III 

GRADUAL   DEVELOPMENT   OF   THE   ART   OF    FIGHTING 

THE  first  wars  of  which  we  have  any  connected  ac- 
counts were  those  which  the  pharaoh,  Thutmose  III, 
waged  against  rebellious  states  in  northern  Pales- 
tine and  Syria.  Of  all  the  wars  and  battles  fought  in  the 
countless  ages  that  preceded  them  we  have  but  the  vaguest 
records,  though  the  monuments  of  Egypt,  Chaldea,  Assyria, 
and  Persia  show  that  many  wars  were  waged.  They  also  show 
that  weapons  and  armor  were  in  existence  before  the  thir- 
teenth century  B.C. ;  while  excavations  made  in  numerous  and 
widely  separated  regions  of  the  world  show  weapons  that  were 
probably  used  some  thousands  of  years  before. 

The  invention  and  use  of  weapons  have  always  proceeded 
on  paths  parallel  with  those  of  tools,  because  a  weapon  is  a 
tool  used  for  the  purposes  of  war.  The  main  reason  why  man 
was  able  to  overcome  the  brute,  and  why  men  of  intelligence 
and  civilization  have  been  able  to  overcome  barbarians  and 
men  of  lesser  intelligence,  is  to  be  found  in  the  use  of  weapons. 
Weapons  were,  of  course,  a  product  of  their  intelligence:  so 
that  it  is  true  to  say  that  it  has  been  due  to  weapons,  and  to 
the  wars  in  which  they  were  used,  that  an  intelligent  civiliza- 
tion has  been  made  possible  against  the  resistance,  first,  of  wild 
beasts  and,  second,  of  barbarians. 

It  may  be  pointed  out  here  that,  while  many  people  have 
suffered  in  war,  yet  they  have  been  only  a  very  small  fraction 
of  the  human  race,  while  the  entire  human  race  has  benefited. 
A  comparatively  few  people  have  been  sacrificed  in  war  for 
the  benefit  of  the  race. 

The  earliest  weapons  and  tools  were  of  stone  and  wood  and 
bone,  principally  of  stone.     In  the  old  stone  age,  these  were 

37 


38  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

rough  and  evidently  chipped  and  hammered  into  shape ;  but  in 
the  new  stone  age  they  were  smooth  and  polished.  There  is 
no  fixed  dividing  line  between  the  old  and  the  new  stone  age, 
however,  and  for  this  reason  we  see  a  gradual  transition  from 
the  rough  weapons  to  the  smooth.  Tools  and  weapons  later 
were  made  of  copper,  and  later  still  of  bronze,  an  alloy  of 
copper  with  tin  or  some  similar  metal.  Iron  seems  to  have 
come  into  use  before  bronze  among  some  nations  and  after 
bronze  in  others.  It  was  more  difficult  at  first  to  make  weap- 
ons of  iron;  but,  after  the  art  of  working  it  had  been  mas- 
tered, iron  supplanted  bronze  for  both  weapons  and  armor, 
because  it  was  harder  and  could  take  a  keener  edge  or  point. 
The  people  who  seem  to  have  been  the  foremost  in  develop- 
ing effective  weapons  were  the  Assyrians,  who  used  military 
equipments,  both  offensive  and  defensive,  as  early  as  the  thir- 
teenth century  B.C.  An  infantry  soldier  of  the  regular  army 
wore  for  defensive  armor  a  helmet  with  a  chin-strap,  a  round 
buckler,  and  sometimes  a  corselet  made  of  plates  of  metal 
sewed  on  skins  or  woven  stuffs.  Some  also  had  real  coats  of 
mail  made  of  steel,  while  their  legs  were  protected  in  front 
as  high  as  the  knee-joint  by  leggings.  Their  offensive  weapons 
were  the  lance,  sword,  bow,  and  sling.  The  militia  soldier 
wore  a  helmet,  but  without  a  chin-strap.  Bas-reliefs  show  that 
the  heads  of  Persian  archers  also  were  protected  with  helmets. 
The  Assyrians  employed  cavalry,  who  carried  lances  and 
swords  and  were  protected  by  armor  not  unlike  that  worn  by 
the  foot-soldiers,  sometimes  consisting  of  entire  coats  of  mail, 
which  protected  them  both  in  front  and  rear.  The  archers 
were  sometimes  mounted,  and  were  protected  in  part  by 
armor ;  and,  in  addition  to  carrying  bows,  arrows,  and  quivers, 
they  carried  swords.  The  Assyrians  seem  to  have  been  the 
inventors  of  the  war  chariot,  which  carried  cutting-scythes 
on  the  wheels;  of  the  catapult,  which  threw  heavy  projectiles, 
such  as  stones  and  pieces  of  lead;  and  of  the  ballista,  which 
hurled  arrows.  Besides  these,  they  used  the  battering-ram 
for  making  breeches  in  the  walls  of  forts  and  cities. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING      39 

Thus  we  see  that  before  the  thirteenth  century  b.c.  the 
gradually  increasing  eivilization  of  the  principal  countries  had 
advanced  the  fabrication  and  use  of  weapons  to  a  degree  not 
far  behind  that  at  which  they  were  in  Europe  in  the  middle  of 
the  fourteenth  century  xV.d.,  when  guns  using  gunpowder  were 
introduced  into  European  warfare.  Before  inventing  these 
weapons,  the  ancients  must  have  realized  the  desirability  of 
having  such  weapons  to  use;  that  is,  they  must  have  realized 
the  value  of  such  appliances  for  carrying  out  their  plans  of 
war.  The  act  of  inventing  and  fabricating  them  was  not  a 
warlike  act,  but  an  act  in  the  practice  of  an  art  that  in  itself 
was  peaceful.  In  other  words,  the  production  of  those  weap- 
ons was  due,  first,  to  a  strategic  conception,  and,  second,  to  a 
resulting  mechanical  invention  and  development.  Since  most 
of  the  appliances  of  the  earlier  civilization  were  such  imple- 
ments as  knives  and  hammers  and  axes,  and  since  the  first  ne- 
cessity of  man  was  to  protect  his  life,  the  inference  seems  un- 
avoidable that  the  first  impetus  to  civilization  was  given  by 
war.  Demmin  says:  ''Hence  weapons,  originally  invented 
for  destructive  purposes,  have  become  the  most  powerful 
means  of  civilization." 

When  we  consider  the  difficulties  in  fabricating  the  weapons, 
whether  in  the  old  stone  age  in  hammering  and  chipping  hard 
pieces  of  flint  into  shape,  or  in  the  new  stone  age  in  smoothing 
and  polishing  them,  or  in  the  bronze  age,  or  the  iron  age,  in 
producing  tools  and  weapons  that  were  as  well  made  as  we  now 
know  them  to  have  been,  we  can  realize  that  an  enormous 
amount  of  mental  and  physical  work  must  have  been  done, 
and  that  back  of  this  there  must  have  been  a  stem  necessity. 

An  important  and  interesting  fact  in  the  matter  of  arms  and 
armor  is  that  arms  were  invented  first  and  armor  afterward. 
A  contrary  situation  could  hardly  be  imagined,  because  armor 
would  not  have  been  invented  except  as  a  protection  against 
arms.  The  first  effort  of  war  ever  since  has  been  offensive, 
and  the  second  effort  has  been  defensive,  both  in  the  making  of 
weapons  and  armor  and  in  the  adoption  of  plans.    For  this 


40  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

reason,  tlie  defense  has  always  lagged  behind  the  offense,  even 
though  eventually  it  may  have  overcome  it :  and  this  explains 
the  enormous  value  of  a  new  weapon,  or  a  new  method,  when 
suddenly  introduced  into  a  war  and  used  before  the  enemy  has 
been  able  to  devise  and  to  develop  into  practical  form  a  means 
or  methods  of  defense  against  it.  In  innumerable  cases  where 
victorj^  has  gone  to  one  side  quickly  and  decisively,  when  the 
two  sides  were  numerically  and  materially  equal,  it  has  been 
because  the  victorious  side  surprised  the  other  with  some  imex- 
pected  weapon  or  operation.  It  is  perplexing  to  note  how 
little  this  historical  fact  has  been  taken  into  account  by  writ- 
ers on  strategy.  That  it  was  recognized  originally,  however, 
is  suggested  by  the  similarity  of  the  two  words — strategy  and 
stratagem — which  grew  from  the  same  Greek  root. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  after  any  new  weapon  had 
been  introduced,  or  any  new  armor  to  protect  against  it,  the 
strategic  plans  of  the  commanders  did  not  have  to  be  modified, 
except  in  detail ;  because  the  results  that  they  were  trying  to 
achieve  were  absolutely  unchanged.  Whether  two  tribes  were 
armed  with  clubs  or  with  spears,  the  effort  was  the  same,  and 
the  means  of  carrying  it  into  effect  identical.  Whether  the 
weapons  were  clubs  or  spears,  the  plan  was  always  to  strike 
the  enemy  in  the  most  advantageous  place  as  quickly  as  pos- 
sible; and  the  desirability  of  attacking  him  on  the  flank,  of 
shutting  off  his  source  of  supplies,  or  of  preventing  his  re- 
treat, was  the  same  in  one  case  as  in  the  other.  The  same  is 
true  if  the  weapons  were  bows  and  arrows,  if  the  archers  were 
mounted  or  unmounted,  if  cutting-scythe  chariots  were  used, 
or  if  ballistas,  battering-rams,  and  catapults  were  employed. 
The  strategy  of  the  operations  was  unchanged. 

But  the  tactics  and  logistics  of  the  operations  were  changed 
enormously.  All  the  actual  marching,  all  the  actual  arrang- 
ing of  supplies,  all  the  actual  computations  of  time  and  dis- 
tance, had  to  be  carried  out  to  meet  the  new  conditions  that 
the  new  weapons  and  armor  had  imposed.  Furthermore, 
the  technical  knowledge  required  by  all  the  participants,  from 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING      41 

the  commanders  down  to  the  lowest  privates,  increased  con- 
tinuously with  the  increase  in  the  number,  size,  and  com- 
plexity of  the  weapons  and  the  defensive  armor.  A  chief  of 
a  savage  tribe  who  was  worthy  to  hold  his  position  had  all  the 
knowledge  necessary  to  plan  and  conduct  operations,  when  the 
only  weapons  were  clubs,  when  no  armor  was  used,  and  when 
the  men  lived  off  the  countr3^  But  a  savage  chief  would  be 
utterly  incompetent  to  plan  and  carry  on  operations  in  which 
ballistas  and  battering-rams  and  scythe  chariots  had  to  be 
supplied,  and  food  had  to  be  provided  for  an  army  of  300,000 
men.  Such  was  the  army  of  King  Darius,  that  marched  from 
Asia  Minor  into  Greece,  and  battled  on  the  plains  of  Marathon. 

During  the  thousands  of  years  that  preceded  the  wars  of 
Thutmose  III,  there  must  have  been  great  progress  made  in 
devising  and  making  new  weapons  and  armor,  and  learning 
how  to  use  them  effectively.  New  weapons  and  new  kinds  of 
armor  necessitated  new  methods  of  tactics  and  logistics;  and 
as  these  had  to  be  devised  by  strategy,  it  necessitated  new 
methods  of  strategy,  new  methods  by  which  the  principles  of 
strategy  could  be  made  applicable  in  succession  to  each  new 
set  of  conditions  brought  about  by  the  new  appliances. 

For  instance,  the  mere  addition  of  shields  for  defense 
against  sharp-pointed  weapons  necessitated  first  the  design- 
ing, then  the  construction,  and  then  the  providing  of  the 
shields,  and  then  the  drilling  of  the  men  in  using  the  shields 
effectively.  In  other  words,  the  use  of  shields  necessitated  the 
expansion  of  the  arts  of  strategy,  logistics,  and  tactics;  for  it 
brought  about  a  condition  in  which,  if  two  tribes  were  other- 
wise equal,  but  if  one  had  shields  and  the  other  had  not,  the 
tribe  with  the  shields  would  defeat  the  tribe  without  them. 
The  same  statement  may  be  made  concerning  the  introduction 
of  bows  and  arrows.  After  any  one  tribe  had  begun  to  use 
them  effectively,  all  the  tribes  in  the  vicinity  would  have  to 
provide  and  use  them,  on  pain  of  being  brought  into  subjec- 
tion. 

Now,  it  must  be  apparent  that  the  introduction  of  bows  and 


42  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

arrows  brought  about  a  change  in  warfare  as  great  as  any 
brought  about  since  by  any  other  invention,  even  gunpowder, 
and  possibly  a  greater  change.  Previouslj^-,  tribes  had  to  fight 
close  together,  and  with  weapons  that  could  be  provided  with 
comparative  ease.  Imagine  yourself  chief  of  a  savage  tribe, 
and  suddenly  confronted  with  the  fact  that  a  rival  tribe  was 
using  new  and  unheard-of  weapons,  by  which  they  could 
wound  and  kill  men  a  hundred  yards  away.  Under  some  cir- 
cumstances you  might  have  a  considerable  time  in  which  to 
learn  how  to  make  those  weapons,  then  actually  to  make  them 
and  provide  your  warriors  with  them,  and  then  to  drill  your 
warriors  so  that  they  could  use  the  weapons  effectively.  But 
if  the  rival  tribe  had  kept  the  existence  of  those  weapons  a 
closely  guarded  secret  until  ready  to  attack  you,  you  might 
not  be  able  to  get  ready  in  time.  Such  a  condition,  it  can 
hardly  be  doubted,  confronted  many  tribes  when  bows  and 
arrows  were  first  introduced ;  for  we  know  that  not  only  savage 
tribes  but  highly  civilized  nations  in  recent  years  have  been 
confronted  with  similar  conditions,  and  suddenly  attacked  with 
weapons  that  they  did  not  know  existed. 

The  introduction  of  bows  and  arrows  must  have  brought 
about  conditions  very  difficult  for  some  savage  tribes  to  meet, 
not  only  in  designing,  making,  and  providing  them,  but  in 
teaching  individual  men  how  to  use  them ;  even  more  in  de- 
vising the  best  tactical  methods  for  employing  them;  and  still 
more  in  drilling  large  bodies  of  men  in  the  methods  decided 
on.  And  when  we  realize  how  much  opposition  every  new 
weapon  has  had  to  overcome,  even  in  modern  times,  and  with 
men  accustomed  to  new  inventions  and  to  changes  of  all  kinds, 
we  can  hardly  avoid  the  conviction  that  the  coming  of  bows 
and  arrows  must  have  been  strenuously  resisted  by  many 
"conservative"  savages.  In  fact,  it  was  not  until  the  battle 
of  Cressy  in  1346  a.d.  that  bows  and  arrows  were  realized  by 
Europe  to  be  as  effective  as  they  actually  were;  it  was  not 
until  the  trained  knights  of  feudal  France,  clad  in  their  heavy 
armor,  were  shot  down  helpless  by  the  skilled  archers  of  Eng- 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING       43 

land,  from  distances  over  which  the  long  lances  of  the  knights 
were  powerless  to  reach. 

Because  of  the  introduction  of  bows  and  arrows,  the  tech- 
nical knowledge  of  the  savage  chief  had  to  be  increased;  for 
how  could  he  plan  to  handle  them  well  in  battle,  and  how 
could  he  make  good  plans  before  battle  for  bringing  them  into 
battle  in  such  a  way  that  he  could  use  them  successfully,  until 
he  had  learned  the  most  important  points  connected  with  their 
weight,  the  length  of  flight  of  the  arrows,  and  the  ways  in 
which  the  arrows  were  affected  by  the  wind;  and  until  he  had 
also  acquired  a  skill  in  measuring  distances  and  in  estimating 
the  strength  of  the  wind  that  he  had  not  needed  before? 
Clearly,  the  introduction  of  bows  and  arrows  demanded  of  the 
strategist,  not  a  clearer  conception  of  the  principles  of  strategy, 
but  an  increased  technical  knowledge  and  a  more  exact  appre- 
ciation of  quantitative  matters ;  in  order  that  he  might  apply 
the  principles  of  strategy  to  practice. 

The  introduction  of  cavalry  into  warfare  must  have  caused 
an  increase  in  complexity  and  difficulty  even  greater  than  did 
that  of  bows  and  arrows;  because  horses  were  living  animals 
whose  food  and  water  had  to  be  provided  as  carefully  as  did 
those  of  men  and  in  greater  quantity,  and  whose  training 
required  almost  as  much  thoroughness  and  care.  Further- 
more, although  the  actual  handling  of  cavalry  was,  in  some 
respects,  like  that  of  foot-soldiers,  nevertheless  it  presented 
many  points  of  difference,  and  was  of  greater  variety  and 
scope.  For,  besides  being  used,  as  foot-soldiers  were,  to  make 
direct  attack  and  direct  defense,  the  speed  of  cavaliy  had  to 
be  utilized  in  operations  independent  of  the  infantry,  and 
beyond  the  immediate  presence  of  the  infantry  and  that  of  the 
commander-in-chief. 

The  introduction  of  cavalry  brought  about  the  use  of  oper- 
ations additional  and  auxiliary  to  the  operations  hitherto  in 
vogue,  and  it  therefore  brought  into  existence  a  system  of 
tactics  (cavalry  tactics)  and  a  system  of  logistics  (cavalry 
logistics)  hitherto  unthought  of.     In  order  to  plan  the  sue- 


44  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

cessful  use  of  cavalry,  the  strategist  had  first  to  come  to  a 
clear  understanding  of  the  main  characteristics  and  require- 
ments of  horses  and  of  horsemen,  in  order  that  he  might  be 
able  to  get  all  the  useful  work  out  of  them  that  was  possible, 
and  yet  not  place  crushing  tasks  upon  them.  The  strategist 
had  to  become  in  some  measure  a  cavalryman  himself,  in  order 
to  do  this  correctly  from  logistical,  tactical,  and  strategical 
points  of  view.  Afterward,  he  had  to  devise  his  plans  for  war 
in  such  a  way  as  to  include  cavalry  manceuvers  in  them ;  and 
he  had  to  plan  to  use  those  cavalry  manceuvers,  not  as  iso- 
lated performances,  but  as  parts  of  a  campaign,  and  so  that 
they  should  bear  the  best  relation  practicable  to  all  the  oper- 
ations as  a  whole,  and  do  the  utmost  possible  toward  attaining 
the  end  in  view. 

The  same  declarations  are  true  with  respect  to  war  chariots, 
battering-rams,  ballistas,  catapults,  and  other  engines  of  war. 
That  great  difficulties  had  to  be  overcome  to  bring  them  into 
use  cannot  be  doubted  by  anyone  who  realizes  how  grievously 
those  engines  taxed  the  engineering  resources  of  those  days, 
and  how  vague  was  the  knowledge  of  mechanics  in  the  minds 
of  the  men  who  lived  when  they  were  introduced.  The  exact 
date  when  this  happened  is  not  known;  but  it  is  known  that 
the  Assyrians  used  war  chariots  with  scythes  on  the  wheels, 
and  that  ballistas  and  catapults  were  invented  and  employed 
by  the  Assyrians,  all  before  the  thirteenth  century  B.C.,  and 
that  battering-rams  were  used  by  the  Babylonians  to  batter 
down  the  walls  of  Jerusalem  in  the  sixth  century  b.c. 

It  is  impossible  for  us,  living  in  the  days  when  the  sciences 
of  mathematics  and  mechanics  are  taught  in  public  schools, 
and  when  we  are  surrounded  with  mechanisms  of  a  thousand 
kinds,  to  realize  how  difficult  it  must  have  been  to  invent  those 
ancient  appliances  of  war,  and  afterward  to  get  them  into  use. 
To  us,  a  wheel  seems  almost  a  work  of  nature;  and  yet,  it  is 
not  a  work  of  nature,  but  one  of  man's  devising,  and  one  of 
the  most  brilliant  inventions  ever  conceived  by  the  human 
mind.     The  strategist  was  not  concerned  as  a  strategist  in  in- 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING      45 

venting  the  engines  of  war,  but  he  was  deeply  concerned  in 
utilizing  them  to  the  best  advantage;  and,  while  it  must  be 
admitted  that  it  did  not  require  so  high  an  order  of  intellect 
to  do  this  as  to  invent  them,  it  required  greater  industry  and 
a  longer  time.  Not  only  did  all  the  technical  difficulties  at- 
tending their  use  have  to  be  understood  and  taken  into  ac- 
count, in  order  that  the  war  engines  might  be  used  success- 
fully in  the  actual  tactical  operations  of  battle;  not  only  did 
the  plans  have  to  arrange  that  the  war  engines  should  be  sup- 
plied in  the  proper  proportions  relatively  to  the  other  appli- 
ances of  war;  but  methods  had  to  be  devised  whereby  they 
should  be  so  used  in  cooperation  with  the  other  appliances  and 
agencies  that  all  the  appliances  and  agencies  should  work  to- 
gether with  the  maximum  effectiveness  to  the  attainment  of 
the  end  in  view.  In  other  words,  each  new  appliance  and 
each  new  method  had  to  be  added  to  the  war  machine,  and 
made  to  work  for  it  and  in  it  and  with  it.  It  had  to  be  made 
an  actual  part  of  the  war  machine  that  already  existed,  and 
to  be  incorporated  with  it  in  such  a  way  that,  though  the  war 
machine  became  larger  and  more  complex,  it  remained  equally 
smooth  working,  efficient,  and  effective. 

A  still  greater  addition  to  warfare  was  that  of  boats.  When 
boats  were  first  introduced,  history  does  not  tell  us ;  and  it  was 
not  until  the  battle  of  Salamis  in  480  B.C.  that  we  have  any 
connected  account  of  their  use  in  actual  battle.  As  we  know, 
however,  that  the  earliest  settlements  of  men  were  on  the  banks 
of  rivers,  bays,  gulfs,  and  seas,  and  as  we  know  that  primitive 
man  used  boats  for  fishing  and  for  going  from  one  shore  to 
another,  it  is  inconceivable  that  boats  were  not  used  for  war 
far  back  in  the  ages  of  the  past.  We  know  that  in  the  cam- 
paigns of  Thutmose  III  in  Syria  vessels  were  employed  in 
cooperation  with  his  armies;  though  we  have  no  clear  record 
that  they  were  actually  used  in  battle. 

The  use  of  mere  boats  propelled  by  paddles  or  oars  did  not 
introduce  as  great  a  complexity,  possibly,  as  did  the  use  of 
horses  and  of  such  engines  of  war  as  the  catapult  and  the 


46  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

ballista;  because  the  boats  were  very  simple  in  construction 
and  easy  to  manage,  and  because  they  were  probably  not  used 
in  great  numbers  or  in  important  operations.  But  as  the 
boats  increased  in  size,  and  as  they  ventured  farther  and  far- 
ther from  the  land,  and  as  various  appliances  were  introduced, 
such  as  sails,  the  compass,  and  other  navigational  instruments, 
the  attendant  complexity  increased,  a  training  more  special 
than  that  in  any  other  branch  of  warfare  was  required,  and 
a  new  profession — the  naval  profession — was  created. 

All  warlike  watercraft  have  one  peculiarity  that  differenti- 
ates them  in  fighting  from  organizations  of  men  that  war  on 
land.  This  peculiarity  is  that,  as  the  resistance  due  to  their 
passage  through  water  is  less  in  proportion  as  the  vessels  are 
long,  the  vessels  are  made  longer  than  they  are  wide,  more 
weapons  can  be  utilized  along  their  sides  than  elsewhere,  and 
the  greatest  offensive  power  can  be  exerted  in  directions  ap- 
proximately perpendicular  to  the  directions  in  which  they 
move;  whereas  men  exert  their  greatest  offensive  power  di- 
rectly to  the  front.  The  line  of  battle  for  troops,  therefore, 
is  a  line  perpendicular  to  that  in  which  they  move;  whereas 
the  line  of  battle  for  watercraft  is  in  the  direction  in  which 
they  move.  In  both  cases,  of  course,  the  line  of  battle  is  the 
direction  in  which  the  lines  are  weakest ;  that  is,  a  line  of  men 
drawn  up  for  battle  is  weakest  on  the  side  or  flank,  whereas 
a  line  of  warships  drawn  up  for  battle  is  weakest  from  ahead 
or  astern. 

An  exception  to  this  statement  must  be  made  in  the  case  in 
which  watercraft  are  used  for  ramming;  and  this  was  one  of 
the  principal  ways  of  using  them  in  the  early  days  of  Greece 
and  Rome,  when  galleys  pulled  by  rowers  charged  on  the 
enemy.  In  this  case,  the  tactics  of  a  fleet  of  galleys  was  not 
very  different  from  that  of  an  army;  and  for  this  reason  we 
find  that  generals  commanded  fleets  in  battles  on  the  sea. 
Furthermore,  the  fighting  men  of  the  galleys  were  soldiers, 
armed  with  spears  and  other  weapons,  provided  with  shields, 
and  often  covered  with  armor. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING      47 

When  sailing  vessels  came  to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of 
war,  the  amount  of  maritime  knowledge  and  skill  required 
made  it  impossible  for  generals  and  soldiers  to  be  the  fighting 
factors  on  the  sea;  and  the  fact  that  the  wind  compelled  the 
vessels  to  head  on  courses  that  bore  a  rigid  relation  to  the 
direction  of  the  wind,  added  to  the  fact  that  the  wind  varied 
greatly,  and  sometimes  suddenly,  both  in  direction  and  in 
strength,  made  the  tactics  of  ships  bear  little  relation  to  the 
tactics  of  armies,  and  introduced  such  uncertainties,  especially 
in  regard  to  the  times  at  which  certain  fleet  operations  might 
be  expected,  that  armies  and  fleets  could  not  act  together,  ex- 
cept loosely.  This  condition  was  most  obvious  and  important 
during  the  period  from  the  fourteenth  century  to  the  nine- 
teenth, beginning,  generally  speaking,  with  the  attempted  in- 
vasion of  England  by  the  Spanish  Invincible  Armada  in  1588. 
Fleets  were  used  in  this  period  to  support  the  policies  of  their 
respective  governments,  but  mostly  in  auxiliary  and  secondary 
ways.  The  only  nation  that  can  be  said  to  have  utilized  them 
successfully  was  Great  Britain.  Partly  by  accident,  partly  by 
foresight,  and  partly  by  a  wise  opportunism,  Great  Britain 
developed  both  her  merchant  service  and  her  navy,  not  only 
in  size  but  in  skill,  to  such  a  degree  that  she  gradually  secured 
possession  of  islands  and  seacoasts  and  barbarian  countries 
that  cover  one  quarter  of  the  surface  of  the  earth. 

Our  earliest  records  of  war  come  from  Egypt,  Chaldea, 
Assyria,  Media,  and  Babylon,  and  show  that  wars  were  car- 
ried on  on  a  scale  greater  than  that  of  many  modem  wars, 
as  far  back  as  the  thirteenth  century  B.C.  From  that  time 
until  the  introduction  into  Europe  of  the  gun,  the  weapons 
of  war  did  not  increase  greatly  either  in  the  number  of  kinds 
or  in  effectiveness;  and  for  this  reason  the  methods  of  war 
did  not  vary  greatly.  But  the  introduction  of  the  gun 
brought  this  condition  to  a  close,  and  inaugurated  a  new  con- 
dition— that  of  perpetual  change,  first  in  weapons  and  after- 
ward in  methods.  After  the  introduction  of  the  gun,  and 
the  changes  in  tactics  and  logistics  that  were  required,  with 


48  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

the  consequent  changes  in  the  methods  of  strategy  that  were 
needed  in  order  that  the  new  methods  might  be  taken  into 
account  in  the  original  plans  of  war,  no  very  great  change 
occurred  until  the  introduction  of  the  railroad  and  the  tele- 
graph, which  were  first  utilized  in  warfare  in  the  American 
Civil  War ;  but  both  parties  to  this  war,  especially  the  North- 
ern, went  into  the  war  so  suddenly,  and  were  so  unprepared, 
that  the  use  of  the  railroad  and  telegraph  simply  grew  in  a 
haphazard  fashion  with  the  progress  of  the  war.  In  1870, 
however,  when  Prussia  went  to  war  with  France,  her  original 
plans  of  campaign  took  careful  account  of  the  railroad  and 
the  telegraph,  as  well  as  of  all  other  new  methods  and  means 
of  warfare;  and  it  was  largely  for  this  reason  that  she  was 
able  to  overwhelm  France  so  quickly  and  completely. 

A  number  of  wars  of  great  importance  have  occurred  since 
then,  and  each  war  has  shown  an  increased  and  increasing  use 
of  new  weapons,  and  therefore  of  new  methods ;  but  it  was  not 
until  Germany  went  to  war  in  August,  1914,  that  the  world 
had  an  illustration  of  a  nation  going  to  war  seriously  prepared 
to  use  successfully  all  the  appliances  that  a  rapidly  increasing 
mechanical  and  scientific  knowledge,  and  a  rapidly  growing 
industrial  world,  had  made  it  possible  to  employ. 

During  the  half  century  between  the  American  Civil  War 
and  the  recent  great  European  war,  the  addition  of  scientific 
instruments,  the  invention  of  electrical  and  mechanical  appli- 
ances, and  the  development  of  these  into  actual  weapons  of 
war,  went  on  at  such  a  rate  as  to  perplex  and  almost  over- 
whelm the  logistician,  the  tactician,  and  the  strategist.  The 
logistician  realized  that  the  principles  of  his  art  were  in  no 
way  changed,  but  that  the  necessity  of  applying  those  ancient 
principles  to  the  new  conditions  was  imperative  and  the  diffi- 
culty great ;  while  the  difficulties  of  successfully  adapting  the 
instruments  and  weapons  to  the  uses  of  logistics  were  possibly 
even  greater.  The  tactician  realized  that  the  principles  of 
his  art  were  in  no  way  changed,  but  that  the  necessity  of  ap- 
plying those  principles  to  the  new  conditions  was  imperative 


DEVELfOPMENT  OF  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING       49 

and  the  difficulty  great;  while  the  difficulties  in  arranging 
that  the  weapons  and  other  instruments  should  be  made  as 
perfectly  adaptable  to  his  art  as  possible  were  enormous.  The 
strategist  also  realized  that  the  principles  of  his  art  were  in 
no  way  changed,  but  that  the  necessity  of  applying  those  prin- 
ciples to  the  new  conditions  was  imperative  and  the  difficulties 
great;  while  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  utilizing  the  new 
conditions  with  the  maximum  effectiveness  for  the  furtherance 
of  his  strategic  purposes  were  almost  overwhelming. 

How  great  all  the  difficulties  were  may  be  realized  from  the 
fact  that  none  of  the  nations  that  went  into  the  last  great 
war  had  really  overcome  them.  Of  all  the  nations,  the  nation 
that  had  come  the  nearest  to  overcoming  them  was  Germany ; 
but  it  seems  to  be  the  fact  that  she  had  failed  to  take  due  ad- 
vantage of  the  possibilities  of  aeronautics,  and  that  if  she  had 
done  so  she  would  easily  have  won  the  war. 

If  either  side  had  taken  advantage  at  the  start  of  the  possi- 
bilities of  aeronautics,  it  would  easily  have  won  the  war. 


CHAPTER  IV 

PRINCIPLES  OF   THE  ART   OP   FIGHTING 

IT  may  be  thought  that  we  have  assumed  more  intelligence 
and  a  clearer  perception  of  the  end  and  the  means  of 
warfare  to  exist  in  the  mind  of  a  savage  chief  than  would 
be  justified  by  the  facts.  The  facts  are,  however,  that  the 
wars  of  savage  tribes  indicate  as  clear  a  perception  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  strategy,  in  many  cases,  as  do  wars  between  highly 
civilized  nations.  In  point  of  courage,  energy,  and  appreci- 
ation of  the  important  things  to  do,  savages  have  often  shown 
an  instinct  surprisingly  correct.  No  better  illustration  of 
this  can  be  found  than  in  the  wars  that  went  on  for  so  many 
years  between  the  Indians  and  the  white  men  in  North  Amer- 
ica. In  many  cases — such,  for  instance,  as  in  the  fight  be- 
tween General  Braddock  and  the  Indians  in  1755 — the  In- 
dians showed  a  better  perception  of  strategy  under  the  condi- 
tions existing  than  did  the  British  general.  The  reason  why 
the  savage  has  gone  down  before  the  white  man  is  that  the 
white  man  has  had  better  weapons,  and  has  in  the  end  been 
able  to  bring  a  greater  number  of  fighters  to  the  field  of  battle. 
Furthermore,  the  white  man  has  been  capable  of  longer  pe- 
riods of  mental  work,  and  therefore  has  been  capable  of  pre- 
paring more  elaborate  plans  and  of  working  them  out  with 
greater  care.  The  savage  is  not  capable  of  long-continued 
mental  effort.  This  fact  explains  his  non-success  in  war,  and 
in  a  great  degree  his  failure  to  advance  in  civilization. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  savage's  almost  continual  contact 
with  warfare,  and  the  necessity  of  concentrating  most  of  his 
attention  on  thoughts  connected  with  war,  has  kept  alive  a 
certain  warlike  spirit,  and  a  certain  instinct  in  regard  to  the 

50 


PEINCIPLES  OF  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING       51 

main  principles  of  war,  that  the  civilized  man  has  partly  lost. 
Very  few  men  have  ever  been  capable  of  attaining  excellence 
in  more  than  one  line  of  endeavor;  and  the  result  has  been 
that,  in  highly  civilized  countries,  the  greater  part  of  the 
population  have  become  so  out  of  touch  with  warlike  matters, 
and  their  mental  muscles  have  become  so  unaccustomed  to 
exercise  on  warlike  problems,  that  the  jar  of  a  sudden  threat 
of  war  is  needed  to  arouse  the  warlike  instinct  that  exists  in 
every  living  thing.  This  instinct  being  aroused,  however,  a 
nation  suddenly  finds  itself  as  closely  bound  together,  and  as 
permeated  by  the  instinct  of  war,  as  the  most  primitive  tribe. 
The  important  difference  exists,  however,  that  the  individuals 
of  the  savage  tribe  are  ready  to  fight  immediately,  whereas  the 
individuals  of  a  civilized  nation  are  not  ready  in  the  least. 
After  being  roused,  the  civilized  man  becomes  ready  very 
quickly  in  point  of  determination  to  fight,  but  not  in  point 
of  decision  as  to  how  to  fight. 

This  indecision  as  to  how  to  fight  is  because  of  his  having 
forgotten  or  never  having  learned  the  elementary  principles 
of  fighting,  and  it  results  commonly  in  the  formation  of  some 
kind  of  public  opinion  as  to  what  ought  to  be  done  that  is 
usually  erroneous.  That  it  should  be  erroneous  is,  of  course, 
to  be  expected :  because  there  is  usually  only  one  line  of  work, 
or  at  best  a  very  few  lines,  that  ought  to  be  followed,  while 
there  are  a  very  great  nimiber  of  lines  that  ought  not  to  be 
followed.  A  person  ignorant  of  any  situation  is  almost  sure 
not  to  adopt  the  proper  course  of  conduct,  for  the  same  reason 
that  an  inexpert  marksman  is  almost  sure  not  to  hit  the  target. 

This  matter  of  public  opinion,  in  the  case  of  a  national 
war,  is  a  matter  of  the  utmost  possible  importance,  because 
public  opinion  guides  in  a  great  measure  the  officials  of  the 
government,  and  handicaps  the  operations  of  the  fleets  and 
armies.  An  important  instance  was  the  effect  of  public  opin- 
ion in  the  Union  States  in  the  early  part  of  the  Civil  War. 
This  public  opinion,  acting  through  the  government,  had  a 
most  harmful  influence  on  the  operations  of  the  generals,  espe- 


52  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

cially  of  McClellan.  Whether  McClellan  was  a  great  general 
or  not  we  cannot  ascertain,  because  he  was  not  given  a  fair 
opportunity  of  showing.  Certain  it  is  that  Julius  Caesar  or 
Napoleon  Bonaparte  could  not  have  been  successful  if  re- 
stricted as  McClellan  was. 

If,  before  our  Civil  "War,  the  people  of  the  country  had 
learned  as  much  about  the  elementary  principles  of  strategy 
as  they  had  about  arithmetic  or  geography,  this  load  of  errone- 
ous public  opinion  would  not  have  had  to  be  borne,  and  the 
war  would  have  ended  much  sooner  than  it  did.  Now,  a  suf- 
ficient knowledge  of  the  elements  of  strategy  could  have  been 
gained  in  very  much  less  time  and  with  very  much  less  effort 
than  were  expended  on  arithmetic  and  geography.  In  fact, 
the  principles  are  so  simple  that  a  mere  authoritative  state- 
ment of  thein  would  have  been  sufficient ;  because  a  perception 
of  them  really  exists  within  every  human  being,  overgrown 
though  it  is  with  the  knowledge  and  the  ambitions  of  a  com- 
mercial and  industrial  civilization. 

The  first  difficulties  caused  by  the  unreadiness  of  the  people 
in  1861  were  in  organizing  the  warlike  forces  needed,  getting 
the  necessary  munitions  and  supplies,  and  drilling  the  various 
officers  in  their  various  posts.  Naturally,  it  was  more  difficult 
to  give  efficient  drill  and  training  to  the  higher  officers  than 
to  the  lower,  while  at  the  same  time  it  was  more  important. 
Even  the  regular  army  and  navy  found  themselves  pitifully 
unprepared — not  only  by  reason  of  the  necessity  for  hastily 
expanding  the  organizations,  and  thereby  producing  new 
organizations  that  must  be  inefficient  for  a  while  simply  be- 
cause they  were  new,  but  also  because  the  immense  complexity 
of  the  machinery  of  modem  warfare,  even  at  that  time,  forced 
the  minds  of  all  to  concentrate  so  strenuously  on  learning  the 
necessary  details  of  weapons  and  methods  as  to  blunt  their 
perception  as  to  what  was  the  purpose  of  those  weapons  and 
methods.  Now,  the  savage  has  no  such  difficulty:  nothing 
stands  in  the  way  of  his  applying  the  full  force  of  his  heredi- 
tary instinct  directly  to  the  actual  problem  in  hand.     The 


PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  ART  OP  FIGHTING       53 

object  that  he  wishes  to  attain  stands  out  brightly  before  him, 
unconfused  by  any  details,  except  of  the  simplest  kind. 

The  operations  between  two  tribes  that  we  have  discussed  in 
outline  illustrate  the  simplest  case  of  operations  between  con- 
tending forces,  because  they  leave  out  all  the  difficult  and  com- 
plicated questions  that  are  connected  with  the  supply  of  food 
and  ammunition,  and  all  other  questions  of  a  comparatively 
minor  character,  such  as  the  care  of  the  sick  and  wounded  and 
the  maintenance  of  communication  between  the  fighting  force 
and  the  base  it  started  from.  Campaigns  of  this  simple  char- 
acter, however,  illustrate  many  of  the  important  points  of 
strategy;  and  some  of  them  have  been  conducted  by  even  mod- 
em armies.  In  Napoleon's  first  campaign  in  Italy,  for  in- 
stance, his  armies  lived  on  the  country  they  passed  through; 
and  as  the  country  was  fertile,  filled  with  numerous  towns, 
and  traversed  with  many  roads,  his  problems  of  supply  were 
comparatively  simple.  At  the  present  day,  however,  when 
enormous  armies  are  manoeuvering,  it  is  impossible  for  them  to 
subsist  upon  the  country,  and  the  supply  of  food  and  ammu- 
nition is  one  of  the  utmost  difficulty  of  attainment ;  while  the 
maintenance  of  inter-communication  and  of  inter-support 
among  all  the  numerous  organizations  and  sub-organizations 
presents  problems  almost  as  difficult  to  master. 

In  the  case  of  two  hostile  tribes  in  the  situation  just  dis- 
cussed, difficulties  would  present  themselves,  however,  if  the 
homes  of  the  hostile  tribes  were  far  apart  and  the  intervening 
land  offered  little  in  the  way  of  food.  Such  situations  have 
been  frequent,  especially  in  northern  climates,  and  in  sterile 
sections  even  in  the  tropics.  Now,  imagine  yourself  under 
the  same  conditions  as  those  discussed,  except  that  a  long 
stretch  of  unfertile  coiuitry,  with  few  towns  or  roads,  lies  be- 
tween your  base  or  village  and  that  of  your  enemy.  In  this 
case,  his  problem  as  the  aggressor  will  be  difficult  in  propor- 
tion to  the  distance  and  the  unfavorable  nature  of  the  country ; 
and  your  problem,  therefore,  will  be  rendered  easier  to  solve. 
You  will  be  no  safer,  however,  unless  you  take  prompt  and. 


54  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

intelligent  advantage  of  the  difficulties  that  your  enemy  has 
to  surmount,  and  are  able  to  render  them  more  troublesome. 
If  you  simply  realize  his  difficulties,  but  not  your  own  advan- 
tages, you  will  permit  him  to  advance  unhindered  to  the 
attack ;  with  the  result  that  he  will  attack  you  as  successfully 
as  in  the  previous  case,  though  his  attack  will  come  more  tar- 
dily. If  you  do  not  take  advantage  of  the  danger  to  which  he 
is  exposed  of  having  his  food  supply  cut  off,  he  will  have  a 
string  of  supplies  coming  to  him  continually  from  his  home 
base  and  will  operate  just  as  successfully^  as  before. 

If  you  are  worthy  of  holding  your  position,  however,  you 
will  employ  such  a  system  of  scouts  that  they  will  keep  you 
informed  of  the  nature  and  localities  of  his  lines  of  supply; 
and  you  will  realize  that  he  will  be  so  conscious  of  his  de- 
pendence on  these  lines  of  supply,  that  a  mere  threat  against 
them  will  force  him  to  detach  part  of  his  force  to  protect 
them,  and  perhaps  even  to  halt  his  main  body.  For  every  army, 
large  or  small,  is  dependent  on  food;  and  every  commander 
knows  that  if  his  food  supply  is  shut  off  his  men  will  starve, 
unless  they  can  succeed  in  retreating  to  some  spot  where  they 
can  obtain  supplies,  or  unless,  indeed,  they  actually  surren- 
der. It  has  happened  in  history  that  armies  have  had  to  sur- 
render simply  because  their  lines  of  supplies  had  been  cut. 
A  notable  instance  of  this  is  the  surrender  of  Lee  at  Appo- 
mattox Court  House,  that  ended  our  Civil  War. 

While  manoeuvering  against  the  main  body  in  the  endeavor 
to  prevent  its  advance,  or  to  defeat  it  altogether,  you  will 
doubtless  arrange  a  system  of  attacks  or  feints  against  your 
enemy 's  lines  of  supply.  Such  feints  and  attacks  form  a  large 
part  of  the  operations  of  strategy.  They  may  or  may  not  en- 
tail much  actual  fighting,  but  their  successful  prosecution  is 
a  matter  of  paramount  importance.  When  one  reads  of  the 
operations  of  armies  against  each  other,  he  finds  himself  fre- 
quently noting  with  surprise  how  little  of  the  time  is  con- 
sumed in  actual  and  decisive  engagements,  and  how  much  is 
consumed  in  making  attacks  or  feints  at  the  lines  of  supply. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING       55 

This  is  somewhat  analogous  to  the  conditions  of  a  fight  be- 
tween two  pugilists  in  which  most  of  the  time  is  taken  up  with 
''sparring,"  in  trying  to  disconcert  the  adversary,  meanwhile 
watching  for  an  opportunity  to  launch  the  decisive  blow.  The 
decisive  blow  itself  may  not  consume  a  quarter  of  a  second. 

Since  your  enemy  wishes  to  advance  against  you,  it  is  obvi- 
ously your  duty  to  do  everji:hing  you  can  to  prevent  him 
from  advancing ;  unless,  indeed,  there  is  some  spot  into  which 
you  wish  to  have  him  advance,  knowing  that  you  would  have 
him  there  at  a  great  disadvantage.  For  instance,  if  there  is 
between  him  and  you  a  defile  in  the  mountains,  your  best  plan 
might  be  to  put  no  obstructions  whatever  in  the  way  of  his 
getting  there,  but  rather  to  lure  him  on;  knowing  that  if  he 
takes  his  men  into  that  defile,  especially  if  he  takes  them  there 
without  a  knowledge  of  your  presence,  you  may  be  able  to 
station  your  men  on  both  sides  of  the  defile  and  attack  him 
on  both  flanks,  under  circumstances  of  the  utmost  possible 
advantage  to  yourself.  Or,  even  if  it  would  not  be  practicable 
for  you  to  attack  him  within  the  defile  itself,  you  would  realize 
the  advantage  of  attacking  him  just  as  he  was  endeavoring 
to  emerge  from  the  defile;  that  is,  if  the  defile  were  narrow 
enough  to  prevent  him  from  deploying  his  men  in  line,  facing 
you.  You  would  realize  that,  by  attacking  a  column  of  men 
trying  to  emerge  from  a  narrow  defile,  you  could  bring  your 
whole  force  to  bear  upon  the  men  at  the  head  of  his  column, 
and  that  most  of  his  men  would  be  unable  to  join  in  the  fight. 
You  would  realize  this  if  you  were  a  man  fit  for  your  post; 
because  you  would  know  that,  if  two  bodies  of  men  equal 
in  fighting  power  array  themselves  against  each  other,  the 
most  advantageous  position  is  one  in  which  all  the  forces  can 
be  used  together,  while  the  most  disadvantageous  is  one  in 
which  only  a  few  can  be  used. 

This  is  because  of  the  principle  of  concentration,  which  can 
best  be  explained  by  reference  to  the  following  tables.  A 
chief  of  a  savage  tribe  would  not  understand  these  tables ;  but 
a  life-long  contact  with  fighting  would  make  him  act  in  ac- 


56  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

cordairce  with  the  principle  they  illustrate.  Similarly,  a  pugi- 
list does  not  understand  the  physiological  principles  in  ac- 
cordance with  which  his  arm  strikes  as  soon  as  he  sees  his  an- 
tagonist expose  an  unguarded  spot — in  fact,  before  he  can 
mentally  formulate  the  situation.    He  strikes  automatically. 

It  is  one  of  the  old  stories  that,  once  upon  a  time,  a  man 
was  attacked  by  three  men,  and,  realizing  that  he  could  not 
overcame  them  all,  he  fled.  The  pursuers  did  not  keep  to- 
gether, and  one  man  outstripped  the  others.  Noting  this,  the 
fleeing  man  permitted  him  to  get  near,  and  then  suddenly 
turned  and  overwhelmed  him,  being  the  stronger.  He  then 
resumed  his  flight,  and  allowed  himself  to  be  overtaken  by  the 
second  man,  whom  he  overwhelmed  in  turn.  He  then  turned 
upon  the  third  man  and  overwhelmed  him.  Whether  this  par- 
ticular incident  ever  happened  may  reasonably  be  questioned ; 
but  it  cannot  be  questioned  that  the  incident  was  entirely  pos- 
sible. And,  whether  the  story  be  true  or  not,  it  illustrates  one 
of  the  fundamental  principles  of  strategy,  usually  spoken  of  as 
the  ''principle  of  concentration,"  though  it  seems  to  me 
that  it  should  be  called  the  ' '  principle  of  isolation. ' '  It  seems 
to  me  that  the  fundamental  reason  for  the  defeat  of  the  three 
men  was  not  so  much  that  the  final  victor  concentrated  on  one 
man  and  then  on  another  as  that  he  isolated  each  of  the  three 
men,  so  that  the  others  could  not  assist  him.  If  the  three  men 
had  not  been  isolated,  but  together,  it  would  not  have  advan- 
taged their  one  antagonist  to  concentrate  on  one  man,  because 
the  other  two  would  have  concentrated  equally  on  him. 

The  fundamental  reason  why  it  is  better  to  do  as  the  final 
victor  in  the  old  story  did  is  that,  if  one  man  is  more  powerful 
than  another,  he  can  do  him  more  injury  in  a  given  length 
of  time  than  the  other  man  can  do  him ;  so  that  at  the  end  of 
that  period  of  time  their  original  inequality  will  be  increased. 
Suppose,  for  instance,  that  one  man  can  exert  a  blow  of  a 
force  that  we  will  call  1,000,  and  that  his  antagonist  can  exert 
a  blow  of  a  force  that  we  will  call  500.  In  this  case  their  rel- 
ative powers  would  be  as  1,000  to  500.    Now,  the  man  who 


PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING       57 

can  exert  a  blow  of  the  force  of  1,000  can  evidently  do  an  in- 
jury to  his  opponent  greater  than  that  which  his  opponent  can 
do  to  him,  in  the  proportion  of  1,000  to  500.  For  the  sake  of 
simplicity,  let  us  suppose  that  each  can,  in  a  given  length  of 
time  can  inflict  an  amount  of  injury  equal  to  1/10  of  his  total 
strength;  that  is,  that  one  man  can  inflict  an  injury  denoted 
by  100  and  the  other  an  injury  denoted  by  50.  At  the  end 
of  some  length  of  time,  the  first  man  will  have  had  his 
strength  reduced  from  1,000  to  950 ;  while  the  other  man  will 
have  had  his  strength  reduced  from  500  to  400.  Therefore, 
at  the  end  of  this  time  the  disproportion  of  strength,  instead 
of  being  2  to  1,  will  be  950  to  400— that  is,  nearly  IV2  to  1. 

In  the  following  table,  the  results  between  two  forces  fight- 
ing are  indicated  in  the  various  columns.  In  the  first  column 
the  forces  are  supposed  to  be  equal,  and  each  represented  at 
first  by  a  strength  of  1,000.  In  column  2  the  forces  are 
1,000  to  900;  in  column  3  they  are  1,000  and  800,  etc.  In 
each  case,  it  is  assumed  that  a  force  can  inflict  an  injury  equal 
to  1/10  of  its  total  force;  that  1,000  men,  for  instance,  can 
inflict  in  a  given  time  an  injury  equal  to  100,  while  900  men  in 
the  same  time  can  inflict  an  injury  of  only  90.  It  is  evident 
that  at  the  end  of  the  first  period  the  first  force  will  have  910 
units  left,  while  the  other  force  will  have  only  800  left  (col- 
umn 2). 

It  will  be  noted  that  in  column  1  the  values  of  the  two  oppos- 
ing forces  continue  equal  throughout ;  that  in  column  2  they 
become  reduced  unequally,  so  that  at  the  end  of  the  twelfth 
period  the  disproportion,  instead  of  being  as  10  to  9,  is  about 
4  to  1 ;  that  in  column  3  the  larger  force  has  a  value  of  569 
when  the  smaller  force  has  become  reduced  to  zero ;  and  that 
the  other  columns  show  that  the  greater  the  disproportion 
of  force  is  originally,  the  more  rapidly  the  disproportion  in- 
creases. Column  10  shows  that,  if  the  original  disproportion 
is  as  1,000  to  100,  the  smaller  force  is  reduced  to  zero  in  the 
first  period,  while  the  larger  force  loses  only  one  per  cent,  of 
its  strength. 


58 


THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 


TABLE  I 


Col. 

Col. 

Col. 

Col. 

Col. 

Col. 

Col. 

Col. 

Col. 

Col. 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

Value  of  offensive  power, 

A 

1000 

1000 

1000 

ICOO 

1000 

1000 

1000 

1000 

1000 

1000 

at    beginning    i 

B 

A 

1000 
100 

900 
100 

800 
100 

700 
100 

600 
100 

500 
100 

400 
100 

300 
100 

200 
100 

100 

Damage  done  in  first  pe- 

100 

riod    bv    

B 

A 

100 
900 

90 
910 

80 
920 

70 
930 

60 
940 

50 
950 

40 
960 

30 

970 

20 
980 

10 

Value  of  offensive  power 

990 

at  end  first  period 

B 

900 

800 

700 

600 

500 

400 

300 

200 

100 

0 

Damaere    doae    in    second 

A 

90 

91 

92 

93 

94 

95 

96 

97 

98 

period  by    ' 

B 

90 

80 

70 

60 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

Value  of  offensive   power 

A 

810 

830 

850 

870 

890 

910 

930 

950 

970 

at  end   second   period. . 

B 

810 

709 

608 

507 

406 

305 

204 

103 

2 

Damage  done  in  third  pe- 

A 

81 

83 

85 

87 

89 

91 

93 

95 

riod    by    

B 

81 

71 

61 

51 

41 

31 

20 

10 

Value  of   offensive  power 

A 

729 

759 

789 

819 

849 

879 

910 

940 

at  end  third  period.... 

B 

729 

626 

523 

420 

317 

214 

111 

8 

Damage    done    in    fourth 

A 

73 

76 

79 

82 

85 

88 

91 

period   by    

B 

73 

63 

52 

42 

32 

21 

11 

Value  of  offensive  power 

A 

656 

696 

737 

777 

817 

858 

899 

at  end  fourth  period... 

B 

656 

550 

444 

338 

232 

126 

20 

Damage  done  in  fifth  pe- 

A 

65 

70 

74 

78 

82 

86 

riod  by  

B 

fA 

65 

591 

55 
641 

44 
693 

34 
743 

23 
794 

13 
845 

Value   of   offensive  power 

at  end  fifth  period 

B 

591 

480 

370 

260 

150 

40 

Damage     done     in     sixth 

A 

59 

64 

69 

74 

79 

85 

period   by    

B 

59 

48 

37 

26 

15 

4 

Value  of  offensive  power 

fA 

532 

593 

656 

717 

779 

841 

at   end   sixth   period 

B 

532 

416 

301 

186 

71 

0 

Damage   done   in   seventh 

A 

53 

59 

66 

72 

78 

period  by  

B 

53 

42 

30 

19 

7 

Value  of  offensive  power 

479 

551 

626 

698 

772 

.... 

at  end  seventh  period.. 

B 

fA 

479 

357 

235 

114 

0 

Damage    done    in    eighth 

48 

55 

63 

70 

period   by    

B 

48 

36 

24 

11 

Value   of  offensive  power 

[A 

431 

515 

602 

687 

at  end  eighth  period... 

B 

431 

302 

172 

44 

.... 

Damage     done    in     ninth 

fA 

43 

52 

60 

69 

period   bv   

B 

43 

30 

17 

4 

Value  of   offensive  power 

fA 

388 

485 

585 

683 

at  end  ninth  period 

B 

388 

250 

112 

0 

Damage     done     in     tenth 

A 

39 

49 

59 

period   by    

B 

39 

25 

11 

Value  of  offensive   power 

A 

349 

460 

574 

at  end   tenth   period 

B 

349 

201 

53 

Damage  done  in  eleventh 

fA 

35 

46 

57 

period   by    

B 

35 

20 

5 

Value  of  offensive   power 

fA 

314 

440 

569 

at   end   eleventh   period 

B 

314 

155 

0 

Damage    done    in    twelfth 

fA 

31 

44 

period  by    

,B 

81 

16 

Value  of  offensive   power 

A 

283 

426 

at  end  twelfth  period. . 

IB 

283 

111 
etc. 

Total     damage      done  f  A 

717 

789 

800 

700 

600 

500 

400 

300 

200 

100 

by    1 

B 

717 

574 

431 

317 

228 

159 

.... 

Table  I  shows  merely  the  conditions  of  a  fight  between  two 
forces,  A  and  B.  It  is  supplemented,  however,  by  Table  II, 
which  shows  what  would  happen  if  a  large  force  engaged  two 


PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING       59 

smaller  forces  in  succession.  In  column  1  a  force  that  origi- 
nally was  1,000  is  supposed  to  have  fought  a  force  of  200,  and 
therefore  to  have  been  reduced  to  a  strength  of  970,  and  then 
to  engage  a  force  of  800.  (See  Table  I,  column  9.)  In  column 
2  the  large  force  is  supposed  to  have  engaged  800  first,  thereby- 
becoming  reduced  to  569  (see  Table  I,  column  3),  and  then  to 
engage  the  force  of  200.  Columns  1  and  2  indicate  that  it 
makes  no  difference  whether  A  engages  the  stronger  or  the 
weaker  force  first;  that  it  makes  no  practical  difference 
whether  it  engages  200  and  then  800,  or  800  and  then  200. 

Column  3  shows  that  a  force  of  841  (the  part  remaining 
after  a  force  of  1,000  had  annihilated  a  force  of  500 — see 
Table  I)  would  have  653  left  after  annihilating  a  second  force 
of  500.  Taken  in  connection  with  columns  1  and  2,  this  in- 
dicates that  it  is  easier  to  defeat  two  separated  equal  forces 
than  two  separated  unequal  forces  of  the  same  aggregate 
value.  It  shows  that  the  weakest  way  in  which  to  divide  a 
force  is  into  equal  parts. 

A  savage  chief  would  not  understand  all  these  arithmetical 
complexities;  but  if  you  were  a  savage  chief  worthy  to  hold 
your  position,  you  would  know  the  lesson  that  they  teach 
by  instinct.  That  is,  you  would  know  that  your  force  would  be 
the  strongest  when  concentrated  in  one  group,  in  which  the 
units  could  help  each  other;  and  that  if  it  were  divided  into 
two  parts,  the  weakest  arrangement  would  be  that  in  which 
the  parts  would  be  equal.  You  would  also  know  that  the 
greater  number  of  parts  into  which  you  divided  your  force, 
the  weaker  it  would  be. 

That  is,  it  would  be  weaker  for  fighting  against  a  concen- 
trated body  that  could  attack  its  various  separated  parts  in 
detail.  This  might  lead  to  the  notion  that  a  force  should 
never  be  divided.  Such  a  notion,  however,  would  be  entirely 
erroneous ;  for  there  are  other  elements  of  weakness  in  a  mil- 
itary force  than  those  due  to  division  into  parts.  One  of  the 
elements  of  weakness  of  a  force  is  its  flanks.    If  a  force  should 


60 


THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 


TABLE  II 


ol.  1   C( 

)1.  2 

Col.  3 

970 

569 

841 

800 

200 

500 

97 

57 

84 

80 

20 

50 

890 

549 

791 

703 

143 

416 

89 

55 

79 

70 

14 

42 

820 

535 

749 

614 

88 

337 

82 

54 

75 

61 

9 

34 

759 

526 

715 

532 

32 

262 

76 

53 

72 

53 

3 

26 

706 

523 

689 

456 

0 

190 

71 

69 

46 

19 

660 

670 

385 

121 

66 

67 

39 

12 

621 

658 

319 

54 

62 

66 

32 

5 

589 

653 

257 

0 

59 

26 

563 

198 

.... 

56 

20 

543 

142 

54 

14 

529 

88 

53 

9 

520 

35 

.... 

52 

4 

516 

0 

f  ^ 

Value  of  oflfensive  power  at  beginning j  g 

( A 
Damage  done  in  first  period  by <  g 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  first  period j -g 

Damage  done  in  second  period  by |  g 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  second  period |g 

Damage  done  in  third  period  by ,'  g 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  third  period jg 

Damage  done  in  fourth  period  by jg 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  fourth  period jg 

Damage  done  in  fifth  period  by jg 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  fifth  period |g 

Damage  done  in  sixth  period  by j  u 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  sixth  period jg 

Damage  done  in  seventh  period  by jg 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  seventh  period <  g 

Damage  done  in  eighth  period  by jg 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  eighth  period j  g 

Damage  done  in  ninth  period  by j  g 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  ninth  period jg 

Damage  done  in  tenth  period  by jg 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  tenth  period jg 

Damage  done  in  eleventh  period  by j  g 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  eleventh  period jg 

Damage  done  in  twelfth  period  by j  g 

Value  of  offensive  power  at  end  twelfth  period jg 


march  in  lines,  one  behind  the  other,  it  would  present  the 
strongest  arrangement  to  an  attack  from  the  front;  and  if  a 
chief  knew  that  he  would  not  have  to  fight  except  directly  in 
front,  he  should  march  all  his  men  in  lines.  But  if,  under  nor- 
mal conditions,  he  should  march  his  whole  force  in  lines,  his 
enemy  would  undoubtedly  detach  a  comparatively  small  part 
of  his  own  force  to  strike  one  or  both  of  the  flanks.  The  whole 
force  being  in  line,  it  would  have  no  advance  guard,  no  scouts, 


PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING       61 

no  flank  guards,  and  no  rear  guard,  and  be  practically  help- 
less, therefore,  against  any  attack  except  one  from  directly  in 
front.  For  this  reason,  as  well  as  others,  the  actual  fighting 
strength  of  a  force  must  be  reduced  by  the  necessity  of  send- 
ing out  detachments  to  get  information  concerning  the  enemy, 
and  to  guard  against  surprise  of  all  kinds. 

Besides,  except  in  the  case  of  very  small  bodies  in  a  fertile 
country,  an  army  cannot  live  on  the  country,  and  must  detail 
a  considerable  number  of  men  to  carry  supplies  and  ammu- 
nition and  guard  the  lines  of  supply.  Furthermore,  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  commander  of  every  force  in  war  to  utilize  his 
force  as  economically  as  possible  in  actual  fighting;  and  this 
means  to  avoid  frontal  attacks  with  the  main  body  except 
when  confident  of  getting  a  favorable  decision,  and  to  devote 
a  great  deal  of  effort  to  securing  advantages  at  small  cost  of 
men  and  effort,  by  striking  at  the  communications  of  the 
enemy,  or  by  threatening  them,  or  by  making  flank  attacks  and 
feints. 

For  these  reasons  and  others,  it  is  impracticable  and  unwise 
to  keep  a  force  continuously  concentrated ;  and  the  result  is 
that  the  various  parts  of  a  large  force  become  like  the  various 
pieces  on  a  chessboard,  or  like  the  various  players  in  a  base- 
ball game ;  and  the  operations  between  the  forces  take  on  some 
of  the  features  of  a  game.  They  suggest,  in  fact,  that  warfare 
is  the  greatest  game  in  the  world,  the  oldest  game  and  the  most 
important.  It  is  a  serious  mistake,  however,  to  regard  war  as 
a  game,  though  many  people  have  spoken  of  it  and  written  of 
it  as  such.  To  do  this  is  to  ignore  the  most  important  feature 
of  war — the  fact  that  warfare  is  fighting,  and  sometimes  fight- 
ing to  death,  and  always  fighting  to  the  death  of  some  of  the 
individuals.  Another  reason  why  warfare  is  not  a  game  is 
that  a  real  game  is  played  for  the  sake  of  the  game,  and  with 
the  sole  aim  of  winning  the  game.  But  warfare  is  not  carried 
on  for  the  sake  of  warfare,  or  even  for  the  sake  of  winning. 
It  is  carried  on  to  accomplish  some  purpose.  Sometimes  the 
purpose  is  good,  sometimes  it  is  bad.     The  purpose  is  usually 


62  THE  ART  OP  FIGHTING 

political,  using  the  word  political  in  its  broad  sense;  that  is, 
the  purpose  concerns  some  result  which  the  tribes  or  nations 
waging  war  wish  to  accomplish  or  prevent. 

Strategy  and  Tactics. — In  making  plans,  you  will  find  your- 
self constantly  confronted  with  the  necessity  of  looking  ahead 
into  the  future ;  but  in  conducting  actual  operations  in  sight 
of  your  enemy,  you  will  have  merely  to  take  prompt  action, 
either  to  seize  some  opportunity  or  to  ward  off  some  threat- 
ened blow.  In  the  one  case,  foresight  and  careful  preparation 
are  needed ;  in  the  other  case,  quick  apprehension  and  prompt 
action.  The  two  phases  of  war  thus  indicated  are  called  the 
strategical  and  the  tactical  phases;  in  one,  strategy  directs 
operations;  in  the  other  tactics.  There  is  no  sharp  dividing 
line  between  them,  and  they  merge  one  into  the  other ;  never- 
theless their  provinces  are  distinct.  The  elementary  prin- 
ciples governing  them  are  the  same ;  the  main  difference  being 
that  the  strategist  sees  with  the  eye  of  the  mind,  while  the 
tactician  sees  with  the  actual  eye  of  the  body.  Whether  con- 
ducting a  strategical  or  a  tactical  operation,  your  endeavor 
will  be  to  bring  destructive  force  to  some  point  before  the 
enemy  can  do  so,  and  to  select  the  most  advantageous  point. 
In  conducting  strategical  operations,  your  work  will  be  mostly 
in  making  plans;  while  in  directing  tactical  operations  your 
work  will  be  in  conducting  the  troops  or  the  ships  to  the  point 
decided  on,  and  manoeuvering  them  afterward  in  the  face  of 
the  enemy. 

Logistics. — No  matter  how  simple  may  be  your  strategical 
plan  of  campaign,  and  the  tactics,  marches,  and  manoeuvers, 
you  will  have  to  arrange  that  your  men  shall  be  fed.  No  mat- 
ter how  simple  may  be  the  weapons  of  your  warriors,  you  must 
see  that  the  weapons  shall  be  provided.  This  may  or  may  not 
be  an  easy  task.  If  the  distances  are  short  and  the  country 
fertile,  and  if  the  weapons  are  easy  to  obtain,  it  will  be  simple ; 
but  if  the  distances  are  long,  the  country  sterile,  and  the 
weapons  difficult  to  obtain,  you  may  find  it  extremely  hard. 
In  the  enormous  armies  of  modem  nations,  which  cannot  live 


PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING       63 

off  the  country,  which  expend  enormous  amounts  of  ammuni- 
tion, and  which  require  millions  of  delicate  and  complicated 
weapons  and  warlike  appliances  of  all  kinds,  the  problems  of 
logistics  are  of  the  highest  order  of  difficulty. 

We  must  not  fall  into  the  error  of  supposing  that  strategy, 
logistics,  and  tactics  are  three  separate  agencies  that  merely 
assist  each  other.  If  they  were,  the  difficulties  of  conducting 
a  military  or  naval  campaign  would  be  far  greater  than  they 
are ;  they  would  be  so  great,  in  fact,  that  no  consistent  plan  of 
operations  could  be  devised.  We  can  easily  avoid  falling  into 
the  error  by  reminding  ourselves  that  the  whole  object  of  both 
tactics  and  logistics  is  to  carry  out  the  plans  of  strategy,  and 
that  they  must,  therefore,  be  subordinate  to  strategy.  The 
dominant  agency  of  war  is  strategy;  tactics  and  logistics  are 
its  subordinates.  Strategy  points  the  way  to  battle,  and  ar- 
ranges the  conditions  under  which  it  shall  begin,  under  which 
it  shall  be  fought,  and  under  which  subsequent  operations 
shall  be  carried  on.  Logistics  arranges  that  the  men  and  ships 
shall  be  supplied,  and  afterward  that  they  shall  be  properly 
fed  and  armed ;  and  tactics  moves  them  to  the  battlefield  and 
manceuvers  them  on  the  battlefield  afterward.  Before  the 
battle,  logistics  is  more  important  than  tactics ;  but  during  the 
battle  tactics  is  more  important  than  logistics.  As  to  which 
may  be  said  to  be  the  more  important  in  the  main,  it  would  be 
merely  wasting  time  to  speculate.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind, 
however,  that  the  ultimate  actual  result  can  be  achieved  by 
tactics  only.  To  gain  tactical  victories  should  be  the  only  aim 
in  war. 


PART  II 
HISTORICAL  ILLUSTRATIONS 


CHAPTER  V 

THUTMOSE  III   AND  RAMSES  II 

THE  first  great  strategist  about  whom  history  tells 
us  was  Thutmose  III,  King  of  Egypt,  who  reigned 
from  about  1501  to  1447  B.C.  Though  a  younger 
son  of  the  king  he  became  a  priest  in  the  temple  of  Karnak. 
He  married  Hatshepsut,  a  princess  of  the  old  line  of  kings; 
and  these  two  together  became  co-regents  later.  Until  the 
time  of  her  death,  covering  a  period  of  more  than  twenty 
years,  the  queen's  influence  seems  to  have  been  greater  than 
her  husband 's,  because  of  a  superior  claim  to  the  throne ;  and 
it  was  not  until  after  her  death  that  Thutmose  III  was  able 
to  display  his  energy  and  genius.  This  he  did  throughout 
thirty-two  years  thereafter,  during  which  he  carried  on  seven- 
teen campaigns,  and  as  the  result  of  which  he  established  his 
kingdom  on  such  a  firm  basis  and  extended  his  boundaries  so 
far,  and  increased  its  wealth  so  greatly,  that  he  is  worthy  of 
the  title  "First  Empire-Builder." 

At  the  time  when  Thutmose  III  came  into  absolute  power, 
the  strength  of  Egj^pt  had  materially  declined,  mainly  because 
the  efforts  of  the  queen  had  been  devoted  for  the  most  part  to 
erecting  beautiful  monuments  and  temples;  with  the  result 
that  the  military  spirit  and  skill  of  the  people  had  danger- 
ously decreased. 

In  a  direction  approximating  northeast  of  Egypt,  on  the 
eastern  shore  of  the  Mediterranean  Sea,  were  Palestine  and 
Syria,  which  contained  many  cities,  like  Tyre  and  Sidon,  that 
had  accumulated  great  wealth  of  many  kinds,  mostly  manu- 
factured products  such  as  silks,  glassware,  jewelry,  etc.  The 
little  nations  of  Palestine  and  Syria  were  supposed  to  be  under 
the  dominion  of  Egypt,  but  they  had  taken  advantage  of  the 

67 


68  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

weakness  of  the  kingdom,  and  many  of  them  were  more  or  less 
openly  in  revolt.    At  the  head  was  the  King  of  Kadesh, 

Late  in  the  twenty-second  year  of  his  reign,  in  1479  B.C. 
Thutmose  marched  from  Egypt  through  southern  Palestine, 
which  was  still  loyal,  toward  the  army  of  the  King  of  Kadesh, 
which  advanced  to  meet  him,  and  occupied  the  strong  fortress 
of  Megiddo.  Not  only  was  this  place  a  powerful  stronghold, 
but  it  occupied  an  important  strategic  position,  commanding 
the  road  from  Egypt,  that  lay  between  two  mountain  ranges. 
The  fact  that  a  fortress  had  been  placed  at  that  point  proves 
that  a  clear  conception  of  at  least  one  principle  of  strategy 
existed  among  the  semi-savage  tribes  of  Syria  in  1479  b.c. 

Learning  of  the  enemy's  occupation  of  Megiddo,  Thutmose 
found  himself  called  upon  to  decide  the  important  strategic 
question  of  whether  he  should  march  against  it  by  a  direct 
route  that  led  him  through  a  narrow  pass,  or  march  by  a  longer 
route  that  would  not  require  him  to  go  through  the  pass. 
Against  the  advice  of  his  officers,  who  pointed  out  the  dangers 
of  being  surprised  on  both  sides  in  the  pass,  or  of  being  met 
by  the  enemy  while  emerging  from  the  pass,  Thutmose  deter- 
mined to  take  the  most  direct  route.  To  encourage  his  men, 
he  led  them  personally.  It  seems  probable  that  he  would  not 
have  made  this  decision  if  he  had  not  judged  that  the  enemy 
was  incompetent  to  take  advantage  of  the  danger  to  which  he 
exposed  himself.  That  he  judged  correctly  is  shown  by  the 
fact  that  he  was  not  molested  in  going  through  the  pass,  and 
was  able  to  bring  his  forces  out  into  the  plain  of  Megiddo 
without  meeting  any  opposition. 

This  incident  illustrates  the  difference  between  good  strat- 
egy and  bad  strategy,  between  good  judgment  and  bad  judg- 
ment, between  action  and  inertness. 

Early  the  next  morning  Thutmose,  in  a  glittering  chariot 
of  electrum,  led  his  forces  forward  to  a  position  in  which  his 
right  rested  on  a  hill  southwest  of  Megiddo,  while  his  left  was 
northwest  of  Megiddo.  The  Asiatics,  drawn  up  in  a  north-and- 
ioutli  line,  confronted,  him.     He  immeLdiately  attacked  them, ^ 


THUTMOSE  III  AND  RAMSES  II  69 

and  with  such  vigor  that  the  enemy  gave  way  at  the  first 
charge  and  fled  inside  of  the  city.  Thutmose  at  once  instituted 
a  siege,  his  army  living  in  great  comfort  on  the  fertile  fields 
of  the  plain  until  the  city  surrendered ;  an  act  caused  mainly 
by  the  fact  that  the  Syrians  were  so  unprepared  that  there  was 
not  food  enough  for  the  defending  soldiers.  An  indication  of 
conditions  in  those  days  may  be  gathered  from  the  fact  that 
Thutmose  captured  in  the  city  924  chariots,  2,238  horses,  200 
suits  of  armor,  the  gorgeous  tent  of  the  king  of  Kadesh,  and 
prodigious  quantities  of  gold  and  silver  and  precious  stones. 

Being  a  good  strategist,  Thutmose  lost  no  time  in  carrying 
on  further  operations,  until  the  close  of  the  dry  season  forced 
him  to  return  to  Egypt.  During  these  operations  he  captured 
three  cities.  Afterward,  he  reorganized  the  territory  con- 
quered. 

Because  of  the  military  decadence  of  Egypt,  Thutmose  was 
not  able  to  resume  his  task  of  subduing  the  revolt  in  Syria 
until  two  years  later.  Finally  he  marched  through  northern 
Palestine  and  Syria,  establishing  his  power  firmly  in  those 
regions.  In  the  following  year  he  carried  on  a  campaign  of 
the  same  nature,  as  he  did  also  in  the  year  ensuing. 

But  it  had  now  become  evident  to  Thutmose  that  he  could 
not  effectively  subdue  the  revolt  until  he  had  captured  the  city 
of  Kadesh  and  the  regions  to  the  north  and  east  of  it;  and 
that  he  could  not  accomplish  this  while  leaving  his  flank  ex- 
posed to  the  unsubdued  Phoenician  cities  on  the  coast  of  the 
Mediterranean.  He,  therefore,  planned  a  series  of  campaigns, 
and  laid  the  basis  of  them  by  organizing  a  fleet.  Employing 
the  new  fleet,  he  transported  his  army  by  sea  on  his  fifth  cam- 
paign, and  moved  directly  against  the  northern  coast  cities. 
Thence  he  moved  his  army  southward  and  captured  the  pow- 
erful city  of  Arvad.  He  thus  gained  a  secure  footing  on  the 
coast,  easily  accessible  by  water  from  Egypt,  and  forming  an 
admirable  base  for  further  operations.  The  strategic  concep- 
tion involved  here  is  respectfully  pointed  out. 

After  making  suitable  preparations  in  the  ensuing  winter, 


70 


THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 


Camp  of 
Division  ^^1  ^ 
ofAmon    Ay^ 


Thutmose  started  out  on  his  sixth  campaign  in  the  following 
spring-,  disembarked  his  army  from  the  fleet  at  Simyra  and 
immediately  marched  upon  Kadesh.  The  city  lay  on  the  west 
side  of  the  Orontes  River,  surrounded  by  its  waters  and  those 

of  a  tributary,  at  the  north  end  of 
a  high  valley  between  the  two 
ridges  of  the  Lebanon  mountains, 
and  protected  b}^  an  inner  moat 
that  reinforced  the  natural  water 
defenses.  It  was  the  most  formida- 
ble fortress  in  Syria,  and  command- 
ed the  valley  of  the  Orontes  River, 
the  only  route  northw^ard  in  that 
part  of  Syria.  The  locality  and 
the  character  of  the  natural  and 
artificial  defenses  show  the  exist- 
ence of  a  clear  conception  of  one 
of  the  first  principles  of  strat- 
egy. 

Thutmose  captured  Kadesh  after 
a  long  and  difficult  siege,  and  spent 
tlie  rest  of  the  season  and  all  of  the 
following  season  in  subduing  the 
cities  in  the  neighborhood,  not  only 
in  the  interior,  but  along  the  coast. 
In  particular  Thutmose  exacted 
that  the  people  of  the  interior 
should  keep  the  coast  towns  liber- 
ally supplied  with  provisions  for  his  next  campaign. 

The  preparations  for  his  next  campaign  occupied  nearly  two 
years;  so  that  it  was  not  until  the  thirty-third  year  of  his 
reign,  in  1469  B.C.,  that  he  was  able  to  begin  it.  In  that 
campaign  Thutmose  carried  his  armies  to  the  northward  and 
eastward  of  S^-ria  to  the  Euphrates  River.  There  he  captured 
the  city  of  Carchemish,  which  enabled  him  to  do  what  he  had 


Asiatics 
— £<g"yp-tians 


5Kin. 


0 


5M. 


From    Breasted's    "History    of 

Egypt." 
By  pel-mission  of  Charles  Scrib- 

ner's  Sons. 


THUTMOSE  III  AND  RAMSES  II  71 

been  fighting  ten  years  to  do — cross  the  Euphrates  River  and 
set  his  boundary  tablet  on  its  eastern  side. 

Thvitmose  had  now  achieved  the  great  object  of  his  life. 
He  had  extended  the  boundaries  of  his  kingdom  farther  than 
any  preceding  king  had  done,  and,  as  a  natural  consequence, 
he  had  established  his  power  more  firmly  at  home,  brought 
about  more  efficient  government,  and  placed  his  kingdom  in  all 
respects,  both  military  and  economic,  on  a  firmer  basis.  It  is 
a  fact  which  one  constantly  meets  in  history,  that  a  really 
competent  ruler  strengthens  his  country  both  externally  and 
internally. 

Thutmose  carried  out  seventeen  campaigns  in  all,  starting 
in  the  spring,  and  returning  to  his  capital  about  October.  Im- 
mediately on  his  return,  after  each  campaign,  he  made  a  tour 
of  inspection  throughout  Egypt,  mainly  for  the  purpose  of 
suppressing  corruption  and  bringing  about  efficiency  in  local 
administration ;  but  also  for  observing  progress  on  temples  and 
other  works  that  he  was  either  erecting,  restoring,  or  adorning. 
His  campaigning  became  regularly  organized  as  part  of  a 
routine  of  his  reign ;  and  as  soon  as  the  spring  rains  in  Syria 
and  Palestine  had  ceased,  he  would  embark  his  troops  and 
sail  for  their  coast. 

The  last  of  his  campaigns,  the  seventeenth,  was  carried  on 
in  the  year  1459  B.C.,  in  which  he  chastised  certain  princes  of 
Syria  who  had  been  incited  by  the  King  of  Kadesh.  Although 
Thutmose  was  now  more  than  seventy  years  of  age,  he  prompt- 
ly started  with  his  fleet  on  his  seventeenth  and  last  campaign, 
landed  his  army,  and  advanced  against  the  city  of  Kadesh, 
which  he  first  isolated  and  then  recaptured.  He  lived  twelve 
years  after  this ;  but  so  thoroughly  had  he  subdued  all  parts 
of  his  kingdom  that  he  had  to  make  no  more  campaigns.  He 
died  in  the  year  1117  B.C.,  leaving  a  record  as  a  strategist 
which  stands  the  first  upon  the  page  of  history,  and  which,  tak- 
ing into  account  the  differences  in  conditions,  has  not  greatly 
been  surpassed  by  that  of  any  strategist  since.    He  seems  to 


72  TPIE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

have  been  the  first  strategist  to  recognize  and  utilize  the  ad- 
vantages of  sea  power. 

It  is  worthy  of  remark  that  the  operations  which  Thutmose 
carried  out  were  similar  in  their  essentials  to  those  which  we 
have  supposed,  in  previous  chapters,  that  one  aggressive  chief 
of  a  savage  tribe  might  carry  out  against  another  tribe,  whose 
village  or  cattle  or  other  material  possessions  he  was  deter- 
mined to  acquire.  In  both  cases  we  see  the  same  aggressive  ad- 
vance, the  same  endeavor  to  attack  the  weak  point  of  the 
enemy,  the  same  ardor  in  attacking,  the  same  energy  in  fol- 
lowing up  the  victory,  the  same  endeavor  to  render  the  enemy 
incapable  of  further  resistance,  the  same  endeavor  to  make 
secure  any  positions  or  possessions  which  had  been  attained. 
In  fact,  if  Thutmose  had  been  acting  as  one  man  only,  and  if 
his  enemy  had  been  one  man  only,  who  possessed  a  hut  or 
other  thing  that  Thutmose  wanted,  he  would  have  proceeded 
in  a  similar  manner,  though  his  operations  would  have  cov- 
ered shorter  distances.  We  can  even  imagine  that  if  his  enemy 
had  lived  on  the  shores  of  some  water  common  to  both,  Thut- 
mose would  have  gone  over  the  intervening  distance  in  a 
canoe  as  he  actually  went  over  the  intervening  distance  with  a 
fleet.  If  we  can  imagine  a  series  of  moving  pictures  that 
showed  the  campaigns  of  Thutmose,  or  of  any  other  strategist 
or  leader,  it  is  not  hard  to  realize  that,  if  the  scale  of  the  dis- 
tances were  changed,  and  if  the  number  of  men  engaged  were 
changed  in  a  similar  proportion,  the  series  of  moving  pictures 
might  represent  in  its  essential  features  almost  any  campaign, 
no  matter  how  large  or  how  small. 

Thutmose  was  succeeded  by  Amenhotep  II,  who  seems  to 
have  been  a  worthy  son  of  his  father,  though  made  on  a  smaller 
scale.  He  was  succeeded  by  Thutmose  IV,  and  he  by  Amen- 
hotep III,  sometimes  called  the  Magnificent.  Amenhotep  re- 
minds us  in  some  ways  of  Solomon,  son  of  David,  and  of  many 
sons  of  men  who  had  amassed  great  wealth ;  because  his  career 
consisted  mainly  in  using  the  powers  in  his  possession  for 
ostentatious  display  and  the  construction  of  objects  of  art  and 


THUTMOSE  III  AND  RAMSES  II  73 

beauty.  During  his  reign  the  empire  of  Egypt  reached  its 
greatest  height  in  the  refinements  and  superficial  splendors  of 
civilization;  so  great  a  height,  indeed  as  to  suggest  that  the 
civilization  of  Greece,  which  followed  about  one  thousand 
years  later,  was  more  indebted  to  Egypt  than  is  often  realized. 

Like  the  high  civilization  of  Egypt,  that  of  Greece  imme- 
diately followed  a  series  of  successful  wars.  The  high  civiliza- 
tion, therefore,  was  based  on  successful  war;  and  as  the  fun- 
damental basis  of  the  successful  war  was  successful  strategy, 
we  see  that  the  high  civilization  was  based  fundamentally  on 
successful  strategy.  We  shall  see  that  this  was  true  of  Rome 
and  of  all  the  other  countries  that  thus  far  have  achieved  a 
high  civilization  of  their  own  making.  That  this  was  expect- 
able is  clear;  because  it  has  only  been  by  successful  strategy 
that  large  nations  have  been  formed,  large  reservoirs  of  wealth 
created,  large  numbers  of  people  enabled  to  live  together 
in  safety,  and  conditions  favorable  to  the  greatest  good  of  the 
greatest  number  established  and  maintained. 

The  result  of  Amenhotep's  rule  was  like  that  of  Solomon 
and  many  sons  of  rich  men  in  that,  to  use  an  old  but  very  apt 
phrase,  ''It  killed  the  goose  that  laid  the  golden  egg";  and, 
unfortunately  for  Egypt's  material  greatness,  he  was  suc- 
ceeded by  a  king  who,  although  one  of  the  greatest  men  of 
history  was  far  from  a  great  statesman  or  a  warrior.  He  be- 
gan his  reign  as  Amenhotep  IV ;  but,  as  he  had  conceived  of  a 
religion  more  highly  spiritual  than  the  worship  of  Amon,  and 
was  determined  to  supplant  the  old  religion  with  the  new, 
which  may  be  described  as  the  worship  of  the  god  of  the  Sun, 
he  changed  his  name  to  Ikhnaton,  or  spirit  of  the  Sun.  He 
reigned  for  seventeen  years,  during  which  he  almost  succeeded 
in  his  purpose ;  and  he  left  a  record  showing  a  greater  individ- 
uality than  that  of  any  other  man  in  history  up  to  that  time. 
But  he  almost  ruined  Egypt,  and  was  known  afterwards  as 
"the  criminal  of  Akhetaton." 

He  was  followed  by  three  weak  kings  in  succession,  under 
whom  Egypt  descended  farther  and  farther  in  the  scale  of 


74  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

strength  and  order.  Then  Harmhab  came  to  the  throne  in 
1350  B.C.  He  was  an  able  ruler  and,  like  all  able  rulers, 
devoted  his  attention  to  both  the  internal  and  external 
strength  and  prosperity  of  the  country.  Under  the  conditions 
he  was  not  able  to  accomplish  much  externally,  except  in  the 
way  of  preparing  the  way  for  some  able  successor.  His  imme- 
diate successor  was  Ramses  I,  an  old  man  who  was  soon  suc- 
ceeded by  his  son  Seti  I.  Seti's  career  was  somewhat  like  that 
of  Thutmose  III,  though  in  a  much  smaller  degree;  for  he 
made  war  in  Palestine  and  Libya,  and  brought  the  little  tribes 
and  kingdoms  there  back  to  their  allegiance.  Like  Thutmose 
also,  he  devoted  his  latter  daj's  to  improving  the  internal  con- 
dition of  Eg3^pt,  and  to  the  development  of  the  various  peace- 
ful arts,  especially  architecture.  He  was  succeeded  about 
1292  B.C.  by  Ramses  II,  who  reigned  sixty-seven  years  and 
was  the  last  great  king  of  Egypt. 

"When  Ramses  came  to  the  throne  the  internal  condition  of 
the  kingdom  was  good;  but  the  warlike  Hittites,  under  their 
king,  Metella,  had  taken  possession  of  some  provinces  in  Syria 
that  had  belonged  to  Egypt,  and  these  Ramses  determined  to 
get  back.  It  is  probable  that  Metella  heard  of  this,  for  he  set 
to  work  to  collect  a  large  army ;  so  that  when  Ramses,  with  his 
army,  entered  Syria  in  1288,  the  Hittites  were  ready  to  oppose 
him.  Ramses,  like  Thutmose  III,  utilized  a  coast  city  of  Pal- 
estine as  a  base,  and  from  it  marched  toward  the  city  of  Ka- 
desh,  on  the  west  side  of  the  Orontes  River.^  His  army  was 
divided  into  four  divisions,  led  by  the  division  of  Amon,  which 
Ramses  himself  commanded.  In  May,  Ramses  found  himself 
on  the  east  side  of  the  Orontes  River  about  a  day's  march 
from  Kadesh,  which  was  on  the  west  side.  It  seems  probable 
that  he  had  not  taken  the  precaution  to  send  an  advance 
guard  very  far  ahead,  or  else  that  Metella  had  taken  unusual 
precautions  to  prevent  any  of  his  own  forces  from  being  seen, 
because  when  Ramses  arrived  at  this  point  he  had  been  unable 
to  find  any  traces  of  the  enemy. 

1  See  sketch  on  p.  70. 


THUTMOSE  III  AND  RAMSES  II  75 

At  this  juncture  two  Bedouins  appeared,  and  declared  that 
they  had  deserted  from  the  Hittites,  and  that  the  Hittites  had 
retreated  far  northward  of  Kadesh.  Acting  on  this  story  as  if 
he  knew  it  to  be  true,  which  a  more  experienced  strategist 
would  not  have  done,  Ramses  crossed  the  river  to  the  west 
side  with  the  division  of  Amon,  and  marched  on  with  that  di- 
vision only  to  the  vicinity  of  Kadesh,  leaving  the  other  divi- 
sions to  straggle  on  after  him.  ^Metella,  being  apprised  doubt- 
less of  the  success  of  his  stratagem,  crossed  to  the  east  side  of 
the  river  and  kept  out  of  sight,  while  Ramses  passed  to  the 
north  on  the  opposite  side.  Metella  thus  secured  a  position  on 
the  flank  of  Ramses,  so  that  when  a  favorable  moment  arrived 
he  could  cross  the  river  and  divide  the  Egyptian  army  in  two. 
Ramses  arrived  in  an  apparently  favorable  position  northwest 
of  Kadesh  in  the  afternoon,  and  camped  there,  in  fancied  se- 
curity. Suddenly  he  learned  that  a  number  of  Hittite  char- 
iots had  issued  from  the  south  side  of  Kadesh  and  struck  the 
division  that  was  following  his  own  division  of  Amon.  This 
second  division  was  quickly  put  to  flight ;  some  fleeing  pre- 
cipitately into  the  camp  of  Ramses,  where  they  produced  a 
consternation  that  can  easily  be  imagined  when  it  is  realized 
that  the  chariots  of  the  Hittites  followed  close  behind  them. 

That  Ramses  had  been  guilty  of  great  negligence  in  strat- 
egy cannot  be  denied;  but  he  instantly  realized  the  situation 
tactically,  and,  with  the  greatest  possible  decision  and  bold- 
ness, charged  into  the  advancing  Hittites  as  they  poured  into 
the  west  side  of  his  camp.  His  first  charge  was  repelled ;  but 
he  instantly  made  another  charge  on  the  eastern  side,  and 
carried  it  out  with  such  impetuosity  th'at  he  drove  his  enemies 
before  him.  Fortunately  for  him,  the  discipline  among  the 
Hittites  was  very  bad,  so  that  the  Hittites,  instead  of  follow- 
ing up  their  advantage,  had  dismounted  from  their  chariots 
and  betaken  themselves  to  plundering  the  camp.  While  in 
this  helpless  situation  they  were  suddenly  set  upon  by  a  body 
of  Egyptian  recruits,  who  probably  had  marched  from  the 
coast  to  join  the  army  of  Ramses.     The  successful  charge  of 


76  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

Ramses  and  the  sudden  appearance  of  the  recruits,  together 
with  the  tactical  skill  and  courage  displayed  by  Ramses  and 
his  followers,  carried  the  day,  finall^^  to  the  extent  of  driving 
the  Hittites  behind  the  walls  of  Kadesh.  Ramses  immediately 
returned  to  Egypt,  and  made  it  appear  to  his  people  that  he 
had  accomplished  a  tremendous  victory.  The  Hittites,  how- 
ever, were  not  deceived,  nor  were  the  small  tribes  and  king- 
doms of  Syria ;  for  revolts  against  Egypt  soon  began  to  spread. 

The  battle  of  Kadesh  is  the  first  battle  of  which  there  is  any 
clear  account  in  history.  From  the  incomplete  knowledge  of 
it  that  we  have,  it  would  seem  that  the  Hittites  had  the  better 
understanding  of  strategy,  but  that  the  Egyptians  were  supe- 
rior to  them  in  tactics.  They  seem  to  have  been  so  much  su- 
perior that,  although  they  began  the  battle  in  a  very  bad 
strategic  situation,  they  were  able  to  secure  the  final  victory — 
the  tactical  victory,  which  was,  of  course,  their  ultimate  end 
in  view. 

Ramses  was  never  able  to  subdue  the  Hittites,  but  he  was 
able  finally  to  bring  about  a  situation  enabling  him  to  make  a 
treaty  with  them  whereby  each  acknowledged  the  other  vir- 
tually his  equal.  From  that  day,  Ramses  never  went  to  war 
again ;  and  though  Egypt,  under  his  reign,  became  very  pros- 
perous and  very  highly  advanced  in  all  the  arts  of  civiliza- 
tion, she  gradually  but  surely  declined. 

The  Egyptians  were  never  really  a  martial  people,  and  it 
was  only  because  of  the  energy  and  ability  of  a  few  of  their 
kings  that  Egypt  was  able  to  maintain  enough  national 
strength  to  resist  the  encroachments  of  the  barbarians  who 
surrounded  her  on  all  sides.  "We  cannot  justly  point  the  finger 
of  scorn  at  Egypt,  however;  for  she  continued  longer  as  a 
great  nation  than  any  other  nation  that  has  ever  lived.  Fi- 
nally in  525  B.C.,  she  was  conquered  by  Cambyses,  King  of 
Persia.  Besides  Egypt,  the  other  great  empires  of  antiquity 
were  Babylonia,  Assyria,  Chaldea,  Media,  and  Persia. 

About  the  early  Babylonian  empire  little  is  known  that 
bears  upon  our  subject,  except  that  the  Babylonians  built 


THUTMOSE  III  AND  RAMSES  II  77 

great  cities  and  formed  a  powerful  nation  by  the  same  means 
that  Egypt  employed  and  that  all  great  nations  have  em- 
ployed since ;  that  is,  by  developing  the  useful  arts  and 
sciences,  including  the  art  and  science  of  government,  and  by 
giving  strength  to  the  national  structure  by  developing  the 
military  arts  and  sciences  as  well.  About  728  B.C.  Babylonia 
was  conquered  by  the  King  of  Assyria,  which  had  been  a 
tributary,  but  which  now  wrested  from  Babylon  the  suprem- 
acy of  the  world.  The  Assyrians  were  a  warlike  people,  and 
originally  hardy;  but  they  succumbed  rapidly  under  the 
enervating  influences  of  wealth  and  were  conquered  about 
606  B.C.  by  the  Chaldeans  in  alliance  with  the  Medes.  Nin- 
evah,  their  capital,  was  then  literally  wiped  ofi"  of  the  surface 
of  the  earth.  The  new  Babylonian  or  Chaldean  kingdom  now 
took  the  place  of  the  Assyrian,  as  the  mistress  of  the  world. 

The  career  of  the  new  Babylonian  empire  was  splendid  in 
all  that  pertained  to  the  luxuries  of  life,  and  probably  for  that 
reason  it  rapidly  deteriorated  in  military  strength.  In  the 
year  538  b.c.  Cyrus,  the  head  of  a  new  kingdom  formed  of 
the  Medes  and  Persians,  fought  a  battle  with  the  King  of 
Babylon  in  the  plains  outside  the  city,  and  defeated  him. 
Strange  as  it  may  seem,  the  gates  of  Babylon,  though  it  was  a 
strongly  fortified  city,  were  then  thrown  open  without  further 
resistance  to  the  Persians !  An  interesting  fact  resulted  from 
this,  in  that  the  scepter  of  world  power  passed  from  the 
Semitic  nations,  which  had  always  held  it  hitherto,  to  the 
Aryan  nations.  Since  the  capture  of  Babylon,  the  great  na- 
tions of  the  world  have  always  been  Aryan.  An  exception 
must  be  made  to  this  statement  in  favor  of  Japan ;  because  in 
the  past  few  years  Japan,  though  not  even  of  the  Caucasian 
race  but  of  the  Turanian  race,  has  fought  her  way  to  the  front 
and  become  one  of  the  great  nations  of  the  earth. 

Until  the  year  553,  fifteen  years  before  the  conquest  of 
Babylon,  the  Medes  had  held  supremacy  over  the  Persians. 
After  they  had  overthrown  the  Assyrian  empire,  acting  in  con- 
junction with  the  Babylonians,  they  extended  their  dominions 


78  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

rapidly;  but  about  553  B.C.  Cyrus,  King  of  Anshan,  east  of 
Persia,  overthrew  their  power,  and  united  all  the  Medes  and 
Persians  under  himself  as  king. 

Cyrus  was  one  of  the  great  conquerors  of  history.  After 
conquering  Media,  he  conquered  Lydia  and  Babylonia,  Lydia 
being  a  rich  and  fertile  country  in  the  western  part  of  Asia 
Minor,  bordering  on  the  Mediterranean.  The  King  of  Lydia 
at  this  time  was  Croesus,  supposed  to  be  the  richest  man  in  the 
world.  Alarmed  at  the  growth  of  Persia,  Crcesus  had  thrown 
down  the  gage  of  battle  to  Cyrus,  who  defeated  him  in  the 
open  field  (in  546  b.c.)  and  captured  Sardis,  the  greatest 
city. 

Cyrus  was  succeeded  by  his  son,  Cambyses,  who  invaded 
Egypt  with  results  unparalleled  in  one  way.  Having  cap- 
tured Memphis  and  ascended  the  Nile  as  far  as  Thebes,  he 
sent  from  there  an  army  of  50,000  men  to  take  possession  of 
the  oasis  of  Amon.  But  of  this  host  not  a  man  ever  returned, 
and  history  does  not  tell  us  why !  By  some  it  has  been  sup- 
posed that  the  army  was  overwhelmed  in  a  tremendous  sand- 
storm.    Shortly  afterwards  Cambyses  committed  suicide. 

He  was  succeeded  by  Darius  I,  who  first  devoted  himself  to 
bringing  about  prosperity  in  the  interior  of  the  country,  and 
afterward  to  extending  its  boundaries.  After  bringing  all  the 
Punjab  in  northwestern  India  under  his  power,  he  turned  his 
thoughts  and  ambitions  to  the  westward,  and  resolved  on  the 
invasion  of  Europe. 


CHAPTER  VI 

MILTIADES  AND   THEMISTOCLES 

DARIUS,  King  of  Persia,  made  three  expeditions  to 
Europe,  of  which  the  second  and  third  were  di- 
rected ultimately  at  Athens.  Great  preparations 
were  made  for  each  expedition,  and  all  precautions  were  taken 
that  the  provinces  left  behind  in  Asia  Minor  should  be  reduced 
to  order  and  compelled  to  take  their  due  part  in  the  prepara- 
tions. The  King's  son-in-law,  Mardonius,  had  charge  of  the 
first.  He  was  sent  to  re-assert  Persian  supremacy  in  Thrace 
and  Macedonia,  and  then  to  march  through  Macedonia  into 
Greece,  while  a  fleet  sailed  along  the  coast  in  cooperation. 
Thrace  and  Macedonia  were  subdued,  but  the  expedition  had 
to  be  abandoned  because  the  fleet  was  partially  wrecked  in  a 
storm  near  the  promontory  of  Mount  Athos.  Mardonius  was 
compelled  to  return  to  Persia,  after  he  had  fulfilled  an  im- 
portant preliminary  part  of  the  undertaking  (492  b.c). 

Two  years  later,  when  the  second  expedition  started  out,  it 
went  straight  across  the  ^gean  Sea,  instead  of  going  by  land 
through  Thrace  and  Macedonia.  The  cities  of  the  Asian  sea- 
board were  compelled  to  equip  warships  and  transports  for 
cavalry,  and  the  command  of  the  army  was  given  to  Datis. 
How  great  were  the  forces  that  he  headed  it  is  impossible  to 
know ;  but  there  can  be  little  question  that  both  the  land  part 
and  the  naval  part  were  much  larger  than  anything  that 
Greece  could  oppose.  The  expedition  sailed  across  the  ^gean 
Sea  between  Asia  Minor  and  Greece,  subduing  the  various 
islands,  and  then  went  up  the  channel  between  Euboea  and 
Attica,  in  which  Athens  was,  and  captured  certain  towns  in 
the  province  of  Euboea.  The  army  then  crossed  the  narrow 
channel  to  Attica,  landed  on  the  shores  of  the  Bay  of  Mara- 

79 


80 


THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 


From  Creasy's  "Fifteen  Decisive  Battles  of  the  World." 
By   permission   of   Harper   &   Brothers. 

thon,  about  twenty-two  miles  northeast  of  Athens,  and  drew 
up  their  galleys  on  the  beach. 

The  Athenians  had  had  plenty  of  time  in  which  to  prepare 
for  the  attack.  They  had  also  had  considerable  experience  in 
war,  and  the  fruits  of  this  experience  showed  in  the  strategical 
and  tactical  excellence  of  their  operations.  Their  army  num- 
bered about  10,000  men,  under  the  war-ruler  Callimachus, 
and  it  was  reinforced  before  the  battle  by  about  1000  Plateaus. 
The  first  decision  the  generals  had  to  make  was  the  very  im- 
portant one  as  to  whether  he  should  await  the  attack  in  Athens 
or  advance  to  meet  the  enemy.  It  seems  that  there  was  con- 
siderable discussion,  and  that  the  final  decision  was  to  follow 
the  campaign  plan  of  Miltiades  and  meet  the  enemy  in  the 
plain  of  Marathon.  This  plain  lay  between  two  marshes  at 
its  northern  and  southern  ends,  and  between  the  sea  on  its 
east  side  and  a  mountainous  country  on  its  west  side.  There 
were  two  roads  by  which  the  army   could  march,   one  of 


MILTIADES  AND  THEMISTOCLES  81 

which  led  to  the  field  of  Marathon  along  a  narrow  stretch  of 
beach,  while  the  other  led  through  the  mountains,  and  entered 
the  plain  somewhere  near  its  middle.  If  the  army  had 
marched  by  the  coast  road,  the  Persians  would  have  been  able 
to  attack  the  head  of  the  column  as  it  reached  the  plain. 
Naturally,  the  Athenians  took  the  other  road,  and  established 
themselves  in  a  good  position  in  the  hills,  where  they  could  not 
be  assaulted  successfully  from  the  plain.  There  they  awaited 
the  first  move  of  the  Persians. 

The  Athenians  had  so  much  the  advantage  of  position  that 
it  was  clearly  to  their  interest  to  delay  the  engagement;  and 
equally  clearly  was  it  to  the  advantage  of  the  Persians  that  it 
should  not  be  delayed  too  long.  After  waiting  several  days 
in  the  hope  that  the  Greeks  would  make  some  false  move,  the 
Persians  made  ready  to  advance  toward  Athens,  the  land  force 
to  follow  the  narrow  main  road  along  the  water-front  and  the 
naval  force  to  go  by  sea.  The  Persians,  who  at  first  had  occu- 
pied the  northern  part  of  the  plain,  crossed  the  river  that 
separated  them  from  the  southern  part,  detaching  a  consider- 
able portion  to  guard  their  right  flank  from  any  assault  by 
the  Greeks.  Exactly  what  happened  immediately  afterward 
is  not  known ;  but  it  seems  that  the  Greek  and  Persian  forces 
soon  found  themselves  drawn  up  in  two  opposing  lines,  the 
Persians  with  their  backs  to  the  sea,  and  the  Greeks  with  their 
backs  to  the  mountains.  The  Greek  force  was  numerically  in- 
ferior in  number  to  the  Persian,  and  composed  mostly  of 
hoplites,  heavily  armed  infantry  soldiers,  clad  in  armor,  and 
carrying  spears,  swords  and  shields. 

The  Greeks  advanced  at  a  run  toward  the  enemy,  in  order 
to  come  to  close  quarters,  where  their  heavy  arms  and  armor 
would  have  a  great  advantage  over  the  lighter  equipment  of 
the  Persians,  and  also  to  escape  the  arrows  that  the  Persians 
shot  at  them.  The  story  is  that  Miltiades  purposely  made 
his  center  weak  and  his  flanks  strong,  with  the  idea  of  permit- 
ting the  Persians  to  break  through  the  center  and  then  of 
enveloping  them  with  his  flanks.     This  is  exactly  what  hap- 


82  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

pened,  and  the  Athenian  wings,  closing  in  on  the  enemy's 
flanks  as  they  rushed  forward,  threw  them  into  confusion,  and 
then  drove  them  back  upon  the  shore  with  slaughter.  It  seems 
probable  that  only  a  portion  of  the  Persian  army  was  engaged, 
and  that  those  unengaged  retreated  to  their  ships  in  disorder 
as  soon  as  the  fact  became  evident  that  the  Greeks  were  suc- 
ceeding. 

The  Persian  fleet  then  sailed  for  Athens;  but,  arriving 
within  sight  of  the  place  and  seeing  that  it  was  not  unde- 
fended (for  the  victors  of  Marathon  had  immediately  marched 
to  Athens  to  defend  it),  they  sailed  away,  and  Datis  aban- 
doned the  enterprise. 

The  battle  of  Marathon,  like  a  few  others  in  history  in  which 
great  forces  were  not  engaged,  was  nevertheless  a  super-im- 
portant battle;  because,  if  the  issue  had  been  decided  in  the 
contrary  way,  Greece  would  have  come  under  the  heel  of 
Persia,  and  the  world  would  now  not  have  the  benefits  of  the 
civilization  that  Greece  afterward  created.  The  battle  is  one 
illustration,  among  countless  others  in  history,  that  the  tri- 
umph of  civilization  over  barbarism  and  semi-civilization  has 
been  brought  about  by  force — that  is,  by  force  of  war.  This 
does  not  mean  that  the  people  on  the  side  of  civilization  have 
been  more  warlike  than  those  on  the  side  of  barbarism  or  of 
the  less  advanced  civilization.  It  does  mean,  however,  that 
the  forces  on  the  side  of  civilization  have  been  directed  with 
a  greater  intelligence  and  skill — that  is,  by  better  strategy. 
This  means  also  that  a  great  factor,  and  possibly  the  greatest 
single  factor,  in  the  triumph  of  civilization  over  barbarism 
and  semi-civilization  has  been  strategy. 

The  failure  of  the  expedition  roused  the  Persian  king  to  a 
determination  to  repeat  the  attempt,  and  on  a  scale  that 
should  not  only  insure  punishment,  which  had  been  the  main 
intention  of  the  second  expedition,  but  accomplish  conquest. 
As  we  shall  see,  the  third  expedition  was  also  a  failure,  be- 
cause of  the  defeat  of  the  Persian  fleet  at  the  battle  of  Salamis. 

The  great  victory  at  Salamis  must,  of  course,  be  credited  to 


MILTIADES  AND  THEMISTOCLES  83 

all  the  Greeks  that  took  part  in  it  directly  or  indirectly.  One 
figure  stands  out,  however,  so  clearly  as  to  outshine  all  the 
others.  This  is  the  figure  of  Themistocles.  If  Thutmose  III 
was  the  first  great  strategist  of  history,  Themistocles  was  the 
second.  Themistocles  was  gifted  with  the  greatest  attribute 
of  the  strategist,  foresight;  and  in  Themistocles  this  gift  of 
foresight  was  reinforced  (as  it  must  be  in  every  great  strate- 
gist) with  sufficient  force  and  courage  to  impress  his  convic- 
tions on  others,  and  with  energy  to  carry  the  consequent 
policy  into  practice  afterward. 

Three  years  before  the  battle  of  Marathon,  Themistocles  had 
stood  up  alone  before  the  admirals  and  generals  (strategoi) 
and  other  public  men  of  Athens,  and  declared  that  the  great- 
ness of  Athens  could  be  best  assured,  not  by  a  great  army,  but 
by  a  great  na\'y.  He  pointed  out  the  long  coastline  of  Greece, 
the  fact  that  the  fleet  alwaj's  cooperated  with  the  Persian  army 
in  distant  expeditions,  that  the  Persian  army  was  dependent 
on  the  fleet  for  assuring  its  supplies,  that  an  Athenian  fleet 
based  on  the  shores  of  Greece  near  by  would  have  a  great  ad- 
vantage over  a  fleet  coming  from  a  distant  place,  that  there- 
fore the  weak  point  in  any  attack  on  Greece  by  Persia  was  the 
Persian  fleet,  and  that,  as  a  consequence  of  all  these  facts, 
the  main  effort  of  Greek  strategy'  should  be  naval. 

Themistocles  was  able  to  con\'ince  the  people  of  Athens  and 
to  commit  them  to  a  great  increase  of  their  na^'y.  A  rich 
bed  of  silver  had  recently  been  discovered  and  had  brought  a 
large  sum  into  the  treasury.  It  was  proposed  to  distribute 
this  among  the  people;  but  Themistocles  persuaded  the  As- 
sembly to  apply  it  to  the  building  of  new  ships,  and  even 
roused  so  much  interest  that  special  contributions  were  made 
afterward,  and  many  ships  were  built.  The  result  was  that, 
before  the  battle  of  Salamis,  Athens  had  nearly  two  hundred 
triremes  in  her  navy. 

After  the  return  of  his  ill-fated  expedition,  King  Darius 
began  almost  immediately  to  make  preparations  for  a  third ; 
but  a  revolt  in  Egypt  delayed  them,  and  shortty  afterward  his 


MILTIADES  AND  THEMISTOCLES  85 

death  occurred,  in  the  year  485  b.c.  He  was  succeeded  by 
Xerxes,  who  debated  with  his  councilors  for  a  long  while  as 
to  whether  or  not  he  should  carry  out  the  project  of  Darius. 
He  was  finally  persuaded  to  do  so,  and  definite  preparations 
were  undertaken  in  the  year  483.  The  first  act  was  the  foolish 
one  of  digging  a  canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  Mount  Athos,  in 
order  that  the  fleet  should  not  be  compelled  to  go  round  the 
promontory  where  so  large  a  part  of  the  fleet  of  Mardonius 
had  been  wrecked.  Another  part  of  the  preparations  was  lay- 
ing bridges  over  the  Strymon  River,  which  the  army  would 
have  to  cross,  and  making  preparations  all  along  the  line  of 
route  for  the  feeding  of  the  soldiers.  Another  part  was  the 
building  of  two  bridges  across  the  Hellespont,  which  divided 
Asia  Minor  in  Asia  from  Thrace  in  Europe,  in  order  that  the 
army  might  march  across,  instead  of  going  by  ship !  The  ac- 
counts show  that  the  construction  of  these  two  unnecessary 
bridges  was  a  work  that  taxed  the  energies  and  resources  of 
the  engineers  and  workmen  to  the  utmost ;  and  that  the  army 
did  not  cross  them  until  April,  480  B.C.  It  is  said  that  they 
crossed  in  two  days ;  and  that  Xerxes  watched  their  passage 
from  a  marble  throne  erected  on  the  shore.  What  the  number 
of  the  army  was  is  not  exactly  known.  The  statements  vary 
from  5,000,000  to  300,000.  The  latter  figure  is  probably  the 
more  nearly  correct. 

The  Persian  army  was  joined  by  the  fleet  near  the  shores  of 
Thrace,  and  both  acted  together  thenceforward.  They  met 
with  little  resistance  until  the  army  reached  the  narrow  pass 
of  Thermopylffi,  sometime  in  July ;  though  a  short  time  before 
the  Persian  fleet  encountered  three  Greek  vessels  sent  forward 
to  reconnoiter,  and  destroyed  two  of  them. 

In  the  meantime,  Greece  had  also  been  busy  making  prepara- 
tions, to  which  she  had  been  stimulated  greatly  by  the  cutting 
of  the  canal  near  Mount  Athos.  It  was  realized,  of  course, 
that  the  defense  w^ould  have  to  be  both  militarj^  and  naval. 
At  that  time  Sparta  was  the  strongest  power  in  Greece,  for 
Athens  had  not  yet  established  herself  even  as  a  naval  power. 


86 


THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 


The  result  was  that  the  command  of  the  army  and  navy  were 
both  given  to  Spartans,  the  command  of  the  army  to  King 
Leonidas,  and  the  command  of  the  navy  to  Eurybiadas. 

When  Xerxes  reached  the  Hellespont,  the  Thessalians  real- 


Longitude  East  2^°  of  Crceiivi  1 


From  Burg's  "History  of  Greece." 
By  permission  of  the  Macmillan  Co. 


IValterO'BoulalIsc 


ized  with  alarm  the  defenseless  condition  of  northern  Greece, 
and  endeavored  to  have  measures  taken  for  its  defense.  In 
this  they  were  unsuccessful,  inasmuch  as  the  final  decision  was 
made  not  to  attempt  any  resistance  until  the  Persians  should 
reach  the  narrow  pass  of  Thermopylae,  which  was  the  only 
direct  road  through  the  mountains  toward  the  south.  Leo- 
nidas  went  there,  therefore,  with  his  army,  which  comprised 
about  7000  men.  In  the  month  of  July  the  Persian  army 
arrived  at  Thermopylge  and  the  Persian  fleet  at  the  southern 
extremity  of  the  promontory  of  Magnesium,  about  fifty  miles 
away.  A  great  storm  then  arose  and  destroyed  some  hundreds 
of  the  Persian  ships.  Naturally,  this  heartened  the  Greeks  ex- 
ceedingly, for  they  believed  that  it  proved  that  the  gods  were 


MILTIADES  AND  THEMISTOCLES  87 

fighting  on  their  side.  The  Persians  then  secretly  sent  two 
hundred  vessels  to  sail  around  Euboea,  to  get  between  the 
mainland  and  the  Greek  fleet,  then  stationed  near  Artemisium, 
at  the  northern  end  of  this  island;  but  the  gods  again  inter- 
fered, with  the  result  that  these  two  hundred  ships,  after  hav- 
ing rounded  the  southern  end  of  the  island,  were  wrecked  in 
a  storm  on  the  coast.  Meanwhile  Leonidas  had  taken  up  his 
post  at  Thermopylse.  The  strategic  and  tactical  situation 
would  have  been  excellent  for  the  Greeks,  had  there  not  been 
a  by-road  over  the  mountains,  which,  though  longer  than  the 
length  of  the  pass,  afforded  very  few  natural  facilities  for  re- 
sistance. It  was  hoped  that  the  Persians  might  not  know  of 
this  road,  but  a  force  of  Phocians  was  nevertheless  sent  to 
guard  it. 

Xerxes  realized  the  danger  of  attempting  to  force  the  pass, 
and  waited  four  days  in  the  hope  that  the  Greeks  would  be 
overawed  by  the  sight  of  his  great  army,  and  retreat.  Since 
they  did  not  do  so,  he  attacked  on  the  fifth  day  and  on  the 
sixth,  but  with  no  result.  He  then  decided  to  send  a  force 
of  his  best  men  by  the  mountain  road  into  the  plain  beyond, 
under  the  guidance  of  a  Greek  named  Ephialtes,  and  from 
there  to  attack  the  Greeks  in  the  rear.  The  manoeuver  was 
successful;  and,  though  the  Greeks  fought  with  the  greatest 
gallantry,  they  could  not,  of  course,  prevail  against  a  force 
so  much  greater,  that  attacked  them  from  both  sides. 

The  forcing  of  the  pass  of  Thermopylae  left  free  the  road  to 
Greece.  The  Persians  advanced  rapidly  and  entered  Athens 
without  resistance.  Meanwhile  the  Athenian  fleet  had  re- 
turned to  Athens,  and  there  they  found  the  Peloponnesians 
building  a  wall  from  sea  to  sea  across  the  isthmus,  in  the  selfish 
endeavor  to  protect  Peloponnesus  only,  leaving  Attica,  includ- 
ing Athens,  undefended.  Themistocles  and  his  colleagues 
made  a  proclamation  that  all  Athenian  citizens  should  embark 
in  the  triremes,  and  that  all  who  could  should  convey  their 
families  and  property  across  the  water  to  places  of  safety. 
This  was  done;  and  therefore  it  was  that  when  the  Persians 


88  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

reached  Athens  they  found  the  city  almost  deserted,  except  for 
a  small  band  of  defenders  who  had  intrenched  themselves  on 
the  Acropolis.  A  conflict  ensued  which  lasted  two  weeks,  at 
the  end  of  which  time  the  Persians  had  secured  possession  of 
that;  natural  fortress. 

After  the  fall  of  the  Acropolis,  the  danger  of  the  situation 


£leu^ 


^^c^f2?i^iis 


^is\ 


T  r  c, 


MEGARIS     /r         '    Qf     E  leu  SIS      >'^*2S^ 


I,  oS   — 


7  ^I  s  i  a^  n  d  3      (.,^., ,  o^^rf^ 


i«^«rn  1  G    y^^ ) 


irv 

S   a    ,    o^if  I  c    -^  G  a  I  f 


Battle  of 

SALAMIS 
B.C. 480. 

Sea  Miles 
;         ?        j        4 


From  Burg's  "History  of  Greece." 
By  permission  of  the  Macmillan  Co. 


IValAerii-eoulalisc, 


was  intensely  realized,  and  the  Greek  strategoi  held  a  council 
of  war,  at  which  it  was  decided  that  the  Greeks  would  retreat 
to  the  isthmus  south  of  Attica,  and  that  the  Greek  fleet  should 
there  await  the  attack  of  the  Persian  fleet.  Themistocles  had 
been  exerting  his  influence  to  have  the  decisive  fight  in  the 
Bay  of  Salamis;  but  his  colleagues,  being  men  of  inferior 
strategic  genius  and  daring,  were  overimpressed  by  the  fact 
that  there  would  be  greater  safety  from  disaster  near  the 
isthmus,  because  they  would  be  in  close  touch  with  their  land 
forces,  and  also  have  the  Peloponnesus  to  retreat  to  in  case  of 
defeat. 


MILTIADES  AND  THEMISTOCLES  89 

At  this  juncture,  with  patriotic  intent,  Themistocles  se- 
cretly thwarted  the  execution  of  the  decision  of  the  strategoi 
by  going  privately  to  Eurybiadas  and  convincing  him  that  ii 
would  be  more  advantageous  to  fight  in  the  restricted  waters 
of  the  Bay  of  Salamis  than  in  the  open  bay;  because  in  the 
narrow  waters  of  Salamis  the  great  number  and  speed  of  the 
Persian  ships  could  not  be  utilized.  A  new  council  was  then 
called,  in  which  Themistocles  was  able  to  impress  his  views, 
though  with  great  difficulty. 

Meanwhile  the  Persians  were  not  idle.  They  had  placed 
their  fleet  across  the  entire  southern  exit  from  the  Bay  of 
Salamis,  and  had  also  landed  troops  on  the  island  of  Psyttalea, 
to  rescue  any  Persians  and  to  kill  any  Greeks  who  might  swim 
ashore  in  the  expected  battle.  These  movements  alarmed  the 
Greeks  to  such  extent  that  another  council  was  called,  at 
which  so  timorous  a  feeling  was  exhibited  that  Themistocles 
saw  that  all  his  work  was  about  to  be  nullified.  He  then  de- 
termined on  a  course  of  action  that  has  no  counterpart  in  re- 
corded history;  and  if  he  had  been  detected  in  carrying  it  out 
he  would  probably  have  been  declared  a  traitor,  and  his  name 
would  have  gone  do\\Ti  in  history  in  infamy.  What  he  did 
was  to  send  a  slave  to  the  Persian  camp,  bearing  a  message 
from  himself  as  a  friend,  to  the  effect  that  the  Greeks  purposed 
to  sail  away  in  the  night ;  and  saying  that  if  they  were  pre- 
vented from  doing  this,  a  Persian  victor}^  was  certain,  owing 
to  the  disaffection  among  the  Greeks;  and,  furthermore,  that 
if  the  Persians  should  attack  the  Greek  ships  where  they  then 
were,  the  Athenians  would  revolt  against  their  allies.  Strange 
as  it  may  seem,  this  message  was  believed,  and  Xerxes  took 
measures  to  hinder  the  Greek  fleet  from  escaping  by  the  west- 
ern straits,  between  the  island  of  Salamis  and  Megaris,  by 
placing  two  hundred  ships  south  of  the  straits. 

Meanwhile,  the  council  of  Greek  strategoi  was  going  on. 
Suddenly  word  was  brought  that  the  Greek  fleet  had  thus  been 
made  prisoner.  Themistocles  had  gained  his  point :  the  battle 
had  to  be  fought  at  Salamis. 


90  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

At  daybreak  on  the  following  morning  the  Persians  began 
their  advance,  passing  on  both  sides  of  the  island  of  Psyttalea 
into  the  Bay  of  Salamis.  This,  of  course,  put  them  at  a  great 
tactical  disadvantage,  because  the  Greek  ships  could  attack 
the  heads  of  the  column  as  they  came  successively  into  the 
bay.  The  Greeks  set  upon  them  furiously;  and  so  crowded 
were  the  waters  that  the  great  numbers  of  the  Persian  ships, 
instead  of  being  an  advantage  to  them,  was  an  actual  dis- 
advantage, because  it  prevented  their  freedom  of  movement. 
The  result  was  a  perfect  victory  for  the  Greeks. 

The  battle  of  Salamis  is  one  of  the  most  instructive  battles  in 
the  history  of  the  world,  in  that  it  proves  the  overwhelming 
possibilities  of  the  genius  of  the  strategist ;  for  by  nothing  else 
than  the  genius  of  Themistocles  was  the  expedition  of  the 
Persians  brought  to  naught  and  Greece  saved  from  ruin. 

The  battle  of  Marathon  has  sometimes  been  declared  to  be 
the  most  important  battle  in  the  history  of  the  world  up  to 
that  time.  Perhaps  it  was,  but  certainly  it  was  not  so  im- 
portant as  the  later  battle  of  Salamis ;  for  the  battle  of  Mara- 
thon repelled  what  was  comparatively  a  minor  expedition, 
while  the  battle  of  Salamis  repelled  the  most  determined  at- 
tack that  Persia  was  capable  of  making. 

The  battle  of  Salamis  is  also  a  better  illustration  of  the 
operations  of  strategy  than  is  the  battle  of  Marathon,  though 
there  was  considerable  strategic  preparation  before  both  bat- 
tles ;  for  the  planning  of  the  battle  of  Marathon  was  of  a  more 
commonplace  order,  made  to  meet  a  more  usual  situation,  and 
more  obviously  suggested  by  the  conditions  than  was  the  plan- 
ning of  the  battle  of  Salamis  by  Themistocles.  Though  many 
of  the  campaigns  that  have  followed  Salamis  in  the  succeeding 
centuries  have  employed  the  services  of  many  more  men,  have 
extended  over  larger  areas  and  required  a  longer  time,  there 
is  no  campaign  that  illustrates  more  brilliantly  the  victory- 
gaining  power  of  good  strategy. 

The  word  strategy,  it  may  be  remarked,  comes  from  the 
Greek  word  strategeia,  which  meant  the  art  of  the  strategos. 


MILTIADES  AND  THEMISTOCLES  91 

Now,  Themistocles  was  a  strategos.  It  is  true  that  he  occupied 
other  positions  at  different  times;  but  it  was  his  ability  as  a 
strategos  that  enabled  him  to  see  that  Greece  needed  a 
navy  more  than  an  army;  to  realize  the  strate^e  advantage 
of  the  Bay  of  Salamis  as  the  locality  for  the  coming  battle ;  to 
bring  the  Athenians  to  his  point  of  view;  and  finally,  when 
they  failed  him  because  of  sheer  lack  of  strategic  genius  them- 
selves, it  was  the  ability  of  Themistocles  as  a  strategos  that 
enabled  him  to  have  the  battle  fought  at  Salamis,  in  spite  of 
them.  All  these  things  might  have  happened,  of  course,  and 
the  battle  have  been  lost  by  the  Greeks.  In  that  case,  Themis- 
tocles would  have  been  like  many  another  man  who  was  just 
about  to  put  his  foot  on  the  pinnacle  of  greatness,  and  then 
slipped  off.  But  Themistocles  did  not  slip  off.  The  issue  of 
the  battle  was  exactly  what  Themistocles  had  foreseen;  and 
the  name  of  Themistocles  is  therefore  enrolled  among  the 
names  of  the  very  few  strategists  who  stand  on  the  high  pla- 
teau of  greatness. 

Many  centuries  later,  after  the  weapons  and  methods  of 
warfare  in  Europe  had  assumed,  for  the  time  being,  a  fairly 
definite  type  in  all  armies,  before  navies  had  yet  emerged  from 
their  relative  inferiority  to  armies  because  of  the  uncertainties 
of  sail  power  and  because  of  the  difficulty  of  cooperation  be- 
tween armies  and  navies,  the  word  strategy  came  gradually  to 
be  applied  to  military  strategy  only,  and  even  to  the  mere 
operating  of  armies  in  the  field,  after  war  had  begun.  That 
this  was  a  very  narrow  view  of  strategy  can  hardly  be  denied ; 
and  that  it  left  out  of  consideration  all  strategic  preparations 
preceding  war  is  clear.  Possibly  this  might  not  have  been 
disadvantageous  if  another  word  had  existed,  or  had  been 
created,  to  bring  before  the  minds  of  people  the  fact  that  the 
most  important  single  factor  in  gaining  victory  in  any  war 
is  the  strategic  preparation  made  before  the  war  begins.  But, 
as  there  is  no  such  word,  we  must  either  recognize  strategy  as 
a  continuing  factor,  existing  before  a  war  and  extending 
through  it,  or  else  ignore  all  that  strategists  like  Themistocles, 


92  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

Philip  of  Macedon,  Frederick  the  Great,  and  Moltke  did  before 
their  wars,  and  imagine  wars  to  start  from  a  strategic  zero! 
The  Romans  tell  us,  ^'Ex  nihilo,  nihil  fit." 

The  Persians  retreated  north  after  the  battle  of  Salamis, 
the  army  by  land  and  the  fleet  by  sea.  The  army  wintered 
in  Thessaly,  and  advanced  south  in  the  fallowing  spring, 
whereupon  the  Athenians  again  abandoned  their  city.  Under 
the  conditions,  one  would  presume  that  all  the  Greeks  would 
rally  zealously  to  repel  their  Asiatic  foe ;  and  yet,  it  was  only 
by  dint  of  the  greatest  exertions  that  the  Athenians  were  able 
to  induce  the  Spartans  to  come  tardily  to  the  assistance  of 
Central  Greece.  The  Persians  and  Greeks  finally  came  to 
battle  on  rough  ground  near  the  town  of  Platea,  though  the 
Persians  tried  to  bring  on  the  battle  on  a  level  plain  near  by, 
which  they  selected  because  it  would  give  them  room  for  the 
movements  of  their  cavalry.  In  the  battle  that  ensued,  the 
Greeks  won,  largely  because  of  their  heavier  armor  and  weap- 
ons, and  the  greater  skill  and  strength  of  the  Spartan  hoplites. 
About  the  same  time  the  crews  of  Greek  vessels  landed  at 
Mycale,  and  gained  a  victory  over  a  superior  force  of  Persians. 

The  victories  of  the  Greeks  over  the  Persians  were  due  in  a 
measure,  of  course,  to  the  fact  that  they  had  the  strategic  ad- 
vantage of  position,  in  being  near  to  their  home  base  of  sup- 
plies, while  the  Persians  were  dependent  on  a  long  line  of 
communications ;  but  they  were  due  in  at  least  equal  measure 
to  the  fact  that  the  Greeks  were  superior  to  the  Persians  men- 
tally, spiritually,  and  physically.  A  contributory  reason  was 
that  the  battlefields  of  Greece,  both  on  the  water  and  on  the 
land,  were  so  small,  owing  to  the  numerous  ranges  of  hills  and 
mountains  and  the  shape  of  the  coastline,  that  the  numerical 
superiority  of  the  Persians  could  not  be  fully  utilized.  An 
army  or  a  fleet  is  at  a  great  disadvantage  when  it  finds  itself 
so  placed  that  its  freedom  of  movement  is  restricted.  We  can 
draw  another  analogy  from  the  prize-ring,  in  which  we  see  that 
one  pugilist  acquires  a  great  advantage  over  the  other  if  he 
can  drive  him  into  a  comer  against  the  ropes. 


MILTIADES  AND  THEMISTOCLES  93 

In  the  same  year  with  the  battle  of  Salamis,  the  Greeks  won 
a  decisive  victory  at  Himera  over  the  Carthaginians,  who, 
doubtless  instigated  by  Xerxes,  attempted  an  invasion  of 
Sicily.  These  great  victories  over  two  different  peoples,  fol- 
lowed by  the  victories  of  Platea  and  Mycale,  filled  the  Greeks 
with  extraordinary  enthusiasm,  and  instilled  in  them  what 
they  had  never  had  before,  a  national  spirit.  In  a  short  time, 
however,  the  long-standing  rivalry  between  Athens  and 
Sparta,  the  great  dissimilarity  in  the  characters  of  their  peo- 
ples, and  the  inherently  jealous  character  of  all,  brought  about 
a  gradually  increasing  enmity.  The  main  cause  of  this  was 
the  fact  that  Athens  devoted  herself  to  the  beautifying  of  the 
city  and  the  production  of  works  of  art,  and  assumed  an  atti- 
tude of  superiority  over  Sparta  and  all  other  parts  of  Greece. 
Under  Pericles,  a  sort  of  Athenian  empire  was  established, 
wliich,  though  small,  was  more  beautiful  and  elegant  than  any 
that  has  existed  since. 

War  between  Athens  and  Sparta  finally  broke  out  in  431  B.C. 
The  resources  of  Athens  and  her  allies  were  greater  than  those 
of  Sparta  and  her  allies;  but  the  result  was  the  same  as  in 
many  similar  wars,  the  side  that  possessed  the  greater  mate- 
rial sources  going  down  before  the  side  that  possessed  the 
greater  strategic  skill  and  military  strength.  The  war  was 
not  fought  at  all  well  by  the  Athenian  side,  and  ended  in 
405  B.C.  with  what  has  been  called  the  battle  of  ^gospotami, 
but  which  was  not  a  battle  at  all,  but  a  disgraceful  incident. 
For  the  Athenians,  not  seeing  the  enemy  near  on  one  occasion, 
left  their  ships  near  the  shore  while  they  landed  to  gather 
food,  and  the  enemy,  coming  up  at  this  time  with  their  fleet, 
simply  attacked  the  vacated  triremes.  This  scandalous  event 
ended  the  war,  and  caused  the  imposition  of  degrading  terms 
of  peace  on  Athens.  In  only  seventy-six  years  after  the  glori- 
ous battle  of  Salamis,  the  Athenians  had  degenerated  so 
greatly  that  they  were  forced  to  demolish  their  long  walls,  give 
up  all  their  warships  except  twelve,  and  follow  Sparta  in  peace 
and  in  war.     The  Peloponnesians  entered  the  Pireeus  with 


94  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

their  fleet,  and  began  the  destruction  of  the  walls  of  Athens  to 
the  music  of  flutes. 

Sparta  had  now  become  preeminent,  wholly  because  of  her 
warlike  spirit;  but  she  soon  had  to  maintain  her  supremacy 
against  the  rising  power  of  Thebes  under  her  king,  Epaminon- 
das.  A  battle  between  them  was  fought  at  Leuctra  in  371 
B.C.,  which  was  won  by  Epaminondas  by  the  exercise  of  an 
unexpected  mode  of  attack  now  called  the  ''attack  en  echelon," 
by  which  one  wing'  (in  this  case  the  left)  was  advanced  ahead 
of  the  center,  and  the  center  ahead  of  the  right.  As  the  left 
wing  would  be  the  first  to  strike  the  enemy,  Epaminondas 
made  it  especially  strong — made  it,  in  fact,  a  column  fifty 
men  deep.  The  Spartans  being  drawn  up  in  line,  twelve  men 
deep  as  usual,  their  right  wing  could  not  withstand  the  impact 
of  the  first  charge,  and  was  hurled  back  in  confusion,  which  a 
prompt  attack  by  the  Theban  cavalry  increased.  The  Spartan 
center  and  left  threw  themselves  on  the  right  flank  of  the 
Theban  column,  but  were  held  off  by  the  reserves,  the  ' '  Sacred 
Band"  of  three  hundred  hoplites,  which  Epaminondas  had 
stationed  in  the  rear  for  that  purpose. 

This  attack,  if  it  were  new,  showed  a  great  deal  of  inventive, 
strategical,  and  tactical  ability  on  the  part  of  Epaminondas. 
And  it  probably  was  new  to  the  Spartans ;  for  otherwise  they 
would  not  have  been  surprised,  and  would  either  have  strength- 
ened their  right  wing,  and  had  reserves  at  hand  there,  or 
would  have  been  prepared  to  take  effective  counter-measures, 
and  attack  more  strongly  the  head  of  the  Theban  column  and 
the  Theban  center  and  rear  with  their  center  and  left  wings. 
It  will  be  noted  that  Epaminondas  did  not  really  isolate  any 
part  of  the  Spartan  force  from  the  rest  of  the  force,  and  that 
all  the  parts  of  the  Spartan  force  could  have  acted  together. 
That  they  did  not  do  so  must  be  ascribed  to  defective  tactical 
skill  in  the  Spartan  chief. 

The  battle  of  Leuctra  enhanced  the  prestige  of  Thebes  and 
prompted  her  to  achieve  the  supremacy  in  Greece :  but  in  the 
battle  of  Mantinea,  in  362  b.c,  though  Epaminondas  repeated 


MILTIADES  AND  THEMISTOCLES  95 

his  tactics  of  Leuctra  with  distinct  success,  and  cut  through 
the  opposing  ranks  of  the  enemy,  he  himself  was  mortally- 
wounded,  and  there  was  no  one  able  to  take  his  place.  The 
result  was  a  victory  for  neither  side,  and  a  truce  that  practi- 
cally restored  the  status  quo. 

From  the  dawn  of  history  until  the  time  we  now  have 
reached  in  this  discussion,  Greece  had  never  become  a  nation, 
and  had  never,  therefore,  been  able  to  exercise  the  influence 
in  the  world  that  might  have  been  expected  from  the  high  in- 
telligence and  strong  character  of  her  various  peoples;  be- 
cause no  single  state  and  no  single  man  had  been  great  enough 
to  draw  all  together  under  one  leadership  and  direct  their 
energies  to  one  purpose.  Greece  was  never  able  to  unite  her- 
self. She  was  finally  united  by  Philip,  king  of  a  semi-bar- 
barous state  called  Macedon. 


CHAPTER  VII 

PHILIP   OF   MACEDON   AND   ALEXANDER   HIS   SON 

PHILIP  was  a  son  of  a  strategist,  Amyntas  II,  who  was 
king  of  the  lowlanders  in  Macedon,  and  who  by  adopt- 
ing the  military  system  and  the  arms  and  armor  of  the 
civilized  Greeks  was  able  to  bring  the  barbarian  highlanders 
into  subjection  and  unite  all  of  Macedon  in  one  monarchy, 
under  himself  as  king. 

Amyntas  died  in  369  B.C.  In  367  the  Thebans  interfered  in 
Macedon,  and  carried  away  Philip  as  a  hostage,  Philip  being 
then  fifteen  years  old.  Thebes  was  at  the  height  of  her  glory. 
Her  army  was  the  best  in  the  world,  and  her  civilization,  while 
not  so  cultured  as  that  of  Athens,  was  more  virile.  Philip 
was  tremendously  impressed,  with  all  he  saw;  and  when,  at 
the  end  of  a  three  years'  stay  in  Thebes,  he  returned  to  Mace- 
don, he  was  filled  with  designs  for  glorifying  himself  and  her. 
In  358  he  deposed  his  nephew,  had  himself  proclaimed  king, 
and  started  on  a  career  which  evidenced  a  combination  of  far- 
sightedness, determination,  courage,  diplomatic  skill,  and 
strategic  wisdom  that  has  no  superior  in  history.  At  this  time 
Macedon  was  looked  upon  by  the  Greeks  as  almost  barbarous ; 
but  Philip  realized  that  Greece  was  a  hopelessly  and  helplessly 
divided  collection  of  little  states,  incapable  of  concerted  action. 
For  twenty-two  years  Philip  carried  on  a  program  of  diplo- 
matic intrigue,  statesmanship,  and  bullying  that  gradually 
brought  Macedon  to  the  front,  and  made  it  evident  that  if  the 
Greek  states  did  not  combine  against  her,  Philip  would  con- 
quer them  all  and  unite  them  under  his  crown,  as  his  father 
had  united  the  tribes  of  Macedon. 

Among  the  many  statesmanlike  things  that  Philip  aceom- 

96 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON  AND  ALEXANDER        97 

plished,  the  most  important  single  thing  was  the  improvement 
he  effected  in  the  Macedonian  army.  In  order  fully  to  appre- 
ciate the  importance  of  this,  we  must  realize  that  Greece  had 
been  on  the  downward  road  ever  since  her  great  victories  over 
Persia  in  480  b.c.  ;  that  Persia,  though  effete,  was  still  the  most 
powerful  empire  in  the  world,  and  that  she  still  threatened  to 
smother  the  only  civilization  in  the  world — the  civilization  of 
Greece. 

Philip  combined  those  traits  which  we  see  in  all  men  who 
have  pushed  their  countries  forward.  If  he  had  not,  he  would 
not  have  been  able  to  achieve  even  his  first  success — that  of 
making  the  Macedonian  army  the  best  in  the  world.  But,  by 
sheer  force  of  character  and  ability,  he  was  able,  not  to  force 
the  Macedonian  people  to  build  up  their  army,  but  to  fire  them 
with  enthusiasm  and  to  enlist  all  classes  of  people  to  take  part 
gladly  in  the  work.  He  was  himself  an  incessant  worker,  a 
fighter,  a  drinker,  and  a  man  of  the  people  in  his  sympathies 
and  tastes.  Demosthenes  said  of  Philip :  "In  his  struggle 
for  power  and  empire  he  had  an  eye  cut  out,  his  collar-bone 
fractured,  and  a  hand  and  leg  mutilated,  and  was  willing  to 
sacrifice  any  part  of  his  body  which  fortune  might  choose  to 
take,  provided  he  could  live  with  the  remainder  in  honor  and 
glory."  This  being  understood,  we  can  readily  see  how  he 
organized  the  rough  highland  huntsmen  and  the  peasants  of 
the  lowlands  in  local  regiments,  and  built  up  the  Macedonia 
phalanx. 

This  phalanx  was  like  the  Greek  phalanx,  except  that  the 
spears  were  much  longer  and  the  armor  lighter,  and  that  the 
men  were  not  massed  so  closely  together,  and  had  therefore 
greater  freedom  of  movement.  The  nobles  served  in  the  cav- 
alry as  ''companions"  of  the  king;  for  a  part  of  Philip's  sys- 
tem was  to  give  greater  prominence  to  the  cavalry.  Gradually 
stirred  by  the  example  and  enthusiasm  of  the  king,  and  by  the 
efficiency  that  the  army  was  evidently  gaining,  the  army  be- 
came the  pride  of  the  people;  and  military  distinction  and 
military  rank  became  the  great  prizes  in  the  eyes  of  everyone. 


98  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

The  effect  on  the  people  was  admirable  in  every  way;  for  it 
instilled  the  virtues  of  courage,  loyalty,  patriotism,  and  health- 
ful living,  and  gave  to  Macedon  that  quality  which  is  more 
effective  than  any  other  in  making  a  nation  strong — sol- 
idarity. 

Naturally,  the  states  of  Greece  became  alarmed  at  the  prog- 
ress of  Philip,  and  several  wars  resulted ;  but  the  Greeks  were 
too  selfish  and  pleasure-loving  to  make  much  effective  resist- 
ance. The  most  important  single  factor  in  arousing  the 
Greeks  against  Philip  was  the  Athenian  orator  Demosthenes. 
Gradually  Demosthenes  brought  about  an  Hellenic  League. 
A  battle  between  the  Hellenic  League  and  Philip  finally  took 
place  at  Charonea  in  the  year  338  b.c.  On  each  side  were 
about  30,000  men.  The  battle  reminds  us  curiously  of  the 
battle  of  Leuctra,  though  reversed ;  that  is,  Philip  used  tactics 
against  the  Thebans  and  the  Athenians  like  those  which  the 
Thebans  had  used  against  the  Spartans.  On  the  League  side, 
the  Thebans  held  the  right  wing,  some  of  the  smaller  states  the 
middle,  and  the  Athenians  the  left;  while  on  the  Macedonian 
side,  the  left  flank  was  made  the  strongest,  and  was  supported 
by  the  cavalry,  as  had  been  the  case  with  the  Theban  side  at 
the  battle  of  Leuctra.  The  subsequent  tactics  also  were  simi- 
lar, for  Philip  directed  the  right  wing  to  give  way  for  a  while 
before  the  Athenians,  while  his  left  wing  forced  back  the 
Thebans  and  threw  them  into  confusion;  whereupon  the  cav- 
alry under  the  king's  son,  Alexander,  then  eighteen  years  old, 
threw  themselves  upon  the  helpless  mass.  The  issue  was  the 
same,  also,  in  that  the  side  pursuing  these  tactics  gained  a  de- 
cisive victory. 

Though  Demosthenes  had  been  able  to  bring  about  the  Hel- 
lenic League,  and  though  his  motives  doubtless  were  patriotic 
and  not  merely  narrow,  it  is  evident  that  it  was  well  for  the 
world  that  Philip  triumphed  and  united  Greece.  Few  Greeks 
held  this  point  of  view,  however;  and  those  who  did  were 
under  the  leadership  of  Isocrates,  a  man  ninety  years  of  age, 
a  student  and  a  statesman.     But  Isocrates,  like  most  of  the 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON  AND  ALEXANDER       99 

sound  statesmen  and  students  of  history,  was  not  an  orator; 
and  his  knowledge  and  wisdom  could  not  contend  successfully 
before  a  crowd  against  the  picturesque  and  emotional  ha- 
rangues of  Demosthenes.  So  it  happened  that,  instead  of 
joining  with  Philip  and  making  common  cause  against  the 
noxious  influences  of  Persia,  the  Greeks  were  compelled  to 
serve  under  him  by  force. 

The  battle  of  Chaeronea  was  one  of  the  most  important  bat- 
tles of  the  world ;  not  only  because  it  united  Greece  and  paved 
the  way  for  the  overthrow  of  Persia  by  Alexander,  but  be- 
cause it  shows  better  than  any  other  battle  in  history,  up  to 
that  time,  the  climax  of  a  long-continued  and  persistent  stra- 
tegical effort,  and  because  it  also  shows  strategy  in  the  role 
of  the  promoter  of  civilization  against  barbarism.  Strategy 
has  not  always  played  this  role ;  sometimes  it  has  been  em- 
ployed by  barbarians  against  civilization.  But,  inasmuch  as 
strategy  requires  for  its  successful  use  a  very  considerable 
mentality,  good  strategy  has  more  often  been  found  on  the 
side  of  civilization  than  on  the  side  of  barbarism.  In  fact, 
while  there  are  many  things  that  account  for  the  gradual  tri- 
umph of  civilization  over  barbarism  and  semi-civilization,  it 
can  hardly  be  denied  that,  inasmuch  as  the  triumph  has  been 
accomplished  by  actual  force  in  the  majority  of  cases,  the 
main  factor  in  effecting  the  triumph  of  civilization  has  been 
strategy. 

Might  does  not  make  right,  and  right  does  not  make  might ; 
but  the  history  of  the  world  seems  to  show  that  it  is  right  for 
the  human  race  to  progress  in  civilization,  and  that  civiliza- 
tion (up  to  the  present  time)  has  triumphed  by  means  of  force 
skilfully  directed  by  strategy. 

Philip  was  a  great  strategist,  but  his  morals  were  not  wholly 
above  reproach;  so,  when  he  desired  to  marry  a  certain  Cleo- 
patra, he  divorced  his  wife,  the  mother  of  Alexander,  and  ar- 
ranged a  wedding  with  Cleopatra.  But  the  offended  queen 
induced  a  man  to  murder  him;  with  the  result  that  Philip 
fell  with  a  dagger  in  his  breast  on  his  wedding  day. 


100  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

Alexander  succeeded  to  the  throne,  and  found  himself  in  a 
situation  fraught  with  urgent  difficulties  and  dangers  of  many- 
kinds  ;  but  it  is  in  meeting  such  situations  that  men  like  Alex- 
ander find  the  opportunities  to  exert  their  powers,  and  to 
show  the  difference  between  themselves  and  other  men.  The 
fact  that  Philip  had  died  brought  about  a  natural  movement 
on  the  part  of  the  states  he  had  subdued  to  rise  instantly  in 
revolt.  The  most  threatening  revolt  was  that  of  Thessaly,  just 
south  of  Macedon.  Marching  thither,  Alexander  soon  found 
himself  confronted  at  the  entrance  of  a  narrow  defile  by  a 
lorce  of  Thessalians.  These  he  succeeded  in  circumventing  by 
adopting  the  ingenious  scheme  of  cutting  a  new  path  up  the 
steep  side  of  a  mountain,  and  thus  making  a  road  for  his  army. 
By  this  road  he  got  behind  the  enemy,  and  threatened  them 
from  sucn  a  position  of  advantage  in  the  rear  that  the  Thes- 
salians abandoned  their  hostile  attitude  at  once.  Alexander 
was  shortly  afterward  made  supreme  general  of  the  Greeks, 
and  an  invasion  of  Persia  under  his  command  was  decided  on. 

But  Llacedon  was  threatened  on  the  northeast  by  Thrace 
and  on  the  northwest  by  Illyria.  Passing  into  Thrace  with 
great  swiftness,  Alexander  reached  a  defile  in  the  mountains 
which  he  had  to  pass,  and  found  it  defended  by  mountaineers 
who  had  hauled  up  a  number  of  war  chariots  to  the  top,  in 
order  to  roll  them  down  upon  the  Macedonians.  Alexander 
showed  himself  at  once  to  be  not  only  a  man  of  daring,  but  an 
inventor ;  for  he  immediately  ordered  the  infantry  to  advance 
up  the  path,  opening  the  ranks  when  possible  to  let  the  chariots 
go  through ;  but,  when  that  was  impossible,  to  fall  on  their 
knees  and  hold  their  shields  together  as  a  sort  of  roof  on  which 
the  chariots  would  slide  and  from  which  they  would  roll  off. 
This  amazing  story  is  supposed  to  be  true ;  and  the  most  amaz- 
ing part  of  it  is  that  the  device  succeeded  perfectly.  When 
the  barbarians  had  expended  all  their  chariots,  they  were 
easily  forced  back  by  the  heavily  armed  and  athletic  Mace- 
donians. 

Shortly  afterward  Alexander  had  to  cross  the  Danube  with 


102  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

all  his  equipments  and  attack  the  barbarians  on  the  other 
bank.  This  he  saw  he  could  not  do  except  by  some  stratagem. 
Here  his  inventive  faculty  was  called  into  play  again,  with  the 
result  that  all  the  fishing-boats  in  the  neighborhood  were  col- 
lected, and  tent-skins  filled  with  hay  were  tied  firmly  together 
and  strung  across  the  stream  in  the  night-time;  and,  by  the 
means  of  these  as  floats,  he  got  his  entire  force  and  their  equip- 
ments across  before  daybreak.  The  work  after  that  was 
easy. 

Alexander  then  marched  toward  lUyria,  but  found  that  the 
Illyrians  were  already  at  the  frontier  of  Macedon  and  had 
captured  Pelion,  a  fortress  commanding  a  mountain  pass. 
He  marched  rapidly  to  the  vicinity  of  Pelion,  and  found  the 
heights  covered  with  Illyrians.  Alexander  intended  to  block- 
ade them  in  their  fastness;  but,  reinforcements  reaching  the 
enemy,  he  saw  that  it  was  necessary  to  retreat.  This  task  was 
excessively  difficult  and  dangerous,  the  route  lying  through 
mountainous  defiles  and  across  a  river;  but  the  skilful  move- 
ments of  the  highly  trained  Macedonians  enabled  them  to  ac- 
complish it,  and  to  reach  the  opposite  side  of  the  river  without 
losing  a  man.  In  this  position  his  communications  were  safe, 
and  Alexander  therefore  waited  there,  watching  for  an  oppor- 
tunity to  strike.  This  soon  came.  For  the  enemy,  being  evi- 
dently exceedingly  stupid  in  strategy,  assumed  that  Alexander 
had  retreated  in  fear,  and  so  far  neglected  all  precautions  as 
to  form  a  camp  near  Alexander's  forces  without  taking  due 
precautions  to  guard  against  surprise.  Alexander  promptly 
surprised  them;  and  the  subjugation  of  lUyria  followed 
promptly  in  consequence. 

But  Alexander  was  not  yet  secure  in  Greece;  for  the  The- 
bans  and  others  had  revolted  and  blockaded  the  citadel  of 
Thebes  called  Cadmea,  in  which  was  a  Macedonian  garrison. 
Alexander,  operating  with  incredible  swiftness,  appeared  sud- 
denly and  unexpectedly  before  the  walls  of  Thebes,  and 
quickly  captured  it.  Then,  in  accordance  with  a  decision  of 
the  Confederacy  of  Corinth,  the  city  was  leveled,  her  land 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON  AND  ALEXANDER       103 

divided  among  the  Confederates,  and  the  inhabitants  sold  into 
bondage. 

With  the  fall  of  Thebes,  Alexander's  campaigns  in  Europe 
ended.  He  then  took  up  with  great  carefulness  the  expedition 
into  Asia  which  his  father  had  projected.  His  greatest  weak- 
ness lay  in  the  lack  of  a  good  navy,  for  the  Persians  had  an 
excellent  navy.  The  Confederacy  of  Corinth  should  have 
helped  him,  but  it  did  not  do  so  on  any  adequate  scale ;  nor  did 
the  Greeks  at  any  time  show  any  but  the  most  languid  inter- 
est in  Alexander's  expedition  into  Asia.  Yet  that  expedition 
spread  Greek  civilization  and  prestige  and  extended  Greek 
commerce  to  the  utmost  confines  of  the  then  known  world. 

Alexander  finally  collected  an  army  of  about  30,000  foot- 
soldiers  and  5000  cavalry.  Of  the  foot-soldiers  there  were  six 
regiments  of  the  phalanx  which  formed  the  center  of  his  army 
in  all  engagements,  and  who  were  supported  by  Greek  hoplites, 
some  belonging  to  the  Confederacy  and  some  mercenary. 
There  were,  besides,  the  light  infantry,  who  were  stationed  on 
the  right  of  the  phalanx,  the  heavy  Macedonian  cavalry  on 
the  extreme  right,  and  the  ThesS'alian  cavalry  on  the  extreme 
left.  The  fleet  transported  the  army  across  the  Hellespont  to 
Abydos,  and  Alexander  landed  in  Asia,  never  to  return. 

At  this  time  the  Persian  empire  had  degenerated  miserably 
in  strength  and  spirit,  though  it  covered  substantially  the  same 
territory  as  when  Cyrus,  its  founder,  died.  The  great  acces- 
sion of  wealth  and  the  long-continued  peace  had  wrought  the 
same  result  which  that  combination  of  conditions  has  always 
wrought,  and  the  whole  structure  of  the  rotten  empire  needed 
but  a  few  strong  blows  to  disintegrate  for  the  benefit  of  man- 
kind. Alexander  had  become  informed,  through  a  system  of 
spies,  of  all  the  conditions  before  he  determined  to  embark 
on  the  expedition ;  so  that  he  was  not  starting  on  any  rash  or 
ill-considered  project,  but  on  a  carefully  calculated  strategic 
enterprise. 

Throughout  the  accounts  of  Alexander's  invasion  of  Persia, 
we  see  on  his  side  an  amazing  series  of  performances,  charae- 


104  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

terized  by  the  highest  order  of  energy,  courage,  and  good 
judgment ;  while  we  see  on  the  other  side  exactly  the  reverse. 
The  Great  King  had  formed  an  army  of  40,000  men  to  defend 
Asia  Minor,  and  he  showed  his  bad  strategic  judgment  at  the 
very  start  by  consigning  the  army,  as  a  joint  command,  to 
several  generals.  These  several  generals  showed  equally  bad 
judgment  when  they  drew  up  their  forces  against  Alexander 
on  the  banks  of  the  little  river  Granicus ;  first  by  opposing  a 
purely  passive  resistance,  and  second  by  making  an  incredibly 
bad  disposition  of  their  troops  in  placing  the  cavalry  in  a 
long  line  in  front  along  the  river-bank,  with  the  Greek  hoplites 
(mercenaries)  on  the  slopes  behind  them!  Alexander  at- 
tacked with  his  usual  force  and  good  judgment,  and  routed  the 
Persian  cavalry,  whom,  it  would  seem,  the  rest  of  the  Persian 
army  did  not  assist  at  all.  Alexander's  phalanx  then  at- 
tacked the  Greek  hoplites,  who  seem  to  have  been  resting  in  the 
background,  waiting  to  be  attacked;  and  then  his  light  and 
heavy  cavalry  attacked  them  on  the  flanks.  The  Persians 
fought  with  great  courage,  but  the  natural  result  of  bad 
strategy  was  not  thereby  prevented. 

Alexander  then  marched  south  along  the  west  coast  of  Asia 
Minor,  and  met  with  no  appreciable  resistance  until  he 
reached  Miletus,  which  consisted  of  two  parts,  an  outer  city 
and  an  inner  city,  the  latter  strongly  fortified  and  surrounded 
with  a  wall  and  a  fosse,  or  moat.  Alexander  occupied  the 
outer  city,  and  then  stormed  the  inner  city  successfully  with 
his  siege  engines.  The  Persian  fleet  was  in  the  vicinity;  but 
the  Macedonian  fleet  had  reached  the  harbor  first,  and  pre- 
vented the  Persian  squadron  from  bringing  help. 

Alexander  showed  his  good  strategic  judgment  at  this  time 
by  refusing  to  follow  the  advice  of  one  of  his  generals  to  send 
his  fleet  against  the  Persians,  which  was  greater  in  size;  for 
Alexander  realized  that,  while  the  superior  individual  excel- 
lence of  his  soldiers  enabled  him  to  encounter  a  greater  force 
of  Persian  soldiers  with  success,  he  could  not  count  on  any 
such  individual  superiority  with  his  ships.     He  even  went 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON  AND  ALEXANDER       105 

further,  and  took  what  undoubtedly  was  a  most  risky  step — 
that  of  disbanding  his  fleet  after  the  fall  of  Miletus.  This 
action  entailed  the  double  disadvantage  of  giving  up  all  the 
aid  the  fleet  might  give  to  him,  and  of  abandoning  any  line  of 
retreat  from  Asia  into  Europe,  in  case  his  operations  in  Asia 
should  be  unsuccessful.  In  a  great  majority  of  circumstances, 
an  action  like  that  of  Alexander's  would  be  strategically  most 
unwise.  But,  like  all  the  other  vocations  of  men,  strategy  is 
not  an  exact  science,  but  an  art ;  and,  like  all  arts,  its  practice 
in  any  set  of  conditions  must  depend  on  those  conditions.  In 
order  to  adapt  the  practice  of  any  art  successfully  to  condi- 
tions, one  must  be  skilful  in  that  art ;  and  Alexander  was  skil- 
ful in  his  art,  the  art  of  strategy.  He  estimated  the  situation 
of  Persia  according  to  the  information  at  his  disposal,  and 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  he  would  be  victorious  on  the 
land;  that,  therefore,  he  did  not  need  a  navy;  and  that,  there- 
fore, he  should  not  waste  any  of  his  resources  in  maintaining 
one.  Whether  Alexander  was  right  or  not  was  to  be  shown  by 
the  result.     The  result  showed  that  he  was  right. 

Alexander  continued  his  march  down  the  west  coast  of  Asia 
Minor,  and  met  the  next  resistance  at  Halicarnassus,  which 
was  surrounded  with  a  wall  and  encompassed  with  a  moat. 
Alexander  filled  up  the  moat,  and  attacked  the  walls  with  his 
war  towers  and  engines.  In  pursuance  of  his  far-sighted  pol- 
icy of  doing  as  little  destruction  as  possible,  Alexander  per- 
mitted the  garrison  to  withdraw,  and  then  took  possession  of 
the  city.  As  the  cold  season  was  now  approaching,  he  per- 
mitted part  of  his  army  to  go  into  winter  quarters,  while  he 
advanced  with  the  remainder  into  Lycia  and  Phrygia,  where 
his  operations  w^ere  largely  diplomatic,  and  were  bent  toward 
winning  the  satrapies  to  his  side. 

IMeanwhile  the  Great  King  was  advancing  against  him  with 
a  large  army.  This  army  and  the  Macedonian  came  together 
in  October,  333  B.C.,  on  the  banks  of  the  river  Pinarus  in  the 
plain  of  Issus.  The  Persians,  with  amazingly  bad  strategy, 
had  deliberately  taken  up  a  position  there,  though  there  was 


106 


THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 


not  space  enough  for  a  large  force  to  manoeuver !  They  made 
better  tactical  dispositions  than  they  had  made  at  the  Grani- 
cus,  but  thej^  again  made  the  strategic  error  of  adopting  a 
purely  defensive  plan.     Alexander  had  to  advance  toward  the 


From  Burg's  "History  of  Greece." 
By  permission  of  the  Macmillaii  Co. 


Walker  GrBoulallsc, 


Persians  across  an  open  plain,  and  to  cross  the  river  and  at- 
tack the  Persians,  who  were  drawn  up  on  the  high  banks  of 
the  opposite  side.  The  forces  were  arranged  as  in  the  accom- 
panying diagram;  and  when  one  looks  at  this  diagram,  and 
realizes  that  the  Persians  had  not  only  the  advantage  of  great 
numerical  superiority  but  of  strategic  position,  one  can  hardly 
imagine  the  state  of  mind  of  Alexander  when  he  determined 
to  attack.    But  strategy  includes  many  more  factors  than 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON  AND  ALEXANDER       107 

numbers  and  positions,  important  as  these  are.  If  aU  the 
force  of  Darius  had  been  Persian,  the  situation  would  have 
been  better  for  Alexander  than  it  actually  was;  for  Darius 
had  30,000  highly  trained  Greek  hoplite  mercenaries. 

Alexander  charged  at  the  head  of  this  cavalry  across  the 
river,  and  at  the  part  of  the  Persian  force  where  the  Great 
King  stood  in  his  war  chariot.  The  Persians  there  opposed 
a  furious  resistance,  in  the  course  of  which  Alexander  was 
wounded  in  the  leg.  Alexander's  phalanx  followed,  assisted 
by  the  lighter  infantry,  the  hypaspists,  and  were  able  to  push 
back  the  enemy  hoplites,  who  were  practically  their  own  coun- 
trymen. The  contest  there  was  for  a  while  indecisive:  but 
suddenly  the  Great  King  himself,  in  his  war  chariot,  turned 
and  fled ! 

This  precipitated  a  general  rout  on  the  whole  left  of  his 
line.  On  his  right,  the  Persian  cavalry  had  crossed  the  river 
and  were  carrying  all  before  them,  when  suddenly  they  heard 
the  news  of  their  king's  flight.  Almost  instantly  they  turned 
and  fled  also ;  so  that  in  a  short  time  the  whole  army  was  in  a 
wild  retreat,  being  cut  down  from  behind  and  on  the  flanks 
by  the  pursuing  Macedons.  For  their  flight  the  Persians 
were  hardly  to  be  blamed ;  for  were  they  not  imitating  as  best 
they  could  the  example  of  the  commander-in-chief?  The 
Great  King  was  so  desirous  of  vacating  the  premises  that  he 
left  his  own  mother  and  wife  in  the  hands  of  the  conqueror. 
Alexander  treated  them  with  scrupulous  courtesy. 

It  has  often  been  said  that  Darius  showed  very  bad  strategic 
judgment  in  placing  his  forces  in  the  narrow  plain  of  Issus, 
where  they  could  not  be  manoeuvered  to  advantage.  This,  of 
course,  is  true ;  and  yet,  it  may  be  pointed  out  that  the  very 
narrowness  of  the  plain,  and  the  very  fact  that  this  necessi- 
tated that  a  great  part  of  the  Persian  forces  should  be  kept  out 
of  the  fight  at  the  beginning  and  had  to  act  as  reserves,  made 
it  impossible  for  the  Macedonians  to  be  victorious  if  the  Per- 
sians held  their  ground  with  even  a  small  measure  of  per- 
sistency.    It  may  also  be  pointed  out  that  the  very  depth  of 


108  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

the  Persian  formation  gave  support  to  the  men  in  front ;  that 
the  very  fact  that  a  large  number  of  men  were  in  the  rear,  and 
comparatively  secure,  tended  to  make  those  in  the  rear  hold 
their  ground ;  and  that  the  men  at  the  front  could  not  possibly 
have  retreated  if  the  men  in  the  rear  had  stood  fast.  But  why 
should  they  stand  fast,  if  the  king  fled  ?  It  is  seldom  that  any 
man  in  command  of  a  great  military  force  has  given  such  per- 
fect examples  of  bad  strategy  as  King  Darius  did. 

It  has  sometimes  been  stated  as  one  of  the  "principles"  of 
strategy  that  when  the  enemy  begins  to  retreat,  he  should  be 
pursued  with  the  utmost  ardor,  Alexander  did  pursue  Darius 
until  nightfall,  but  then  he  forbore ;  and  then,  letting  Darius 
go  where  he  willed  in  peace,  Alexander  turned  his  footsteps 
toward  the  south. 

For  Alexander  was  no  academic  strategist.  He  had  been 
bom  and  bred  in  the  midst  of  war;  and  the  first  man  whom 
he  had  known  was  the  greatest  strategist  of  his  time.  Alex- 
ander had  determined  on  a  perfectly  definite  objective  before 
he  left  Macedon,  and  this  objective  was  the  conquest  of  Persia. 
To  accomplish  this,  Alexander  knew  that  he  must  proceed  step 
by  step,  and  that  at  every  step  he  should  leave  no  powerful 
enemy  to  harass  him  from  behind.  If  he  had  started  east 
from  Issus  in  pursuit  of  Darius,  he  would  have  left  behind  him 
not  only  Syria  and  Egypt,  but  the  great  Phoenician  fleet,  which 
was  the  backbone  of  the  Persian  navy.  He  therefore  per- 
sisted in  his  original  intention,  and  advanced  against  the  sea- 
coast  towns  of  Syria. 

The  three  principal  cities  were  Aradus,  Sidon,  and  Tyre, 
great  commercial  centers  of  Phoenicia,  and  bound  together  as 
a  federation.  They  would  have  been  a  strong  trio  if  they  had 
been  sufficiently  unselfish  to  act  together ;  but,  like  most  com- 
mercial bodies,  their  aims  were  selfish,  and  as  a  result  they 
accomplished  less,  even  materially,  than  otherwise  they  would 
have  done.  As  an  illustration,  it  may  be  stated  that  some 
years  before  Sidon  had  revolted  from  Persia,  and  her  two  sis- 
ter cities  had  promised  to  support  her;  but  that  Tyre  and 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON  AND  ALEXANDER        109 

Aradus  had  then  agreed  together  to  abandon  Sidon  and  let 
her  be  crushed,  so  that  they  could  profit  by  the  trade  that  she 
would  lose.     In  the  present  juncture,  Aradus  and  Byblus, 


TYRE. 


From  Burg's  "History  of  Greece." 
By  permission  of  the  Macmillan  Co. 


lyaiker  &-Boutall  sc. 


which  had  in  a  measure  taken  Sidon 's  place,  submitted  to 
Alexander. 

When  Alexander  reached  the  vicinity  of  Tyre,  he  expressed 
his  desire  to  visit  the  city ;  but  the  Tyrians,  not  knowing  what 
would  be  the  result  of  his  war  with  Persia,  feared  to  compro- 
mise themselves,  and  refused  permission.     Alexander  realized 


110  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

that  to  conquer  Tyre  was  a  necessity,  because  Tyre  was  the 
naval  base  not  only  of  Phoenicia  but  of  Persia;  and  that  the 
only  way  in  which  he  could  nullify  the  power  of  the  Persian 
fleet  was  to  destroy  its  base.  But  to  capture  Tyre  was  no 
trivial  undertaking  for  a  general  who  had  only  hoplites  and 
cavalry  to  work  with ;  for  Tyre  was  surrounded  with  an  enor- 
mous wall,  very  thick  and  very  high,  and  stood  on  an  island 
separated  from  the  shore  by  more  than  half  a  mile  of  deep 
water. 

What  would  you  have  done  if  you  had  been  Alexander? 

Alexander  built  a  causeway.  The  first  part  of  the  work  was 
easy;  but  the  farther  out  the  causeway  reached  the  more  diffi- 
cult the  work  became,  because  the  water  became  deeper,  the 
workmen  came  within  the  range  of  projectiles  from  the  island, 
and  Tyrian  vessels  issued  from  the  two  harbors  of  the  island 
and  threw  projectiles  also.  To  protect  the  men,  Alexander 
erected  two  towers  on  the  causeway,  on  which  he  mounted  war 
engines  for  throwing  projectiles,  and  to  which  he  attached  cur- 
tains of  leather  to  act  as  shields.  Then  the  Tyrians  con- 
structed a  fire-ship  and  let  it  drift  down  on  the  causeway. 
The  result  was  that  they  set  fire  to  the  towers  and  the  engines, 
while  the  Tyrians  in  the  vicinity  discharged  darts  at  the 
Macedonians  who  tried  to  put  out  the  fire. 

Alexander,  being  Alexander,  was  undismayed,  and  pro- 
ceeded at  once  to  widen  the  causeway,  so  that  it  could  ac- 
commodate more  towers  and  engines.  He  also  went  up  to 
Sidon  and  got  together  some  galleys  with  which  to  assist  his 
operations.  Then  suddenly  the  squadrons  of  the  Phoenician 
cities,  Aradus  and  Byblus,  which  had  been  in  the  ^gean  Sea, 
and  had  learned  that  their  cities  had  submitted  to  Alexander, 
came  to  Sidon  and  submitted  also.  As  these  ships  numbered 
eighty,  and  as  various  other  ships  came  in  soon  after  from 
other  cities  similarly  placed,  as  well  as  from  Cyprus,  whose 
king  submitted  also,  Alexander  found  himself  ultimately  in 
possession  of  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  triremes,  and  there- 
fore stronger  on  the  water  than,  the  Tyrians  themselves. 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON  AND  ALEXANDER        111 

When  ready,  Alexander  bore  down  upon  Tyre  with  his 
whole  fleet,  of  which  he,  like  a  good  general  of  those  days, 
commanded  the  right  wing.  The  Tyrians  would  not  accept 
the  gage  of  battle ;  but  they  drew  up  their  triremes  across  the 
mouths  of  their  harbors  and  blocked  any  entrance  to  them. 
The  causeway  by  this  time  had  been  carried  up  to  the  island, 
and  the  best  engineers  that  Cyprus  and  Phoenicia  could  pro- 
duce had  constructed  the  necessary  war  engines.  Some  of 
these  engines  were  placed  on  the  causeway,  while  others  were 
placed  on  old  galleys  and  transport  ships.  But  they  could 
make  little  impression  on  the  wall  at  the  east  side,  which  was 
one  hundred  and  fifty  feet  high  and  enormously  thick,  and 
from  behind  which  the  besieged  replied  with  fiery  missiles 
hurled  from  war  engines.  Furthermore,  Alexander's  engine- 
carrying  vessels  could  not  get  close  enough  to  the  wall,  be- 
cause of  large  boulders  under  the  water. 

Alexander  placed  galleys  carrying  windlasses  near  the  boul- 
ders to  try  to  drag  them  away ;  but  the  Tyrians  sent  out  boats 
and  cut  the  anchoring  ropes  of  the  galleys,  so  that  they  drifted 
away.  Alexander  answered  by  stationing  boats  close  to  the 
anchors;  and  then  Tyrian  divers  came  out  and  cut  the  cables 
under  water.  Finally  chains  were  brought,  by  the  use  of 
which  the  galleys  could  be  kept  in  position  while  the  boulders 
were  hauled  away.  The  engine-bearing  vessels  then  got  close 
to  the  wall.  Then  the  Tyrians  made  a  large  curtain  of  canvas, 
behind  which  they  manned  a  number  of  triremes  and  smaller 
vessels  with  picked  men,  and  from  which  they  suddenly 
launched  an  attack  on  Alexander's  vessels.  Alexander  imme- 
diately started  a  counter-movement  of  small  vessels,  which  he 
led  himself,  against  the  Tyrian  vessels,  and  with  such  perfect 
success  that  henceforth  the  Tyrians  made  no  further  attempts 
at  offensive  measures,  but  restricted  themselves  to  a  purely 
passive  defense. 

This  passive  defense  ended  as  all  purely  passive  defenses 
have  ended — with  an  inglorious  surrender — but  after  the 
walls  had  been  breeched,  and  several  thousands  had  been  slain. 


112  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

The  fall  of  Tyre  gave  Alexander,  with  his  new  fleet,  the 
command  of  the  sea,  and  removed  the  last  obstacle  in  Syria  to 
his  journey  south.  But  at  the  lower  end  of  Palestine,  just 
before  the  shore  turns  toward  the  westward,  towered  the  great 
stronghold  of  the  Philistines,  Gaza.  It  stood  on  high  ground ; 
and,  since  more  than  two  miles  of  sand  lay  between  it  and  the 
seashore,  Alexander's  fleet  could  not  assist  him.  Alexander's 
engineers  declared  that  the  walls  could  never  be  stormed,  on 
account  of  the  great  height  of  the  hill  on  which  they  stood. 
Alexander  replied  by  ordering  that  ramparts  be  thrown  up 
around  the  city  so  high  that  war  engines  mounted  on  them 
would  be  on  a  level  with  the  walls.  Since  the  best  chance 
seemed  to  be  on  the  south  side,  the  work  there  was  pushed 
on  rapidly.  The  engines  that  had  been  used  at  Tyre  soon  ar- 
rived, underground  mines  were  placed  beneath  the  walls,  and 
finally,  the  walls  being  breeched  in  places,  the  Macedonians 
entered  Gaza. 

Egypt  was  now  cut  off  from  Persia;  so  that  the  Egyptians, 
having  lost  all  their  ancient  spirit,  yielded  at  once  when  Alex- 
ander marched  within  her  boundaries  and  sent  his  fleet  up  the 
Nile  to  Memphis.  In  Egypt,  Alexander  showed  his  customary 
attitude  toward  the  people  of  the  countries  that  he  conquered, 
treating  with  respect  the  native  religion  and  customs,  but 
making  it  clear  that  he  intended  to  impress  Greek  civilization 
upon  them,  and  to  advance  in  every  way  the  interests  of  Greek 
commerce.  His  principal  act  in  this  direction  was  in  found- 
ing a  new  city  where  the  Nile  empties  into  the  Mediterranean, 
to  be  called  after  himself,  Alexandria.  It  is  said  that  Alex- 
ander himself  traced  out  the  ground-plan  of  the  new  city. 
Alexandria  became  not  only  the  seat  of  the  greatest  learning 
in  the  world,  but  the  principal  port  in  the  eastern  Mediter- 
ranean, diverting  commerce  from  the  Phoenician  cities,  as  had 
been  the  intention  of  Alexander. 

In  order  to  make  his  position  secure  politically  as  well  as 
strategically,  Alexander  undertook  an  expedition  to  the  sanc- 
tuary of  Ammon ;  and  he  succeeded  in  making  it  believed  that 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON  AND  ALEXANDER       113 

he  was  recognized  there  by  the  priests  of  Ammon,  after  com- 
munication with  their  god,  as  a  descendant  of  Ammon  and  the 
rightful  King  of  Egypt.  After  reorganizing  its  government 
he  returned  to  Tyre.  After  establishing  an  efficient  system  of 
administration  there,  he  started  east  toward  Babylon. 

Alexander  left  the  sea  far  behind  him  and  struck  out  into 
the  midst  of  a  hostile  empire.  But  there  was  nothing  reck- 
less or  thoughtless  about  his  expedition.  Every  detail  of  logis- 
tics seems  to' have  been  attended  to,  the  service  of  the  trans- 
ports and  supplies  well  organized,  and  the  intelligence  depart- 
ment for  securing  and  transmitting  information  concerning 
the  movements  of  the  enemy  fairly  comparable  in  essentials 
with  that  which  any  modem  army  has  brought  forth. 

From  this  intelligence  department  Alexander  learned  that 
Darius,  with  a  much  larger  army  than  that  which  fought  at 
Issus,  was  waiting  for  him  just  beyond  the  Tigris  River,  in  a 
plain  near  Gaugamela,  about  fifty  miles  northwest  of  Arbela. 
The  number  was  reported  to  be  1,000,000  foot-soldiers  and 
40,000  horses,  a  formidable  array  to  be  attacked  by  a  force 
that  numbered  in  all  only  47,000.  Alexander  approached, 
however,  by  night,  and  attained  the  crest  of  the  hill,  whence  he 
could  look  down  and  see  the  enemy  drawn  up  for  battle.  As 
a  precaution,  Alexander  had  the  intervening  ground  searched 
for  pits  and  concealed  dangers.  He  himself  rode  over  the 
plain,  and  found  that  the  Persians  had  cleared  it  of  bushes 
and  other  obstacles;  and  he  rightly  surmised  that  this  meant 
that  the  enemy  intended  to  make  important  use  of  their  war 
chariots. 

Alexander  was  advised  to  make  a  night  attack,  in  view  of 
the  disproportion  of  forces ;  but  he  decided  against  this  advice, 
believing  that  the  greater  skill,  strength,  and  courage  of  his 
men  and  his  own  superior  ability  would  compensate  for  his 
numerical  inferiority.  The  result  proved  him  to  be  right,  as 
it  usually  did.  The  Persians  probablj'-  expected  a  night  attack 
the  first  night ;  for  they  remained  under  arms  the  entire  time 
and  were,  therefore,  comparatively  weak  and  jaded  when  the 


114  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

troops  of  Alexander,  fresh  after  a  good  night 's  rest,  advanced 
to  the  attack. 

The  Persians  were  drawn  up  in  two  lines,  with  war  chariots 
and  some  elephants  in  front ;  and  the  Great  King,  with  a  large 
body-guard,  was  in  the  center,  as  he  had  been  at  Issus.  Alex- 
ander's force  was  disposed  in  the  usual  mannei',  with  the  six 
regiments  of  the  phalanx  in  the  center,  the  light  infantry  and 
the  heavy  cavalry  on  the  right,  and  the  Thessalian  cavalry  on 
the  left.  His  line  was  so  short,  however,  compared  with  the 
Persian,  and  the  consequent  danger  of  having  his  wings  envel- 
oped by  the  Persian  wings  was  so  great,  that  he  put  behind 
each  wing  a  second  line,  which  by  facing  to  the  right  or  left 
could  meet  a  flank  attack.  As  he  advanced,  leading  with  the 
cavalry  as  usual,  he  was  nearly  .opposite  the  center  of  the 
enemy's  line.  He,  therefore,  directed  his  attack  obliquely 
toward  the  right.  Darius  noted  that  this  movement  was  tak- 
ing the  Greek  force  away  from  the  plain  in  front  of  his  char- 
iots, which  he  had  smoothed  for  their  operation;  and  there- 
fore he  directed  the  cavalry  from  his  left  flank  to  deliver  a 
flank  charge  on  the  Macedonian  right,  to  prevent  a  further 
movement  in  that  direction.  A  brisk  battle  naturally  fol- 
lowed. 

Meanwhile  the  Persian  scythe  chariots  charged  forward. 
But  the  athletic  Macedonian  archers  and  spear-throwers  at- 
tacked the  chariot  drivers,  seizing  the  reins  of  the  horses  and 
pulling  the  drivers  from  their  seats ;  while  the  light  infantry, 
opening  out  quickly,  let  the  chariots  pass  harmlessly  through 
their  ranks.  The  whole  Persian  line  now  advanced.  It  was 
a  critical  moment  for  Alexander,  for  he  saw  no  weak  point  in 
their  line  on  which  he  could  deliver  a  blow  with  any  reasonable 
hope  of  breaking  through.  But  at  this  moment  a  number  of 
Persian  cavalry  were  despatched  to  the  assistance  of  the  Per- 
sian left  flank,  thereby  leaving  a  gap.  Into  this  gap  Alexan- 
der charged  at  the  head  of  his  cavalry,  and  then  turned  to  the 
left  and  charged  the  enemy's  center  near  the  post  of  the  king 
and  his  body-guard.     At  the  same  time,  the  Greek  phalanx 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON  AND  ALEXANDER       115 

came  into  contact  with  the  front  of  the  Persian  center,  and — 
the  Great  King  turned  his  chariot  and  fled ! 

The  series  of  events  that  closed  the  battle  of  Issus  were 
repeated  in  their  essentials  now,  except  that  between  the  two 
reg:iments  on  the  left  of  the  Greek  phalanx  a  gap  was  opened, 
through  which  the  Persian  and  Indian  cavalry  rushed.  This 
would  have  created  a  dangerous  situation  if  the  cavalry  had 
done  as  it  should  have  done,  and  attacked  the  rear  of  the 
Greek  phalanx;  but,  instead  of  doing  this,  they  galloped 
straight  to  the  Macedonian  camp  and  began  to  plunder. 
While  engaged  in  this  occupation  they  were  attacked  from 
the  rear  by  the  Greeks,  and  readily  overcome.  A  desperate 
conflict  was  going  on,  meanwhile,  on  the  left  of  Alexander's 
line ;  but  the  superior  strength  and  skill  of  the  Macedonians, 
and  the  destruction  of  the  Persian  morale  caused  by  the  cow- 
ardly flight  of  the  Persian  king,  soon  brought  this  conflict  to 
a  result  that  was  favorable  to  the  Greeks,  Thus  one  of  the 
critical  battles  of  the  world,  usually  called  the  battle  of  Arbela, 
came  to  the  rescue  of  civilization. 

Darius  fled.  Alexander  did  not  pursue,  but  pressed  for- 
ward to  his  objective,  Babylon.  To  his  surprise,  when  he  ap- 
proached the  city  prepared  for  battle,  the  gates  opened,  and 
the  satrap  surrendered  the  city  and  the  citadel.  Here  Alex- 
ander followed  the  same  policy  as  he  had  in  Egypt,  and  as  he 
did  later  in  all  the  conquered  provinces  of  Asia:  he  concil- 
iated the  people,  posed  as  the  protector  of  their  customs  and 
religion,  and  endeavored  to  win  the  people  to  his  support.  At 
Babylon  he  rebuilt  the  temples  that  had  been  destroyed  by  the 
Persians,  and  commanded  especially  the  restoration  of  the 
magnificent  temple  of  Bel,  which  the  fire-worshiper  Xerxes 
had  partially  demolished. 

After  resting  his  army  in  the  most  luxurious  city  of  the 
world,  Alexander  advanced  to  Susa,  and  thence  toward  Persia. 
He  soon  encountered  a  tribe  of  hillsmen  in  the  Uxian  Pass, 
who  effectually  blocked  his  way  through  the  defile,  but  whom 
he  easily  circumvented  by  a  march  night  over  a   difficult 


116  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

mountain  pass,  which  enabled  him  to  surprise  them  in  the 
rear. 

Alexander  now  entered  a  region  unknown  to  the  outside 
world,  and  began  an  expedition  of  discovery  as  well  as  a 
march  of  conquest.  He  had  not  gone  far  when  he  came  to  a 
narrow  defile,  called  the  Persian  Gates,  where  he  found 
opposed  to  him  an  army  of  40,000  foot  and  700  horse,  guard- 
ing this  pass,  which  was  fortified  with  a  wall.  A  slight  tenta- 
tive attack 'showed  Alexander  that  thcp^s^was  impregnable. 
He  learned  from  his  intelligence  department,  however,  that 
there  were  some  paths  leading  through  the  forests  that  cov- 
ered the  mountains,  but  that  these  paths  were  very  dangerous 
at  any  time,  especially  to  men  in  armor,  and  still  more  so  at 
this  time,  when  snow  was  on  the  ground.  Nothing  daunted, 
Alexander  started  over  the  paths  at  nightfall,  leaving  part  of 
his  troops  in  front  of  the  pass,  with  orders  to  attack  as  soon 
as  they  heard  his  trumpets  sounding  from  the  other  side. 
"With  the  rest  of  his  force,  including  the  cavalry,  he  succeeded 
in  traversing  the  devious  and  perilous  paths  and  reaching  the 
point  decided  upon.  Sounding  the  trumpets,  he  attacked  the 
foe  so  ardently  in  their  rear,  while  his  troops  in  front  attacked 
them  at  the  same  time  there,  that  he  put  them  to  flight  after 
little  effective  resistance,  and  with  great  slaughter. 

This  account  and  most  of  the  other  accounts  of  Alexander's 
amazing  victories  in  Asia  disclose  an  almost  incredible  differ- 
ence between  the  forces  engaged ;  and  this  difference  is  not  in 
courage,  is  not  to  any  great  degree  in  strength,  but  is  almost 
wholly  in  strategy.  In  fact,  it  is  almost  as  easy  for  an  ordi- 
nary man  to  gaze  undazzled  at  the  brilliant  performances  of 
Alexander  as  to  gaze  good-temperedly  at  the  stupid  perform- 
ances of  his  enemies.  Can  anyone  understand  how  a  general 
in  command  of  40,000  men  could  have  guarded  the  Persian 
Gates  against  an  assailant,  and  yet  failed  to  guard  the  by- 
roads over  the  mountains? 

Alexander  continued  his  path  of  conquest,  unprecedented 
then  and  unequalled  to  this  day,  through  Persia,  and  thence 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON  AND  ALEXANDER       117 

north  to  Media  and  the  city  of  Ectabana,  in  pursuit  of  Darius. 
Traveling  at  great  speed,  both  day  and  night,  he  finally 
learned  that  Darius  had  been  taken  prisoner  by  Bessus,  the 
satrap  of  Bactria.  He  finally  overtook  Darius  just  as  he  was 
breathing  his  last,  having  been  stabbed  by  his  captors.  Alex- 
ander sent  the  corpse  with  all  honor  to  the  queen  mother,  and 
then  started  to  capture  and  punish  Bessus  for  the  murder  of 
his  king. 

Alexander  was  now  carrying  out,  and  in  an  increasing  de- 
gree, his  project,  not  of  destroying  or  of  merely  conquering 
the  nations  and  provinces  of  the  East,  but  of  forming  a  grand 
empire  which  should  embrace  the  whole  known  world,  and 
which  should  be  divided  into  states,  under  efficient  administra- 
tors, and  directed  by  the  spirit  of  the  highest  Greek  civiliza- 
tion; each  state,  however,  living  under  its  own  religion  and 
adhering  to  its  own  national  customs  and  institutions.  In 
order  to  effect  this,  he  deemed  it  wise  to  take  on  himself,  in 
some  measure,  the  characteristics  of  the  Egyptians  when  in 
Egj-pt,  of  the  Babylonians  when  in  Babylon,  and  of  the  Per- 
sians when  in  Persia.  This  procedure  succeeded  admir- 
ably with  the  conquered  peoples,  but  it  aroused  an  increasing 
discontent  and  jealousy  among  his  followers.  Naturally,  they 
did  not  take  so  comprehensive  a  view  as  he  did,  and  it  filled 
them  with  anger  to  see  their  king  show  so  much  respect  to 
people  whom  they  despised  as  low  barbarians;  and  it  espe- 
cially angered  them  when  the  king  put  on  an  oriental  dress 
and  conferred  with  Persian  lords  and  satraps,  showing  them 
marks  of  confidence  and  favor. 

Alexander  continued  his  progress  through  Persia,  subduing 
provinces,  founding  cities,  and  establishing  an  empire.  The 
court  he  took  with  him  might  be  called  a  small  moving  city, 
so  large  was  it,  so  filled  with  men  of  many  callings,  and  so  well 
organized  for  the  purpose  that  Alexander  had  in  mind  and 
was  accomplishing.  One  becomes  dizzy  in  reading  of  how  this 
young  man  not  only  carried  all  before  him  in  a  military  way, 
but  accomplished  much  more  in  the  way  of  construction  than 


118  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

destruction ;  how  he  gave  the  people  more  efficient  and  honest 
government  than  they  had  had  before ;  and  how  he  performed 
the  seemingly  impossible  task  of  super-imposing  Greek  civiliza- 
tion on  Persian  civilization  to  the  advantage  of  both.  And 
one  becomes  lost  in  admiration  in  noting  that,  although  he 
continually  increased  his  distance  from  his  home  base,  he  kept 
his  communications  secure,  using  both  political  and  strategic 
methods,  and  playing  skilfully  on  the  jealousies  of  rival  of- 
ficials, both  military  and  civil. 

Although  required  to  fight  his  way  almost  continually  from 
one  place  to  another,  Alexander  met  no  very  serious  check 
until  he  arrived  in  northwestern  India,  and  crossed  the  Indus 
River.  Shortly  after  doing  this,  he  learned  that  King  Porus 
had  gathered  an  army  from  30,000  or  40,000  strong,  and  was 
encamped  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Hydaspes  River  to  pre- 
vent his  crossing.  After  a  slow  and  toilsome  march,  Alexander 
arrived  on  the  western  bank  of  this  river,  and  saw  the  army 
of  Porus  on  the  opposite  shore,  protected  by  a  multitude  of 
elephants.  Alexander  realized  that  it  would  be  foolish  to 
attempt  to  cross  at  that  place,  and  that  some  stratagem  had 
to  be  devised.  He  adopted  various  measures,  one  of  which 
was  to  seem  to  make  preparations  to  cross  in  the  early  night 
and  thus  rouse  the  enemy  to  prevent  it.  He  made  feints  of 
this  kind  a  number  of  times,  each  time  with  success,  until  he 
noted  that  the  enemy  were  getting  weary  of  the  useless  night 
watches  and  becoming  consequently  negligent.  Then  one 
night  he  moved  up  the  west  bank  of  the  river  about  sixteen 
miles,  to  a  place  where  the  river  made  a  sharp  bend,  and 
where  there  was  a  thickly  wooded  island  in  midstream  and 
dense  woods  on  the  opposite  shore.  Here  he  determined  to 
cross.  He  caused  to  be  brought  there  the  parts  of  the  boats 
that  had  been  used  in  crossing  the  Oxus  River,  and  had  those 
boats  remade ;  and  he  also  had  skins  prepared,  such  as  he  had 
often  used  before  as  floats,  stuffed  with  straw.  He  left  a  suf- 
ficient force  in  the  camp  to  prevent  the  suspicions  of  the  enemy 
from  being   roused;    and,   when   all   was   ready,    began   his 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON  AND  ALEXANDER       119 


adventurous  crossing,  leading  the  way  himself.  (326  b.c.) 
As  usual  in  enterprises  where  preparations  have  been  care- 
fully made  and  all  the  conditions  studied,  Alexander  was  suc- 
cessful. Hardly  had  he  landed  on  the  eastern  side,  however, 
when  his  forces  were  discovered  by  scouts  of  Poms,  who  gal- 


Battle  of  the 

HYDASPES. 

(J.B.B.yedi.) 


K 


I  H 

.^5]    I II!  Ill 

ISIL     • 


B 


B' 


AAA 


AAA.  Infantry   \ 

BBf     Caualnj     }- INDIAN 

CCC.  Elephants) 

H.  Hypaspists 

I.    Heavy  cavalry  led  by  Alexander 
K.      ,,  ,,        ,,    „  Coenifs 

L.  Mounted  Archers  j 


[MACEDONIAN 


From  Burg's  "History  of  Greece." 
By  permission  of  the  Macmillan  Co. 


l^al/ierijrBoulatl  so 


loped  away  to  warn  him.  Alexander  at  once  prepared  to 
advance  to  the  last  great  battle  of  his  life.  He  had  no  heavy 
infantry  with  him,  only  light  infantry,  cavalry,  and  archers. 
Following  his  wont,  Alexander  advanced  toward  the  camp  of 
Porus  at  the  head  of  his  cavalr^^  Soon  he  met  a  troop  advanc- 
ing against  him.  It  was  merely  a  heavy  reconnoitering  party 
under  the  son  of  Porus ;  and  it  turned  and  retreated  at  the 
first  charge  of  the  Macedonians. 

Porus  himself  was  soon  seen  advancing  with  his  army.    As 
soon  as  he  reached  ground  suitable  for  the  movements  of  his 


120  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

cavalry  and  war  chariots,  he  drew  up  his  line  of  battle  (indi- 
cated in  the  accompanying  diagram).  Alexander  realized  at 
once  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  make  a  frontal  attack  suc- 
cessfully, because  of  the  elephants.  But  he  rarely  made  a 
frontal  attack  when  he  could  make  a  flank  attack;  and  so 
he  promptly  proceeded  to  make  a  flank  attack  with  his 
cavalry  (see  the  diagram),  while  the  archers  attacked  the 
Indian  cavalry  on  the  left  and  the  infantry  maintained  a 
position  facing  the  left  flank  of  the  elephants  and  the  main 
body.  Against  such  an  attack,  delivered  with  all  the  force 
and  speed  that  Alexander  could  give  to  it,  the  enemy  were 
almost  helpless.  In  a  short  time  the  utmost  confusion  reigned. 
The  elephants  got  bej^ond  control,  and  the  army  of  Porus 
became  little  but  a  mob.  Then  Alexander  ordered  the  infan- 
try to  advance  shield  to  shield,  while  he,  reforming  his  cavalry, 
dashed  in  again  on  the  left  flank.  About  this  time,  the  forces 
that  Alexander  had  left  on  the  other  side  of  the  river  crossed 
without  resistance,  and  consummated  the  victory. 

In  this  battle,  as  in  so  many  of  the  battles  of  Alexander, — 
in  fact,  in  so  many  of  the  battles  of  which  we  read  in  his- 
tory,— we  see  on  the  defeated  side  such  an  utter  absence  of 
all  strategic  apprehension  as  to  amaze  us.  If  Porus,  instead 
of  having  an  army,  had  had  a  club,  or  a  sword,  or  a  spear,  he 
would  not  calmly  have  stood  in  one  place  and  let  his  opponent 
come  on  his  left  side  and  deliberately  attack  him  there.  He 
would  have  wheeled  around  toward  the  left,  so  that  he  could 
protect  himself  with  his  weapon.  Yet,  having  ah  army,  which 
was  simply  a  weapon  placed  in  his  hands,  he  took  no  meas- 
ures whatever  to  protect  his  left  side !  Porus  failed  to  realize, 
what  many  commanders  have  failed  to  realize,  that  an  army 
or  a  fleet  is  a  weapon,  like  a  club  but  bigger ;  and  that  a  man's 
success  depends  upon  the  skill  with  which  he  strikes  blows 
upon  the  enemy  and  parries  the  blows  they  deliver.  The  rea- 
son for  the  failure  to  realize  this  truth  seems  to  lie  in  the  fact 
that  it  has  been  necessary  to  concentrate  so  attentively  on  the 
details  of  constructing  the  weapon,  keeping  it  in  good  order, 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON  AND  ALEXANDER       121 

and  wielding  it  that  the  object  at  which  it  should  be  directed 
has  been  overlooked !  It  is  not  only  in  strategy,  but  in  every 
vocation  and  profession,  and  even  in  the  daily  lives  of  indi- 
viduals, that  we  see  people  so  engrossed  with  details,  and  so 
enmeshed  in  circumstances,  as  to  forget  the  end  in  view. 

Alexander  restored  to  Porus  his  kingdom,  but  as  a  protected 
state  under  the  suzerainty  of  Macedon ;  and  near  the  site  of 
the  battle,  on  each  side  of  the  river,  he  founded  a  city,  one 
named  after  his  horse,  Bucephala.  Then  Alexander  took  up 
his  march  to  the  eastward,  his  mind  filled  with  no  one  knows 
what  dreams  and  projects,  when  suddenly  the  long-restrained 
discontent  and  the  utter  weariness  of  his  soldiers  resulted  in 
their  refusal  to  go  any  farther.  Alexander  brought  into  play 
all  the  batteries  of  his  elotiuence  and  authority,  but  without 
avail.  For  twelve  long  and  terrible  years  his  army  had 
toiled  and  fought,  in  cold  and  heat,  and  now  they  would  not 
and  could  not  go  any  farther.  So  Alexander  was  forced  to 
yield  and  retrace  his  steps,  although  almost  within  arm 's  reach 
of  the  end  of  the  world,  as  he  thought. 

It  was  a  toilsome  journey  that  he  had  to  make,  especially 
across  the  desert  of  Gedrosia.  At  its  end  he  was  joined  by  his 
fleet  under  Nearchus,  whom  now  he  sent  to  complete  his  voy- 
age up  the  Persian  Gulf.  For  by  this  time  Alexander  had  proj- 
ects of  world  dominion,  to  achieve  which  the  conquest  of  the 
sea  was  necessary,  and  which  undoubtedly  he  would  have 
achieved  if  he  had  lived.  But  not  long  after  reaching  Baby- 
lon, and  while  building  a  fleet  and  cutting  wood  in  the 
forests  for  it,  he  was  taken  ill  of  a  fever  and  shortly  after- 
ward died.  He  was  not  at  that  time  quite  thirty-three  years 
old.     (June  13,  323  b.c.) 

Thus  passed  from  the  stage  of  history  the  most  picturesque 
figure  that  has  ever  appeared  upon  it.  Doubtless  one  must 
make  considerable  allowance  for  enthusiasm  and  exaggeration 
in  the  accounts  that  one  reads  about  him.  But  after  all  rea- 
sonable subtractions  have  been  made,  one  is  confronted  with 


122  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

the  fact  that  Alexander,  of  his  own  initiative,  under  his  own 
sole  direction,  and  by  his  own  force  of  character,  led  a  small 
army  through  the  greatest  empire  of  the  world,  conquered  it' 
all,  and  created  an  empire  larger  and  better  than  any  that  had 
ever  before  existed.  It  is  true  that  this  empire  broke  up  almost 
immediately  when  he  died ;  but  it  simply  became  divided  into 
parts,  and  those  parts  did  not  die. 

The  two  larger  parts,  the  kingdom  of  the  Seleucidae,  which 
occupied  the  same  territory  approximately  as  Persia,  and  the 
kingdom  of  the  Ptolomies,  or  Egypt,  continued  for  three  bril- 
liant centuries  afterward.  Of  the  two,  the  former  was  prob- 
ably the  better  administered,  as  it  certainly  was  the  larger: 
but  Egypt  represented  the  higher  civilization ;  for  Alexandria, 
with  its  wonderful  museum  and  library,  became  the  seat  of 
learning  and  civilization  of  the  world.  And  after  the  fall  of 
Rome  at  the  latter  end  of  the  fifth  century  a.d,,  when  civiliza- 
tion in  Europe,  even  in  Italy,  was  almost  wholly  blotted  out, 
it  was  in  the  lands  that  were  conquered  by  Alexander,  and  on 
which  he  had  impressed  Greek  civilization,  that  civilization 
continued.  And  when  the  minds  of  men  began  again  to  turn 
in  search  of  a  better  life  than  that  which  Europe  in  the  Middle 
Ages  gave  them,  it  was  to  those  lands  that  they  had  to  go  for 
the  materials  of  literature  and  science  and  learning  with  which 
to  start  again  on  the  upward  path.  If  Alexander  had  not  con- 
quered Persia,  where  would  Europe  have  obtained  the  start 
with  which  she  began  the  Renaissance? 

Had  not  Alexander  conquered  Persia  and  the  East,  we  have 
reason  for  supposing  that  both  Greece  and  Persia  would  have 
continued  on  the  downward  path  on  which  thej^  had  already 
started,  and  that  the  lamp  of  civilization  would  gradually  have 
flickered  out.  It  was  the  impetus  that  Alexander  gave  to  the 
sluggish  spirits  of  the  Greeks,  and  the  opportunities  he  offered 
to  them  for  enhancing  their  prestige  and  expanding  their  com- 
merce, that  carried  Greek  civilization  into  Asia  and  planted 
it  there.    Alexander's  conquests  not  only  give  the  best  single 


PHILIP  OF  MACEDON  AND  ALEXANDER       123 

illustration  of  the  overwhelming  influence  of  strategy  on  mili- 
tary operations,  but  they  were  the  greatest  single  factor  in 
preserving  ancient  civilization,  and  thus  supplying  a  basis 
for  the  civilization  of  to-day. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

C^SAR 

IN  order  to  appreciate  Caesar's  campaigns  in  Gaul,  and 
their  effect  in  supporting  civilization,  we  must  remind 
ourselves  that  at  the  time  when  C«sar  went  into  Gaul  the 
Roman  Republic  controlled  not  only  Italy,  but  practically  all 
the  coast  of  the  Mediterranean  Sea;  and  that,  within  the  ter- 
ritory that  she  controlled,  law,  order,  and  material  prosperity 
reigned  in  greater  degree  than  in  any  other  part  of  the  world. 

Before  the  time  of  Cassar,  Rome's  progress  had  been  threat- 
ened seriously  only  once — when  the  great  Carthaginian  gen- 
eral Hannibal  invaded  Italy  in  the  Second  Punic  War.  Han- 
nibal was  the  son  of  a  great  general  named  Hamilcar,  and  a 
brother  of  another  great  general  named  Hasdrubal ;  and  it  is 
one  of  the  most  curious  facts  of  history  that  a  people  so  wholly 
pacifistic  and  commercial  as  the  Semitic  Carthaginians  should 
have  brought  forth  such  strategists.  Of  the  three,  Hannibal 
was  the  greatest. 

Because  of  the  events  of  the  First  Punic  War,  Hamilcar 
determined  on  revenge  against  Rome ;  and,  in  order  to  secure 
it,  formed  a  Carthaginian  province  in  Spain,  intending  to  use 
it  as  a  base  of  operations.  After  Hannibal  became  commander 
of  the  Carthaginian  army,  he  captured  Saguntum,  a  city  of 
Spain  allied  with  Rome.  (218  b.c.)  He  then  crossed  the  Pyre- 
nees and  invaded  Gaul  and  then  Italy.  In  an  important  battle 
on  the  Trebia  River,  he  defeated  a  Roman  army ;  and  in  a  sub- 
sequent battle  near  Lake  Trasimene  he  almost  annihilated  an- 
other. Later,  at  Cannge  (216  b.c),  he  disastrously  defeated 
another  army  and  threatened  Rome  itself.  Then  the  Roman 
general  Fabius  made  a  distinct  contribution  to  strategy  by  in- 
stituting what  are  now  called  "Fabian  tactics."    These  con- 

124 


C^SAR  125 

sisted  in  continually  avoiding  actual  battle,  but  perpetually 
harassing  the  enemy,  and  especially  interfering  with  his  get- 
ting supplies.  These  tactics  were  the  best  possible  under  the 
circumstances,  and  prevented  Hannibal  from  achieving  any 
more  tactical  victories.  The  crisis  came  when  Hannibal's 
brother,  Hasdrubal,  marching  from  Spain,  endeavored  to  form 
a  junction  with  Hannibal,  but  was  brought  to  battle  and  de- 
feated on  the  Metaurus  River,  in  Italy,  shortly  before  he  could 
accomplish  it.  Hannibal  quitted  Italy  soon  afterward  and 
returned  to  Carthage.  Near  Carthage  he  suffered  the  only 
defeat  of  his  life,  in  a  decisive  battle  at  Zama. 

When  Cifisar  marched  into  Gaul,  the  lands  of  Asia  and 
Africa  to  the  east  and  southeast  of  Rome,  on  which  Alexander 
had  impressed  the  civilization  of  Greece,  had  a  considerable 
degree  of  good  government  and  prosperity;  but  outside  of 
these  territories  only  primitive  civilization  existed  and  barbar- 
ous customs  prevailed.  The  territories  that  lay  to  the  north 
and  northwest  of  Italy  were  inhabited  by  tribes  of  a  very  war- 
like cast,  and  wars  among  them  were  continual.  Of  these 
tribes,  the  bravest  and  least  civilized  were  the  German  tribes 
on  the  east  bank  of  the  Rhine,  the  Belgians  in  the  northern 
part  of  Gaul,  and  the  Aquitanians  in  the  southwestern  part. 
In  the  middle  of  Gaul  the  various  tribes  had  been  considerably 
influenced  by  Roman  traders  who  had  gone  there  with  the 
products  of  the  Roman  civilization;  with  the  result  that, 
though  those  tribes  were  no  less  prone  to  war  than  before, 
they  had  become  less  hardy,  and  therefoi-e  less  efficient. 

It  is  easy  for  the  people  of  to-day  to  decry  the  civilization  of 
Rome,  and  to  point  out  many  particulars  in  which  the  Romans 
were  cruel  atid  militaristic;  but  let  us  remember  that  the 
Romans  were  no  more  cruel  or  militaristic  than  the  savage 
tribes  that  comprised  most  of  the  rest  of  the  world.  It  is  abso- 
lutely essential  to  anyone  who  wishes  to  come  to  a  just  opinion 
about  any  nation,  at  any  time,  to  realize  that  man  was  orig- 
inally a  savage,  living  a  life  little  different  from  that  of  the 
beasts  of  the  field ;  and  that  it  has  been  only  by  means  of  what 


126  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

we  call  civilization  that  man  has  been  raised  above  that  state. 
Furthermore,  it  is  necessary  to  realize  that  the  advance  of  civ- 
ilization has  been  forced  by  a  comparatively  few  men,  that  it 
has  been  steadily  resisted  by  barbarians,  and  that  the  only  way 
by  which  civilization  overcame  barbarism  was  by  the  use  of 
military  force.  Finally,  it  is  necessary  to  realize  that  military 
force  alone  could  not  have  overcome  the  opposing  military 
force  of  barbarism,  if  it  had  not  been  directed  by  superior  in- 
telligence. Now,  the  directing  of  force  by  intelligence  is  the 
province  of  strategy. 

Caesar  marched  from  Italy  into  Gaul  in  the  year  58  B.C.  He 
had  been  Consul;  and  during  his  consulate  the  general  condi- 
tion of  unrest  in  Gaul  had  been  such  as  to  arouse  alarm  in 
Italy.  The  proximity  of  the  Gauls  was  so  intimate,  and  the 
difference  between  them  and  the  Romans  was  so  great,  as  to 
incite  and  maintain  the  aggressive  hatred  of  the  barbarians, 
and  the  need  for  defensive  measures  against  them  by  the 
Romans.  Now,  the  Romans,  being  a  military  people,  knew  that 
purely  defensive  measures  would,  in  the  end,  be  broken  down, 
and  that  the  only  way  in  which  they  could  preserve  security 
inside  their  borders  was  to  take  offensive  measures  on  the  out- 
side against  the  Gauls.  This  was  the  procedure  they  had  been 
carrying  on  for  some  centuries,  first  within  the  peninsula  of 
Italy,  and  afterward  outside,  as  the  Roman  state  gradually 
expanded.  This  procedure  the  Roman  Senate  now  commis- 
sioned Julius  Cffisar  to  institute  in  Gaul.  They,  therefore, 
gave  him  command,  not  only  in  Cisalpine  Gaul  on  the  southern 
side  of  the  Alps,  but  in  Transalpine  Gaul  beyond  the  Alps ;  his 
commission  to  last  five  years. 

At  this  time  Cassar  was  forty-three  years  old.  *  His  health, 
originally  good,  had  been  conserved  by  an  abstemious  and 
active  life,  and  he  was  in  the  fullest  vigor  of  mind  and  body. 
He  had  had  little  experience  as  a  soldier ;  but  he  had  been  bom 
and  bred  in  a  military  atmosphere,  and  his  habits  of  life  and 
traits  of  character  were  of  the  military  cast.  He  had  the 
quickness  of  mind,  the  strength  of  nerve,  and  the  natural  cour- 


128  THE  ART  OP  FIGHTING 

age  that  enable  a  man  to  scent  danger  quickly  but  with  equa- 
nimity, to  separate  important  from  unimportant  facts,  and  to 
decide  what  course  it  is  best  to  follow,  unconfused  by  details. 
Finally,  he  had  what  is  the  most  valuable  single  attribute  in 
a  great  commander — that  of  foresight.  This  does  not  mean 
that  Cffisar  was  a  prophet,  or  that  a  strategist  must  be  a 
prophet ;  but  it  does  mean  that  Caesar  had  the  patience  and  the 
moral  courage  to  study  an  actual  situation  with  thoroughness, 
to  look  it  in  the  face  without  quailing,  and  to  arrive  at  an 
intelligent  estimate  of  the  course  of  events  that  the  situation 
would  bring  forth.  In  addition,  he  had  the  persistency  and 
industry  to  make  preparations  with  the  utmost  care  and 
thoroughness  for  doing  whatever  he  decided  to  do;  the  self- 
control  to  refrain  from  overt  action  until  he  was  quite  ready ; 
and  the  energy  and  ardor  to  strike  with  the  utmost  possible 
celerity  and  force  when  he  was  ready  and  the  opportunity  had 
arrived. 

There  were  two  events  in  particular  that  had  aroused  the 
Romans.  These  were  disturbances  produced  in  Gaul  by  the 
westward  crossing  of  the  Rhine  by  a  German  tribe,  and  a 
threatened  westward  exit  from  Switzerland  into  Gaul  of  the 
Swiss.  The  Germans  had  attacked  and  beaten  a  tribe  called 
the  ^duans,  who  were  more  or  less  under  the  protection  of 
Rome.  The  Swiss  had  as  yet  committed  no  overt  act ;  but  for 
two  years  they  had  been  making  preparations  showing  that 
they  contemplated  a  complete  exodus  from  Switzerland  and  a 
long  march  to  the  westward.  The  danger  of  this  action  on  the 
part  of  the  Swiss  was  not  only  that  they  would  drive  before 
them  the  Gauls,  who  would  overflow  into  Italy,  but  that  they 
would  leave  Switzerland  open  to  occupation  by  the  Germans 
and  a  road  for  the  Germans  into  the  Roman  province.  The 
Germans  then,  as  now,  were  the  disturbing  force  in  Central 
Europe.  The  Swiss,  in  fact  were  practically  being  driven  out 
of  Switzerland  by  pressure  from  the  Germans. 

Since  the  seven  million  barbarians  of  Gaul  and  Germany, 
regardless  of  how  much  they  might  fight  among  themselves, 


C^SAR  129 

were  all  hostile  to  the  Romans,  Caesar  realized  that  he  faced  a 
gigantic  task.    No  mortal  ever  faced  a  greater. 

In  the  midst  of  his  preparations,  Cassar  learned  that  the 
Swiss  were  about  to  set  fire  to  their  towns  and  villages,  to  burn 
up  all  the  corn  except  what  they  were  to  carry  with  them, 
and  to  start  on  their  expedition,  taking  a  route  that  lay 
through  the  Roman  Province  in  southern  Gaul.  He  left  Rome 
at  once,  and  hastened  through  Gaul  to  the  vicinity  of  Geneva, 
where  there  was  a  bridge  across  the  Rhone  River,  over  which 
the  Swiss  had  to  pass.  He  took  with  him  the  only  legion  in 
Gaul,  though  he  made  requisition  on  the  Roman  Province  for 
as  many  troops  as  it  could  muster.  When  he  arrived  at 
Geneva  he  immediately  destroyed  the  bridge.  The  Swiss  evi- 
dently had  not  expected  such  rapid  movements;  and,  being 
taken  by  surprise,  had  neglected  to  secure  the  bridge.  They 
thereupon  pleaded  with  CjEsar  to  permit  them  to  cross.  Ca?sar 
replied  that  he  would  take  a  space  of  time  for  consideration, 
and  told  them  to  return  in  two  weeks,  on  the  13th  of  April. 
He  utilized  the  interval  by  taking  obstructive  measures  of  the 
most  energetic  and  effective  kind ;  so  that,  when  the  two  weeks 
had  elapsed,  he  had  constructed  walls  and  trenches  and  posted 
separate  garrisons  in  newly  constructed  intrenched  forts. 
The  Swiss  attempted  by  various  operations  to  get  across  the 
river,  but  finally  abandoned  the  attempt. 

We  see  in  this  first  operation  of  Ccesar,  and  throughout  his 
campaigns  in  Gaul,  a  marked  skill  in  the  utilization  of  mechan- 
ical and  engineering  appliances.  In  some  cases  we  see  also  a 
high  order  of  invention.  Froude  says  of  him:  "He  was 
never  greater  than  in  unlooked-for  difficulties.  He  never 
rested.     He  was  always  inventing  some  new  contrivance." 

The  Swiss  then  started  to  the  westward  by  another  pass, 
though  they  had  to  secure  the  consent  of  the  Sequani  to  do  so. 
This  having  been  secured,  the  whole  multitude  set  out,  in  num- 
ber about  368,000,  of  whom  92,000  were  fighting  men.  And 
these  fighting  men  were  not  like  the  Persians  whom  Alexander 
encountered,  but  hardy  mountaineers,  brave,  determined,  and 


130  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

accustomed  to  war.  Caesar  estimated  the  situation  as  so  men- 
acing that  forthwith  he  hurried  back  to  Italy,  enrolled  two 
legions,  and  brought  out  of  winter  quarters  three  more :  then, 
with  these  five  legions,  he  marched  back  with  the  greatest 
speed  and  by  the  shortest  route,  though  it  lay  over  the  Alps. 

At  this  time  a  Roman  legion  at  its  full  strength  seems  to 
have  been  about  5000  men  in  number ;  but  it  was  rarely  at  its 
full  strength  in  Caesar's  campaigns.  In  a  legion  there  were 
only  about  300  cavalry,  and  their  use  was  mainly  for  recon- 
noitering,  scouting,  and  pursuit.  The  legion  was  made  up  of 
ten  cohorts,  each  cohort  being  made  up  of  three  maniples,  and 
each  maniple  being  made  up  of  two  centuries.  If  a  century 
had  really  been  composed  of  100  men,  as  its  name  would  indi- 
cate, this  would  have  made  a  legion  6000  strong.  In  battle 
formation  a  legion  was  drawn  up  in  three  lines.  The  infantry 
were  trained  to  attack  with  javelins  at  short  range,  and  to  fol- 
low immediately  with  a  charge  and  a  hand-to-hand  encountcK 
with  swords.  A  shield  was  carried  on  the  left  arm,  and  this, 
of  course,  protected  the  left  side  rather  than  the  right. 

The  commander-in-chief  (imperator)  of  an  army  that  con- 
sisted of  two  or  more  legions  had  a  staff  that  varied  in  num- 
bers, according  to  the  size  of  the  army  and  the  requirements  of 
the  situation ;  and  at  the  head  of  this  staff  was  a  quaestor,  who 
combined  the  duties  of  what  we  now  call  the  chief  of  staff  and 
the  quartermaster  general.  He  was  also  second  in  command 
and  had  his  quarters  next  to  those  of  the  commander-in-chief. 
The  commander-in-chief  had  a  special  body-guard  (or  prato- 
rian  guard),  who  were  picked  men;  Ceesar's  guard  was  the 
tenth  legion.  The  prsetorian  guard,  under  the  empire,  ac- 
quired an  enormous  influence,  in  some  cases  making  and  un- 
making emperors.  Besides  the  fighting  men  strictly  consid- 
ered, Csesar  had  a  considerable  number  of  engineers,  expert 
workmen  who  built  bridges,  looked  after  siege  material,  and 
did  mechanical  work  of  all  kinds.  The  skilful  and  frequent 
use  that  Caesar  made  of  these  men  was  the  most  powerful  sin- 
gle factor  in  contributing  to  his  success.    Csesar  's  men  were  no 


C^SAR  131 

braver  than  the  men  of  the  Gallic  tribes,  the  fighting  instinct 
was  no  better  developed,  and  even  in  discipline  there  was  no 
overwhelming  superiority;  but  the  barbarians  of  Gaul  had 
nothing  with  which  to  compete  with  the  mechanical  appli- 
ances that  Csesar  provided  in  advance  for  his  campaigns 
against  them.  In  no  other  way  did  Csesar  show  more  clearly 
his  genius  as  a  strategist  than  in  his  careful  and  skilful  prep- 
aration of  mechanical  appliances. 

By  the  time  that  Caesar  reached  their  vicinity  in  the  early 
summer,  the  Swiss  had  emerged  from  the  defiles,  gone  through 
the  territory  of  the  Sequani,  reached  the  borders  of  the  ^dui, 
and  begun  to  lay  waste  their  lauds,  following  the  destructive 
instinct  of  barbarians.  They  had  now  reached  the  bani:s  of 
the  Saone  River  and  were  engaged  in  crossing  it.  Seeing  his 
opportunity,  Csesar  waited  until  his  scouts  informed  him  that 
three-quarters  of  the  enemy  had  crossed,  and  then  attacked  the 
remaining  quarter  with  the  utmost  suddenness  and  force,  took 
them  completel}^  by  surprise,  and  routed  them  utterly.  This 
done,  he  built  a  bridge  over  the  river  and  sent  his  army 
across.  The  Swiss  were  tremendously  alarmed;  for  not  only 
had  Ceesar  destroyed  a  large  part  of  their  force,  but  he  had 
crossed  the  river  in  one  day,  whereas  it  had  taken  them  twenty 
days.  They  thereupon  sent  a  deputation  to  him,  which  made 
both  pleas  and  threats,  but  without  avail. 

The  Swiss  thereupon  moved  their  camp,  and  Caesar  followed, 
sending  forward  his  cavalry  to  keep  in  touch  with  them  and 
inform  him  of  their  doings.  This  cavalry  was  a  very  irregular 
force,  which  he  had  raised,  and  which  he  soon  found  to  be 
entirely  unreliable.  In  a  short  time  Caesar  began  to  be  in 
straits  for  corn ;  for  he  could  not  get  any  from  the  land,  he 
had  left  his  provision  boats  on  the  Saone  River,  and  the 
-'Eduans  (whom  he  was  defending  against  the  Swiss),  though 
they  continually  promised  to  give  him  com,  failed  to  do  so. 
He  was  finally  compelled  to  cease  following  the  Swiss  and  to 
march  toward  Bibracte,  where  the  ^duans  had  stored  a  large 
supply.    The  Swiss  construed  this  change  of  course  as  a  re- 


132  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

treat  and  turned  on  him  in  pursuit  and  annoyed  his  rear 
guard. 

The  situation  came  to  a  crisis  with  a  battle,  in  which  four 
veteran  Roman  legions  drawn  up  in  three  lines,  with  the  two 
new  legions  and  the  wagons  and  tent  equipage  behind  them  on 
a  hill  were  attacked  from  directly  in  front  by  a  close  pha- 
lanx of  the  Swiss,  who  much  exceeded  them  in  numbers.  The 
first  few  volleys  of  the  long  Roman  javelins  had  great  effect, 
piercing  the  ineffective  shields  of  the  barbarians,  and  some- 
times binding  two  of  them  together.  The  Swiss  were  grad- 
ually forced  back ;  but  suddenly  about  15,000  men  of  two  other 
tribes  attacked  the  Romans  on  their  right  flank.  The  situation 
was  serious,  but  it  was  to  meet  serious  situations  that  the 
Roman  legions  trained.  The  rear  line  of  the  Romans  wheeled 
and  advanced  toward  the  new  attack,  while  the  first  two  lines 
again  pressed  back  the  enemy,  who  had  advanced  when  their 
allies  made  the  flank  attack.  A  double  conflict  of  the  utmost 
fury  followed,  which  continued  far  into  the  night;  the  Swiss 
finally  fighting  from  behind  a  rampart  of  carts,  that  they  had 
constructed,  while  some  of  them  from  underneath  the  carts 
hurled  lances  and  javelins.  Superior  equipment  and  training 
prevailed  in  the  end,  however,  and  a  wholesale  retreat  ensued. 

It  is  said  that  for  three  days  130,000  marched  away  from  the 
scene  of  battle.  Ceesar  did  not  pursue  them,  but  he  ordered 
the  other  tribes  not  to  give  them  food.  The  result  was  that  the 
Swiss  were  soon  compelled  by  lack  of  provisions  to  ask  for 
terms.  These  being  arranged,  the  Swiss  went  back  into  their 
own  province.  Of  those  who  reached  home  there  were  only 
110,000,  though  368,000  had  left. 

After  the  Swiss  campaign,  certain  tribes  of  Gaul  besought 
Cagsar  to  save  them  from  the  Germans,  who  had  come  across 
the  Rhine  to  the  number  of  about  120,000,  and  were  gradually 
taking  possession  of  their  territory  by  sheer  force  of  military 
strength,  under  their  king,  Ariovistus.  Csesar  concluded 
finally  to  endeavor  to  treat  with  the  German  king;  but,  not 
being  able  to  accomplish  this,  he  decided  to  advance  against 


C^SAR  133 

him.  He  had  received  word  in  time  that  the  Germans  were 
marching  to  seize  the  town  of  Vesontio,  a  place  well  fortified, 
well  situated  strategically,  and  well  provisioned.  With  the 
celerity  that  characterized  all  his  operations,  Caesar  advanced 
to  Vesontio,  reached  it  before  the  Germans  did,  and  cap- 
tured it. 

But  the  Roman  soldiers,  even  their  officers,  were  soon 
thrown  into  a  virtual  panic  by  the  accounts  they  received  of  the 
enormous  strength  and  courage  of  the  Germans.  It  re(iuired 
all  Caesar's  ability  as  an  orator  (and  he  stood  second  only  to 
Cicero)  to  infuse  heart  into  them ;  but  this  he  did.  He  immedi- 
ately set  out  on  the  march.  On  the  seventh  day  his  scouts 
informed  him  that  the  Germans  were  only  twenty-four  miles 
away ;  and  he  soon  received  emissaries  from  the  German  king 
suggesting  a  parley.  At  this  parley  Ctesar  found  himself  con- 
fronted by  a  man  whom  he  could  neither  threaten  nor  per- 
suade into  a  peaceful  line  of  conduct,  with  the  result  that  the 
two  forces  soon  found  themselves  in  opposing  camps,  two  miles 
apart. 

For  several  days  in  succession  Csesar  brought  his  forces  out 
in  front  of  his  camp,  to  give  the  Germans  opportunity  for 
battle ;  but,  ascertaining  from  prisoners  that  the  reason  why 
the  Germans  abstained  from  battle  was  that  the  German 
matrons  had  declared,  after  certain  occult  observances,  that 
Heaven  forbade  that  they  should  win  a  victory  if  they  fought 
before  the  new  moon,  Cassar  realized  his  opportunity  at  once, 
and  advanced  his  forces  in  triple  line  right  up  to  the  German 
camp,  thereby  forcing  the  Germans  as  valiant  soldiers  to  come 
out  and  fight.  This  they  did,  and  with  the  utmost  valor  and 
energy.  In  fact,  they  charged  so  quickly  that  a  hand-to-hand 
conflict  ensued  at  once,  in  which  by  sheer  weight  of  numbers 
the  Germans  almost  forced  the  Romans  back.  A  tactical  man- 
CBuver,  however,  by  which  the  Romans  brought  their  third  line 
in  to  the  support  of  their  left  flank,  saved  the  day,  and  the 
Germans  were  soon  in  full  retreat. 

One  notes  in  this  battle,  and  in  others  between  the  Romans 


134  THE  ART  OP  FIGHTING 

and  the  barbarians,  that,  although  the  first  onslaught  of  the 
barbarians  was  splendid,  they  seemed  to  be  at  a  loss  if  any- 
thing unexpected  occurred,  or  after  any  reverse  had  been  sus- 
tained. In  this  case,  after  the  German  retreat  began,  it  was 
conducted  without  even  an  attempt  at  preserving  order.  Now, 
one  of  the  distinctive  features  of  a  well  disciplined  army  is 
that,  unless  the  circumstances  are  excessively  unfavorable,  it 
withdraws  in  good  order  instead  of  plunging  into  a  headlong 
rout. 

The  defeat  of  the  Swiss  and  the  Germans  removed  the  two 
menaces  that  Caesar  had  been  sent  into  Gaul  to  remove.  He 
accomplished  this  in  the  first  summer,  and  with  that  combina- 
tion of  deliberation,  celerity,  and  force  that  distinguished 
everything  he  did.  He  then  sent  his  army  into  winter  quar- 
ters among  the  Sequani,  north  of  the  Roman  Province. 

In  the  early  summer  following,  he  learned  that  the  Bel- 
gians were  forming  a  conspiracy  with  the  tribes  of  northern 
Gaul,  and  inciting  them  to  unite  against  the  Roman  power. 
He,  therefore,  enrolled  two  more  legions,  sent  them  into  Gaul, 
and  followed  them  soon  himself.  Having  arranged  for 
his  corn  supply,  he  then  marched  north  with  his  army, 
and,  as  usual,  with  the  greatest  possible  speed.  Arriving  near 
the  borders  of  the  Belgians,  he  ascertained  that  the  various 
tribes  had  got  together  about  300,000  men,  and  that  they 
were  already  advancing  against  him.  He  thereupon  marched 
his  army  across  the  Aisne  River  and  pitched  his  camp ;  going 
over  a  bridge  to  the  farther  side,  setting  a  guard  on  both  ends 
of  the  bridge,  and  placing  his  lieutenant,  Sabinus,  on  the 
nearer  side  of  the  river.  He  gave  orders  to  Sabinus  to  con- 
struct and  intrench  a  camp  there  with  a  rampart  twelve  feet 
high  and  a  trench  eighteen  feet  wide. 

When  the  Belgians  reached  a  point  about  eight  miles  dis- 
tant from  Caesar,  they  stopped  and  attacked  a  town  named 
Bribax  with  great  violence.  In  accordance  with  their  method, 
a  host  of  men  surrounded  the  ramparts,  and  formed  a  "tor- 
toise, ' '  which  was  a  formation  in  which  the  men  in  front  and 


C^SAR  135 

on  the  sides  held  their  shields  in  a  sloping  position,  while  the 
other  men  held  their  shields  horizontally;  so  that  all  men 
were  completely  protected  from  missiles  from  behind  the  ram- 
parts. At  the  same  time,  a  storm  of  missiles  was  kept  up 
against  the  defenders.  When  these  were  driven  from  the 
walls  (as  soon  happened  in  this  case),  they  undercut  the 
walls  and  advanced  to  the  gates.  Receiving  news  of  this, 
Cffisar  sent  archers  and  slingers,  and  these  succeeded  in  driv- 
ing otf  the  Belgians. 

The  whole  barbarian  host  then  advanced  toward  Cassar,  and 
soon  the  two  forces  stood  in  front  of  each  other.  CaBsar  had 
secured  a  very  advantageous  position,  and  protected  his  flanks 
by  artificial  means  also.  There  being  a  swamp  between  the 
two  forces,  and  neither  venturing  to  put  itself  to  a  disad- 
vantage while  crossing  the  swamp,  no  action  occurred  except 
a  minor  cavalry  engagement.  Cassar  then  withdrew  his  army 
toward  the  camp ;  whereupon  the  barbarians  rushed  past  him 
and  crossed  the  river  by  fords,  evidently  intending  to  capture 
the  fort  of  Sabinus  and  get  between  the  Romans  and  their 
base.  Cffisar  at  once  crossed  the  bridge  which  his  guards  still 
held  and  engaged  the  enemy  while  many  of  them  were  in  the 
river  and  while  the  whole  force  was  disorganized.  The  bar- 
barians fought  gallantly  but  unavailingly,  and  with  tremen- 
dous loss.  That  night  they  decamped  without  order,  each 
seeking  for  himself  the  shortest  route  home.  Cgesar  was  cau- 
tious about  pursuing,  realizing  the  danger  of  ambush ;  but  on 
the  following  morning  his  cavalry  pursued  the  Belgians  furi- 
ously, attacking  the  rear  guard,  and  producing  a  confusion 
that  spread  increasingly  through  the  horde. 

Caesar  now  proceeded  to  assault  a  town  called  Noviodunum. 
Though  there  were  few  there  to  defend  it,  because  most  of  the 
men  were  absent  in  the  war,  he  could  not  take  it  by  storm. 
He,  therefore,  made  ready  his  siege  appliances  and  prepared 
to  use  them  against  the  walls.  But  the  mere  sight  of  his  ap- 
pliances so  impressed  the  barbarians  that  they  at  once  sent 
deputies  to  make  terms  of  surrender. 


136  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

Cassar  soon  received  information  that  the  water-drinking 
Nervii,  the  most  hardy  tribe  in  Gaul,  were  organized  to  oppose 
him,  and  that  they  were  already  in  position  on  the  farther 
side  of  the  Sambre  River.  He  at  once  sent  scouts  ahead  to 
select  a  place  for  a  camp,  and  moved  his  army  north.  It  was 
his  custom  on  ordinary  marches  to  have  each  legion  followed 
by  its  baggage  train ;  but  on  this  occasion,  and  usually  when 
near  the  enemy,  he  directed  that  six  legions  should  march  at 
the  head,  with  the  army  baggage  behind  them,  followed  by  two 
legions  as  a  rear  guard.  Not  knowing  of  this  later  arrange- 
ment, certain  Gauls  informed  the  Nervii  how  Cgesar's  army 
usually  marched,  and  pointed  out  the  ease  with  which  the  head 
of  the  column  could  be  attacked.  The  result  was  that  when 
the  six  legions  reached  the  site  of  the  camp  and  began  to  form 
it,  and  just  as  the  first  baggage  detachment  came  in  sight,  the 
Nervii  dashed  out  from  the  woods  with  full  force  upon  the 
cavalrj^  which  were  ahead.  The  cavalry  were  quickly  thrown 
back ;  and  then  with  amazing  swiftness  the  enemy  attacked  the 
camp  itself  before  the  legions  could  arm  themselves.  The  sur- 
prise was  complete  and  the  crisis  was  one  of  the  utmost  urg- 
ency. It  was  impossible  for  Csesar,  or  even  for  the  subordi- 
nate commanders,  to  give  all  the  directions  that  were  neces- 
sary ;  and  it  was  impossible  even  for  the  line  to  form  in  order. 
It  was  here  that  the  admirable  discipline  of  Caesar's  force 
showed  itself;  for  almost  automatically  every  ofiScer  and  man 
seemed  to  realize  what  ought  to  be  done,  and  to  do  it  at  once. 

At  one  time  the  situation  became  extremely  critical ;  but  the 
personal  magnetism  of  Caesar,  his  calmness  and  courage, 
enabled  him  to  rally  his  forces  at  the  most  dangerous  point, 
and  even  to  advance  against  the  enemy.  The  barbarians,  on 
the  other  hand,  after  their  original  plan  had  been  put  into 
operation,  had  no  methods  by  which  to  adapt  their  operations 
to  changed  conditions ;  and  the  result  was  that,  after  fighting 
with  the  utmost  possible  courage  and  determination,  their 
fighting  was  reduced  to  mere  desperate  struggles,  and  then 
to  dying  bravely.    And,  as  has  so  often  happened  with  sav- 


C^SAR  137 

ages,  when  disaster  came  it  was  complete.  The  name  and  the 
nation  of  the  Nervii  were  almost  annihilated. 

A  neighboring  tribe  had  been  advancing  to  the  assistance 
of  the  Nervii.  On  hearing  of  their  defeat,  however,  they  re- 
turned home,  abandoned  all  of  their  towns  and  forts,  and 
gathered  themselves  with  their  belongings  into  one  strong- 
hold, which  was  admirably  fortified  by  nature.  On  all  sides 
save  one  it  looked  down  on  steep  rocks,  and  on  that  one  side 
the  approach  was  very  narrow.  This  approach  they  had  for- 
tified with  a  double  wall  of  great  height.  Upon  the  arrival 
of  the  Romans,  they  made  frequent  sallies  against  them. 
But  Caesar  made  a  fortified  rampart  around  the  town,  pushed 
his  mantlets  (large  shields  on  wheels,  protected  on  the  sides 
and  on  top)  up  toward  the  wall,  and  built  a  tower.  The 
barbarians  laughed  at  the  tower,  seeing  it  so  far  away,  and 
judging  that  no  darts  could  reach  them  from  that  distance. 
But  when  they  saw  the  tower  moving  toward  them,  they  were 
filled  with  terror,  and  sent  deputies  at  once  to  treat  for 
peace.  Caesar  granted  peace,  but  exacted  that  they  give  up 
their  arms.  The  barbarians  threw  over  a  great  quantity  from 
the  walls ;  but  they  did  not  throw  them  all,  and  in  the  middle 
of  the  night  they  made  a  sudden  sally.  Anticipating  such  a 
movement,  Caesar  instantly  gave  the  signal  prepared  before- 
hand, and  a  battle  ensued,  in  which  the  superior  equipment 
and  discipline  of  the  Romans  had  the  usual  effect. 

These  achievements  brought  peace  in  Gaul,  and  Csesar  de- 
parted to  Italy,  purposing  to  return  in  the  following  summer. 
During  his  absence  the  Veneti,  a  large  tribe  on  the  north- 
western coast,  the  most  skilful  seamen  and  navigators  of 
Gaul,  stirred  up  a  revolt  that  quickly  spread.  This  revolt 
was  especially  dangerous  because,  in  case  of  a  conflict,  the 
superiority  of  skill  and  equipment  would  rest  with  the  bar- 
barians and  not  with  the  Romans;  for  the  reason  that  the 
Veneti  could  not  be  subdued  except  upon  the  sea,  and  neither 
the  Roman  sailors  nor  the  Roman  vessels  were  as  good  for 


138  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

navigating  in  the  boisterous  seas  on  the  Vencti  coast  as  were 
the  Veneti  themselves. 

Nothing  daunted,  Caesar  ordered  men-of-war  to  be  built  on 
the  river  Loire,  and  rowers  and  seamen  to  be  drafted  from 
the  Roman  Province.  The  Veneti,  hearing  these  prepara- 
tions, and  having  the  barbarians'  fear  of  the  Roman  power, 
made  all  possible  preparations  for  defense.  But  with  good 
reason  they  looked  forward  to  victory:  for  what  could  the 
Romans,  with  their  comparatively  small  vessels  built  for  navi- 
gation on  the  Mediterranean,  and  navigated  by  men  ignorant 
of  the  waters  near  their  coast — what  could  they  do  against 
the  very  much  stronger  and  larger  Veneti  ships,  with  their 
heavy  sails  of  hides  and  skins,  manned  and  officered  by  ex- 
perienced seamen?  The  two  fleets  finally  came  together — the 
Veneti  fleet  being  not  only  made  up  of  the  stronger  vessels 
and  manned  by  the  more  skilful  seamen  and  navigators,  but 
even  superior  in  numbers.  The  Roman  vessels  could  have  no 
success  in  ramming  them,  and  were  at  a  great  disadvantage 
in  the  matter  of  throwing  missiles,  because  the  decks  of  the 
Veneti  ships  were  higher. 

What  happened?  The  Roman  galleys  were  rowed  rapidly 
against  the  Veneti  ships,  and  Roman  sailors  raised  long  poles, 
on  which  were  sharp  hooks,  which  they  put  over  the  halyards 
that  held  up  the  sails.  Then  the  Roman  galleys  rowed  rap- 
idly away.  The  halyards  were  cut  or  broken,  and  down  come 
the  sails.  The  Veneti  ships  at  once  became  helpless,  and  were 
immediately  boarded,  with  the  result  that,  of  all  the  number, 
very  few  made  their  escape.  This  engagement  ended  the  cam- 
paign against  the  Veneti  and  the  whole  coast;  for  nearly 
every  ship  and  every  fighting  man  available  had  been  in  the 
battle. 

The  following  winter,  which  ushered  in  the  year  55  B.C., 
brought  an  invasion  from  a  savage  German  tribe  that  was 
forced  out  of  Germany  by  a  tribe  more  powerful.  This  inva- 
sion seriously  threatened  the  stability  of  Gaul,  and  Caesar  at 


C^SAR  139 

once  advanced  to  drive  it  back.  He  was  soon  met  by  envoys, 
who  said  that  the  tribe  had  been  driven  from  its  own  country, 
and  had  come  to  Gaul  to  seek  a  home.  Caesar  replied  that 
there  were  no  unoccupied  lands  that  could  receive  so  great  a 
multitude,  and  that  they  must  go  back  across  the  Rhine  at 
once.  The  envoys  departed,  begging  Caesar  to  advance  no 
farther  until  he  heard  from  them.  Csesar  was  too  experi- 
enced a  strategist  to  grant  this  request,  knowing  the  Germans 
would  utilize  the  time  by  concentrating  their  forces. 

The  two  armies  soon  came  in  sight  of  each  other,  and  Caesar 
gave  orders  to  his  men  not  to  meddle  with  the  Germans.  A 
body  of  the  Germans,  however,  attacked  the  Roman  advance 
guard  during  a  period  of  truce,  and  killed  and  wounded  sev- 
eral. CtEsar  thereupon  committed  an  act  for  which  he  has 
been  more  blamed  than  for  any  other  of  his  life.  On  the  fol- 
lowing morning,  when  some  German  chiefs  appeared  to  apolo- 
gize, he  detained  them,  and  then  flung  his  army  upon  the 
German  tribe,  which  was  entirely  unprepared — ^the  members 
of  which  were  lying  about,  in  fact,  with  women  and  children 
dispersed  among  them.  The  Roman  legions,  furious  at  the 
German  treachery  of  the  previous  day,  made  wholesale 
slaughter  of  men,  women,  and  children.  The  original  num- 
ber was  stated  by  Caesar  as  430,000.  Of  these  it  is  not  known 
how  many  survived;  but  it  is  said  that  no  clear  record  re- 
mains of  any  survivors  except  certain  detachments  which 
were  absent  from  the  battle,  and  the  chiefs  whom  Ceesar  had 
detained.  For  his  act  no  justification  can  be  urged  accord- 
ing to  modem  standards.  The  nearest  approximation  to  jus- 
tification that  one  can  make  is  to  say  that  the  Germans  would 
probably  have  treated  the  Romans  in  a  similar  manner,  had 
they  been  offered  a  similar  opportunity. 

The  effect  of  his  action  was  tremendous  in  impressing  the 
Gauls  and  the  Germans  with  fear  of  the  Roman  power,  and 
thereby  in  pacifying  the  Gallic  tribes.  But,  across  the  Rhine, 
the  Suevi,  the  most  savage  of  the  German  tribes,  were  threat- 
ening weaker  tribes  in  the  vicinity;  and  these  begged  Caesar 


140  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

to  come  and  save  them.  Caesar  decided  to  cross  the  Rhine, 
not  for  conquest,  but  for  the  psychological  effect;  and,  in 
order  to  make  this  effect  as  great  as  possible,  to  construct  a 
bridge  and  send  his  army  over  it.  This  was  done  with  the 
celerity,  thoroughness,  and  success  that  distinguished  Caesar's 
acts ;  for  in  ten  days  after  he  had  decided  to  make  the  bridge, 
at  which  time  the  material  was  still  standing  in  the  forest,  a 
bridge  forty  feet  wide  had  been  constructed.  Caesar  marched 
across  with  his  legions,  and  remained  in  Germany  eighteen 
days.  His  visit  had  an  enormous  effect,  mainly  by  reason  of 
the  bridge;  for  the  construction  of  such  a  bridge  in  ten  days 
made  the  barbarians  realize  with  awe  and  fear  that  the 
Romans  were  of  a  superior  race. 


CHAPTER  IX 

c^SAR  (Continued) 

IT  was  now  early  August  of  the  year  55  B.C.  Gaul  had 
been  reduced  to  submission;  but  across  a  narrow  strait 
was  an  island  whose  white  cliffs  could  be  seen  sometimes, 
but  of  which  the  Romans  knew  little,  save  that  on  it  the  ene- 
mies of  Rome  had  sometimes  found  shelter.  Csesar  deter- 
mined to  visit  it.  He  directed  an  officer  to  take  a  galley  and 
make  a  survey  of  the  island  coast,  sent  the  ships  he  had  used 
in  the-  Veneti  war  into  the  English  Channel,  and  finally  gath- 
ered about  eighty  ships  at  the  point  where  Boulogne  now  is. 
After  the  surveying  officer  had  returned,  he  started  across, 
carrying  two  legions  in  the  ships. 

He  found  the  white  cliffs  lined  with  warriors,  and  saw  that 
the  cliffs  were  so  close  to  the  water  that  landing  there  would 
be  impossible,  in  face  of  the  threatened  resistance.  He  there- 
fore moved  up  the  coast  until  he  found  an  open  beach.  The 
Britons  followed  him,  some  in  chariots  and  some  on  horses, 
evidently  intending  fight.  The  Roman  soldiers  hesitated  (for 
which  we  can  scarcely  blame  them),  but  Caesar  did  not.  He 
at  once  sent  his  armed  galleys  ahead  with  archers  and  cross- 
bowmen  to  clear  the  approach,  and  then  ordered  the  legion- 
aries to  spring  overboard  and  advance  toward  the  beach. 
The  Britons  rode  their  horses  into  the  water  to  meet  the 
Romans.  A  hand-to-hand  struggle  then  ensued,  which  ended 
in  the  usual  way. 

Cassar  then  formed  a  camp.  All  went  well  till  the  fourth 
day,  when  a  storm  arose  that  drove  some  of  the  ships  ashore 
and  some  of  them  into  the  Channel.  With  his  customary 
energy  and  resourcefulness,  Ceesar  collected  all  of  his  vessels 

141 


142  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

save  twelve,  and  repaired  such  as  were  injured.  Meanwhile 
the  Britons,  much  heartened  by  the  accident,  made  two  sud- 
den attacks  on  the  Romans  in  their  camp.  They  were  de- 
feated, however,  and  made  to  beg  for  peace,  despite  their  skil- 
ful use  of  chariots,  to  which  the  Romans  were  not  accustomed. 
Caesar  then  returned  to  Gaul  and  put  his  army  in  winter 
quarters  among  the  Belgians.     He  himself  departed  to  Illyria. 

In  the  following  April  of  the  year  54  b.c.  CfEsar  returned  to 
Boulogne,  where  he  found  nearly  ready  28  armed  galleys,  as 
well  as  600  transports,  constructed  in  accordance  with  his  own 
design.  On  the  20th  of  July  he  set  sail  with  five  legions  and 
considerable  cavalry,  embarked  in  800  vessels;  and  at  noon 
landed  on  the  same  beach  as  in  the  previous  year,  but  without 
opposition,  made  his  camp,  and  intrenched  it.  Caesar  then 
advanced  inland,  at  the  cost  of  overcoming  considerable  re- 
sistance; but  suddenly  he  heard  that  his  fleet  had  again  been 
broken  up  by  storm.  He  returned  immediately  to  the  coast, 
and  set  about  the  work  of  salvage  and  repair.  His  measures 
were  so  well  directed  and  so  efficiently  executed  that  in  ten 
days  he  was  able  to  resume  his  march.  He  again  met  with 
considerable  resistance  from  the  Britons.  They  were  as 
brave  and  warlike  as  any  he  had  ever  met ;  but,  like  all  bar- 
barian tribes,  they  had  no  plan  of  action  after  their  first  as- 
sault had  been  made,  and  quickly  lapsed  into  a  state  of  con- 
fusion, in  which  the  highly  disciplined  Roman  legions,  under 
the  resourceful  Caesar,  were  able  to  inflict  tremendous  dam- 
age, which  increased  their  confusion  and  finally  produced  a 
rout. 

Of  all  the  men  in  history,  the  man  who  seems  to  have  been 
the  most  resourceful,  to  have  been  the  best  able  to  adapt  meas- 
ures to  changed  conditions  and  devise  new  methods  and  appli- 
ances in  emergencies,  was  Julius  CcBsar. 

The  summer  passed  successfully  for  the  Romans,  and  Caesar 
led  them  back  to  Gaul  about  the  middle  of  September.  The 
harvest  in  northern  Gaul  that  year  was  bad ;  and  Caesar  was 
forced,  for  this  reason,  to  disperse  his  troops  over  a  wider  area 


C^SAR  143 

than  he  otherwise  would  have  done.  The  Gauls,  noting  this, 
saw  an  opportunity  for  attacking  the  garrisons  in  detail. 
The  leader  of  the  movement  possessed  the  engaging  name  of 
Indutiomarus ;  and  he  persuaded  a  chief  named  Ambiorix  to 
achieve  the  capture  of  the  garrison  at  Tongres  by  treachery, 
as  being  easier  than  by  force.  Ambiorix,  being  personally 
known  to  Sabinus,  the  Roman  general  in  command,  told  him, 
under  the  guise  of  friendship,  that  vast  bodies  of  Germans 
had  crossed  the  Rhine  and  were  about  to  attack  Tongres, 
while  all  over  Gaul  the  other  Roman  garrisons  would  be  at- 
tacked at  the  same  time.  He  advised  Sabinus  to  escape  to 
another  garrison  while  there  was  time.  Against  the  advice 
of  his  second  in  command,  against  the  orders  of  Caesar,  and 
with  a  stupidity  that  is  surprising  in  a  Roman  general,  Sabi- 
nus broke  camp  and  marched  to  join  Labienus,  another  Roman 
general.  Ambiorix  waited  for  him  in  a  large  valley  two  miles 
distant  from  camp,  and  at  the  appropriate  time  and  place 
attacked  him  on  all  sides.  The  Romans  fought  with  the  ut- 
most possible  valor,  the  last  of  them  dying  like  Romans  on 
each  other's  swords.  Only  a  few  stragglers  escaped.  These 
took  the  news  to  Labienus. 

Not  far  away  from  Tongres  was  Charleroi,  in  command 
of  which  was  Quintus  Cicero,  a  brother  of  the  orator.  As 
soon  as  it  was  known  that  Sabinus  and  his  command  had 
been  destroyed,  the  tribes  in  the  vicinity  attacked  Cicero,  and 
with  their  usual  violence  and  courage.  Failing  in  their  at- 
tack, they  tried  on  Cicero  the  methods  that  had  been  success- 
ful with  Sabinus,  but  without  avail.  The  barbarians  then, 
having  learned  many  things  from  the  Romans,  made  a  high 
rampart  and  a  deep  ditch  around  the  camp  and  constructed 
a  tower,  though  they  possessed  no  tools  but  their  swords,  and 
then  threw  red-hot  clay  balls,  and  darts  carrying  lighted 
straw,  over  the  ramparts  upon  the  thatched  roofs  of  the  sol- 
diers' huts.  The  houses  and  stores  took  fire;  whereupon  the 
enemy  redoubled  their  efforts  with  javelins  and  stones  and 
arrows,  but  again  unavailingly.     Csesar  was  one  hundred  and 


144  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

twenty  miles  away;  but  no  word  could  be  got  to  him,  until 
finally  a  slave  was  found  willing  to  brave  torture  and  death, 
and  to  carry  a  letter  to  Cgesar  in  the  shaft  of  his  javelin. 

With  that  swiftness  of  decision  and  movement  that  distin- 
guished him,  CjBsar  set  out  at  once  to  the  relief  of  Cicero, 
gathering  such  reinforcements  as  he  could  from  the  various 
garrisons.  He  was  well  served  by  spies,  being  a  good  strate- 
gist ;  but  he  had  only  7000  men  with  which  to  oppose  60,000. 
Receiving  information  that  Cicero  was  out  of  immediate  dan- 
ger, and  that  there  was  no  reason  for  risking  a  battle  at  a 
disadvantage  to  relieve  him,  he  formed  a  camp,  making  it  as 
small  as  he  could  in  order  to  lead  the  Gauls  to  underestimate 
the  force  he  really  did  have.  In  various  ways  he  affected 
weakness;  then,  seizing  a  favorable  moment,  when  the  enemy 
had  evidently  acquired  an  over-confidence  and  consequent 
carelessness,  he  suddenly  flung  open  the  gates  of  his  camp  and 
rushed  upon  the  barbarians  with  his  whole  force,  nearly  cut- 
ting them  to  pieces. 

It  is  evident  from  this  incident  and  others,  that  the  bar- 
barians, like  most  untrained  people,  were  unable  to  persist 
long  in  any  state  of  watchfulness.  Not  long  before,  Caesar 
had  remarked  that  wise  men  anticipate  possible  difficulties 
and  decide  beforehand  what  they  will  do  if  certain  possible 
occasions  arise.  Clearly,  this  was  what  the  barbarians  did 
not  do,  and  what  Cffisar  did  do  habitually. 

Cassar  at  once  relieved  Tongres,  entering  Cicero's  camp 
about  nine  o'clock  in  the  evening.  He  then  returned  to 
Amiens,  realizing  that  the  whole  country  was  in  turmoil,  and 
that  imminent  danger  threatened  the  Roman  power.  Labi- 
enus  was  still  intrenched  in  his  camp,  besieged,  in  fact,  by  In- 
dutiomarus.  Following  the  tactics  of  Ca?sar,  he  affected  timid- 
ity, permitting  the  barbarians  to  ride  around  the  intreneh- 
ments,  to  call  the  Romans  cowards,  and  to  fling  javelins  over 
the  wall,  while  he  was  apparently  afraid  to  reply.  Then,  one 
afternoon,  just  as  the  Gauls  had  scattered  after  one  of  these 


C^SAR  145 

expeditions,  he  sent  his  cavalry  out  suddenly  with  special  or- 
ders that,  after  they  had  put  the  enemy  to  flight,  they  should 
kill  Indutiomarus,  the  chief.  The  sally  was  successful,  and 
the  result  of  it  quieted  in  part  the  exultation  of  the  Gauls 
over  the  destruction  of  the  legions  of  Sabinus. 

Cgesar  did  not  go  to  Italj^  as  was  his  custom  in  the  winter; 
and  before  spring  arrived  he  advanced  with  four  legions 
against  the  Nervii  who  had  attacked  Cicero.  Without  the 
slightest  warning,  he  fell  upon  them,  seized  their  cattle,  and 
wasted  their  country.  Returning  to  Amiens,  he  marched 
thence  to  Paris  with  his  usual  rapidity,  and  brought  two  other 
tribes  to  pray  for  pardon.  He  then  turned  on  the  tribes  that 
had  destroyed  Sabinus,  throwing  bridges  over  the  dykes  and 
creeks  in  search  for  Ambiorix,  who  was  hiding  in  Flanders. 
At  the  same  time,  Labienus,  under  orders  from  Caesar, 
tempted  the  Treveri  to  engagement  by  feigned  flight,  and 
then  turned  on  his  pursuers  with  great  success.  Their  Ger- 
man allies  retreated  again  across  the  Rhine,  and  Ceesar  again 
threw  a  bridge  over  that  river  and  pursued  them.  But  his 
pursuit  was  in  vain ;  for  his  savage  enemies  simply  fled  to  the 
forest,  and  they  had  no  towns  or  fields  or  other  property  that 
could  be  destroyed.  Ccesar  therefore  recrossed  the  Rhine  to 
Gaul. 

Shortly  after,  he  came  again  to  Tongres,  which  Sabinus 
had  deserted.  The  intrenchments  were  still  standing;  and 
CaBsar,  finding  himself  encumbered  by  his  heavy  baggage,  left 
it  there  with  Cicero  and  one  legion;  promising  to  return  in 
seven  days,  and  giving  Cicero  strict  orders  to  keep  his  men 
within  the  lines.  It  happened  on  the  seventh  day  of  Cgesar's 
absence  that  2000  German  horsemen,  coming  into  the  vicinity, 
and  hearing  that  Cgesar  was  away,  attacked  the  place.  Un- 
fortunately, Cicero  had  not  obeyed  his  orders,  and  had  per- 
mitted Ms  men  to  go  foraging  and  leave  some  gates  un- 
guarded. Into  the  gates  the  enemy  galloped.  Here  again 
they  showed  the  inherent  weakness  of  the  barbarian,  lack  of 


146  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

foresight;  for  they  betook  themselves  merely  to  plundering, 
and  then  galloped  away,  after  a  brief  engagement  with  the 
returning  foragers. 

The  impression  left  on  the  Romans  may  easily  be  imagined. 
To  make  things  worse  for  their  own  feelings,  they  inferred 
from  the  attack  that  the  Germans  must  be  in  great  force  in 
the  vicinity,  and  that  Ceesar  and  his  small  force  must  have 
been  destroyed.  Cgesar,  however,  returned  with  his  usual 
precision  at  the  time  that  he  had  fixed.  It  is  said  that  Caesar 
was  not  pleased  with  what  he  heard. 

Gaul  was  now  seemingly  quiet,  but  Rome  was  not.  Politi- 
cal intrigues  of  great  violence  and  complexity  were  going  on 
there,  of  which  one  element  was  jealousy  of  Csesar.  Csesar 
went  to  Rome.  News  of  this  arrived  in  Gaul,  and  encouraged 
the  tribes  to  the  belief  that  Caesar's  standing  in  Gaul  was  so 
uncertain  that  a  sudden  and  simultaneous  revolt  would  be 
successful,  especially  as  he  himself  was  now  on  the  other  side 
of  the  Alps.  A  day  was  fixed  for  a  general  rising;  and  on 
that  day  the  revolt  was  ushered  in  by  the  massacre  of  a  party 
of  Roman  civilians  in  the  town  of  Gien  on  the  river  Loire. 
The  massacre  became  known  in  a  few  hours  to  the  tribes  in 
the  south;  with  the  result  that  the  Auvergne  country,  which 
had  hitherto  been  peaceful,  immediately  revolted  under  their 
young  chief,  Vercingetorix.  This  chief  soon  developed  an 
extraordinary  ability  and  energy,  raised  an  army  of  consider- 
able size,  and  imbued  it  with  his  spirit. 

Caesar  started  at  once  toward  Gaul,  though  to  do  so  left  his 
own  interests  in  Rome  in  jeopardy.  He  realized  that  the  task 
of  joining  his  legions  was  one  of  enormous  difficulty,  the 
Roman  garrisons  in  Gaul  being  scattered  over  a  large  area 
filled  with  the  enemies  of  Rome.  Caesar  overcame  the  diffi- 
culties confronting  him  largely  by  the  method  of  moving  more 
rapidlj^  than  his  enemies  expected,  and  surmounting  obstacles 
that  they  thought  he  could  not  surmount.  With  a  few  levies 
added  to  some  troops  that  he  had  left  beyond  the  Alps,  he 
marched   through   the   passes   of   the    Cevennes   Mountains, 


C^SAR  147 

though  the  snow  was  six  feet  deep,  and  the  roads  were  sup- 
posed to  be  impassable  for  even  single  travelers.  By  this 
means  he  was  able  to  fall  upon  the  rebels  of  Auvergne,  and 
lay  the  country  waste,  before  they  had  imagined  that  he  could 
be  anywhere  in  the  vicinity.  Caesar  made  a  strong  intrenched 
camp  there,  and  left  Decimus  Brutus  in  charge ;  while  he,  un- 
known to  any  one,  dashed  across  the  country  with  a  handful 
of  attendants.  Riding  day  and  night,  he  finally  reached  two 
legions  that  were  quartered  near  Auxerre,  and  sent  word  for 
the  other  legions  to  join  him  there. 

Meanwhile  the  Gauls  were  concentrating,  and  Caesar's 
forces  were  confronted  with  an  increasing  shortage  of  sup- 
plies. He  ordered  the  ^duans  to  furnish  supplies,  and  then 
suddenly  advanced  on  Gien,  where  the  Romans  had  been 
murdered.  There  was  a  bridge  over  the  river,  and  by  this 
the  barbarians  tried  to  escape  in  the  night;  but  Caesar  was 
quicker  than  they,  and  took  all  of  them  prisoners.  Ver- 
cingetorix,  who  had  not  known  that  Caesar  was  not  still  in  the 
camp  where  he  had  left  Decimus  Brutus,  now  hastened  to  en- 
gage him  in  battle.  This  battle  had  the  usual  result;  but  it 
had  another  result — that  of  opening  the  eyes  of  Vercingetorix 
to  the  fact  that  the  best  way  to  destroy  Caesar  was  not  to  meet 
him  in  battle,  but  to  prevent  his  soldiers  from  getting  food. 
This  he  forthwith  set  out  to  accomplish,  burning  the  fields  in 
the  vicinity,  harassing  Caesar's  communications,  and  resort- 
ing to  many  ingenious  expedients  like  those  of  the  Roman  gen- 
eral Fabius. 

Part  of  the  young  chief's  plan  was  not  to  defend  even  the 
towns;  but  he  was  prevailed  upon  to  permit  the  defense  of 
Avaricum,  a  rich  and  strongly  fortified  city,  protected  by 
rivers  on  three  sides,  while  on  the  fourth  there  were  swamps 
and  marshes  that  could  be  passed  only  along  a  single  ridge. 
Caesar  found  that  the  place  could  not  be  taken  except  by  a 
regular  siege ;  and  it  seemed  doubtful  whether  the  corn  sup- 
ply of  the  Romans  would  last  as  long  as  the  necessary  siege 
would.     The  situation  culminated  in  an  almost  actual  famine ; 


148  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

but,  under  the  inspiration  of  Caesar,  the  soldiers  determined 
to  persevere.  The  siege  work  was  made  peculiarly  difficult 
by  the  fact  that  the  inhabitants  of  that  part  of  the  country 
were  skilled  artisans,  and  had  surrounded  the  town  with  walls 
forty  feet  thick,  made  of  alternate  layers  of  stone  and  timber. 
The  weather  was  cold  and  wet ;  but  in  twenty-five  da^^s  the 
Romans  had  built  against  the  wall  a  bank  of  turf  and  fagots 
one  hundred  yards  wide  and  eighty  feet  high,  as  high  as  the 
walls  of  the  town.  Then  the  ingenious  Gauls  managed  to 
undermine  it  and  set  it  on  fire,  while  they  threw  torches  and 
burning  fagots  from  the  walls.  Finally,  however,  the  fires 
were  subdued.  On  the  following  morning  the  Romans  dashed 
over  the  walls  from  the  top  of  the  bank,  and  killed  every 
human  being  in  the  town. 

The  effect  of  this  disaster  was  to  heighten  the  prestige  of 
Vercingetorix,  who  had  opposed  any  attempt  to  defend  the 
town;  and  it  consequently  caused  his  followers  to  redouble 
their  exertions  to  shut  off  the  food  supply. 

There  was  another  town,  called  Gergovia,  which  Ver- 
cingetorix was  persuaded  to  defend  also.  It  was  believed  to 
be  impregnable;  and  Cgesar  himself  realized  that  it  could  not 
be  taken  except  by  siege.  He  began  an  intrenched  camp  near 
it ;  but  before  he  could  proceed  further  with  the  work,  he 
heard  that  ^duans,  on  whom  he  relied  largely  for  his  food, 
had  become  very  unreliable;  in  fact,  that  10,000  men,  whom 
they  had  raised  according  to  his  orders,  had  murdered  the 
Roman  officers  in  charge  of  them,  and  were  preparing  to  join 
Vercingetorix.  Leaving  two  legions  to  guard  his  camp, 
Caesar  intercepted  the  ^duan  revolters  and  took  them  pris- 
oners. 

In  his  absence,  Vercingetorix  attacked  liis  camp.  Csesar 
returned  in  time  to  save  the  camp;  but  the  urgency  of  his 
food  supply  had  now  become  so  great  that  he  was  forced  to 
give  up  the  siege  and  accept  the  single  military  failure  of  his 
entire  Gallic  campaign.  His  position  was  indeed  critical. 
To  feed  the  army  in  his  present  position  was  no  longer  pos- 


C^SAR  149 

sible;  to  retreat  into  the  Roman  Province  would  be  a  confes- 
sion of  defeat,  and  rouse  the  barbarians  to  still  greater  efforts. 
He  set  out  immediately  for  the  territory  of  the  ^duans, 
where  he  knew  there  would  be  an  abundance  of  food ;  and  by 
swift  movements,  which  included  crossing  a  ford  over  which 
the  troops  had  to  wade  in  water  up  to  their  armpits,  he  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  his  entire  army  to  its  destination. 

At  this  time  Labienus,  with  a  separate  command,  was  near 
a  town  that  now  is  Paris.  Hearing  of  Cesar's  retreat,  and 
realizing  the  necessity  of  joining  him,  but  being  confronted 
by  a  large  force  of  Gauls  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river,  he 
saw  the  necessity  of  some  stratagem.  He  thereupon  sent  a 
fleet  of  small  barges  to  a  bend  in  the  river  four  miles  below 
Paris,  and  directed  them  to  wait  for  him.  At  nightfall  he 
sent  a  small  force  up  the  river  in  boats,  with  orders  to  make 
a  great  noise  as  though  they  were  retreating,  while  he  with 
the  major  part  of  his  force  marched  silently  to  the  barges 
and  crossed  the  river  in  them  without  being  detected.  The 
Gauls,  judging  by  the  noise  made  by  the  smaller  force,  con- 
cluded that  the  whole  army  was  in  flight,  and  started  to  fol- 
low them,  but  in  disorder.  Labienus  fell  upon  them  witli 
the  usual  result,  and  then  joined  Ca?sar. 

Meanwhile  Cgesar's  failure  at  Gergovia  inspired  all  Gaul 
with  the  hope  of  expelling  the  Roman  invaders.  They  there- 
upon elected  Vercingetorix  their  commander,  and  proceeded 
with  redoubled  vigor  to  cut  off  Cagsar  from  supplies  of 
food.  But  Ceesar,  by  reason  of  Ms  conquests  across  the  Rhine 
and  his  wise  treatment  of  the  people  there  afterward,  was 
enabled  to  get  large  supplies  of  food,  and  besides  that  a  great 
number  of  German  horsemen.  These  horsemen,  however,  he 
was  compelled  to  mount  on  Roman  horses,  because  of  the  in- 
feriority of  the  German  horses.  When  ready,  Ceesar  started 
out  to  punish  the  treacherous  ^duans.  On  his  way,  he  was 
attacked  by  a  large  force  under  Vercingetorix,  who  had  the 
bad  strategic  judgment  to  attack  him  in  the  open  field.  The 
men  under  Vercingetorix  were  defeated  with  great  loss,  and 


150  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

driven  toward  the  fortress  of  Alesia.  They  were,  in  fact, 
driven  within  the  fortress,  and  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
sieges  in  history — in  many  respects  the  most  remarkable — 
resulted. 

The  fortress  of  Alesia  stood  on  a  hill  that  sloped  steeply  in 
all  directions,  and  lay  between  two  rivers  that  flowed  virtually 
parallel  to  each  other  and  emptied  into  the  Brenne  River, 
about  two  miles  distant.  In  it  80,000  men  had  now  taken 
refuge.  The  place  was  impregnable  except  to  famine,  and 
Caesar  knew  enough  of  barbarians  to  feel  sure  that  they  had 
not  had  the  foresight  to  supply  a  great  amount  of  food.  He 
soon  learned  from  horsemen  sent  out  by  Vercingetorix  that 
they  had  enough  for  thirty  days,  and  that  Vercingetorix  was 
calling  on  all  Gaul  to  come  to  his  assistance  before  that  time 
elapsed. 

Csesar  realized  (and  so  did  the  Gauls)  that  the  final  crisis 
in  the  conflict  between  the  Gauls  and  the  Romans  was  close 
at  hand.  Ctesar  began  at  once  the  construction  of  intrench- 
ments  and  appliances  of  various  kinds,  and  so  did  the  be- 
sieged; for  by  this  time  they  had  learned  a  good  deal  from 
the  Romans.  He  cast  up  around  the  town  siege  works  that 
had  a  length  of  eleven  miles,  placed  camps  at  convenient 
spots,  and  constructed  twenty-three  forts.  Scarcely  had 
the  work  begun  when  a  cavalry  battle  took  place  on  the  plain, 
which  was  fought  with  the  utmost  vigor,  and  which  was  lost 
by  the  barbarians  chiefly  because  they  managed  affairs  so 
badly  that  their  great  numbers  caused  interference  of  one 
man  with  another.     The  usual  result  occurred. 

Cgesar  dug  around  the  fortress  a  trench  twenty  feet  deep 
with  vertical  sides;  and  four  hundred  yards  back  of  this  he 
began  his  other  siege  works,  the  unoccupied  space  of  four 
hundred  yards  acting  to  prevent  a  surprise  by  the  enemy. 
Behind  it  he  dug  two  trenches  parallel  to  each  other,  fifteen 
feet  broad  and  fifteen  feet  deep.  Behind  these  he  built  a  ram- 
part with  a  palisade  twelve  feet  high,  and  to  this  he  added  a 
breastwork  of  pointed  stakes  projecting  horizontally.     At  in- 


C^SAR  ,     151 

tervals  of  eighty  feet  he  constructed  turrets.  In  addition,  he 
had  branches  cut  from  trees,  and  sharpened  on  the  ends ;  and 
these  he  fastened  at  the  bottom  of  trenches  five  feet  deep,  so 
that  the  points  projected  just  above  the  ground.  In  front  of 
these  he  dug  shallower  pits,  into  which  tapering  stakes  as 
thick  as  a  man's  thigh,  sharpened  at  the  top  and  fire-hard- 
ened, were  driven,  so  as  to  project  about  four  inches  above 
the  ground;  and  at  the  same  time  the  earth  was  trodden 
down  strongly  and  firmly  for  a  distance  of  a  foot  from  the 
bottom.  The  pits  were  covered  with  twigs  and  brushwood  to 
conceal  them.  Eight  rows  of  these  pits  were  dug,  three  feet 
apart ;  and  in  front  of  all,  stakes  with  iron  hooks  were  buried 
in  the  ground  and  scattered  at  brief  intervals  over  the  field. 
When  all  these  things  had  been  done,  Csesar  constructed  par- 
allel intrenchments  of  the  same  kind,  but  facing  in  the  other 
direction,  for  the  reception  of  the  enemy,  whom  he  knew 
would  come  from  the  outside  to  the  assistance  of  the  town. 

The  expected  reinforcements  did  not  come  within  the  thirty 
days;  but  a  few  days  later  they  arrived,  in  number  about 
250,000,  and  filled  the  entire  plain  to  the  east  of  the  town  to 
a  depth  of  three  miles.  CjEsar  disposed  of  his  whole  army  on 
both  faces  of  the  intrenchments,  and  then  gave  orders  for 
the  cavalry  to  go  out  and  engage  the  enemy.  The  Gauls  had 
placed  archers  and  light-armed  skirmishers  among  their  horse- 
men, and  these  at  first  had  some  effect.  Seeing  this,  Caesar's 
German  cavalry  formed  in  mass  and  charged  the  enemy,  and 
speedily  put  them  to  flight. 

On  the  following  day  the  enemy  made  a  great  number  of 
hurdles,  ladders,  and  grappling-hooks ;  and  that  night  they 
left  their  camp  silently,  approached  the  intrenchments,  and 
then  raised  a  shout  as  a  signal  to  the  besieged  inside.  A 
combined  assault  then  began  against  the  Roman  lines  from 
two  opposite  directions,  in  the  darkness.  By  dint  of  contin- 
ual drill  in  their  new  posts,  each  Roman  had  learned  what 
to  do  under  every  probable  contingency;  and  in  this  respect 
they  had  their  customary  advantage  over  their  foes.     The 


152  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

battle  continued  during  most  of  the  night,  but  ended  without 
decisive  result.  After  a  council  of  war,  and  after  having  re- 
connoitered  the  locality  by  means  of  scouts,  the  barbarians 
decided  upon  an  excellent  plan,  which  was  to  send  a  picked 
force  by  a  circuitous  route  to  a  hill  north  of  the  town,  where 
the  Roman  line  was  weak,  and  from  there  to  attack  from  be- 
hind a  camp  that  the  Romans  had  been  obliged  to  lay  out  on 
the  side  of  the  hill  that  sloped  toward  the  fortress. 

About  midday,  when  all  was  ready,  this  attack  was  made; 
and  simultaneously  Vercingetorix  from  the  inside  and  the 
other  barbarians  from  the  outside  precipitated  a  general  as- 
sault. As  the  Roman  force  numbered  only  about  50,000, 
while  the  besieged  inside  numbered  80,000  and  the  Gauls 
outside  numbered  250,000,  the  situation  was  critical  for  the 
Romans.  The  critical  point  was  the  hill  north  of  the  fortress. 
The  battle  was  fought,  of  course,  with  the  greatest  cour- 
age by  both  sides.  Csesar  sent  a  part  of  the  cavalry 
around  the  outer  intrenchments  to  the  back  of  the  hill 
with  orders  to  attack  the  enemy  in  the  rear.  He  himself  then 
hurried  to  this  critical  part  of  the  battlefield,  attired  in  his 
scarlet  cloak,  and  filled  his  troops  with  that  ardor  which  he 
was  always  successful  in  inspiring.  His  coming  being  well 
timed,  his  cavalry  was  now  seen  advancing  toward  the  rear 
of  the  enemy.  The  barbarians  were  seized  with  panic  and 
turned  to  flee.  The  panic  spread  as  panics  always  have 
among  barbarians;  and  after  that  the  battle  became  a  merci- 
less slaughter. 

The  faU  of  Alesia  virtually  completed  the  conquest  of 
Gaul.  Much  had  to  be  done  to  bring  the  various  tribes  into 
submission;  but  this  was  done  without  great  difficulty, 
Caesar  by  his  sudden  movements  appearing  in  one  district 
and  then  in  another,  and  crushing  each  in  turn,  before  any 
formidable  resistance  could  be  organized.  The  last  part  of 
Gaul  to  yield  was  the  extreme  southwest,  where  a  single 
tribe,  reljdng  on  the  strength  of  a  fortress,  persisted  in  re- 
sistance.    Cassar  realized  that  the  last  spark  must  be  put  out, 


C^SAR  153 

lest  it  spread.  The  fortress  was  taken  by  the  stratagem  of 
cutting  a  tunnel,  by  which  the  Roman  engineers  tapped  the 
spring  that  gave  the  garrison  water. 

Before  leaving  Gaul,  Ccesar  reconciled  the  tribes  to  the 
new  conditions,  convincing  them  that  they  would  be  happier 
united  as  a  province  under  the  orderly  government  of  Rome 
than  divided  up  into  little  bands,  perpetually  fighting  each 
other.  He  gave  the  chiefs  magnificent  presents,  laid  no  im- 
positions on  either  the  leaders  or  the  people,  and  left  them 
resolved  to  maintain  the  peace  that  was  now  established. 

In  the  spring  of  50  B.C.  he  went  to  Italy,  and  met  an  atmos- 
phere of  animosity,  especially  in  the  Senate.  The  people  re- 
ceived him  with  demonstrations  of  affection,  but  the  politi- 
cians hated  him.  After  a  brief  stay  he  went  back  to  the 
army;  for  he  had  yet  one  more  year  of  command  in  Gaul. 
But  the  politicians  did  not  want  him  to  remain  in  command. 
At  this  time  the  government  was  exceedingly  corrupt,  and 
the  politicians  were  alarmed  by  the  fact  that  Caesar  had 
been  promised  the  Consulship  at  the  end  of  his  second  five 
years  in  Gaul.  They  foresaw  an  end  of  their  peculations  if 
Cffisar  should  become  Consul.  They  knew  that  he  would 
carry  out  the  same  program  of  honest  and  efficient  govern- 
ment that  he  had  pursued  when  he  had  been  Consul  before, 
and  had  invented  and  put  into  operation  the  epochal  "Leges 
Juliae." 

After  much  debate  and  indecision,  the  Senate  finally  or- 
dered him  to  give  up  his  command  in  the  following  March. 
To  carry  out  this  order  would  force  Caesar  to  go  to  Rome  as 
a  private  citizen,  and  expose  himself  helpless  to  all  possible 
dangers,  including  murder.  He  therefore  addressed  the  one 
legion  he  had  with  him  with  a  statement  of  the  case.  In  re- 
ply, the  legion  promised  him  their  enthusiastic  support  for 
whatever  he  might  do.  Thereupon  he  sent  orders  over  the 
Alps  for  two  more  legions  to  follow  him,  and  then  crossed 
the  river  Rubicon  with  his  legion,  thus  leaving  his  province 
and  going  into  Italy  with  an  armed  force.     The  Senate  took 


154  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

instant  flight — a  flight  so  precipitous  that  they  left  their 
wives,  property,  and  children  behind,  even  the  money  in  the 
Treasury — and  sought  refuge  with  Pompey's  army  near 
Capua. 

The  greatest  confusion  reigned  in  their  councils.  The  only 
man  who  took  decisive  action  was  Domitius,  who  had  been 
appointed  Caesar's  successor,  and  his  action  was  very  foolish, 
for  he  took  a  hostile  position  in  Corfinium  and  defied  Caesar. 
Cassar  took  Corfinium  by  his  Gallic  methods.  Then,  with  his 
usual  clemency,  he  gave  Domitius  and  all  his  followers  their 
liberty,  and  even  their  money,  without  even  exacting  a  prom- 
ise to  refrain  from  further  hostilities. 

The  fall  of  Corfinium  so  alarmed  Pompey  and  the  Senate 
that  most  of  them  fled  from  Italy  into  northern  Greece. 
Pompey  had  a  very  considerable  fleet,  and  with  this  he  could 
almost  bring  starvation  to  Italy.  Cgesar  could  not  follow,  be- 
cause he  could  not  get  the  necessary  ships;  but  he  utilized 
the  time  by  sending  expeditions  to  Sicily  and  Sardinia,  on 
which  Rome  depended  for  its  corn,  and  clearing  them  of 
enemies.  Gaul  remained  true  to  Cfesar;  except  that  Mar- 
seilles, a  purely  commercial  city,  revolted  to  Pompey,  as  a 
result  largely  of  a  visit  from  a  squadron  of  Pompey's  fleet 
under  the  command  of  Domitius.  This  was  the  same  Domi- 
tius whom  Caesar  had  recently  spared  at  Corfinium. 

Caesar  could  not  afl'ord  to  leave  Marseilles  hostile  and  ef- 
fective, because  he  was  about  to  dash  into  Spain  to  attack 
Pompey's  legion  there,  and  she  would  threaten  his  communi- 
cations. How  could  Caesar  shut  in  Marseilles  when  he  had 
no  fleet?  Caesar  made  a  fleet.  He  cut  down  trees  in  the 
forests,  and  in  thirty  days  built,  launched,  and  manned 
twelve  strong  ships.  Leaving  these  ships  to  blockade  Mar- 
seilles by  sea,  and  three  legions  to  blockade  it  by  land,  Caesar 
hurried  through  the  passes  in  the  Pyrenees  Mountains,  which 
the  enemy  had  not  had  the  foresight  to  guard.  In  forty  days 
all  the  enemy  in  northern  Spain  were  his  prisoners,  while 
those  in  the  south  were  begging  for  peace. 


C^SAR  155 

But  the  melting  snow  on  the  mountains  in  northern  Spain 
carried  away  bridges,  made  the  fords  of  the  rivers  impassable, 
and  brought  Caesar's  army  to  the  point  of  starvation.  What 
did  he  do?  Remembering  that  in  Britain  the  fishermen  used 
boats  made  of  frames  of  wicker  covered  with  skins,  Caesar 
collected  wicker  from  willows  on  the  river-bank,  secured  hides 
from  the  carcasses  of  animals  in  the  camp,  constructed  a  num- 
ber of  light,  buoyant  vessels,  and  crossed  the  Segre  River  in 
them.  Soon  afterward  he  returned  to  Marseilles,  just  in  time 
to  receive  its  surrender.  The  siege  had  been  a  difficult  one, 
and  several  engagements  had  been  fought  on  the  water,  in 
which  the  extemporized  vessels  of  Ciesar  had  gained  the 
mastery. 

Cffisar  left  two  legions  in  Marseilles,  and  sent  others  back 
into  Gaul,  not  thinking  it  wise  to  give  the  Gauls  too  much 
temptation  to  revolt.  With  the  rest  of  his  army  he  returned 
to  Rome  at  the  beginning  of  the  winter,  and  was  at  once 
named  Dictator.  Civil  affairs  were  in  the  wildest  confusion; 
public  credit  was  shaken ;  debts  were  long  in  arrears ;  and  the 
whole  nation  was  in  terror  of  Pompey's  fleet.  Under  these 
circumstances,  Caesar  gave  eleven  days  of  work  to  Rome,  and 
then  (just  a  year  after  he  had  crossed  the  Rubicon)  marched 
into  southern  Italy  with  an  army  not  greater  than  30,000 
men.  Pompey  and  his  force,  with  the  Senate,  were  now  on 
the  opposite  shore  of  the  Adriatic  in  western  Greece,  with 
nine  legions  and  an  abundance  of  money,  stores,  and  auxili- 
aries of  all  kinds.  Besides  these,  two  more  legions  were  com- 
ing from  Syria,  and  great  numbers  of  slingers  and  archers 
from  the  islands.  In  addition,  Pompey  had  a  fleet  of  one 
hundred  and  thirty  ships,  the  principal  purpose  of  which  was 
to  prevent  Caesar  from  crossing. 

By  great  exertions  Caesar  collected  twelve  fighting  triremes 
and  enough  transports  to  carry  half  his  army.  To  attempt  to 
cross  under  such  circumstances  would  seem  a  wild  project; 
and  for  this  reason  Csesar  attempted  it,  and  in  bad  weather, 
knowing  that  he  would  not  be  expected.    As  a  result  he  got 


156  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

across  with  15,000  men  and  500  horses,  and  landed  on  the 
eastern  shore  of  the  Strait  of  Otranto,  which  lies  between 
Italy  and  Greece.  As  soon  as  he  disembarked,  Csesar  ordered 
the  transports  to  start  back  in  the  darkness.  But  even  Caesar 
could  not  inspire  the  men  with  intelligence  and  energy  while 
he  was  absent;  and  the  result  was  that  the  transports  lin- 
gered until  daylight  and  were  promptly  overtaken. 

Not  knowing  this  and  expecting  that  Mark  Antony  would 
follow  shortly,  Csesar  occupied  Apollonia  and  intrenched 
himself  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Apsus  River.  He  had  depre- 
cated the  civil  war,  though  in  a  sense  he  had  caused  it ;  and 
he  hoped  still  to  persuade  Pompey  to  come  to  terms  with  him, 
Pompey  had  been  absent  in  Macedonia;  but  he  hurried  back 
to  Durazzo,  near  Apollonia,  and  for  some  time  the  oppos- 
ing forces  confronted  each  other,  divided  only  by  a  narrow 
river.  Deputations  from  both  sides  were  chosen  to  consult, 
with  Cesar's  approval;  but  their  consultations  were  ended 
when  one  of  Cesar's  officers  was  assaulted  with  a  shower  of 
darts. 

]\Ionths  passed  by,  while  Csesar  watched  in  vain  for  Mark 
Antony  and  the  other  legions :  but  Antony  was  blockaded  in 
Brindisi  by  Pompey 's  ships.  Antony  drove  these  off,  but  did 
not  start.  Finally  Caesar  wrote  to  Antony  that  the  legions 
were  true  as  steel,  and  ready  to  take  any  risks,  rather  than 
leave  their  commander  in  danger. 

Spurred  by  this,  Antony  took  advantage  of  a  favoring 
wind,  and  sailed,  though  closely  followed.  In  the  darkness 
his  ships  were  swept  from  their  intended  course;  but  finally 
they  ran  into  a  harbor  which  they  were  fortunate  enough  to 
enter  safely,  though  hotly  pursued. 

In  the  position  that  Antony's  army  now  took  up,  Pompey 's 
army  lay  between  his  and  Caesar's.  Casar  surmounted  this 
difficulty  by  swiftly  marching  around  Pompey 's  army  and 
joining  Antony  before  Pompey  knew  t-hat  he  had  moved. 
Cgesar  was  still  greatly  outnumbered  by  Pompey,  but  Pom- 
pey would  not  fight.    Csesar  then  drew  a  line  of  fortified  posts 


CiESAR  157 

around  him  and  shut  off  many  of  the  streams  on  which  Pom- 
pey  depended  for  water,  so  that  horses  and  cattle  died  and 
fever  set  in.  Csesar's  lines  were  several  miles  long;  so  one 
wonders  why  Pompey  did  not  attack  him,  as  Caesar  undoubt- 
edly would  have  done,  if  the  cases  had  been  reversed. 
Caesar's  army  had  plenty  of  meat,  but  practically  no  wheat; 
but,  having  been  used  to  hardships,  and  having  an  ingenious 
commander,  they  made  cakes  out  of  roots,  which  they  ground 
into  paste  and  mixed  with  milk. 

In  June,  48  B.C.,  the  two  legions  from  Syria  approaching 
Pompey  through  Asia  Minor  and  Macedonia,  Ctesar  sent  a 
force  eastward  to  get  into  touch  with  them  and  report  their 
movements  to  him.  While  his  force  in  the  camp  was  thus 
reduced,  two  young  Gauls,  turning  traitor  to  Cgesar,  gave 
Pompey  information  of  a  certain  weak  point  in  Caesar's  line, 
and  Pompey  promptly  attacked  it.  Cgesar 's  forces  being  sur- 
prised and  distributed  over  great  distances,  nearly  a  thou- 
sand were  killed,  and  the  situation  at  once  became  so  desper- 
ate that  even  Casar  failed  to  restore  confidence.  If  Pompey 
had  possessed  Cesar's  quick  apprehension  of  situations,  he 
would  have  seized  the  opportunity,  and  perhaps  destroyed  all 
of  Caesar's  force.  Some  hundred  of  Caesar's  legionaries  were 
taken  prisoners;  and  these,  despite  Ceesar's  clemency  shown 
on  so  many  occasions,  were  led  into  the  midst  of  Pompey 's 
camp  and  killed. 

Caesar  realized  the  situation  at  once,  and  immediately  fell 
back  on  Apollonia.  Leaving  his  sick  and  wounded  there,  he 
endeavored  to  rejoin  the  force  that  he  had  sent  to  the  east- 
ward to  watch  the  coming  legions  from  Sj^ria;  a  thing  which 
he  succeeded  in  accomplishing.  He  then  marched  into  Thes- 
saly,  which  was  a  fertile  country,  capable  of  feeding  his  army, 
and  soon  reached  the  vicinity  of  Pharsalia.  Pompey  was  now 
following  him  to  bring  him  to  battle,  not  being  guided  by  his 
own  judgment,  but  bullied  by  the  Senators  who  accompanied 
his  army,  and  who  by  this  time  had  almost  taken  his  author- 
ity out  of  his  hands.     Not  understanding  the  relative  impor- 


158  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

tance  of  the  various  factors  of  war,  which  can  be  learned  only 
by  experience,  they  were  perfectly  confident  that  Pompey's 
forces  could  defeat  Caesar's  because  they  were  superior  in 
numbers.  So  confident  of  this  were  they  that  they  arranged 
what  was  to  be  done  with  Caesar  and  his  followers,  and  even 
with  those  who  remained  neutral. 

The  long-expected  battle  finally  was  fought  on  the  banks  of 
the  Enipeus  River.  It  occurred  at  a  place  and  a  time  not 
determined  by  Pompey,  but  forced  on  him  by  his  Senators 
and  politicians.  Caesar  had  only  22,000  men  besides  1000 
cavalry.  Pompey  had  47,000  Roman  infantry  and  7000  cav- 
alry, besides  his  allies.  Pompey's  right  was  covered  by  the 
river,  and  his  left  spread  out  into  the  open  plain,  reaching,  of 
course,  beyond  Ctesar's  right  flank.  Pompey  intended  to  send 
his  cavalry  outside,  with  archers  and  slingers,  to  attack 
Cfesar's  cavalry  on  his  right  flank.  Caesar  expected  this,  and 
trained  about  1000  picked  men  to  assist  his  own  cavalry; 
and  besides  that  he  added  a  fourth  line  of  cohorts  of  specially 
selected  men,  to  engage  the  enemy's  cavalry.  He  told  these 
men  that  the  result  of  the  action  would  depend  on  them. 

Pompey  commanded  on  his  own  left  flank.  Caesar,  with  his 
favorite  Tenth  Legion,  commanded  his  own  right  flank. 
Mark  Antony  commanded  the  left  flank,  and  Loginus  the 
center.  Caesar  made  the  attack,  as  usual,  his  front  rank  ad- 
vancing on  the  run.  Seeing  that  Pompey's  men  did  not  move, 
they  halted  until  they  had  recovered  breath,  and  then  rushed 
on,  flung  their  darts  and  closed  with  the  sword.  Then  Pom- 
pey's cavalry  charged  on  Ctesar's  right  flank,  reinforced  with 
their  archers.  Caesar's  cavalry  gave  way;  whereupon  Pom- 
pey's squadrons  of  cavalry  came  wheeling  round,  to  attack 
from  the  rear.  To  their  astonishment,  Caesar's  fourth  line 
suddenly  wheeled  into  line  against  them.  Surprised  and 
bewildered  by  the  firmness  of  the  resistance  of  the  infan- 
try, which  cavalry  always  fear,  Pompey's  cavalry  broke 
in  confusion  and  galloped  away.  As  an  explanation,  it 
must    be    stated   that    these   were   not    trained    cavalrymen, 


C^SAR  159 

but  "carpet  knights"  from  home.  Caesar's  fourth  line 
now  threw  themselves  on  Pompey's  exposed  left  wing,  and 
were  at  once  reinforced  by  Caesar's  third  line.  Suddenly 
Pompey's  left  flank  yielded,  and  then  the  entire  army  turned 
and  fled. 

Only  200  of  Cesar's  men  were  lost;  of  the  opposite  side 
15,000  lay  dead  upon  the  ground.  A  tremendous  victory  had 
been  gained.  Nevertheless,  Caesar  allowed  his  men  no  rest; 
but  taking  the  freshest  of  them  he  set  out  by  a  rapid  march 
to  cut  off  the  line  of  retreat  of  the  defeated  enemy.  As  a 
result,  he  succeeded  in  capturing  24,000,  who  came  to  him 
sobbing  for  mercy.  With  his  usual  clemency,  Caesar  par- 
doned them  all. 

The  battle  of  Pharsalia  has  been  described  as  a  battle  be- 
tween aristocracy  and  democracy.  So  it  was,  in  effect.  Cer- 
tainly the  result  was  a  defeat  for  the  corrupt  aristocracy  of 
Rome,  and  a  triumph  for  the  democracy  of  Italy,  and  for  a 
cause  which  shortly  made  Rome  the  greatest  nation  that  had 
ever  lived,  and  the  exemplar  of  efficient  government  for  all 
the  nations  that  were  to  follow. 

Pompey  fled  to  Egypt,  but  was  murdered  treacherously 
while  he  was  attempting  to  land.  Csesar  followed  him;  and 
on  reaching  Alexandria  was  presented,  much  to  his  disgust, 
with  Pompey's  head.  The  Alexandrians  endeavored  to  pro- 
pitiate Caesar,  and  expected  that  they  would  have  little  diffi- 
culty, and  that  he  would  shortly  return  to  Italy  and  give  them 
their  independence.  But  Caesar  soon  dispelled  all  such  expec- 
tations; and  thereupon  a  revolt  was  started  which  soon  as- 
sumed great  proportions.  Cgesar  found  himself  blockaded  in 
the  palace,  while  the  Egj-ptian  fleet,  which  had  come  back 
from  Greece,  was  in  the  inner  basin,  outnumbered  his,  and 
threatened  his  communications  with  Italy.  Without  hesita- 
tion, Caesar  set  fire  to  the  docks,  burned  and  disabled  most  of 
the  Egyptian  ships  at  the  docks,  seized  the  Pharos  and  the 
mole  that  connected  it  with  the  town,  and  fortified  the  palace. 

The  Alexandrians  pumped  sea  water  into  the  conduits  that 


160  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

supplied  the  palace  with  drinking  water;  then  Caesar  sank 
wells  and  got  fresh  water.  The  Alexandrians  constructed  a 
new  fleet,  and  brought  down  others  from  the  canals,  and  made 
oars  and  spars,  even  out  of  benches  and  tables.  At  one 
time  they  made  a  sudden  attack  on  a  ship  on  board  which 
Caesar  happened  to  be,  and  from  which  he  had  to  swim  for  his 
life.  Finding  at  length  that  they  seemed  to  be  making  no" 
impression,  the  Alexandrians  pretended  to  desire  peace;  but 
this  move  made  no  impression  on  the  sapient  Caesar. 
Finally,  reinforcements  for  Caesar  arrived,  imder  the  com- 
mand of  Mithridates;  but  a  division  of  the  Egyptian  army 
lay  between  them  and  Csesar.  By  his  customary  method  of 
extraordinarily  rapid  movement,  Cassar  joined  Mithridates, 
despite  the  Alexandrians.    Alexandria  at  once  surrendered. 

Caesar  now  went  to  Syria,  leaving  two  legions  in  Egypt. 
Pharnaees,  son  of  King  Mithridates  the  Great,  hearing  that 
Caesar  was  shut  up  in  Alexandria,  had  lain  claim  to  his  fa- 
ther 's  kingdom  and  was  killing  or  otherwise  maltreating  every 
Roman  there.  Caesar  saw  that  he  must  punish  Pharnaees 
before  he  returned  to  Rome,  and  set  out  at  once  to  meet  him. 
Pharnaees  promised  submission,  and  sent  Caesar-  a  golden 
crown;  but  Caesar  took  the  ground  that  his  submission  must 
be  made  to  the  empire  and  not  to  himself,  and  that  the  prov- 
inces he  had  invaded  must  be  evacuated  at  once.  Pharnaees 
adopted  dilatory  tactics,  knoM'ing  that  Caesar's  presence  was 
required  in  Rome;  but  Caesar  cut  short  negotiations,  and, 
seizing  a  position  at  night  on  the  brow  of  a  hill  near  the  Ar- 
menian camp,  began  to  intrench.  Pharnaees,  seeing  this,  de- 
cided to  attack  at  once,  and  was  able  to  throw  some  confusion 
into  the  Roman  legions  before  they  could  exchange  their  dig- 
ging tools  for  their  arms  and  armor.  But,  as  soon  as  the  ex- 
change had  taken  place,  the  Armenians  were  hurled  back  with 
tremendous  slaughter,  and  the  insurrection  brought  to  a  sud- 
den end. 

When  Ccesar  returned  to  Italy,  Spain  was  in  confusion. 
Italy  was  disorganized,  and  a  general  lack  of  leadership  per- 


C^SAR  161 

vaded  the  whole  republic.  The  issue  between  the  Senate  and 
the  people  had  not  yet  been  decided  finally;  and,  though 
Cffisar  was  consul  now,  the  situation  was  most  difficult,  even 
for  Csesar.  He  soon  restored  quiet  in  the  city  and  the  coun- 
try, but  was  then  confronted  with  a  difficulty  he  had  not 
expected — one  with  his  own  legionaries.  The  trouble  was  that 
they  had  been  led  by  foolish  or  ill-intentioned  officers  to  expect 
extravagant  rewards ;  and,  these  not  having  been  received, 
they  were  on  the  point  of  mutiny.  Even  the  favorite  Tenth 
Legion  demanded  speech  with  Caesar,  and  then  asked  for  their 
discharge.  Caesar  met  them  coldly,  but  granted  them  their 
discharge  and  certain  lands  that  he  had  arranged  to  have 
allotted  to  them.  He  gave  them  money  also,  and  told  them 
to  go. 

But  they  M'ould  not  go.  Ca3sar  had  shamed  them  by  speak- 
ing to  them  as  he  had  never  spoken  before,  not  as  comrades, 
but  as  plain  citizens,  and  had  offered  them  land  and  money, 
but  evidently  with  contempt.    Not  one  soldier  left  him. 

Csesar  now  had  to  go  into  Africa,  where  a  large  force  of 
Pompeiians  under  Scipio  were  assembled  with  60,000  Italians 
in  addition,  120  elephants,  and  a  multitude  of  African  cav- 
alry. He  left  with  only  a  verj^  small  force,  ordering  the  rest 
to  follow  as  soon  as  they  could;  and  on  arriving  fortified  a 
suitable  spot  at  Ruspinum  on  the  coast.  The  other  legions 
followed  slowl}^  Finally,  when  all  had  arrived,  an  evident 
lack  of  suitable  equipment  showed  how  their  officers  had  dete- 
riorated. 

Cffisar,  noticing  that  his  men  feared  elephants,  delayed 
active  operations  until  he  got  some  elephants  from  Italy,  so 
that  his  men  might  learn  to  handle  them.  He  then  tried  to 
get  into  battle,  but  the  enemy  held  aloof.  In  order  to  pre- 
cipitate it,  Caesar  blockaded  the  peninsula  of  Thapsus  by  sea 
and  land,  reasoning  that  this  would  force  Scipio  to  come  to 
its  assistance.  The  issue  showed  him  to  be  right,  as  usual. 
The  enemy  advanced  toward  Ca?sar;  whereupon  Caesar's 
legionaries  showed  such  eagerness  for  battle  that  even  Csesar 


162  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

was  forced  to  advance  sooner  than  he  otherwise  would  have 
done.  Then  he  sprang  upon  his  horse  and  led  the  charge  in 
person.  The  first  thing  that  happened  was  that  the  elephants 
that  had  been  placed  in  front  of  the  enemy  wheeled  around 
and  crashed,  trumpeting  and  roaring,  through  the  lines  of 
their  own  men,  precipitating  a  rout. 

Cffisar  then  returned  to  Rome,  to  meet  triumphal  proces- 
sions, rejoicings,  and  honors  of  all  possible  kinds.  He  was 
made  Dictator  for  ten  years,  and  received  powers  equal  to 
those  of  a  king.  He  used  these  powers  more  wisely  and  more 
energetically,  and  more  in  opposition  to  the  efforts  and  de- 
sires of  the  ruling  classes,  than  any  other  man  in  history.  It 
would  be  out  of  place  in  a  book  of  this  kind  to  describe  what 
they  were,  nor  would  it  be  necessary.  We  should  remember, 
however,  that  the  great  reforms  which  Caesar  instituted  were 
made  by  the  greatest  strategist  the  world  has  ever  seen,  that 
he  could  not  have  made  them  unless  he  had  attained  the  posi- 
tion which  he  then  held,  and  that  he  could  not  have  attained 
that  position  except  by  means  of  strategy.  We  must  realize, 
therefore,  that  the  greatest  single  agency  in  producing  that 
government  of  Rome,  which  has  been  the  pattern  of  all  good 
governments  since,  was  strategy. 

But  Csesar  had  yet  one  more  campaign  to  carry  through, 
though  he  was  now  fifty-five  years  old,  and  his  splendid  health 
had  begun  to  fail,  under  the  terrific  strain  of  the  preceding 
fourteen  years.  His  presence  was  required  in  Spain,  where 
the  officers  whom  he  had  sent  there  had  brought  about  a  bad 
state  of  affairs — as  the  subordinate  officers  of  great  strategists 
have  usually  done  when  left  to  the  guidance  of  their  own  intel- 
ligence and  character  only.  Caesar  took  with  him  his  grand- 
nephew,  Octavius,  then  a  lad  of  seventeen,  who  was  to  follow 
him  in  power,  and  to  bring  to  a  climax  of  unsurpassed  effi- 
ciency and  glory  the  government  he  had  founded. 

Caesar  met  his  enemies  on  the  17th  of  March,  45  B.C.,  on  the 
plain  of  Munda  on  the  Guadalquivir  River,  not  far  from  Cor- 
dova.   The  two  armies  were  both  composed  mainly  of  highly 


C^SAR  163 

trained  Roman  soldiers.  The  enemy  had  the  advantage  in 
position,  Caesar's  army  in  morale.  The  battle  was  a  mere 
stand-up  brutal  fight ;  and  for  a  long  while  the  struggle  was 
so  equal  that  Csesar  himself  saw  the  necessity  of  some  signal 
act  to  strengthen  his  men.  So  he  seized  a  standard,  and,  by 
the  exercise  of  his  rare  powers  of  persuasion  and  command, 
rallied  a  legion  that  was  beginning  to  waver.  At  that  moment, 
Labienus,  a  traitor  from  Caesar's  Gallic  army,  and  one  of  the 
important  generals  on  the  enemy's  side,  was  seen  to  gallop 
across  the  field.  A  shout  arose  that  he  was  fleeing.  A  panic 
thereon  ensued,  which  Csesar's  legions  took  advantage  of  to 
break  through  the  enemy's  lines.  The  enemy  then  broke  into 
two  masses,  one  running  to  shelter  at  Munda,  and  the  other  to 
shelter  at  Cordova. 

Caesar  returned  shortly  to  Rome,  and  resumed  the  work  of 
reforming  the  abuses  of  the  government  that  is  historical. 
The  work  was  not  favored  by  the  Senate,  for  reasons  that  also 
are  historical ;  and  it  was  ended  on  the  15th  of  March,  44  B.C. 

On  that  day,  that  man  was  murdered  by  Roman  Senators 
who  pretended  to  be  his  friend,  who  had  done  more  than  any 
other  mortal  who  has  ever  lived  for  the  establishment  of  good 
government  and  the  reign  of  law. 


CHAPTER  X 

CHARLEMAGNE,    WILLIAM    AND   MARLBOROUGH 

THE  death  of  Cffisar  had  an  effect  contrary  to  the  one 
intended,  for  it  established  in  the  hearts  and  con- 
victions of  the  people  a  belief  in  the  sincerity  of  his 
character  and  the  wisdom  of  his  policies.  He  was  followed 
in  power  by  his  grand-nephew  Octavius,  one  of  the  most  for- 
tunate facts  in  history,  because  Octavius  possessed  the  char- 
acter and  the  ability  to  build  still  higher  the  structure  that 
Julius  Csesar  had  founded.  Under  succeeding  emperors  the 
Roman  empire  became  greater  and  stronger,  until  the  reign 
of  Trajan  in  the  early  part  of  the  second  century,  when  it 
acquired  its  greatest  territorial  extent.  After  this  the  empire 
slowly  but  surely  declined;  and,  if  one  analyzes  the  causes, 
he  sees  that  the  immediate  cause  was  a  decrease  first  in  strate- 
gic ability  and  afterward  in  purely  military  ability;  and  that 
this  decrease  was  due  to  the  increase  in  wealth. 

While  the  empire  became  weaker  inside,  the  barbarians 
became  stronger  outside;  and  finally  the  city  of  Rome  itself 
was  sacked  by  Alaric,  Chief  of  the  Visigoths.  Britain  was 
then  abandoned  by  the  Romans ;  and  not  long  after,  Genseric, 
King  of  the  Vandals,  conquered  the  Roman  Province  in  North 
Africa,  and  then  captured  and  sacked  the  city  of  Rome  itself. 
The  Huns  under  Atilla,  a  natural  military  genius,  after  de- 
feating the  Goths  and  the  armies  of  the  Eastern  Empire  and 
receiving  tribute  from  Constantinople,  moved  westward  into 
Gaul,  and  finally  were  met  in  battle  in  the  year  451  by  the 
Roman  legion  under  Aetius  near  Chalons.  One  of  the  critical 
battles  of  the  world  then  followed,  in  which  Atilla  was  de- 
feated by  the  same  agency  as  that  which  has  usually  defeated 

164 


CHARLEMAGNE,  WILLIAM,  MARLBOROUGH       165 

barbarians  in  their  world-old  war  against  civilization,  that  is, 
by  superior  strategy.  But  Rome  was  now  too  decadent  to 
stand  up  long  against  the  virile  barbarians;  and  the  Roman 
Empire  of  the  West  fell  in  476. 

The  Eastern  Empire  continued,  however,  with  Constanti- 
nople as  its  capital;  and  for  almost  a  thousand  years  the  em- 
pire kept  at  bay  the  barbarians  and  Mohammedans  by  the  sheer 
power  of  superior  strategy.  Meanwhile,  about  486  b.c,  the 
Kingdoms  of  the  Franks,  a  collection  of  the  Teutonic  tribes, 
was  established  in  Gaul;  and  later  Mohammedanism  was 
spread  in  the  Orient  and  Africa  by  the  sword.  By  the  year 
732,  just  one  hundred  years  after  the  death  of  Mohammed, 
it  had  been  forced  on  the  natives  all  along  the  shores  of  the 
southern  Mediterranean,  through  Spain,  and  thence  into 
France.  In  that  year  another  critical  battle  was  fought, 
usually  called  the  battle  of  Tours,  between  the  Saracen  Mo- 
hammedans on  one  side  and  the  Christian  Franks  under  Duke 
Pippin,  usually  called  Charles  Martel,  on  the  other  side.  The 
battle  was  fought  with  the  utmost  courage  and  energy  on  both 
sides,  but  with  distinct  lack  of  strategic  ability  on  the  Saracen 
side ;  with  the  result  that  the  Christians  forced  the  Mohamme- 
dans out  of  Gaul  and  back  into  Spain,  and  thereby  stopped  the 
advance  of  Mohammedanism  into  western  Europe. 

Charles  Martel  was  succeeded  by  his  son,  also  Duke  Pippin, 
who  was  made  King  of  the  Franks  with  the  approval  of  the 
Pope,  and  therefore  with  his  assistance.  This  favor  he  later 
repaid  by  marching  into  Italy  and  expelling  the  Lombards 
and  donating  certain  lands  regained  from  them  to  the  Pope. 
This  laid  the  foundation  of  the  Pope's  temporal  power. 

Pippin  was  succeeded  by  his  son,  Charles,  who  became 
known  later  as  Charlemagne,  or  Charles  the  Great.  ^  He 
reigned  for  forty-seven  years.  During  his  reign  he  made 
more  than  fifty  campaigns,  which  resulted  in  his  extending 
the  boundaries  of  his  kingdom  beyond  the  Rhine,  beyond 
Rome  in  Italy,  and  from  the  Mediterranean  on  the  south  to 
the  North  Sea  on  the  North,    His  principal  campaigns  were 


166  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

against  the  Lombards,  the  Mohammedan  Moors  in  Spain,  and 
(especially)  the  so-called  Saxons,  a  collection  of  barbarous 
Teuton  tribes,  who  seem  to  have  come  originally  from  the 
neighborhood  of  the  Rhine,  but  who  had  spread  to  the  west- 
ward. 

Like  Alexander  and  Caesar,  Charlemagne  was  a  great 
statesman  as  well  as  a  great  strategist,  and  did  not  wage  war 
for  mere  conquest,  but  in  order  to  establish  good  government 
over  a  large  area.  In  Charlemagne 's  time  the  civilization  that 
Egypt,  Greece,  and  Rome  had  produced  had  almost  been 
extinguished,  except  in  western  Asia;  and  Gaul  was  in  a  con- 
dition not  far  above  barbarism.  While  Charlemagne  did  not 
extend  his  boundaries  over  such  large  areas  as  did  Alexander 
and  Caesar,  he  probably  was  nearly  as  great  personally  as 
either  of  them,  both  as  a  strategist  and  as  a  statesman ;  for  he 
did  not  have  the  advantage  that  they  had  of  commanding 
armies  far  superior  in  skill  and  discipline  to  the  armies  of  the 
enemy.  In  one  way  he  achieved  a  greater  personal  success 
than  either;  for  he  was  crowned  Emperor  of  the  West  (800 
A..D.),  and  for  fourteen  years  was  the  ruler  of  an  empire  he  had 
himself  created.  His  empire  was  divided  after  his  death  into 
three  parts,  which  were  made  afterward  into  two;  but  it  did 
not  disappear,  like  the  empire  of  Alexander.  One-half  of 
his  empire  became  approximately  the  France  of  to-day,  and 
the  other  half  the  late  German  Empire. 

It  was  the  stable  government  that  Charlemagne  established 
in  his  empire  that  made  possible  the  civilization  of  the  Europe 
of  to-day;  and  it  must  not  be  overlooked  that  the  uniting  of 
so  many  mutually  hostile  barbarian  tribes  under  one  good 
government  was  due  initially  to  Charlemagne's  superior  strat- 
egy, and  would  not  have  been  possible  without  it. 

After  Charlemagne's  death,  civil  wars  of  all  kinds  took 
place  in  his  dominions,  with  the  result  that  the  government 
became  so  weak  that  the  Norsemen  did  much  as  they  pleased 
in  the  northern  part  of  Gaul,  and  finally,  in  912,  forced  the 
French  king  to  cede  the  province  of  Neustria  to  their  chief, 


CHARLEMAGNE,  WILLIAM,  MARLBOROUGH       167 

Hrolf,  who  later  changed  his  name  to  Rollo.  Later  the  name 
of  the  province  was  changed  to  Normandy.  The  Normans 
came  to  be  the  best  combination  of  civilization,  intelligence  and 
character  that  Gaul  contained. 

In  1065  the  name  of  the  Duke  of  Normandy  was  William. 
He  was  a  man  of  great  ability,  energy  and  ambition;  and  he 
took  advantage  of  the  wreck  on  the  coast  of  Harold,  who  was 
the  probable  heir  to  the  throne  of  England,  to  make  Harold 
swear  allegiance  to  himself  and  promise  to  assist  him  to  attain 
the  crown  of  England,  after  the  death  of  Edward,  the  actual 
king.  Harold  was  then  permitted  to  return  to  England. 
King  Edward  dying  soon  afterward,  Harold  was  declared  to 
be  the  king,  the  late  king  ha\dng  nominated  him  as  his  suc- 
cessor. Harold  thereupon  declared  his  oath  to  William  to 
be  void,  because  given  under  compulsion  and  had  himself 
appointed  king. 

William  at  once  organized  an  expedition  of  invasion,  and  in 
September,  1066,  set  out  for  England  with  60,000  men.  For- 
tunately for  him,  Harold  was  attacked  in  the  same  month  by 
a  Norwegian  army,  and  compelled  to  fight  a  bloody  battle  at 
Stamford  Bridge,  in  which  he  lost  many  men;  for  it  was  dur- 
ing Harold 's  absence  with  his  army  and  fleet  on  this  campaign 
that  William  appeared  off  the  coast  of  England.  He  landed 
at  once,  on  the  29th  of  September,  1066,  without  meeting  any 
opposition  whatever. 

Harold  came  south  to  meet  him;  and,  though  his  army  was 
far  inferior  in  number  to  William's,  and  though  his  fleet 
would  be  able  seriously  to  threaten  William's  communication 
with  Normandy,  he  committed  the  strategic  blunder  of  pre- 
cipitating a  battle,  when  it  would  have  been  much  better  strat- 
egy to  lay  waste  the  country",  keep  out  of  William's  way,  and 
let  his  army  starve.  The  two  forces  finally  met  near  Has- 
tings. Harold  selected  a  very  good  position  on  a  small 
eminence,  in  which  both  his  flanks  and  rear  were  well  pro- 
tected, and  threw  up  a  barricade  in  front  of  his  force,  con- 


168  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

structed  of  shields  and  wooden  stakes  so  joined  together  as 
to  make  a  sort  of  wall. 

The  Normans  hurled  themselves  against  the  Saxons,  but  for 
several  hours  had  no  success.  The  Normans  then  resorted  to 
the  stratagem  of  pretending  to  flee  in  order  to  tempt  the  Sax- 
ons from  the  shelter  of  their  little  fortress.  The  Saxons  fell 
into  the  trap,  and  followed  the  Normans,  and  finally  broke 
into  disorder  in  the  eagerness  of  their  pursuit.  Seizing  a 
favorable  opportunity,  the  Normans  turned  around  and  re- 
newed their  attack.  The  Saxons,  being  inferior  in  numbers 
and  deprived  of  the  protection  that  the  wall  had  given  them, 
were  finally  defeated.  On  Christmas  Day,  William,  Duke  of 
Normandy,  known  in  history  as  William  the  Conqueror,  was 
crowned  King  of  England. 

It  is  the  verdict  of  historians  that  the  conquest  of  England 
by  the  Normans  was  one  of  the  most  fortunate  events  of  his- 
tory. Not  only  were  the  Nonnans  superior  in  ability  and 
character  to  the  Saxons,  but  the  combination  that  was  eventu- 
ally produced  of  Saxons  and  Normans  made  the  splendid 
British  race.  If  the  invasion  had  not  occurred,  no  reason  war- 
rants us  to  suppose  that  the  interminable  little  strifes  between 
tribes  and  provinces  would  have  ceased  until  some  other  great 
occurrence  had  brought  pressure  against  England  from  the 
outside,  and  compressed  the  English  together  into  a  single 
nation. 

When  William  invaded  England,  the  light  of  a  renewal  of 
civilization  was  dimly  visible  in  Europe,  and  nations  were 
beginning  to  form  approximately  along  present  lines,  by  the 
union  in  various  sections  of  many  tribes  and  clans.  Especially 
clear  were  the  nations  of  England,  France,  Germany  and 
Spain.  The  crusades  that  were  waged  against  the  Turks, 
mainly  in  the  twelfth  century,  assisted  in  this  movement; 
while  the  institution  of  Chivalry,  which  sprang  from  the  Cru- 
sades, operated  in  all  countries,  especially  in  France,  to  soften 
the  manners  of  the  people  and  alleviate  the  horrors  of  war, 


CHARLEMAGNE,  WILLIAM,  MARLBOROUGH       169 

The  principal  single  epoch  was  that  comprised  in  what  is 
usually  called  the  Hundred  Years '  War,  which  was  a  series  of 
wars  between  1338  and  1453,  waged  between  France  and  Eng- 
land for  the  possession  of  the  crown  of  France.  The  ultimate 
decision  of  this  war,  by  which  the  English  were  finally  forced 
out  of  France  in  1453,  had  less  influence  on  history  than  did 
the  fact  that  the  war  united  each  nation  by  making  it  fight 
against  an  outside  enemy.  The  war  produced  strong  feelings 
of  nationality  in  each  country. 

That  this  was  a  beneficent  influence  cannot  reasonably  be 
doubted;  for  history  tells  us  in  unmistakable  language,  and 
tells  us  many  times,  that  every  advance  in  civilization  has 
been  contributed  by  some  country  whose  people  were  natu- 
rally cooperative  because  bound  together  by  a  strong  feeling  of 
nationality. 

Patriotic  nations  have  always  been  the  most  useful  to  the 
world. 

In  the  same  year  that  marked  the  expulsion  of  the  English 
from  France,  1453,  Constantinople  was  finally  taken  by  the 
Ottoman  Turks,  under  Mohammed  II,  surnamed  the  Great. 
He  must  have  been  a  remarkable  strategist,  for  the  difficulties 
he  had  to  overcome  were  numerous  and  important.  He  be- 
came possessed  of  a  gun,  enormous  for  those  days,  that  threw 
balls  weighing  one  hundred  pounds,  made  of  hard  black  stone. 
He  was  not  only  energetic,  brave,  and  determined,  but  very 
resourceful  and  inventive.  One  of  his  ingenious  and  success- 
ful accomplishments  was  to  transport  eighty  galleys  for  a 
distance  of  eightj'^  miles  across  the  land  and  into  the  harbor, 
because  he  was  unable  to  reach  the  harbor  through  the  regular 
channels.  He  then  captured  or  sank  all  the  ships  in  the  har- 
bor, and  built  a  bridge  over  it,  by  which  the  city  was  laid 
open  to  assault.  The  Ottoman  Turks  at  this  time  were  great 
warriors,  and  included  among  their  number  an  organization 
called  Janizaries,  a  special  corps  who  were  selected  at  first 
from  Christian  captives  when  they  were  boys,  and  trained  to 
the  profession  of  arms. 


170  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

An  extraordinary  occurrence  was  the  expedition  of  Jen- 
ghis  Khan,  which  began  in  1206  and  lasted  twenty-one  years. 
Jenghis  Khan  was  only  the  chief  of  some  Mongolian  tribe  in 
the  eastern  part  of  Asia;  but  he  collected  an  enormous  horde 
of  barbarians,  and  marched  through  Asia  at  their  head,  lay- 
ing waste  everything  in  his  path.  He  conquered  the  northern 
part  of  China,  overran  Turkestan  and  Persia,  and  established 
a  savage  empire.  He  was  succeeded  by  his  son,  Oktai,  who 
continued  his  father's  course,  and  during  the  interval  between 
1238  and  1241  ravaged  nearly  half  of  Europe.  One  of  his  suc- 
cessors was  Kublai  Khan,  who  made  the  present  Peking  his 
capital.  Upon  his  death  this  curious  empire  fell  apart.  It 
was  partially  restored  by  Tamerlane.  After  his  death  his 
descendant  Baber  invaded  India,  and  established  the  kingdom 
Great  Moguls,  which  lasted  two  hundred  years.  These  men 
cannot  strictly  be  called  strategists;  yet  one  must  admit  that 
they  possessed  many  of  the  qualities  of  great  strategists,  and 
achieved  some  of  their  successes.  The  first  two  seem  to  have 
been  destroyers  only,  and  to  have  carried  their  rage  for  de- 
struction further  than  anybody  else  known.  It  is  said  that  in 
some  cities  that  they  destroyed  they  killed  every  living  thing, 
human  and  brute ! 

The  reason  for  mentioning  them  in  this  book  is  to  point  out 
that  their  success  was  due  almost  entirely  to  the  absence  of 
real  resistance.  The  lands  over  which  they  swept  were  inhab- 
ited for  the  most  part  by  peaceful  people,  who  had  exactly 
the  amount  of  skill  and  resourcefulness  to  defend  themselves 
that  might  have  been  expected.  The  barbarians  had  that 
hatred  of  civilization  which  all  barbarians  have,  and  always 
will  have;  and  they  gained  the  success  which  barbarians  al- 
ways have  gained  and  always  will  gain,  against  people  who 
have  become  so  persuaded  of  the  permanence  of  peace,  and 
so  averse  to  war,  as  to  have  lost  the  power  of  self-protection. 
Self-protection  is  the  first  law  of  nature;  and  any  man  and 
any  nation  that  becomes  so  ultra-civilized  as  to  lose  that  in- 
stinct will  inevitably  go  down,  if  seriously  attacked. 


CHARLEMAGNE,  WILLIAM,  MARLBOROUGH       171 

The  fate  meted  out  by  Jenghiz  Khan  to  the  pacifists  of  his 
day  is  respectfully  called  to  the  attention  of  the  pacifists  of 
the  present  day :  for  barbarism  is  not  dead,  but  only  held  in 
incomplete  subjection. 

After  the  fall  of  Constantinople,  the  Mohammedans  became 
increasingly  aggressive,  and  threatened  to  spread  to  the  west- 
ward over  Europe.  They  were  stopped  by  Don  John  of  Aus- 
tria in  1571,  who,  at  the  head  of  the  Spanish  fleet,  aided  by 
Venetian  and  Papal  squadrons,  defeated  the  Turkish  fleet  at 
the  battle  of  Lepanto.  Again  civilization  was  saved  from  the 
wrath  of  barbarians  by  fighting. 

The  next  incident  of  strategic  importance  was  the  expedi- 
tion of  the  Spanish  Invincible  Armada,  sent  by  Philip  II  of 
Spain  in  1588  to  invade  England.  The  expedition  was  fitted 
out  and  organized  with  the  most  extraordinary  energy  and 
completeness ;  and  the  original  plan  was  good.  It  was  simply 
that  the  Armada  was  to  sail  into  the  English  Channel  in  over- 
powering force  and  secure  command  of  the  sea  there,  in  order 
to  permit  the  Prince  of  Parma  to  sail  across  from  Calais  in 
France  with  a  large  force  of  infantry  soldiers  and  cavalry,  be- 
sides gun-carriages,  siege  machinery,  and  all  requisites  for 
building  bridges  and  forming  camps.  The  king  made  the  stra- 
tegic mistake  at  the  start,  however,  of  rejecting  the  advice  of 
the  admiral,  Santa  Cruz,  to  make  sure  of  some  harbor  on  the 
coast  of  Holland  to  be  used  as  a  base  and  harbor  of  refuge; 
and,  after  the  death  of  this  admiral,  he  made  a  mistake  possi- 
bly greater,  by  appointing  a  man  to  the  command  of  the  fleet 
who,  though  a  duke  and  a  grandee  of  Spain,  was  wholly  un- 
qualified. After  a  number  of  mishaps,  the  Spanish  fleet 
engaged  the  British  fleet,  and  in  overpowering  force — not 
numerically,  but  in  aggregate  tonnage  and  in  number  and 
weight  of  guns.  The  result  of  the  fight  was  such  as  might 
have  been  expected  by  anyone  who  knew  of  the  superior  skill 
of  the  British.  The  Armada  was  disastrously  defeated, 
Parma 's  army  could  not  get  across  the  Channel,  and  the  whole 
expedition  was  a  failure. 


172  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

This  fight  decided  that  England,  and  not  Spain,  should  rule 
the  seas ;  that  free  institutions,  and  not  despotic  governments, 
should  prevail;  that  civilization  was  to  advance  and  not  re- 
cede. It  was  decided,  not  by  superior  courage,  but  by  supe- 
rior strategy.  As  in  all  the  long  battle  between  civilization 
and  barbarism,  or  between  a  higher  and  a  lower  civilization, 
superior  intelligence,  as  embodied  in  superior  strategy,  in 
superior  leadership  in  fighting,  decided  the  result. 

Queen  Elizabeth  died  in  1603.  The  throne  then  passed  to 
the  Stuart  family,  from  whom  it  was  wrested  by  the  strategic 
genius  of  Cromwell  in  1649,  to  whom  it  reverted  in  1660,  and 
from  whom  it  was  again  wrested  in  1688,  There  followed  the 
accession  of  the  Protestant  William,  Prince  of  Orange.  Mean- 
while, Henry  IV  of  France  had  made  the  French  into  a  strong 
nation;  Philip  II  of  Spain  had  died,  leaving  a  ruined  coun- 
try; the  Thirty  Years'  War  had  been  fought  in  Germany,  and 
ended  by  the  establishment  of  Protestantism  there ;  Richelieu 
had  continued  the  advancement  of  the  military  and  civil 
power  of  France ;  and  Louis  XIV  had  come  to  its  throne. 

Louis  XIV  is  not  usually  classed  among  the  great  strate- 
gists of  history;  and  yet  it  cannot  truthfully  be  denied  that 
in  foresight,  courage,  initiative,  knowledge  of  military  mat- 
ters, and  ability  to  select  and  support  subordinates,  it  would 
be  absurd  to  deny  him  strategic  and  statesmanlike  ability. 
Certain  it  is  that  during  all  his  youth  and  middle  life  he  ad- 
vanced the  prosperity  of  France  by  that  policy  of  military 
and  economic  progressiveness  which  permanently  prosperous 
countries  have  always  followed.  Skilful  generals  led  his 
armies;  wise  statesmen  administered  his  departments;  and 
the  greatest  military  engineer  of  history,  Vauban,  fortified  his 
frontiers  and  directed  the  sieges  of  the  fortresses  of  his  ene- 
mies. In  the  latter  part  of  the  seventeenth  century  and  until 
]\Iarlborough  defeated  his  armies  and  destroyed  his  prestige, 
France  was  the  best  governed  country  the  world  had  seen 
since  the  days  of  Rome  and  Octavius  Caesar. 

The  death  of  the  childless  King  of  Spain  in  1700,  and  the 


1 


CHARLEMAGNE,  WILLIAM,  MARLBOROUGH      173 

fact  that  he  bequeathed  his  kingdom,  as  if  it  were  a  piece  of 
personal  property,  to  the  grandson  of  Louis  XIV,  menaced 
Europe  with  the  danger  that  the  Bourbon  family  would  again 
dominate  Europe,  as  Charles  V  had  dominated  it,  but  more 
arbitrarily  and  less  wisely.  A  coalition  was  quickly  formed, 
of  which  the  main  members  were  England,  Holland,  Prussia, 
and  Austria.  Their  forces  outnumbered  those  of  Louis;  but 
they  were  merely  allies,  unaccustomed  to  act  together,  sepa- 
rated by  considerable  distances,  and  with  no  leader  of  recog- 
nized ability;  whereas  the  forces  of  Louis  occupied  a  central 
position,  were  united  under  one  government,  and  spoke  one 
language.  They  were,  besides,  intimately  allied  with  those  of 
Spain.  The  death  of  William  III,  the  natural  leader  of  the 
coalition,  was  hailed  with  joy  in  France;  but  it  would  not 
have  been  hailed  with  joy  if  the  French  had  known  that  it 
would  result  in  placing  in  command  of  the  allied  troops  the 
greatest  strategist  of  the  day,  the  Duke  of  Marlborough. 

The  Allies  declared  war  against  France  in  1702.  Marl- 
borough was  made  commander-in-chief  of  the  allied  troops.  In 
the  first  two  years  of  the  war  he  took  some  towns  in  Flanders, 
but  accomplished  nothing  decisive.  Louis  XIV,  however,  ob- 
tained the  alliance  of  Bavaria ;  and  this  gave  him  a  powerful 
strategic  advantage  by  virtue  of  the  geographical  position  of 
Bavaria  relatively  to  Austria,  which  was  the  most  powerful 
member  of  the  coalition  against  him.  Louis  then  planned  a 
campaign  of  the  greatest  strategic  boldness  and  reasonable- 
ness. It  was  simply  to  assemble  a  grand  army  and  march  on 
Vienna.  The  army  was  to  be  made  up  from  a  large  force 
under  Marshal  Villeroy  taken  from  Flanders,  the  army  under 
Marshal  Tallard  then  near  Strasbourg,  the  French  troops 
under  Marshal  Marsin,  then  with  the  elector  of  Bavaria,  and 
the  French  army  of  Italy,  which  was  to  advance  through 
Tyrol  into  Austria.  This  plan  had  excellent  prospects  of  suc- 
cess. Had  it  succeeded,  the  Bourbon  family  and  the  Roman 
Catholic  Church  would  probably  have  dominated  Europe  for 
a  long  while  thereafter. 


174  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

As  we  know,  it  did  not  succeed. 

What  prevented  it  ?     The  strategic  genius  of  Marlborough. 

Louis  had  not  been  accustomed  to  be  opposed  by  any  strate- 
gic genius.  Marlborough  immediately  frustrated  his  plan  by 
the  simple  and  daring  act  of  marching  rapidly  to  the  vicinity 
of  the  French  main  forces,  near  Strasbourg  and  operating 
against  Bavaria.  This  extraordinary  move  not  having  heen 
expected,  the  plans  of  Louis  were  at  once  thrown  out  of  the 
orderly  procedure  he  and  the  generals  had  arranged,  and  had 
to  be  modified  at  once.  Villeroy,  in  the  north,  seems  to  have 
been  utterly  disconcerted  and  to  have  done  nothing  whatever. 
If  he  had  followed  close  on  the  heels  of  Marlborough,  the 
results  that  ultimately  were  obtained  by  Marlborough  would 
probably  not  have  been  obtained;  and  this  is  one  illustration 
out  of  many,  that  the  triumphs  of  good  strategy  have  often 
been  gained  because  of  being  opposed  by  bad  strategy.  Mar- 
shal Tallard,  fearing  that  Marlborough  was  about  to  attack 
Alsace,  did  not  advance  himself,  but  remained  where  he  was. 
Marshal  Marsin  and  the  Elector  of  Bavaria  forbore  to  press 
upon  the  Austrians  opposed  to  them,  fearing  to  divert  their 
own  attention  from  Marlborough.  This  left  the  Austrians  free 
to  oppose  the  inroad  of  the  French  from  Italy  into  Austria, 
which,  therefore,  did  not  take  place. 

In  this  condition  of  affairs  Marlborough  was  able  to  catch 
the  Bavarians  while  they  were  unsupported,  and  to  defeat 
them  in  the  battle  of  Donauwert.  This  battle  roused  Marshal 
Tallard  at  last  to  the  real  state  of  affairs,  and  caused  him  to 
march  at  once  to  the  eastward  and  unite  his  force  with  those 
of  Marshal  Marsin  and  the  Elector  of  Bavaria.  Their  com- 
bined forces  took  up  a  position  facing  to  the  eastward,  with 
their  right  under  the  command  of  Tallard,  resting  on  the 
village  of  Blenheim  on  the  Danube,  while  the  left,  under  Mar- 
sin and  the  Elector,  rested  on  the  village  of  Lutzingen.  Marl- 
borough took  up  a  position  facing  them,  commanding  the  left 
wing  in  person,  while  Prince  Eugene  commanded  the  right 
wing,  which  consisted  mostly  of  cavalry.     Marlborough  had 


CHARLEMAGNE,  WILLIAM,  MARLBOROUGH       175 

about  56,000  men  and  fifty-two  guns,  while  Tallard  had  about 
60,000  men  and  sixty-one  guns. 

The  battle  began  at  early  morning  on  the  13th  of  August, 
1704.  As  a  result  the  French  army  was  almost  entirely  de- 
stroyed. Yet  they  had  not  only  been  superior  numerically 
to  the  allies,  but  had  the  advantage  of  position;  their  flanks 
being  protected  by  the  Danube  on  the  right  and  high  ground 
on  the  left,  while  the  little  river  Nebel  made  a  barrier  that 
Marlborough's  forces  had  to  cross.  Furthermore,  the  French 
were  supposed  to  be  as  well  commanded  and  to  be  as  brave 
and  skilful  soldiers. 

When  one  reads  the  accounts  of  the  battle,  he  realizes  that 
after  it  had  begun  it  was  purely  a  tactical  fight ;  and  he  finds 
himself  wondering  why  it  resulted  as  successfully  for  Marl- 
borough as  it  did.  One  reason  undoubtedly  was  that  Marl- 
borough possessed  in  an  extreme  degree  the  ability  to  decide 
wisely  and  quickly  under  circumstances  of  the  most  extreme 
peril  and  urgency.  This  was  evidenced  by  his  brilliant  man- 
oeuver  of  reforming  his  troops  under  fire,  and  changing  the 
brunt  of  his  attack  from  the  village  of  Blenheim,  where  the 
French  line  was  strong,  to  a  point  where  he  suddenly  realized 
that  their  line  was  weak,  breaking  through  the  line,  and  di- 
viding the  French  force.  The  absence  of  this  kind  of  ability 
in  savages,  when  opposed  to  white  men,  is  notable  in  many 
battles  in  history.  In  an  actual  battle,  this  tactical  ability 
in  a  commander-in-chief  is  the  most  important  that  a  com- 
mander-in-chief can  have. 

Marlborough  was  assisted,  of  course,  by  a  genius  almost 
equal  to  his  own,  that  of  Prince  Eugene;  and  it  must  have 
been  the  mutual  and  cooperating  action  of  these  two  geniuses 
that  brought  about  the  actual  result.  No  other  cause  seems 
assignable.  What  other  cause  can  we  assign,  when  a  numeri- 
cally inferior  force  beats  a  superior  force  that  has  great  ad- 
vantage of  position?  One  may  say  that  there  was  a  better 
morale  on  the  side  of  Marlborough  than  on  the  other  side. 
There  probably  was,  and  it  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  Marl- 


176  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

borough  took  tlie  oft'cnsivo.  But,  even  if  we  grant  this,  must 
we  not  credit  Marlborough  and  Eugene  with  having  inspired 
this  morale  1 

The  war  eoulinued  until  1713,  when  it  was  concluded  by 
the  Peace  of  Utrecht.  It  resulted  to  the  advantage  of  the 
allies  almost  wholly;  because  of  the  military  operations  of 
Marlborough,  and  especially  his  victories  at  Blenheim,  Ramil- 
ies,  Oudenarde,  and  Malplaquet. 

There  is  only  one  reasonably  assignable  cause  for  the  vic- 
tories of  Marlborough,  and  the  consequent  liberation  of 
Europe  from  the  stilling  conditions  of  Bourbon  rule — supe- 
rior strategy. 


CHAPTER  XI 

FREDERICK 

IN  the  year  1640  the  Margravate  of  Brandenburg  had  lit- 
tle importance  in  the  world;  but  a  man  who  was  to  in- 
fluence all  future  history  came  then  to  its  throne,  and 
started  it  on  a  career  that  no  historian  since  has  neglected  to 
describe.  His  title  was  Margrave;  but,  as  he  was  one  of  the 
men  who  elected  the  German  Emperor,  he  had  the  title  also 
of  Elector.  In  history  he  is  called  the  Great  Elector.  He 
ruled  from  1640  to  1688.  He  found  Brandenburg  poor,  unim- 
portant, and  disordered ;  he  left  it  comparatively  rich,  with  a 
recognized  standing  as  an  independent  state,  a  good  army,  an 
excellent  corps  of  administrators,  and  a  very  efficient  govern- 
ment. He  accomplished  this  by  that  combination  of  good 
statesmanship  and  good  generalship  by  which  all  good  govern- 
ments have  been  established. 

He  was  followed  by  his  son,  who  was  a  painful  contrast  to 
his  father,  but  who  mainly  because  of  the  excellent  condition 
in  which  his  father  had  left  Brandenburg  and  its  sister  Prus- 
sia, succeeded  in  being  made  the  King  of  Prussia.  He  was 
followed  in  turn  by  his  son,  Frederick  William  I,  who  was  in 
essentials  like  his  grandfather,  the  Great  Elector.  He  also 
was  a  great  statesman,  a  great  strategist,  and  a  great  patriot, 
though  coarse  and  brutal,  as  many  of  the  Prussians  were — in 
fact,  as  the  German  peoples  have  ever  been  since  the  time  of 
Cgesar  and  before.  He  continued  the  work  of  securing  pros- 
perity at  home  and  security  abroad,  fighting  against  the 
opposition  of  nearly  all  of  his  own  people,  including  his  own 
family,  including  even  his  own  son,  who  was  later  to  reap  such 
advantage  from  his  father's  work,  and  to  do  so  much  in  addi- 
tion, as  to  secure  the  name  in  history  of  Frederick  the  Great, 

177 


178  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

It  must  be  said,  however,  in  exculpation  of  Frederick,  that 
his  attitude  toward  his  father  was  caused  largely  by  the  evil 
influence  of  his  mother ;  and  that  he  came  later  to  realize  that, 
while  his  father  had  done  many  coarse  and  brutal  things,  the 
number  and  the  magnitude  of  the  good  things  that  he  did,  and 
the  results  they  achieved,  were  such  that  in  the  end  he  accom- 
plished much  more  good  than  harm. 

Frederick  II  came  to  the  throne  of  Prussia  in  1740,  at  the 
age  of  twenty-eight.  During  most  of  his  youth  he  was  a  dilet- 
tante and  a  dreamer,  playing  the  flute,  writing  poetry,  and 
amusing  himself  in  literature.  Suddenly  he  became  an  auto- 
cratic king,  and  the  commanding  general  of  an  army.  One 
of  his  first  acts  was  to  abolish  the  tall  grenadiers,  who  had 
been  his  father's  only  extravagance.  He  addressed  himself 
especially  to  the  improvement  of  the  army,  which  had  already 
been  made  the  most  efficient  army  in  Europe ;  for  he  realized 
that  the  Emperor  of  Germany's  death  was  not  far  distant, 
and  that  the  opportunity  would  come  then,  if  ever,  to  press 
those  claims  to  Silesia  that  his  father  and  grandfather  had 
urged  but  had  not  been  able  to  have  recognized. 

A  few  weeks  after  Frederick's  accession,  the  Emperor  died. 
Frederick  resolved  at  once  to  invade  Silesia.  In  fact,  he  took 
immediate  steps  actually  to  invade  it ;  but  he  kept  the  fact  a 
secret.  On  the  very  evening  before  his  departure  for  the 
army,  he  gave  a  double  entertainment  that  lasted  far  into  the 
night;  and  then,  on  the  following  morning,  he  mounted  his 
coach  and  drove  off  to  carry  out  a  project  that  has  been  un- 
sparingly condemned  by  historians  and  others  ever  since,  but 
has  also  been  vigorously  defended. 

"Whether  or  not  Frederick  was  justified  in  invading  Silesia, 
it  is  not  within  the  province  of  strategy  to  discuss,  any  more 
than  it  is  within  the  province  of  engineering  to  discuss  ques- 
tions of  religion.  It  is  within  the  province  of  strategy,  how- 
ever, to  discuss  the  skill  and  energy  with  which  Frederick 
carried  out  his  invasion;  and  strategy  has  always  declared 
that  his  conduct  of  the  invasion  was  admirable.    One  of  the 


180  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

first  requisites  in  a  strategist  is  the  capacity  for  making  plans 
in  advance,  starting  promptly  to  carry  out  the  plans  when  the 
proper  moment  comes,  and  continuing  thereafter  to  do  every- 
thing vi^ith  timeliness  and  force.  That  Frederick  made  certain 
claims  concerning  Silesia  was  well  known;  but  no  suspicion 
that  he  intended  to  press  them  seems  to  have  been  entertained ; 
for,  before  Austria  had  taken  any  defensive  measures  of  any 
kind,  Frederick  was  in  Silesia  and  had  captured  Breslau,  its 
capital. 

The  Austrians  having  committed  the  capital  strategic  crime 
of  being  caught  unprepared,  were  consequently  slow  in  get- 
ting an  army  into  Silesia,  to  oust  Frederick;  but,  when  they 
did  start,  they  did  it  with  so  much  secrecy  and  swiftness  that 
Frederick  himself  was  almost  caught  unprepared,  for  he  had 
his  troops  scattered  in  many  dii¥erent  camps.  The  Austrians, 
however,  probably  through  lack  of  a  good  intelligence  depart- 
ment, were  unable  to  bring  him  to  battle.  They  finally  took 
up  a  defensive  position  near  Mollwitz,  and  there  Frederick 
determined  to  attack  them,  though  there  was  two  feet  of  snow 
on  the  ground.  His  infantry  was  greater  in  numbers  than 
that  of  the  Austrians,  but  the  Austrian  cavalry  was  the 
stronger. 

The  battle  was  bitterly  contested  on  both  sides.  At  one 
time,  owing  largely  to  the  fact  that  Frederick's  soldiers  were 
unused  to  actual  war,  the  second  battle  line  fired  into  the  rear 
of  their  own  first  line.  Frederick  was  so  overwhelmed  with 
despair  that  he  was  induced  to  leave  the  field  of  battle  by 
his  general,  Schwerin,  who  possibly  wished  to  get  rid  of  him. 
Schwerin  then  rallied  his  forces  and  advanced  to  the  attack 
with  his  right  wing  upon  the  Austrian  infantry.  The  Prus- 
sians had  an  enormous  advantage  in  the  fact  that  their  mus- 
kets were  better  than  those  of  the  Austrians,  and  also  that  by 
the  use  of  a  novel  iron  ramrod  they  could  be  loaded  and  fired 
more  quickly — Carlisle  says  in  the  ratio  of  five  to  two.  This 
enormous  advantage  was  not  the  result  of  accident,  but  of 


FREDERICK  181 

superior  strategic  foresight,  combined  with  prompt  action  in 
accordance  with  it.  The  Austrians  were  soon  in  retreat,  and 
then  Sehwerin  tlirew  forward  his  whole  left  wing  at  double 
time,  and  struck  the  Austrians,  not  with  an  irregular,  waver- 
ing line,  but  with  a  line  that  was  moving  with  the  absolute 
rigidity  which  the  father  of  Frederick  had  had  in  view,  and 
to  attain  which  he  had  drilled  the  army  so  stubbornly  and  so 
long.    As  a  result,  the  Austrian  army  was  soon  in  full  retreat. 

Frederick  shortly  afterward  made  a  treaty  with  France, 
whereby  France  guaranteed  Lower  Silesia  to  him  and  agreed 
to  prosecute  the  war  vigorously  on  her  own  account,  but  in 
cooperation  with  him.  In  accordance,  an  allied  French  and 
Bavarian  army  soon  captured  Linz,  the  capital  of  Upper  Aus- 
tria. 

Frederick  then  showed  a  true  conception  of  strategy  by  in- 
sisting that  the  allied  forces  should  at  once  attack  Vienna, 
which  probably  could  have  been  easily  taken  then.  He  said: 
"This  Austria  must  be  struck  to  earth;  incurable  wounds 
must  be  inflicted  upon  her  before  she  is  in  a  condition  to 
parry  the  blows. ' '  But  this  the  French  would  not  consent  to. 
They  gave  various  reasons;  but  the  real  reason  was  that  a 
successful  attack  on  Vienna  would  have  been  too  greatly  to 
the  advantage  of  Charles  Albert  of  Bavaria,  who  was  their 
Emperor  Elect  of  Germany,  but  whom  they  did  not  wish  to 
encourage  too  much.  A  French  diplomat  is  said  to  have  re- 
marked: "If  we  make  the  Elector  master  of  Vienna,  we  shall 
no  longer  be  the  master  of  the  Elector." 

This  incident  is  important  because  it  illustrates  the  conflicts 
between  strategy  and  statesmanship  that  often  have  taken 
place,  especially  when  allies  were  cooperating,  but  which  have 
also  taken  place  in  the  service  of  one  country  when  the  states- 
man and  the  strategist  were  two  different  persons.  Alexan- 
der suffered  from  no  such  difficulty ;  neither  did  Caesar ; 
neither  did  Louis  XIV;  and  neither  did  Frederick  as  long  as 
his  operations   concerned  his  own  army  only.     In  fact,  in 


182  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

some  of  his  later  wars  the  strongest  single  factor  in  his  favor 
was  that  both  the  statesman  and  the  strategist  wore  the  uni- 
form of  the  King  of  Prussia. 

Disgusted  with  the  inefficient  support  of  France,  and  with- 
held himself  by  no  scruples  of  ethics  or  morality,  Frederick 
now  made  a  secret  agreement  with  Austria,  providing  that 
there  should  be  a  sham  siege  of  Neisse,  which  should  surrender 
to  him  at  the  end  of  fifteen  days,  after  which  a  truce  would 
follow.  This,  he  saw  later,  was  not  even  wise,  because  it 
enabled  the  Austriaus  to  use  their  entire  army  against  the 
French.  He  therefore  promptly  repudiated  his  agreement 
with  Austria  and  took  possession  of  the  Province  of  Glatz. 
The  Austrians  then  advanced  to  attack  him,  but  wit"h  such 
strategic  unskilfulness  that  they  allowed  him  to  unite  two 
separated  forces.  A  battle  ensued  at  Chotusitz,  which,  like 
most  battles,  was  fought  bravely  by  both  sides.  The  Aus- 
trians were  finally  defeated,  largely  because  of  the  poor  dis- 
cipline of  the  Austrian  cavalry,  who  took  advantage  of  a 
favorable  opportunity  to  stop  and  do  some  plundering  for 
their  personal  benefit. 

By  the  Treaty  of  Breslau,  signed  soon  after  in  July,  1742, 
Frederick  secured  the  greater  part  of  Silesia,  a  territory  equal 
to  one  third  of  the  entire  former  Prussian  state. 

The  war  continued  between  France  and  Austria,  and  was 
carried  on  by  the  French  with  the  same  lack  of  skill  as  char- 
acterized most  of  the  French  operations  during  the  reign  of 
Louis  XV,  conducted  as  they  were  by  generals  selected,  not 
because  they  were  brave  and  skilful,  but  because  they  were 
favorites  of  the  king  or  of  his  mistresses.  In  1743  a  treaty 
between  Austria  and  Sardinia,  which  was  followed  by  a  treaty 
between  Austria  and  Saxony  in  January,  1744,  decided  Fred- 
erick to  reenter  the  war  in  order  to  preserve  what  he  had 
gained  in  Silesia,  and  to  endeavor  to  get  more.  To  this  end 
he  made  a  treaty  with  France,  and  then  advanced  at  once 
and  captured  Prague. 

At  this  time  Maria  Theresa's  army,  under  command  of 


FREDERICK  183 

Prince  Charles  of  Lorraine,  was  making  a  victorious  advance 
into  Alsace.  On  hearing  of  Frederick's  advance,  Charles 
immediately  recrossed  the  Rhine.  Of  course,  the  French 
should  have  pursued  him,  and  Frederick  naturally  expected 
that  they  would.  They  did  not,  however,  and  soon  Frederick 
found  himself  not  taking  Vienna,  as  he  had  hoped,  but  re- 
treating to  Silesia.  He  was  opposed  by  greatly  superior 
numbers,  and  he  could  not  bring  them  to  battle,  as  the  Aus- 
trian general  followed  the  Fabian  policy  of  letting  Freder- 
ick's army  wear  itself  away  under  the  influence  of  hunger 
and  discouragement,  which  it  soon  began  to  do.  Then  Fred- 
erick adopted  the  stratagem  of  leaving  the  passes  in  the  Giant 
Mountains  unguarded,  hoping  that  the  enemy  would  take  his 
apparent  failure  as  a  sign  of  weakness  and  rush  forward  to 
attack  him.  This  they  did,  but  so  quickly  that  Frederick 
himself  was  almost  caught  unprepared  for  their  onslaught, 
and  got  his  forces  together  in  time  only  by  dint  of  the  utmost 
energy.  Prince  Charles  of  Lorraine  was  so  confident  of  his 
own  tactical  ability,  and  so  sure  that  he  had  Frederick  in  his 
grasp,  that  he  took  the  actual  command  away  from  General 
Traun  and  assumed  it  himself,  and  then  lay  down  to  sleep 
without  taking  adequate  measures  for  watching  Frederick. 
As  a  result,  Frederick  moved  out  of  his  camp  in  the  night- 
time, leaving  his  fires  burning  and  tents  standing,  and  took  up 
a  more  favorable  position  near  Hohenfriedberg.  From  this 
position,  at  early  dawn,  he  attacked  the  enemy  so  violently 
and  so  unexpectedly  as  to  put  them  to  ruinous  flight. 

Shortly  afterward  he  himself  was  attacked  at  the  village  of 
Sohr  by  an  Austrian  army  nearly  twice  as  large  as  his  own, 
which  tried  the  same  manceuver  against  him.  Curiously 
enough,  Frederick  himself  was  caught ;  but  he  was  able  to  re- 
ply with  an  attack  on  the  enemy,  and  to  conduct  it  with  such 
courage  and  coolness  as  to  win  the  day.  Shortly  afterward 
he  sent  an  army  into  Saxony,  in  order  to  prevent  the  union  of 
the  Saxon  and  Austrian  armies,  and  with  peremptory  orders 
to  attack  the  Saxons  before  the  union  could  be  effected.     The 


184  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

expedition  was  successful,  but  by  a  very  narrow  margiuj  be- 
cause when  the  old  Prussian  Field  Marshal,  with  22,000  men, 
finally  stormed  the  heights  at  Kesseldorf,  on  which  were 
34,000  Saxons,  the  Austrian  army  of  46,000  men  was  only  five 
miles  away.  Since  Frederick  was  now  ready  to  unite  with 
his  victorious  general,  the  Austrians  sued  for  peace.  As  a 
result,  the  Peace  of  Dresden,  which  confirmed  the  Peace  of 
Breslau,  was  signed  on  Christmas,  1745. 

The  War  of  the  Austrian  Succession  continued,  mainly  be- 
tween Austria  and  France,  for  a  little  more  than  two  years, 
and  was  ended  in  1748  by  the  Peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle.  One 
clause  in  this  treaty  guaranteed  to  Frederick  the  possession 
of  Silesia. 

In  1756  the  long-presaged  Seven  Years'  War  broke  out.  In 
the  complicated  situation  that  had  gradually  been  forming, 
the  various  countries  that  took  part  in  the  war  found  them- 
selves lined  up  in  a  way  very  difl^erent  from  the  way  in  which 
they  had  been  lined  up  in  the  previous  war,  England  and 
Prussia  being  allied  against  France,  Austria,  and  Russia. 

Frederick,  having  a  good  intelligence  department,  soon 
learned  that  Austria  and  Russia  were  both  secretly  preparing 
enormous  forces  to  take  the  field  against  him.  He  tried  to 
get  a  declaration  of  intentions  from  Maria  Theresa,  but  with- 
out success;  whereupon  he  at  once  invaded  Saxony,  marched 
into  Dresden,  forced  open  the  door  of  the  room  in  the  palace 
where  the  archives  were  kept,  selected  three  bags  full  of 
compromising  documents,  and  sent  them  to  Berlin  to  be  pub- 
lished. He  then  ordered  the  commanding  general  of  the 
Saxon  army  to  make  his  whole  army  take  oath  of  allegiance  to 
him.  At  this  time  an  Austrian  army  was  advancing  to  the 
relief  of  Saxony.  A  battle  took  place  between  them  and  Fred- 
erick at  Lobositz,  which  ended  to  the  advantage  of  the  Prus- 
sians. Little  was  accomplished,  however,  except  that  Saxony 
was  placed  under  Prussian  administration,  and  the  taxes  of 
her  subjects  were  diverted  to  the  use  of  Prussia. 

Louis  XV  of  France  was  now  induced  to  take  the  offensive 


FEEDERICK  185 

energetically,  and  to  furnish  an  army  of  115,000  men ;  where- 
upon he,  Maria  Theresa,  and  the  Empress  of  Russia  started 
a  very  effective  plan  of  operations,  even  drawing  Sweden  into 
their  alliance,  with  an  agreement  to  furnish  20,000  men.  In 
addition,  Austria  succeeded  in  drawing  to  her  side  sixty  out 
of  eighty-six  of  the  estates  of  the  German  empire;  the  Diet 
voting  "imperial  execution"  against  Frederick  for  invading 
Saxony. 

Frederick  was  now  in  a  perilous  situation.  England  was 
his  only  friend,  and  her  hands  were  full,  waging  wars  of  her 
own  with  both  America  and  India.  Numerically,  he  was  at  a 
crushing  disadvantage ;  but  he  had  two  enormous  military  ad- 
vantages which  ultimately  made  him  victorious — that  of  supe- 
rior stategic  ability,  and  the  fact  that  the  statesman  and  the 
strategist  were  united  in  one  person.  These  were  of  incalcul- 
able value  to  him  in  many  ways,  but  especially  in  endowing 
him  with  that  prime  requisite  in  strategy — speed  of  action. 

In  those  days  in  Europe,  armies  went  into  winter  quarters 
in  the  winter-time.  In  the  following  winter  of  1756-57,  Fred- 
erick spent  his  time  studying  and  pondering  the  campaigns  of 
the  great  strategists,  especially  those  who  had  fought  in  the 
vicinity  in  which  he  expected  to  fight  when  fighting  weather 
came.  As  a  result  he  made  an  early  dash  at  the  enemy's  camp 
at  Koniggratz.  He  took  the  enemy  so  wholly  by  surprise  that 
they  retreated  at  once  to  the  hills  near  Prague,  and  left  be- 
hind them  stores  that  were  of  great  value  to  Frederick.  They 
took  up  a  strong  position,  but  the  Prussians  followed  them, 
though  under  great  difficulties  because  of  the  nature  of  the 
ground,  and  finally  put  them  to  flight.  Leaving  the  bulk  of 
his  army  to  coop  up  the  Ausfrians  in  Prague,  Frederick 
started  to  cut  off  General  Daun,  who  was  advancing  to 
Prague's  relief.  At  this  time  he  made  the  strategic  blunder 
of  giving  them  battle  at  once,  refusing  to  believe  the  reports 
given  him  of  the  strength  of  Daun's  army.  The  result  was  a 
disaster  that  decided  the  whole  campaign  adversely  to  him, 
and  for  which  nobody  was  to  blame  but  Frederick,     His  situ- 


186  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

ation  was  now  almost  desperate.  To  make  it  worse,  an  army 
of  Hanoverians  and  Hessians,  under  the  command  of  the 
Duke  of  Cumberland,  was  conducted  with  such  strategic  un- 
skilfulness  that  it  was  forced  to  surrender  to  the  French, 

Frederick's  next  move  was  to  march  into  Thuringia  and  try 
to  get  battle  with  the  French  army  there.  He  failed  to  ac- 
complish this,  however,  and  meanwhile  a  small  Austrian  force 
entered  Berlin  and  laid  it  under  contribution.  Frederick  en- 
deavored to  intercept  this  force  after  it  withdrew;  and  his 
movement  appeared  to  the  French  and  Austrian  commanders 
as  a  retreat.  They  therefore  advanced,  and  Frederick  then 
took  up  a  strong  position  at  Rossbach.  So  confident  were  the 
French  and  Austrians  that  they,  having  43,000  men,  could 
capture  Frederick  and  his  army  of  20,000  men,  that  they 
tried  the  dangerous  manoeuver  of  marching  around  Freder- 
ick's flank.  Seizing  a  favorable  moment,  Frederick  dashed 
down  upon  the  enemy  from  the  crest  of  the  hill,  and  in  the 
course  of  an  hour  routed  them  completely. 

The  victory  was  splendid  and  important,  but  not  enough  so 
to  redeem  the  dangerous  situation  in  which  Frederick  still 
was.  To  make  the  situation  worse,  an  important  new  for- 
tress in  Silesia  fell  after  a  siege  of  seventeen  days,  and  5800 
Prussians  were  made  prisoners  of  war.  When  finally  a  battle 
did  take  place  near  Breslau,  the  capital  of  Silesia,  the  Prus- 
sians were  defeated,  and  obliged  to  take  refuge  in  the  town. 
Soon  afterward  Breslau  was  captured,  and  Silesia  seemed  to 
be  lost  to  Frederick.  So  confident  were  the  Austrians  now 
that  Charles  of  Lorraine,  commander  of  the  Austrian  army, 
was  ordered  to  hasten  and  give  the  finishing  blow  to  Fred- 
erick's disordered  forces. 

But  Charles  was  a  poor  strategist,  while  Frederick  was  a 
great  one;  and  the  result  was  that  Frederick  got  his  army 
together  and  inspired  in  a  very  short  time,  and  then  hurled 
it  like  a  living  weapon  against  the  inert  and  unskilful  line  of 
Charles.     In  this  battle  (Leuthen),  Frederick  is  said  to  have 


FREDERICK  187 

shown  his  genius  as  both  a  strategist  and  a  tactician  in  a 
higher  degree  than  at  any  other  time,  and  to  have  handled 
his  army  as  a  skilful  fencer  handles  his  rapier.  The  result 
was  that,  though  his  forces  were  vastly  inferior  in  numbers, 
he  inflicted  upon  his  enemy  a  defeat  that  was  also  a  disaster. 

This  victory  put  nearly  all  of  Silesia  once  more  back  into 
Frederick's  hands.  At  the  same  time,  a  piece  of  great  good 
fortune  came  to  him  when  William  Pitt  was  made  Prime  Min- 
ister of  England,  and  induced  Parliament  to  vote  £4,000,000  to 
him,  after  having  declared  in  Parliament :  "I  feel  the  most 
grateful  sentiments  of  veneration  and  zeal  for  a  prince  who 
stands,  the  unshaken  bulwark  of  Europe,  against  the  most 
powerful  and  malignant  confederac.y  that  ever  yet  has  threat- 
ened the  independence  of  mankind. ' ' 

But  Frederick  was  nevertheless  in  a  very  dangerous  posi- 
tion, and  it  was  rapidly  made  worse  by  Russian  operations  in 
East  Prussia.  Frederick  replied  by  marching  against  the 
fortress  of  Olmutz;  but  his  engineers  made  some  mistakes  in 
calculations  that  occasioned  considerable  delay,  during  which 
4000  transport  wagons  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  AUstrians, 
and  reduced  dangerously  Frederick's  supply  of  ammunition. 
As  usual  with  great  strategists,  the  emergency  stimulated 
Frederick;  and,  as  usual  also  with  great  strategists,  Fred- 
erick stimulated  his  army. 

As  a  result,  Frederick  marched  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles 
in  ten  hot  days,  joined  forces  with  one  of  his  generals,  and 
forced  the  Russians  to  give  up  the  siege  of  Kustrin.  Immedi- 
ately afterward  he  brought  the  Russians  to  battle  at  Zorndorf, 
and  defeated  them  disastrously  and  completely.  Then,  with- 
out any  rest  whatever,  he  started  off  for  Saxony,  which  the 
Austrians  had  invaded.  At  Hochkirch  he  committed  the 
strategic  blunder  of  despising  his  enemy  and  encamping  in  a 
position  where  he  was  virtually  surrounded  by  a  superior 
force  that  held  the  hills,  despite  the  warning  of  some  of  his 
officers.     He  paid  for  it  by  being  surprised  at  night  and 


188  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

driven  back.  The  enemy  then  committed  the  strategic  mis- 
take of  not  following  up  the  victory,  but  intrenching  them- 
selves.    As  a  result,  Frederick  slipped  away. 

In  the  following  summer  the  Russians  again  advanced. 
This  time  they  took  the  important  town  of  Frankfort  on  the 
Oder,  while  simultaneously  a  corps  of  Austrians  was  sent 
into  Prussia.  The  armies  were  able  to  combine  and  to  make 
a  force  twice  as  great  as  Frederick's.  Nevertheless,  he  at- 
tacked them  at  Kunersdorf,  routing  the  enemy's  left  wing  and 
taking  several  thousand  prisoners.  Following  this,  he  com- 
mitted the  strategic  mistake  of  overworking  his  men  in  an  en- 
deavor to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  Russians,  and  as  a  result 
he  suffered  one  of  the  most  disastrous  reverses  of  his  career. 
During  the  same  month  Ferdinand  of  Brunswick  won  the 
battle  of  Minden  against  the  French;  but  shortly  afterward 
one  of  Frederick's  generals  surrendered  a  garrison  of  4000 
men  and  a  great  accumulation  of  supplies  in  Dresden.  Then 
came  the  surrender  at  Maxen  of  12,000  Prussian  soldiers  un- 
der General  Fink. 

Frederick  again  seemed  on  the  verge  of  ruin.  In  the  fol- 
lowing spring,  that  of  1760,  he  could  oppose  only  90,000  Prus- 
sians to  200,000  Austrians;  and,  for  the  first  time,  the  cam- 
paign opened  on  Prussian  territory.  Frederick  attempted  to 
capture  Dresden,  but  without  success,  and  then  marched  to 
Silesia,  where  he  found  himself  surrounded  by  three  Austrian 
armies,  while  a  Russian  force  also  was  advancing  toward  him. 
Day  after  day  the  enemy  forces  would  make  their  dispositions 
for  an  attack  the  following  morning;  but  night  after  night 
Frederick  would  change  his  camp.  At  last  they  felt  sure  of 
securing  him ;  two  of  the  forces  got  ready  to  fall  upon  him 
simultaneously,  while  the  third  prepared  to  cut  off  his  retreat. 
But  that  night,  Frederick  caught  the  latter  force  while  on  the 
march  to  take  up  its  appointed  position,  and  defeated  it  with 
a  loss  of  11,000  men,  while  he  himself  only  lost  3500. 

Frederick  then  evaded  the   Russians,   but  they   captured 


FREDERICK  189 

Berlin.  The  Austrian  General  Lacy  then  took  Potsdam  and 
Charlottenburg ;  but  on  Frederick's  approach  the  Russians 
withdrew  to  the  Oder  River,  and  Lacy  to  Torgau,  where  he 
joined  another  Austrian  force  under  Daun.  A  battle  soon 
was  fought  near  Torgau,  in  which  Frederick,  with  44,000  men, 
was  confronted  with  60,000  Austrians,  who  furthermore  had 
almost  twice  as  many  large  guns  as  he  had.  When  night  came 
on,  the  battle  had  not  been  decided;  but  in  the  night-time  a 
violent  cavalry  charge  from  the  Prussians  forced  the  Aus- 
trians to  retreat.  This  victory  was  a  Pyrrhic  victory  to  Fred- 
erick, for  it  cost  him  more  than  it  really  was  worth. 

In  the  following  spring  he  had  only  96,000  men,  while  the 
Austrians  and  Russians  had  three  times  as  many.  For  this 
reason,  Frederick  had  to  abandon  the  offensive  during  that 
year,  1761,  and  defend  himself  with  intrenchments.  During 
the  year  two  important  towns  were  lost  and  Frederick's  forces 
shrank  to  60,000.  At  this  time,  as  if  to  put  the  final  touch  to 
Frederick's  agony,  Pitt  fell,  and  Frederick's  supplies  from 
England  consequently  were  shut  off.  Bute,  who  took  Pitt's 
place,  even  went  so  far  as  to  urge  Russia  to  continued  action, 
in  order  that  Frederick  might  not  have  free  play  against  Aus- 
tria. Frederick  was  urged  to  make  peace  even  at  the  price 
of  some  of  his  territory,  but  this  advice  he  refused  to  follow. 

Shortly  afterward,  in  January,  1762,  the  Czarina  of  Russia 
died,  and  her  successor,  Peter  III,  who  w^as  an  ardent  admirer 
of  Frederick,  sent  18,000  men  to  fight  for  Frederick  instead 
of  against  him!  The  Russian  general  commanding  these 
forces  joined  Frederick  just  as  he  was  preparing  to  fight  a 
battle  for  the  rescue  of  one  of  his  towns  that  had  been  cap- 
tured; but,  before  the  attack  was  actually  made,  news  came 
that  Peter  had  been  replaced  by  Catherine  II,  who  refused  to 
have  her  soldiers  fight  for  Frederick.  This  news  was  kept 
secret,  however,  until  after  the  battle — a  fact  that  helped  to 
decide  it  in  his  favor. 

In  1762  a  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  between  England  and 


190  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

France  that  left  Austria  and  Prussia  the  only  remaining 
belligerents.  After  various  diplomatic  manoeuvers  between 
the  two,  peace  was  signed  in  February,  1763. 

Frederick  had  now  reigned  for  twenty-three  years,  during 
which  he  had  been  engaged  in  continual  war  or  preparation 
for  war,  and  had  made  a  reputation  as  a  strategist  that  few 
have  excelled.  He  reigned  almost  exactly  the  same  length  of 
time  afterward  in  peace ;  and  during  that  time  he  made  a 
reputation  as  a  statesman  virtually  equal  to  that  which  he 
had  made  as  a  strategist.  Like  Csesar  before  him,  and  Wash- 
ington after  him,  he  devoted  the  same  energy,  foresight,  pa- 
triotism, and  wise  management  to  the  affairs  of  peace  that  he 
had  devoted  to  the  affairs  of  war. 

It  may  not  be  inappropriate  to  point  out  here  that,  while 
many  men  without  military  training  have  been  good  states- 
men, and  while  many  strategists  have  also  been  good  states- 
men, no  statesman  without  military  training  has  ever  been  a 
good  strategist;  though  many  have  thought  that  they  were, 
and  have  consequently  done  great  harm.  It  might  further  be 
pointed  out  that  the  greatest  statesmen  have  been  the  greatest 
strategists,  and  the  greatest  strategists  have  been  the  greatest 
statesmen.  It  might  be  a  little  bold  to  suggest,  though  I  my- 
self believe  it  to  be  true,  that  the  men  who  have  done  the  most 
to  insure  good  government  in  the  world  have  been  men  who 
were  both  strategists  and  statesmen,  like  those  whose  names 
head  certain  chapters  in  this  book. 


CHAPTER  XII 

WASHINGTON 

GEORGE  WASHINGTON,  who  had  been  a  skilful  and 
daring  fighter  in  the  seven  years'  French  and  Indian 
War,  was  appointed  commander-in-chief  of  the  army 
of  the  United  Colonies  on  June  15,  1775,  At  this  time  the 
British  forces  occupied  Boston  and  the  skirmishes  at  Concord 
and  Lexington  had  taken  place.  On  June  17  the  bloody  bat- 
tle of  Bunker  Hill  was  fought. 

Washington  arrived  at  Cambridge,  just  outside  Boston,  on 
July  3,  and  took  command.  He  had  about  17,200  men  pres- 
ent for  duty,  whose  only  military  training  had  been  in  shoot- 
ing and  whose  terms  of  enlistment  would  expire  within  six 
months.  Washington  organized  this  motley  group,  expecting 
attack  at  almost  any  moment  by  the  British  under  General 
Howe,  who  ought  to  have  attacked  him  but  did  not.  Finally, 
on  March  4,  after  he  had  organized  a  new  army,  and  brought 
heavy  cannon  through  the  snow  from  Ticonderoga,  and  some 
privateers  had  captured  a  considerable  amount  of  gunpowder, 
and  his  fortifications  were  sufficiently  complete  to  furnish 
rallying  points  in  case  of  defeat,  he  took  the  offensive.  He 
did  this  by  seizing  and  fortifying  Dorchester  Heights,  on  the 
mainland  of  Massachusetts  about  two  miles  south  of  Boston, 
from  which  he  could  command  by  guns  the  whole  of  Boston 
and  the  channel  south  of  it.  General  Howe,  who  was  then  in 
command  of  the  British  forces,  should  have  prevented  this, 
but  he  did  not;  but  after  the  Heights  had  been  fortified  he 
endeavored  to  capture  them.  Being  unsuccessful  in  this,  he 
evacuated  Boston,  taking  his  army  of  about  11,000  soldiers 
and  seamen  to  Halifax.     He  left  behind  a  great  amount  of 

191 


192  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

supplies  and  military  stores,  without  even  endeavoring  to  de- 
stroy them.  Washington  occupied  Boston  at  once,  but  in 
three  v^eeks  set  out  for  New  York,  to  which  he  had  already 
sent  a  considerable  part  of  his  army. 

The  British  Parliament  now  realized  the  necessity  of  send- 
ing a  greater  force  to  America,  and  provided  for  an  addi- 
tional 12,000  seamen  and  an  army  of  55,000  men.  Many  of 
these  were  mercenaries,  of  whom  about  sixty  per  cent,  were 
hired  from  Hesse:  from  this  circumstanjce  the  mercenaries 
were  called  Hessrans. 

The  British  realized  the  strategic  value  of  New  York,  due 
mainly  to  the  fact  that  the  broad  Hudson  River  separated 
New  England  from  New  York  and  the  rest  of  the  country, 
and  they  decided,  therefore,  to  capture  that  city  and  seize 
and  hold  the  Hudson.  They  did  not  follow  this  plan  as 
closely  as  they  should  have  done,  however,  but  allowed  them- 
selves to  be  diverted  to  side  issues,  especially  in  South  Caro- 
lina, which  had  the  usual  effect  of  accomplishing  nothing 
important,  and  handicapping  the  m-ain  operations.  Washing- 
ton also  realized  the  strategic  importance  of  New  York,  and 
endeavored  to  defend  it.  He  built  a  number  of  small  bat- 
teries at  salient  points  on  the  North  and  East  rivers ;  but,  be- 
cause of  the  small  number  of  his  total  force,  he  concentrated 
his  main  defense  in  an  intrenched  camp  on  Brooklyn  Heights. 

The  first  squadron  of  the  British  fleet,  coming  from  Halifax 
and  comprising  about  32,000  troops,  landed  on  Staten  Island 
in  July  and  early  August.  The  menace  was  great,  since  the 
British  commanded  all  the  water  and  could  land  wherever 
they  pleased;  while  Washington's  force  was  too  small,  the  dis- 
tances too  great,  and  his  means  of  getting  information  too 
poor  to  enable  him  to  oppose  any  effective  resistance  at  any 
landing  point.  On  August  22  Howe  landed  20,000  men  and 
forty  pieces  of  artillery  on  the  beach  of  Gravesend  Bay,  near 
the  present  Coney  Island,  about  eight  miles  south  of  the 
American  camp. 

Washington   reinforced  the  Americans   as  best  he  could. 


WASHINGTON  193 

Unwisely,  the  Americans,  instead  of  remaining  within  the 
protection  of  their  intrenchments  or  of  retreating  promptly, 
advanced  into  the  open.  Howe  made  a  feint  by  advancing 
along  the  west  shore  line  of  Long  Island,  but  sent  a  large 
flanking  force  by  night  to  the  eastward  as  far  as  Jamaica 
Pass,  which  then  turned  to  westward  on  the  morning  of 
August  27,  and  advanced  so  rapidly  that  it  got  behind  the 
American  lines  outside  of  their  camp.  Considerable  fighting 
followed,  which  resulted  in  the  retreat  of  the  Americans.  The 
British  do  not  seem  to  have  followed  them  very  energetically, 
with  the  result  that  most  of  the  Americans  got  back  into  their 
camp.  Why  Howe  did  not  attack  them  at  once  is  a  matter 
for  surprise;  for  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  a  determined  attack 
with  the  forces  he  had  available  could  have  failed  to  bring 
about  disaster  to  the  Americans.  Instead,  Howe  prepared  for 
a  siege;  with  the  result  that  Washington  made  a  retreat,  in 
the  night  of  August  29  and  30,  which  for  skill  and  daring  and 
success  has  sJdom  been  surpassed. 

He  landed  his  troops  on  the  east  side  of  Manhattan  Island, 
near  what  is  now  Fulton  Street,  and  disposed  them  as  best  he 
could,  expecting  that  the  British  would  attack,  landing  some- 
where on  the  long  water-front.  They  landed  on  September 
15,  near  what  is  now  East  34th  Street,  and  rapidly  drove  the 
Americans  back  to  the  westward  and  thence  to  the  northward, 
despite  the  passionate  endeavors  of  Washington  to  make  them 
stand.  By  dark  that  night,  his  forces  had  fled  to  positions  on 
Harlem  Heights  north  of  the  ' '  Hollow  Way, ' '  near  the  129th 
Street  of  to-day,  while  the  British  confronted  them  on  lines 
facing  north  in  the  neighborhood  of  what  is  now  100th  Street. 
Washington  wrote  to  Congress  the  next  morning  of  the  **  dis- 
graceful and  dastardly  retreat"  of  his  men. 

He  occupied  a  position  that  was  very  strong  against  assault, 
but  that  could  easily  be  surrounded  by  a  large  force.  Howe 
endeavored  to  surround  it.  He  did  not  succeed;  but,  in  order 
to  prevent  it,  Washington  had  to  move  to  the  northward. 
Because,  however,  of  a  foolish  resolution  of  Congress,  he  did 


194  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

not  withdraw  the  garrison  from  Fort  Washington.  Howe 
then  succeeded,  on  November  16,  in  surrounding  and  captur- 
ing the  fort  and  its  garrison — a  terrible  calamity  to  the 
Americans.  Meanwhile  Washington  had  gone  to  White 
Plains,  and  there  received  an  assault  from  Howe,  which  was 
only  partially  successful  on  the  first  day,  but  which  would 
undoubtedly  have  been  successful  the  following  day,  after 
Howe  had  received  a  reinforcement  that  brought  his  strength 
up  to  20,000  men,  had  not  a  storm  delayed  the  attack.  Under 
cover  of  the  storm  Washington  withdrew  five  miles  to  a 
strong  position  at  North  Castle.     Howe  did  not  follow. 

Washington  joined  General  Greene  at  Fort  Lee,  which  was 
on  the  west  side  of  the  Hudson,  opposite  Fort  Washington,  at 
the  time  when  Fort  Washington  was  attacked,  and  with  him 
retreated  to  Newark.  Thence  he  retreated  to  Brunswick, 
thence  to  Trenton  on  the  Delaware  River,  and  thence  to  a 
position  on  the  opposite  shore.  He  had  ordered  General  Lee, 
then  at  White  Plains,  to  cross  the  Hudson  and  join  him ;  but 
Lee  was  excessively  dilatory  in  doing  this,  and  was  finally 
taken  prisoner.  Washington's  force  was  now  reduced  to 
3000  men,  whose  enlistments  would  expire  during  that  month 
(December),  and  Howe  had  30,000  regular  troops  with  which 
to  capture  and  destroy  him.  Instead  of  attempting  this  at 
once,  as  any  competent  strategist  would  have  done,  he  went 
into  winter  quarters  in  New  York,  and  sent  6000  troops  and 
a  large  part  of  the  navy  to  Newport,  to  carry  on  eccentric 
operations  in  New  England ! 

But  Washington's  day  of  ruin  did  not  seem  far  away.  It 
was  averted  by  the  same  agency  that  contributed  to  the  vic- 
tories of  Csesar  and  Alexander,  the  personal  genius  of  the 
man  in  command.  Washington,  with  a  discouraged,  half 
ragged,  underfed,  and  untrained  handful  of  men,  crossed  the 
Delaware  on  Christmas  night,  forced  his  way  through  floating 
ice,  fell  on  the  camp  of  the  Hessians  at  Trenton  with  a  vio- 
lence, a  suddenness,  and  a  success  that  are  unsurpassed  in 
history,  and  changed  the  aspect  of  the  situation  almost  in  a 


WASHINGTON  195 

moment.  Comwallis  advanced  at  once  against  Washington; 
but  again  Washington  displayed  that  amazing  celerity  and 
force  which  in  supreme  emergency  marks  the  great  com- 
mander. By  dint  of  personal  courage,  ability  to  inspire,  tre- 
mendous exertion,  and  wise  direction,  he  succeeded  in  eluding 
the  greatly  superior  force  in  the  night-time,  and,  reaching  the 
vicinity  of  Princeton  in  safety,  defeating  in  a  skirmish  on  the 
wa}'  a  British  force  that  intercepted  him.  He  then  went  into 
winter  quarters  at  Morristown. 

Washington  expected  throughout  the  winter  that  Howe 
would  attack  him  then  or  in  the  spring,  which  he  certainly 
should  have  done,  but  did  not  do.  In  the  month  of  July,  1777, 
Howe  embarked  his  men  in  transports  and  sailed  from  New 
York  for  Delaware  Bay.  But,  after  remaining  there  a  day,  he 
sailed  for  the  Chesapeake.  On  August  25  he  landed  at  the 
northern  end  of  the  bay,  and  then  moved  northeast  with  the 
evident  intention  of  attacking  Philadelphia.  Washington 
was  at  hand,  and  a  battle  took  place  on  September  11,  near 
the  Brandywine,  on  Howe's  line  of  march  to  Philadelphia, 
which  seems  to  have  been  fought  against  Washington's  better 
judgment  as  a  militar}^  man,  but  which  he  feared  to  evade  on 
account  of  the  effect  of  such  an  act  upon  the  people.  The 
British  had  the  superior  force  and  defeated  the  Americans. 
After  a  few  unsuccessful  manoeuvers,  made  with  the  intention 
of  catching  Washington  at  a  disadvantage,  Howe  took  posses- 
sion of  Philadelphia. 

There  have  been  several  reasons  given  why  Howe  took  such 
a  roundabout  method  of  getting  to  Philadelphia.  One  of 
them  is  that  he  had  received'  information  from  General 
Charles  Lee,  whom  he  had  taken  prisoner  and  who  had  there- 
upon turned  traitor,  that  there  was  such  a  strong  Tory  senti- 
ment in  Pennsylvania  and  IMaryland  that  his  best  line  of  at- 
tack on  Philadelphia  would  be  by  way  of  the  Chesapeake. 
This  reason  does  not  seem  verj^  good,  if  one  considers  all  the 
circumstances;  but  many  of  the  reasons  given  for  many  of 
General  Howe's  actions  do  not  seem  very  good  from  the  point 


196 


THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 


of  view  of  strategy.  The  fact  probably  is  that  General  Howe 
was  ail  excoodingly  poor  strategist,  and  that  Washington  was 
an  exceedingly  good  one.     No  other  reason  seems  sufficient  to 


Washington's  movements  in  1776. 

explain 'how  the  successes  of  Washington  could  possibly  have 
been  achieved,  against  troops  so  much  supej*ior  in  number,  so 
much  better  equipped  and  so  much  more  highly  trained. 

General  Howe,  after  reducing  some  of  the  forts  in  the  vicin- 
ity with  the  aid  of  his  brother,  Lord  Howe,  who  was  in  com- 
mand of  the  British  fleet,  went  into  comfortable  winter  quar- 
ters at  Philadelphia.  Washington  and  his  soldiers  went  into 
winter  quarters  at  Valley  Forge,  twenty-one  miles  away. 
There  conditions  were  so  bad  that  the  army  could  not  have  sur~ 


WASHINGTON  197 

vived  as  an  army,  unless  led  and  inspired  by  a  man  like 
Waiihinglon. 

Meanwhile,  a  campaign  marked  by  amazing  mismanagement 
by  the  British  had  been  carried  on  in  the  middle  of  New  York 
State.  The  British  government,  apparently  without  consult- 
ing with  General  Howe,  and  on  the  advice  of  one  of  his  sub- 
ordinates. General  Burgoyne,  then  on  leave  in  England,  had 
directed  a  double  expedition,  one  to  go  from  Oswego  down 
the  Mohawk  Valley,  and  the  other  from  Montreal  down  Lake 
Champlain  and  the  Hudson,  the  two  forces  to  meet  at  Albany. 
General  Howe  was  to  join  them,  marching  from  New  York; 
but  no  instructions  were  sent  him  to  that  effect.  Few  better 
illustrations  are  given  in  history  of  the  folly  of  endeavoring 
to  manage  military  campaigns  from  an  office  in  a  ministry. 

Howe  did  not  go  up  the  Hudson  to  Albany.  The  force  that 
went  to  Oswego,  and  thence  started  for  Albany,  was  brought 
to  battle  and  defeated,  and  never  reached  Albany.  Bur- 
goyne's  force,  which  came  down  Lake  Champlain  and  the 
Hudson,  soon  found  itself  in  great  difficulties  for  lack  of 
supplies.  Sir  Henrj^  Clinton,  whom  Howe  had  left  in  com- 
mand at  New  York,  went  up  the  Hudson  in  October  with 
about  3000  men,  convoyed  by  several  ships  of  war,  in  con- 
formity with  some  rather  vague  instructions  he  had  received 
from  Howe.  Instead  of  going  at  once  to  Burgoyne 's  assist- 
ance, however,  he  accomplished  a  few  minor  successes,  and 
then  returned  to  New  York,  although  he  knew  that  Burgoyne 
was  in  desperate  straits.  Burgoyne,  after  being  defeated  at 
Bennington  and  Saratoga,  finally  surrendered  on  October  17, 
1777. 

Burgoyne 's  expedition  was  strategically  unwise.  It  was 
decided  on  by  the  king,  in  preference  to  another  plan,  which 
was  the  one  that  Washington  naturally  expected  to  be  carried 
out — that  of  concentrating  most  of  the  British  forces  in  New 
York  and  with  them  crushing  Washington's  forces.  This 
campaign  furnishes  one  illustration,  out  of  many  in  history, 
of  the  tendency  of  poor  strategists  to  devise  complicated  plans 


198  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

instead  of  simple  ones;  of  a  forgetfulness  of  one  of  the  ele- 
mentary principles  of  strategy,  which  anyone  can  see  being 
carried  into  practice  in  the  next  fist  fight  he  witnesses,  and 
colloquially  expressed  in  the  phrase  "hit  liim  first  and 
hardest." 

Washington's  winter  quarters  at  Valley  Forge,  which  he 
occupied  from  December,  1777,  till  June,  1778,  were  only  six- 
teen miles  by  road  from  Howe's  outposts  at  Germantown. 
Washington  had  about  15,000  men,  of  whom  about  12,000 
were  at  Valley  Forge,  and  Howe  had  19,500  at  Philadelphia 
and  10,400  at  New  York — about  30,000  available  troops;  and 
yet,  Howe  did  not  molest  Washington  during  the  entire  six 
months!  Washington  improved  the  opportunity  strenuously, 
devotedly,  passionately.  In  spite  of  the  almost  criminal  neg- 
ligence of  Congress,  and  the  actually  treasonable  conduct  of 
some  Congressmen  and  others,  despite  difficulties  of  all  pos- 
sible kinds,  which  we  need  not  enumerate  here,  Washington 
succeeded  in  putting  into  the  field  in  June  a  well  disciplined 
and  efficient  force.  Possibly  not  even  Washington  could  have 
accomplished  this  if  he  had  not  been  assisted  by  the  German 
General  Steuben,  who  joined  him  as  a  volunteer  and  was  later 
made  Inspector  General.  Steuben  was  a  thoroughly  compe- 
tent accountant,  tactician,  and  drill-master,  having  learned 
those  arts  on  the  personal  staff  of  Frederick  the  Great. 

The  surrender  of  Burgoyne  and  Washington's  masterly 
battles  near  Philadelphia  gave  the  French  such  confidence  in 
the  cause  of  the  Americans  that  they  made  an  alliance  with 
them  in  the  spring  of  1778.  This  alliance  proved  to  be  of 
such  value  as  to  warrant  the  statement  that  without  it  the 
Americans  would  have  failed. 

Another  important  factor  that  contributed  no  less  to  their 
success  was  the  very  bad  strategy  of  the  British,  who,  after 
Burgoyne 's  surrender,  abandoned  the  offensive  in  America, 
divided  their  forces,  and  even  sent  part  of  it  out  of  the  United 
States  to  the  West  Indies.  To  initiate  the  change  in  plan, 
Philadelphia  was  to  be  evacuated  and  the  troops  there  sent  to 


WASHINGTON  199 

New  York.  In  pursuance  of  this  plan,  Clinton,  who  had  re- 
lieved Howe,  began  to  make  preparations  for  evacuating  Phil- 
adelphia at  the  beginning  of  June.  Washington  had  organ- 
ized an  excellent  intelligence  department,  and  was  thereby  in- 
formed continually  of  the  doings  of  the  enemy.  He  therefore 
took  measures  to  march  out  of  Valley  Forge  when  the  appro- 
priate moment  should  come,  keep  in  touch  with  the  enemy, 
and  precipitate  a  battle  as  soon  as  a  favorable  opportunity 
could  be  found. 

Clinton  left  Philadelphia  on  June  18,  crossed  the  Delaware, 
and  marched  to  the  eastward  about  five  miles.  Early  that 
afternoon,  six  American  brigades  marched  out  of  Valley 
Forge,  followed  at  five  o'clock  the  following  morning  by 
Washington  with  the  rest  of  his  army.  The  weather  was  in- 
tensely hot.  The  two  armies  advanced  in  a  direction  approxi- 
mately northeast.  Clinton  at  the  end  of  the  sixth  day  had 
marched  only  thirty-four  miles,  while  Washington  had 
marched  forty-seven  miles  and  was  almost  directly  ahead  of 
him.  So  Clinton  moved  off  to  the  right,  putting  all  of  his 
baggage  train  ahead.  At  this  time  and  afterward  he  was 
forced  to  move  his  army  on  one  road  only,  so  that  his  total 
column  was  more  than  twelve  miles  long.  His  force  arrived 
at  Monmouth  on  June  26,  and  took  up  a  strong  position  there 
and  rested  for  a  day.  At  the  close  of  June  27,  Lee  and 
Lafayette  (Lee  in  command),  with  the  advance  guard  of  5000 
men,  were  five  miles  westward,  and  Washington  with  6000  was 
about  five  miles  west  of  Lee. 

Since  Clinton  was  approaching  broken  eountrj^,  where  it 
would  be  easy  for  him  to  get  defensible  positions,  AVashington 
told  Lee  that  evening  to  be  ready  to  attack  early  the  following 
morning.  Clinton  started  early,  whereupon  Washington  or- 
dered Lee  to  attack.  Lee  moved  forward  toward  Clinton's 
rear,  but  in  a  leisurely  fashion,  delivered  a  half-hearted  at- 
tack, and  then  ordered  a  retreat.  This  had  such  a  bad  effect 
on  his  men  that  a  disorderly  rout  ensued.  At  this  time  Wash- 
ington was  advancing  with  the  main  body  behind  Lee.     Gal- 


200  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

loping  ahead,  he  met  the  fugitives,  whose  morale  was  utterly- 
broken  down.  Then  the  "Washington  of  history  seized  those 
terrified  and  wildly  fleeing  men,  wheeled  them  about,  and 
formed  them  in  a  line  that  stubbornly  defied  and  successfully 
held  back  their  late  pursuers.  No  finer  example  of  the  power 
of  a  passionate  and  impetuous  leader  of  men  can  be  found  in 
history.  He  established  his  line  quickly,  but  with  calm 
strategic  judgment,  between  two  swamps  that  protected  both 
his  flanks. 

Clinton,  meanwhile,  had  turned  back  with  his  main  force. 
The  so-called  battle  of  Monmouth  then  ensued.  This  battle 
was  fought  in  a  terrible  heat  until  nightfall;  and  then  both 
sides  took  up  positions  confronting  each  other.  At  daybreak 
the  British  had  disappeared  in  retreat,  although  they  were 
superior  in  number.  They  retreated  quickly  to  Sandy  Hook, 
where  Admiral  Lord  Howe  embarked  them,  and  whence  he 
transported  them  to  New  York. 

On  July  8  (1778)  Rear  Admiral  Comte  d'Estaing  arrived 
in  command  of  a  French  fleet  with  4000  soldiers  at  Delaware 
Bay;  but  he  sailed  almost  immediately  to  the  northward,  and 
anchored  in  the  ocean  just  outside  of  Sandy  Hook.  The 
British  Admiral  Lord  Howe  was  behind  the  bar  and  inside 
the  hook,  with  nine  ships  of  the  line  to  d'Estaing 's  twelve, 
and  534  guns  to  his  834.  D'Estaing  remained  there  eleven 
days,  but  could  not  pluck  up  courage  to  brave  the  perils  of 
the  bar  and  attack  Lord  Howe  besides.  As  it  had  been  ar- 
ranged between  Washington  and  d'Estaing  that  at  a  juncture 
like  this  a  combined  land  and  naval  attack  should  be  made 
against  Newport,  d'Estaing  went  there.  Shortly  afterward, 
the  energetic  Lord  Howe  appeared  outside  the  bay.  D'Es- 
taing went  out  to  give  him  battle;  but  a  tremendous  gale 
came  up,  which  did  such  serious  damage  that  Howe  returned 
to  New  York  and  d'Estaing  went  to  Boston  for  repairs. 

For  the  next  four  years  the  military  operations  in  the  north 
were  carried  on  in  an  excessively  half-hearted  manner  by  the 


WASHINGTON  201 

British,  and  so  nothing  occurred  that  influenced  materially 
the  outcome  of  the  war.  This  was  most  fortunate  for  the 
Americans,  because  Washington  could  only  with  difficulty 
keep  the  army  paid  and  fed,  and  was  hardly  able,  therefore, 
to  maintain  it  in  any  discipline  whatever,  even  under  the 
comparatively  easy  conditions  that  the  inaction  of  the  British 
permitted  to  exist. 

The  British  abandoned  Newport  in  October,  1779,  and 
Cornwallis  arrived  later  at  New  York  with  reinforcements; 
so  that  in  December  the  British  garrison  numbered  nearly 
29,000.  Washington  had  between  10,000  and  11,000,  and  yet 
Clinton  did  not  attack  him !  Instead  he  sent  a  large  part  of 
his  force  away,  to  carry  on  operations  that  were  strategically 
unimportant  in  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas. 

For  a  long  while  the  French  alliance  seemed  to  be  of  little 
assistance,  D'Estaing,  after  completing  repairs  on  his  ships 
at  Boston,  went  to  the  West  Indies;  and  then,  instead  of  re- 
turning north,  as  Washington  implored  him,  he  became  in- 
volved in  a  siege  of  Savannah  in  which  he  was  repulsed,  and 
after  which  (October,  1779)  he  sailed  away  to  France.  Dur- 
ing the  entire  year  1779  Washington  had  been  exerting  him- 
self to  concentrate  a  large  force  at  New  York,  insisting  that  if 
the  French  would  secure  the  command  of  the  sea  there,  and 
land  a  few  troops,  he  could  bring  25,000  effective  men,  cap- 
ture New  York,  and  end  the  war.  Washington  was  right,  of 
course ;  but  during  the  entire  war  he,  and  next  to  him  General 
Greene,  seem  to  have  been  almost  the  only  men  who  could  be 
depended  on  to  be  right  in  strategic  matters. 

In  July,  1780,  another  French  fleet,  consisting  of  seven 
ships  of  the  line,  arrived,  bringing  6000  troops  commanded 
by  Rochambeau.  This  fleet  anchored  at  Newport.  Washing- 
ton now  thought  he  saw  an  opportunity  for  an  attack  on  New 
York,  and  he  pushed  his  preparations  rapidly.  But  his 
hopes  were  killed  almost  immediately  by  the  arrival  of  six 
British  ships  under  Admiral  Graves,  which  made  the  com- 


202  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

bined  British  fleet  under  Admiral  Arbuthnot  superior  to  the 
Frencli.  The  British  fleet  now  blockaded  the  French  forces 
in  Newport. 

At  this  time  the  Revolution  almost  came  to  a  full  stop  from 
lack  of  money  and  supplies.  A  determined  mutiny  soon  fol- 
lowed, caused  mainly  by  the  fact  that  the  soldiers  had  not 
been  paid  for  a  year  and  were  insufficiently  fed  and  clothed. 
It  was  finally  repressed,  but  only  by  dint  of  all  the  force  and 
persuasion  that  Washington  could  exert.  Colonel  Laurens 
was  now  sent  to  France,  under  instructions  from  Washington 
to  try  to  get  some  money.  He  succeeded  not  only  in  getting 
money,  but  in  having  the  French  fleet  sent  from  the  West 
Indies  to  Yorktown.  It  was  this  French  fleet  that  finally 
enabled  Washington  to  end  the  war  with  victory. 

Meanwhile  the  British  had  been  frittering  away  irretriev- 
able time  in  operations  in  the  South,  under  the  mistaken 
strategic  notion  that  their  mission  was  to  secure  territory, 
whereas  it  really  was  to  destroy  Washington's  armed  force. 
These  operations  were  in  the  main  successful,  though  not  im- 
portant for  victory  in  the  war.  The  most  important  of  the 
earlier  expeditions  resulted  in  the  capture  of  Savannah  in 
December,  1778,  and  the  ensuing  conquest  of  the  State  of 
Georgia. 

A  year  later  Clinton  himself  headed  a  large  expedition  to 
complete  the  conquest  of  the  South.  He  arrived  off  Charles- 
ton in  February,  1780,  and  received  the  surrender  of  the  city 
on  May  12.  After  some  further  operations,  designed  to  se- 
cure the  conquest  of  all  South  Carolina,  Clinton  returned  to 
New  York,  leaving  Comwallis  in  command  in  the  South  with 
about  8400  men. 

Cornwallis  soon  started  on  a  march  to  the  Northwest.  On 
August  16  he  fought  at  Camden,  South  Carolina,  an  Ameri- 
can force  under  General  Gates,  and  almost  destroyed  it.  The 
main  reason  for  the  disaster  was  that  Gates,  while  an  adroit 
and  unscrupulous  politician,  was  a  bad  strategist. 

Congress  now  allowed  Washington  to  appoint  a  commander 


WASHINGTON  203 

in  Gates's  place.  Washington  showed  his  good  judgment  by 
appointing  Greene.  A  long  series  of  operations  now  ensued 
between  Greene  on  one  side  and  Cornwallis  on  the  other,  which 
were  conducted  by  Greene  with  great  skill  and  tremendous 
energy,  and  by  Cornwallis  with  little  skill  and  almost  no 
energy  whatever.  Affairs  came  to  a  climax  in  a  battle  at 
Guilford,  North  Carolina,  on  March  15,  1781,  in  which 
Greene  suffered  a  tactical  defeat  but  won  a  strategic  victory ; 
because  he  forced  Cornwallis  to  abandon  the  offensive  and 
resort  to  the  defensive.  This  Cornwallis  did  by  retreating  to 
Wilmington,  North  Carolina. 

Cornwallis  now  found  himself  in  an  extremely  embarrass- 
ing position,  far  from  his  base  of  supplies,  and  unable  to  get 
definite  instructions  from  either  Clinton  or  the  Colonial  Sec- 
retary in  England,  both  of  whom  were  writing  to  him  letters 
that  only  embarrassed  him.  Finally,  Cornwallis  decided  to 
march  north  into  Virginia,  to  carry  on  operations  there,  where 
he  thought  he  saw  an  opportunity  to  destroy  Lafayette,  who 
commanded  a  force  much  inferior  to  his  own.  This  was 
probably  a  good  plan ;  but  he  carried  it  out  with  such  lack  of 
celerity,  while  Lafayette  carried  on  his  own  operations  with 
such  extreme  celerity,  that  Cornwallis  failed  altogether  to 
accomplish  his  intention.  At  last,  in  July,  he  received  an 
order  from  Clinton,  revoking  a  previous  order  and  directing 
him  to  keep  all  his  troops  with  him,  and  occupy  Old  Point 
Comfort,  as  a  support  for  the  fleet  that  was  to  be  sent  to 
Hampton  Roads.  Instead  of  occupying  Old  Point  Comfort, 
Cornwallis  occupied  Yorktown,  which  was  probably  a  more 
suitable  locality. 

Meanwhile  Washington  was  bending  every  energy,  with  the 
small  force  he  had  after  sending  the  necessary  forces  to 
Greene,  to  secure  the  cooperation  of  the  French  in  the  attack 
on  New  York  on  which  he  had  set  his  heart.  When  he  re- 
ceived the  information  that  a  French  fleet  was  to  be  sent  from 
the  West  Indies  to  the  American  coast,  he  went  at  once  to 
Wethersfield,   Connecticut,   met   Rochambeau,   and  perfected 


204  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

with  him  the  details  of  the  attack.  At  the  same  time  he  sent 
most  urgent  requests  to  the  New  England  Governors  to  fill 
up  their  regiments,  if  only  for  one  season.  He  also  wrote  to 
de  Grasse,  urgently  requesting  him  to  bring  troops  as  well  as 
ships  from  the  West  Indies,  and  to  come  to  New  York,  stop- 
ping on  his  way  at  the  Chesapeake. 

In  accordance  with  his  plan,  the  French  army  left  Newport, 
and  Washington  met  them  with  his  army  near  Dobbs  Ferry. 
He  then  made  a  careful  reconnaissance  of  the  fortifications  of 
Manhattan  Island,  and  came  to  the  conclusion  that  they  were 
too  strong  to  be  successfully  attacked  with  the  force  he  then 
commanded,  being  held  as  they  were  by  about  14,000  effective 
troops.  Like  all  good  strategists,  however,  Washington  had 
an  alternative  plan;  and  he  held  both  plans  in  reserve  until 
he  got  more  definite  information  from  de  Grasse.  In  the 
middle  of  August  he  received  word  from  de  Grasse  that  he 
would  sail  north  on  August  13  with  twenty-nine  vessels  of 
war,  three  regiments  of  1000  men  each,  100  dragoons,  lOO 
artillerymen,  ten  field  pieces,  and  several  siege  cannon  and 
mortars;  that  he  would  go  directly  to  the  Chesapeake;  and 
that  he  would  sail  from  there  for  the  West  Indies  on  Octo- 
ber 15. 

There  was  no  time  to  be  lost.  Washington  did  not  lose  a 
second.  He  resolved  instantly  to  march  to  the  Chesapeake 
and  meet  de  Grasse  with  all  of  his  available  force,  and  crush 
Cornwallis.  He  gave  orders  to  Lafayette  to  prevent  Corn- 
wallis  from  getting  away;  he  directed  General  Heath  to  take 
command  of  a  certain  force  that  he  would  leave  in  the  North ; 
and  he  sent  despatches  to  de  Grasse,  telling  him  what  he 
wished  to  do,  and  requesting  him  to  send  suitable  vessels  to 
the  northern  end  of  Chesapeake  Bay,  to  transport  American 
troops  to  the  vicinity  of  Yorktown.  On  August  21  he  crossed 
the  Hudson  River,  and  began  a  march  behind  the  Palisades 
to  Newark  and  New  Brunswick,  and  thence  to  the  northern 
end  of  Chesapeake  Bay.  He  carried  out  his  movements  so 
skilfully  and  rapidly  that  most  of  his  troops  had  reached  Phil- 


WASHINGTON  205 

adelphia  before  Clinton  knew  that  he  had  left  the  vicinity  of 
New  York.  Evidently  Clinton  had  a  very  poor  intelligence 
department. 

Washington  was  taking  a  tremendous  risk;  but  he  knew 
Clinton,  and  knew  that  the  risk  was  justified.  Clinton  had 
more  than  16,000  men,  and  yet  he  let  Washington  get  away. 
The  fact  that  Clinton  was  so  inactive  does  not  in  the  least  de- 
tract from  the  merit  of  Washington's  brilliant  and  daring 
move ;  for  every  strategist  makes  his  plans  according  to  the 
situation  as  he  estimates  it,  and  the  character  of  Clinton  was 
the  most  important  single  factor  in  the  situation  of  which 
Washington  made  his  estimate.  Washington  estimated  the 
situation  correctly,  as  he  usually  did.  He  then  made  the  cor- 
rect decision,  as  he  usually  did.  He  then  acted  on  his  decision 
with  energy,  daring,  and  skill,  as  he  usually  did. 

It  was  an  essential  part  of  Washington's  plan,  of  course, 
that  the  French  should  have  command  of  the  sea  for  a  time 
long  enough  to  enable  him  to  concentrate  all  his  forces  on 
Cornwallis.  By  this  time  he  knew  that  de  Grasse  was  a  com- 
petent strategist  instead  of  an  incompetent  one,  like  d'Estaing; 
and  he  included  this  factor  in  his  estimate  of  the  situation, 
his  consequent  decision,  and  his  consequent  action.  He  con- 
cluded that  he  could  rely  upon  de  Grasse,  and,  as  usual,  his 
conclusion  was  correct.  De  Grasse  arrived  at  Chesapeake  Bay 
on  August  30,  and  at  once  sent  the  troops  up  the  James  River, 
where  they  joined  Lafayette.  On  the  same  day  that  they 
landed,  a  British  fleet  came  within  sight  of  Cape  Henry,  and 
de  Grasse  went  out  to  meet  it.  A  battle  was  then  fought 
which,  while  not  decisive  tactically,  was  decisive  strategically ; 
because  the  French  fleet  inflicted  so  much  damage  on  the  Brit- 
ish as  to  force  it  to  go  to  New  York  for  repairs,  and  leave  the 
French  in  command  of  the  sea.  The  first  result  of  this  was 
that  the  French  admiral,  de  Barras,  with  a  small  squadron, 
was  able  to  bring  into  the  Chesapeake  some  reinforcements 
from  Newport  and  a  large  train  of  siege  artillery'. 

Clinton  realized,  as  soon  as  he  heard  that  de  Grasse  was  in 


206  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

the  Chesapeake,  that  Washington  had  outgeneraled  him  and 
would  capture  Cornwallis  unless  he,  Clinton,  could  reinforce 
Cornwallis  sufficiently  and  in  time.  He  therefore  embarked 
4000  men  on  transports.  But  he  could  not  send  these  safely, 
because  the  British  fleet  were  under  repairs  and  could  not 
furnish  a  convoy.  When  this  convoy  was  ready,  on  October 
19,  Clinton  sailed  With  7000  men;  but,  as  often  happened  to 
Clinton,  he  was  too  late.  The  allied  army,  under  Washington 
as  commander-in-chief  and  Rochambeau  under  his  orders,  had 
arrived  in  the  vicinity  of  Yorktown  in  the  middle  of  Septem- 
ber. They  numbered  in  all  about  16,600  men,  while  Corn- 
wallis had  less  than  8000,  and  besides  this,  the  allies  were 
much  superior  in  siege  artillery.  The  natural  result  fol- 
lowed. Cornwallis  surrendered  on  October  19,  1781.  This 
act  virtually  ended  the  war,  though  the  definitive  treaty  of 
peace  was  not  signed  until  September  3,  1783. 

This  war,  like  most  wars  in  which  a  force  inferior  in  num- 
bers and  resources  triumphs  over  a  superior  force,  was  marked 
with  great  energy  and  skill  on  one  side,  and  great  lack  of 
energy  and  skill  on  the  other  side.  It  seemed  almost  impos- 
sible that  the  Colonies  could  triumph  under  the  conditions, 
and  yet  they  did.  The  fact  that  England  was  so  threatened 
by  war  in  Europe  that  she  could  not  send  to  America  as  large 
a  force  as  she  otherwise  would  have  done  does  not  furnish  an 
adequate  explanation,  because  the  force  that  she  did  send  was 
enormously  superior  in  numbers,  training,  and  equipment  to 
the  American  force.  If  one  analyzes  the  reasons  for  the  Brit- 
ish failure,  and  traces  events  to  their  causes,  he  will  see  that 
the  main  cause  was  that  the  British  operations  in  America 
were  directed  by  the  Colonial  Secretary,  who  was  in  turn  di- 
rected by  the  king, — both  the  Colonial  Secretary  and  the  king 
being  exceedingly  poor  strategists, — while  opposed  to  them 
was  Washington,  one  of  the  greatest  strategists  of  history. 

Like  Csesar  and  Frederick,  Washington  devoted  his  declin- 
ing years  to  the  tasks  of  statesmanship.  Like  Csesar  and 
Frederick,  he  was  as  fine  in  statesmanship  as  he  was  in  strat- 


WASHINGTON  207 

egy.  It  has  been  the  fashion  in  America,  in  speaking  of 
Washington,  to  concentrate  the  attention  of  the  people  on 
President  Washington  and  to  ignore  General  Washington. 
That  this  has  been  intentional  there  can  be  no  doubt;  and 
that  it  has  been  a  part  of  the  general  pacifist  movement  there 
can  also  be  no  doubt.  It  and  the  whole  pacifist  movement 
seem  to  be  because  of  a  curious  trait  in  human  nature  which 
leads  successful  people  and  successful  nations  to  ignore  the 
causes  of  their  success;  which  leads  rich  families,  for  in- 
stance, to  keep  persistently  in  the  background  the  means  by 
which  the  family  money  was  acquired. 

The  independence  of  the  United  States  was  gained  by  mili- 
tary force,  guided  by  the  strategy  of  George  Washington. 
That  the  subsequent  statesmanship  of  Washington  was  fine 
there  can  be  no  doubt.  But  there  can  also  be  no  doubt  that 
the  task  of  Washington  as  President  was  immeasurably  easier 
than  his  task  as  general.  As  President,  he  lived  at  ease  in 
the  absolute  security  and  the  comparative  luxury  of  the  presi- 
dential mansion,  with  assured  rest  at  night,  regular  and  suf- 
ficient meals,  assisted  by  the  organization  of  an  established 
government  and  the  resources  of  a  prosperous  nation.  As 
general,  he  had  to  oppose  treachery,  negligence,  and  disaffec- 
tion in  Congress,  and  among  great  numbers  of  the  people ;  and 
amid  the  continual  dangers  of  war  to  direct  and  force  to 
action  a  ragged,  half  fed,  and  half  trained  army,  by  day  and 
by  night,  in  heat  and  in  cold,  in  mud  and  rain  and  storm  and 
snow,  for  five  destiny-deciding  years.  In  comparison  with 
this,  Washington's  career  as  President  was  like  a  vacation. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

NELSON 

ON  February  14,  1797,  a  British  fleet  of  fifteen  ships 
of  the  line,  commanded  by  Admiral  Sir  John  Jervis, 
was  sailing  on  a  course  a  little  west  of  south  in  col- 
umn of  battle  (that  is,  one  ship  behind  the  other)  on  the 
starboard  tack  (that  is,  with  the  wind  on  the  starboard  side). 
Ahead  and  a  little  on  their  starboard  side  was  a  Spanish  fleet 
of  eighteen  sail,  heading  toward  the  east  with  the  wind  astern, 
their  destination  being  Cadiz,  about  one  hundred  and  fifty 
miles  away ;  while  ahead  and  a  little  on  the  port  side  were  nine 
Spanish  ships  that  had  become  separated  from  the  eighteen. 
The  distance  between  the  two  parts  of  the  Spanish  fleet  was 
about  six  miles. 

Jervis  headed  his  column  between  the  two  parts  in  order  to 
keep  them  from  assisting  each  other,  and  with  the  purpose  of 
tacking  and  heading  to  the  northward  after  he  had  passed  be- 
tween, and  then  of  attacking  the  eighteen  ships.  These 
eighteen  ships  then  headed  to  the  north.  Jervis  headed  his 
column  to  the  north  as  soon  as  the  head  of  his  column  had 
passed  between  the  two  separated  parts  of  the  Spanish  fleet. 
The  third  ship  from  the  end  of  his  column  was  the  Captain, 
which  flew  the  broad  pennant  of  Commodore  Horatio  Nelson. 
When  Nelson's  ship  came  abreast  of  the  last  Spanish  ships 
in  the  main  body  of  eighteen  ships,  Nelson  noticed  that  the 
leading  ships  of  that  body,  which  had  previously  headed  to  the 
northward,  now  suddenly  headed  again  to  the  eastward,  with 
the  evident  intention  of  crossing  behind  the  British  column 
and  effecting  a  junction  with  the  other  nine  ships.  Without 
any  orders  (and  therefore  almost  contrary  to  orders),  Nelson 

208 


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From  Mahan's  "  Life  of  Nelson." 


By  permission  of  Little,  Brown  &  Company. 
209 


210  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

directed  the  Captain  to  "wear,"  and  thus  get  into  position 
ahead  of  those  Spanish  ships  and  prevent  them  from  making 
the  junction. 

By  this  time  the  head  of  the  British  column,  which  was 
now  heading  to  the  northward,  was  nearly  abreast  of  Nelson ; 
and  so  it  came  down  before  the  wind  at  once,  and  joined  him 
in  the  terribly  unequal  but  successful  combat  that  he  was 
waging.  About  the  same  time,  the  rear  ship  of  the  British 
column,  the  Excellent,  commanded  by  Collingwood  (the  great 
Collingwood  that  was  to  be),  obeyed  a  signal  to  do  the  same. 
The  other  ships  of  the  British  column  followed,  and  a  general 
action  ensued  in  which  the  eighteen  Spanish  ships  were  badly 
worsted.  The  other  nine  ships  ultimately  joined,  however, 
raising  the  Spanish  force  to  twenty-seven  ships,  nine  of  which 
were  uninjured.  Jervis  thereupon  withdrew.  The  victory- 
was  not  decisive;  but,  considering  the  enormous  inequality  in 
force,  and  the  fact  that  immeasurably  more  harm  was  done 
to  the  Spaniards  than  to  the  English,  it  was  not  only  glorious 
but  important.  For  it  was  absolutely  essential  to  Great  Brit- 
ain then  that  she  maintain  her  supremacy  at  sea. 

The  action  of  Nelson  was  one  of  those  unexpectable  and 
unique  actions  that  stand  out  in  history  like  a  bright  spark 
in  the  dark.  Judged  by  some  of  his  later  deeds,  and  by  many 
other  deeds  in  history,  it  was  not  of  commanding  importance ; 
but  judged  from  the  standpoint  of  strategy  and  tactics,  or 
from  the  standpoint  of  individual  merit,  it  was  as  great  as 
any  other  single  act  we  know  of.  For  a  British  commodore 
to  leave  the  column  of  battle  was  an  act  that  could  be  justi- 
fied by  one  thing  only — success.  For  a  captain  to  realize 
what  Nelson  realized,  in  the  hurry  and  excitement  of  the 
coming  battle,  required  extraordinary  strategic  insight.  To 
possess  this  extraordinary  insight,  a  clear  and  accurate  mind 
was  needed,  and  also  an  intense  training  of  that  mind  by  in- 
cessant thought  for  a  long  period  on  strategic  and  tactical 
questions.  To  act  upon  it  required  physical  courage  of  a 
high  order — to  brave  the  physical  dangers  that  Nelson  real- 


NELSON  211 

ized  he  was  rushing  into ;  and  in  an  immeasurably  higher  de- 
gree it  required  moral  courage  to  face  the  professional  ruin 
it  invited. 

His  justification  was  his  success.  His  success  was  because 
of  the  fact  that  he  estimated  the  situation  correctly,  decided 
correctl}^  and  acted  correctly.  Similarly,  the  trained  gym- 
nast makes  some  daring  leap.  His  justification  depends  on 
his  success.  His  success  depends  on  whether  he  estimates  the 
situation  correctly,  decides  correctly,  and  acts  correctly. 

In  the  early  part  of  1798  the  French  Directory  decided  to 
send  an  expedition  to  Egypt  under  Bonaparte;  and,  al- 
though they  succeeded  in  keeping  its  destination  a  secret,  they 
could  not  keep  secret  the  fact  that  a  large  expedition  was 
being  prepared  in  Toulon  and  neighboring  places  on  the  south- 
em  coast  of  France.  The  commander-in-chief  of  the  British 
fleet  received  orders  to  endeavor  to  thwart  the  expedition. 
With  this  end  in  view,  he  formed  a  squadron  of  thirteen  ships 
and  put  Rear-Admiral  Nelson  in  command. 

Bonaparte  sailed  from  Toulon  on  May  19.  Nelson,  after  a 
variety  of  disappointments  of  many  kinds,  one  of  which  was 
an  inability  to  get  scouts  in  the  shape  of  fast  sailing  frigates 
to  search  the  sea  for  Bonaparte's  expedition,  was  finally  able 
to  start  in  search,  but  not  until  June  7.  His  estimate  of  the 
situation  brought  him  to  the  conclusion  that  Bonaparte's  ex- 
pedition was  bound  for  Egypt.  He  came  to  this  conclusion 
by  the  same  kind  of  mental  process  as  that  which  a  chess- 
player employs  in  divining  the  intentions  of  his  opponent; 
but,  in  order  to  arrive  at  it,  he  ha.d  to  take  into  consideration 
an  immeasurably  greater  number  of  factors,  and  to  evaluate 
each  of  these  factors  by  the  exercise  of  his  professional  judg- 
ment. It  is  in  this  process  of  evaluation  that  the  knowledge 
and  experience  of  the  professional  man  is  valuable,  in  com- 
parison ivith  the  knowledge  and  experience  of  the  a^mateur. 

Nelson  reached  Alexandria  in  Egypt  on  June  28,  and  ascer- 
tained that  the  French  had  not  appeared  there,  and  that  no 
knowledge  of  their  whereabouts  or  destination  could  be  ob- 


212  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

tained.  He  at  once  started  back  to  the  westward.  Bona- 
parte's expedition  arrived  at  Alexandria  three  days  after 
Nelson  left,  having  purposely  gone  by  an  indirect  route.  For 
several  days,  while  the  two  expeditions  were  proceeding  to 
the  eastward,  they  were  not  more  than  one  hundred  miles 
apart — a  fact  that  Nelson's  lack  of  frigates  prevented  him 
from  ascertaining. 

Nelson  proceeded  to  Syracuse  in  Sicily,  and  arrived  there 
on  July  19.  The  only  news  he  could  get  was  that  the  French 
fleet  was  not  west  of  Sicily  or  at  Corfu.  He  therefore  started 
again  to  the  eastward,  convinced  that  his  first  estimate  of 
Napoleon's  destination  was  correct,  a  conviction  that  was 
strengthened  by  further  information  received  on  July  28,  that 
four  weeks  before  the  French  expedition  had  been  seen  near 
Candia,  steering  southeast.  In  the  afternoon  of  August  1  the 
masthead  lookout  of  one  of  Nelson's  ships  discerned  and  re- 
ported thirteen  French  line-of-battle  ships  in  Aboukir  Bay, 
fifteen  miles  east  of  Alexandria.  The  French  fleet  was  found 
later  to  be  at  anchor,  in  a  single  column,  with  both  flanks 
exposed. 

Throughout  the  voyage  Nelson  had  occupied  his  mind  con- 
tinually with  plans  as  to  what  he  should  do  under  all  prob- 
able contingencies,  and  with  laboriously  instructing  his  cap- 
tains in  his  plans;  so  that,  as  he  gradually  approached  the 
enemy,  and  as  their  formation  and  position  became  gradually 
clear,  he  was  prepared,  and  so  were  his  captains,  for  the 
steps  they  should  take.  When  the  battle  began,  the  task  of 
strategy  was  ended  and  the  task  of  tactics  began;  but  they 
shaded  one  into  the  other  without  jar  or  hitch :  the  tactical 
execution  was  as  good  as  the  strategic  preparation,  both  fitted 
into  each  other,  and  together  they  formed  a  perfect  whole. 
The  analogy  may  be  here  suggested  among  all  performances 
that  are  first  well  planned  and  then  well  carried  out. 

Thus  it  happened  that  the  British  fleet  went  unhesitatingly 
around  one  exposed  flank  of  the  French  fleet  in  the  gathering 
darkness,  and  six  British  ships  almost  immediately  concen- 


NELSON  213 

trated  on  four  French  ships  and  destroyed  them.  Four  other 
British  ships  impetuously  attacked  four  other  French  ships 
anchored  at  the  same  end  of  the  French  line,  where  they  could 
not  get  assistance  from  other  French  ships  anchored  near: 
and  the  battle  was  actually  decided  in  favor  of  the  British, 
before  three  British  ships  arrived  on  the  scene,  largel}^  be- 
cause five  French  ships  did  not  and  could  not  become  engaged 
or  render  any  service  whatever.  The  result  was  that  the 
French  fleet  was  destroyed  at  once  as  a  fighting  force,  though 
two  line-of-battle  ships  out  of  thirteen  succeeded  in  escaping. 

This  victory  cut  Napoleon's  communications  with  France, 
prevented  his  carrying  out  his  ultimate  intention,  and  ruined 
his  entire  campaign.  A  few  months  later  Napoleon  was  able 
to  traverse  the  Mediterranean  to  France — ^but  as  a  furtive 
passenger  in  a  single  ship,  and  not  as  the  head  of  a  grand 
naval  force. 

In  1780  the  Baltic  states,  Russia,  Denmark,  and  Sweden, 
combined  in  a  League  of  Armed  Neutrality,  to  assert  by  arms 
their  rights  as  neutrals  against  certain  practices  of  the  Brit- 
ish navy,  especially  in  searching  neutral  ships  at  sea.  The 
matter  was  smoothed  over,  but  in  1799  it  again  assumed  im- 
portance ;  and  this  importance  increased  in  the  following  year, 
when  Czar  Paul  seized  three  hundred  British  vessels  then  lying 
in  Russian  ports,  in  sudden  hostility  toward  England,  because 
of  her  refusal  to  surrender  Malta  after  it  had  been  captured 
from  the  French.  On  the  16th  of  December  a  treaty  was 
signed  by  Russia  and  Sweden,  to  which  Denmark  and  Prussia 
soon  adhered,  renewing  the  Armed  Neutrality.  This  renewal 
was  largely  the  work  of  Napoleon,  who  was  using  all  means 
available  to  ruin  the  sea  commerce  of  Great  Britain. 

The  menace  to  Great  Britain's  supremacy  on  the  sea,  and 
especially  in  the  Baltic,  was  so  strong  and  clear,  and  the  need 
to  Great  Britain  for  maintaining  that  supremacy  in  her  war 
with  Napoleon  was  so  absolute,  that  she  took  immediate  meas- 
ures in  her  own  defense.  The  first  step  was  against  Denmark, 
her  nearest  adversary  in  the  coalition.. 


214  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

In  the  early  days  of  March,  1801,  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Hyde 
Parker  received  orders  to  proceed  with  his  fleet  to  the  vicinity 
of  Copenhagen,  and  send  an  envoy  to  Copenhagen,  to  attempt 
to  induce  Denmark  to  withdraw  from  the  coalition.  His  in- 
structions, in  case  the  envoy  was  not  successful,  were  to  bring 
force  to  bear.  Nelson  was  made  second  in  command  of  the 
fleet.  The  envoy  was  not  successful,  but  Sir  Hyde  Parker 
adopted  measures  that  seemed  dilatory  to  Nelson.  Nelson 
estimated  the  situation  as  one  requiring  the  utmost  prompt- 
ness of  action  to  prevent  the  Danes  from  strengthening  their 
defenses  at  Copenhagen.  He  finally  persuaded  (almost  bul- 
lied) his  superior  officer  to  allow  him.  Nelson,  to  take  a  part 
of  the  fleet  into  the  actual  harbor  of  Copenhagen  and  attack 
the  floating  defenses  and  land  batteries  that  the  Danes  had 
got  into  position  there.  The  attempt  was  most  hazardous; 
because  to  the  dangers  from  the  fire  of  the  vessels  and  the  forts 
had  to  be  added  the  dangers  of  navigation,  which  were  great. 

The  main  fleet  anchored  on  March  30  about  five  miles  from 
Copenhagen.  Nelson's  division,  thirty-three  vessels  in  all,  of 
which  the  main  part  was  twelve  ships-of-the-line,  advanced  to 
the  south  on  the  afternoon  of  April  1  through  a  channel  to 
the  east  of  Copenhagen,  and  anchored  at  nightfall  south  of  a 
large  shoal  called  the  Middle  Ground,  about  two  miles  from 
the  southern  end  of  the  Danish  line  of  block-ships  and  float- 
ing batteries  that  ran  nearly  north  and  south.  His  plans  hav- 
ing already  been  laid,  the  evening  and  night  were  spent  in 
arranging  the  final  details  and  sending  out  the  final  orders. 
His  division  was  to  start  in  the  morning ;  but  not  a  pilot  could 
be  found  who  would  take  charge  of  a  ship !  At  length  one  of 
the  officers  of  the  fleet  undertook  the  piloting  of  the  column, 
and  the  signal  to  get  under  way  was  made.  Of  the  twelve 
ships-of-the-line,  two  grounded  on  the  west  side  of  the  Middle 
Ground  shoal,  and  another  did  not  succeed  in  getting  around 
it.  The  other  nine  proceeded  boldly,  and  anchored  as  nearly 
as  they  could  in  their  designated  stations,  parallel  to  the  line 
of  Danish  hulks  that  shielded  Copenhagen. 


NELSON  215 

A  hotly  contested  battle  followed,  in  which  there  were  great 
losses  on  both  sides,  but  which  in  the  end  resulted  in  the 
virtual  destruction  of  all  the  Danish  defenses,  both  fixed  and 
floating.  In  the  middle  of  the  action  Sir  Hyde  Parker  sig- 
naled to  Nelson  to  withdraw  his  ships.  This  order  Nelson 
very  properly  disobeyed.  It  was  on  this  occasion  that  Nelson 
put  his  telescope  to  his  blind  eye  and  said  jokingly  that  he 
could  not  read  the  signal. 

The  result  was  a  complete  victory  for  the  British.  Its  im- 
portance was  increased  and  the  results  were  hastened  by  the 
murder  of  the  Czar  of  Russia,  which  had  occurred  on  March 
24,  but  news  of  which  did  not  reach  Copenhagen  until  several 
days  after  the  battle.  Not  long  afterward,  in  early  May, 
Nelson  relieved  Parker  as  commander-in-chief,  and  thereupon 
promptly  started  for  the  Eussian  port  of  Revel,  hoping  to 
find  the  Russian  fleet  there  and  prevent  its  forming  a  junction 
with  the  Swedish.  When  he  arrived  in  the  outer  bay,  how- 
ever, he  found  that  the  Russian  fleet  had  gone.  Receiving 
an  intimation  from  the  Czar  that  his  coming  with  so  large  a 
fleet  did  not  look  like  a  friendly  act.  Nelson  at  once  moved 
away,  and  wrote  a  diplomatic  and  conciliatory  note  to  the 
Russian  Minister.  Shortly  afterward  he  received  an  answer 
from  the  Minister,  announcing  that  because  of  Nelson's 
prompt  withdrawal,  and  the  friendly  character  of  his  note, 
the  Czar  had  ordered  the  immediate  raising  of  the  embargo 
that  his  predecessor  had  placed  upon  English  merchant-ships 
in  Russian  ports. 

Like  most  great  warriors.  Nelson  was  a  statesman  and  a 
diplomat  as  well. 

The  League  of  the  Armed  Neutrality  soon  broke  up,  and 
what  had  been  at  the  start  a  great  menace  to  Great  Britain 
disappeared.  The  main  cause  of  its  disappearance  was  the 
strateg.y  of  Nelson. 

It  was  not  until  the  year  1805  that  Nelson  was  again  able, 
in  any  preeminent  degree,  to  contribute  his  unrivaled  skill  as 
a  naval  strategist  to  the  service  of  his  country.     In  the  early 


216  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

part  of  that  year  it  was  known  that  Napoleon  had  been  collect- 
ing and  drilling  in  Boulogne  an  army  of  150,000  men,  and 
that  many  flotillas  suitable  as  transports  had  been  constructed. 
It  was  suspected  that  his  object  was  to  invade  England  and 
Ireland;  but  it  was  realized  that  Napoleon  could  not  accom- 
plish this  unless  he  could  secure  control  of  the  English  Chan- 
nel by  a  French  fleet  during  a  period  long  enough  to  enable 
an  expedition  to  get  across.  It  was  also  realized  that,  by  rea- 
son of  the  known  superiority  of  the  British  fleet,  Napoleon, 
would  not  attempt  an  invasion  unless  by  some  means  he  could 
get  the  British  fleet  out  of  the  way.  It  was  also  realized  that 
a  very  natural  thing  for  him  to  attempt  would  be  to  lure  it 
to  the  West  Indies,  by  sending  a  French  fleet  thither  to 
threaten  British  possessions,  which  were  of  great  importance 
to  British  commerce.  At  this  time  Napoleon  had  twenty 
ships-of-the-line  in  the  naval  port  at  Brest  on  the  northwest 
coast  of  France,  five  at  Rochefort  on  the  west  coast,  and  ten 
at  Toulon  on  the  south  coast.  For  the  full  success  of  his  ex- 
pedition, it  would  be  necessary  that  these  ships  should  unite 
somewhere  at  sea  and  then  return  and  enter  the  Channel. 
For  this  reason,  a  British  fleet  was  kept  on  watch  at  each  port. 

The  ten  ships  at  Brest  were  successfully  kept  in  by  Admiral 
Comwallis;  the  five  ships  at  Rochefort  got  away  and  went  to 
the  West  Indies,  but  came  back  without  effecting  anything. 
The  ships  at  Toulon,  under  command  of  Vice- Admiral  Vil-  • 
leneuve,  got  out  on  the  17th  of  January. 

The  officer  in  command  of  the  British  fleet  watching  Toulon 
was  Nelson.  He  was  informed  by  a  frigate  on  January  19  of 
Villeneuve's  departure.  Not  knowing  Villeneuve's  destina- 
tion, and  being  in  command  in  the  Mediterranean,  Nelson 
deemed  it  his  first  duty  to  prevent  any  descent  on  Egypt  or 
on  any  place  in  the  Mediterranean  under  the  British  flag  or 
under  British  protection;  and  he  therefore  bestirred  himself 
— a  prey  to  the  most  agonizing  doubts  and  conjectures — ^to 
patrol  the  sea,  even  to  Alexandria  in  Egypt,  in  search  of 
Villeneuve.     On  the  19th  of  February  he  received  inf orma- 


NELSON  217 

tion  that  Villeneuve's  ships  had  been  so  badly  disabled  in  a 
gale  that  he  had  had  to  go  back  to  Toulon.  On  April  4  he 
learned  from  a  frigate  that  Villeneuve  had  again  sailed  on 
March  30;  but  he  heard  nothing  more  until  April  18,  when 
he  received  chance  information  that  Villeneuve  had  been  seen 
on  the  7th  off  the  southern  coast  of  Spain,  steering  toward  the 
Strait  of  Gibraltar  and  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  On  April  19 
he  received  certain  information  that  the  enemy  fleet,  consist- 
ing of  twelve  French  ships-of-the-line,  had  passed  out  of  the 
Straits  into  the  Atlantic. 

Nelson  at  once  concluded  that  Villeneuve  had  gone  to  the 
"West  Indies.  He  had  determined  several  months  before  that, 
in  case  he  got  information  at  any  time  that  Villeneuve  was 
going  to  the  West  Indies,  he  would  pursue  him.  Therefore 
he  now  took  immediate  steps  to  follow;  but,  because  of  un- 
favorable winds  and  other  causes  that  hampered  so  much  the 
movements  of  vessels  in  those  days,  he  did  not  start  for  the 
West  Indies  until  the  evening  of  May  11.  He  had  only 
eleven  ships-of-the-liue.  Villeneuve  had  eighteen,  six  Spanish 
ships  having  joined  him  at  Cadiz. 

Nelson  arrived  at  Barbados  on  June  4,  and  received  infor- 
mation, subsequently  found  to  be  erroneous,  from  the  general 
commanding  the  British  troops  at  Santa  Lucia,  that  the 
enemy  fleet  had  passed  there,  steering  south,  during  the 
night  of  May  28  and  29.  Nelson  was  amazed  at  this  report, 
being  unable  to  see  what  strategic  plan  could  possibly  justify 
Villeneuve  in  going  south.  As  the  information  was  authori- 
tative, however,  he  started  the  next  morning  toward  the  south, 
only  to  find  on  June  7,  by  information  from  Trinidad,  that 
no  hostile  fleet  had  appeared.  He  steered  north  at  once,  and 
reached  Antigua,  the  northernmost  of  the  Windward  Islands 
save  one,  on  June  12.  There  he  received  information  that 
Villeneuve  had  reached  Martinique  on  May  14,  had  left  on 
June  4,  and  that  he  had  then  sailed  northward.  Nelson  at 
once  divined  that  for  some  reason,  probably  hearing  of  his 
(Nelson's)  presence,  he  had  abandoned  all  hostile  operations 


218  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

in  the  West  Indies  and  was  returning  to  Europe.  Nelson 
immediately  decided  to  go  after  Villeneuve,  and  to  send  a 
fast-sailing  frigate  to  inform  the  British  Admiralty  of  the 
entire  situation.  This  frigate,  the  Curieux,  fulfilled  her  mis- 
sion perfectly,  and  was  a  vital  factor  in  bringing  about  the 
success  of  the  campaign. 

On  June  13  Nelson  got  away  from  Antigua,  and  on  July  18 
he  sighted  Cape  Spartel  on  the  northwest  coast  of  Africa,  just 
outside  the  Strait  of  Gibraltar,  There  he  ascertained  that  no 
information  had  been  received  of  Villeneuve.  However,  the 
Curieux  had  sighted  Villeneuve 's  fleet  on  June  19,  and  had 
reached  England  on  July  7 ;  and  on  July  9  the  First  Lord  of 
the  Admiralty,  a  trained  naval  officer  and  strategist,  issued 
orders  for  the  British  blockading  squadrons  off  the  ports  of 
Rochefort  and  Ferrol  to  unite  and  take  post  one  hundred  miles 
otf  Cape  Finisterre  on  the  northwest  coast  of  Spain.  On  July 
19  the  combined  force  was  in  this  position,  under  command  of 
Admiral  Calder,  and  on  the  22d  Villeneuve  rushed  into  his 
arms.  Calder  had  fifteen  ships  and  Villeneuve  had  twenty. 
The  ensuing  battle  went  to  the  advantage  of  the  British ;  but 
Calder  did  not  press  his  advantage  and  Villeneuve  got  away, 
for  which  Calder  was  bitterly  blamed  by  the  British  public. 
Villeneuve  sent  three  ships  into  Vigo,  and  sailed  himself  to 
the  Spanish  port  of  Ferrol,  a  few  miles  south  of  Cape  Finis- 
terre, which  he  reached  on  August  1  with  fifteen  ships. 
Calder,  after  sending  five  of  his  ships  to  resume  the  blockade 
of  Rochefort  on  the  west  coast  of  France,  joined  Comwallis's 
blockading  force  off  Brest  on  August  14.  The  next  day  Nelson 
joined  with  his  eleven  ships,  thus  raising  the  force  under 
Comwallis's  command  to  thirty-seven,  and  effectually  pre- 
venting all  possibility  of  Villeneuve 's  force  uniting  with  the 
one  in  Brest. 

By  reason  of  poor  health,  Nelson  now  received  leave  to  go 
home.  On  the  19th  of  August  he  hauled  down  his  flag,  ex- 
pecting the  rest  that  he  much  required.     But  news  soon  came 


NELSON  219 

that  Villeneuve  had  got  away  from  Ferrol,  and  that  on  August 
20  he  had  arrived  at  Cadiz  with  his  fleet. 

The  Admiralty  at  once  decided  to  force  that  fleet  to  come 
out  and  fight,  and  realized  that  Nelson  was  the  best  man  to 
be  charged  with  the  undertaking.  Accordingly,  Nelson  re- 
ceived orders  to  this  effect.  At  half  past  eleven  in  the  morn- 
ing of  September  14  he  hoisted  his  flag  on  board  the  Victory, 
and  on  the  following  morning  sailed. 

Nelson  arrived  off  the  port  of  Cadiz  with  twenty-seven 
ships-of-the-line.  Villeneuve  was  inside  with  thirty-three 
ships-of-the-line,  of  which  eighteen  were  French  and  fifteen 
Spanish.  Villeneuve  came  out  on  the  19th  of  October,  pos- 
sibly forced  out  by  the  difficulty  of  subsisting  so  large  a  force 
for  a  long  time  in  a  small  l)lockaded  port.  In  view  of  the 
known  character  of  Nelson,  both  sides  realized  that  a  fight  to 
a  finish  was  in  prospect. 

Nelson's  plans  had  now  been  carefully  made,  and  all  his 
captains  had  been  not  only  fully  informed  as  to  those  plans, 
but  fully  imbued  with  the  spirit  that  inspired  them.  The  re- 
sult was  that  when  the  battle  took  place,  on  October  21,  it 
was  carried  out  with  that  combination  of  decision  and  flexi- 
bility, of  deliberation  and  celerity,  of  caution  and  ardor,  that 
characterized  all  of  Nelson's  operations. 

The  allied  fleet  was  destroyed  as  a  fighting  force,  and  Great 
Britain  vsas  established  even  more  firmly  than  before  in  her 
supremacy  of  the  seas.  This  made  it  impossible  for  Napoleon 
to  gain  the  world  dominion,  to  obtain  which  he  was  bending  all 
his  powers. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  while  the  destruction  of  re- 
publicanism in  Europe  was  prevented  by  the  strategy  of 
Napoleon,  the  undue  aggrandizement  of  Napoleon  was  pre- 
vented by  the  strategy  of  Nelson. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

NAPOLEON 

ON  October  15,  1793,  a  youthful  and  ill-clad  captain  of 
artillery  vehemently  opposed  a  plan  for  driving  the 
British  out  of  the  French  city  and  harbor  of  Toulon, 
which  had  been  drawn  up  by  a  celebrated  engineer  and  ap- 
proved by  the  Committee  on  Fortifications.  He  proposed  in 
place  of  it  a  plan  which  was  much  simpler.  His  plan  was  to 
mount  some  guns  at  -a  point  which  he  specified  on  the  shores  of 
the  harbor,  and  to  drive  out  the  British  fleet.  He  pointed  out 
that  after  the  fleet  had  left  the  British  army  would  have  to 
leave  also,  and  that  the  result  could  be  secured  without  doing 
any  harm  to  the  town.  His  plan  was  eventually  adopted  and 
carried  out.  It  was  carried  out  largely  by  the  captain  of 
artillery  who  had  originated  and  proposed  it ;  for  it  was  he 
who  put  the  guns  into  place  and  afterward  directed  them. 
His  name  was  Napoleon  Bonaparte. 

In  none  of  his  later  campaigns  did  Napoleon  show  any 
clearer  insight  into  the  problem  presented  to  him,  or  any 
greater  energy  and  daring  in  carrying  it  out,  than  in  his  first 
essay  at  Toulon,  when  he  was  only  twenty-four  years  old, 
poor,  friendless,  and  inexperienced. 

At  Toulon  he  showed  the  same  rare  combination  as  he  did 
later,  of  great  imagination  and  intense  ardor  with  mathe- 
matical correctness.  He  was  a  dreamer  at  Toulon  and  he  was 
a  dreamer  ever  afterward;  but  his  dreams  were  not  vague 
dreams,  or  about  vague  projects,  or  proceeding  from  vague 
knowledge.  His  dreams  were  sharply  defined  and  based  on 
accurate  knowledge;  and  they  were  pointed  as  definitely  to- 
ward the  end  in  view  as  the  calculations  of  an  engineer  or  the 
diagrams  of  a  draftsman. 

220 


222  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

His  services  at  Toulon  were  so  evident  and  so  important 
that  he  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  brigadier-general ;  and 
in  the  spring  of  1794  he  was  sent  to  the  army  of  Italy,  to 
command  the  artillery.  The  army  there  was  under  the  com- 
mand of  a  general  who  was  old  and  incapable ;  but  Bonaparte 
was  able  to  have  some  suggestions  of  his  own  adopted  which 
brought  about  some  successes  of  an  important  kind.  During 
his  stay  in  Italy  he  con*ceived  a  plan  for  a  campaign  there  to 
drive  out  the  Austrians,  and  submitted  it  to  the  Committee  of 
Public  Safety  in  Paris.  It  was  rejected  by  them  then,  but 
adopted  in  its  main  features  later. 

About  September  of  that  year,  1794,  Bonaparte  went  to 
Paris,  At  this  time  the  government  of  the  Republic  was  in  a 
precarious  position.  In  the  early  part  of  October  it  was 
threatened  with  actual  ruin  by  the  National  Guard,  30,000 
strong,  which  suddenly  rose  in  revolt.  In  the  emergency, 
Bonaparte  was  given  command  of  all  the  troops,  only  5000  in 
number,  that  the  government  had  there  under  its  control, 
with  which  to  subdue  30,000.  AVith  these  5000  troops,  and 
forty  pieces  of  artillery  which  Bonaparte  knew  how  to  use  so 
well,  he  dispersed  the  insurgents  after  a  brief  but  violent  at- 
tack with  grape,  and  at  the  cost  of  only  four  hundred  lives. 

This  was  a  small  campaign  compared  with  his  later  ones; 
but  it  was  won  in  the  same  way  that  those  campaigns  were ' 
won — by  a  rapid  but  correct  estimate  of  the  situation,  a 
prompt  and  correct  decision,  and  an  extraordinary  celerity 
of  action.  It  was  won,  also,  by  complete  thoroughness — to 
use  a  colloquialism  of  the  present  day,  ' '  by  making  a  complete 
job  of  it."  Napoleon  realized,  as  every  great  strategist  has 
realized,  that  mere  operations,  mere  fighting,  mere  working, 
may  be  absolutely  fruitless;  that  what  must  be  done  in  order 
to  get  decisive  results  is  to  do  a  definite  injury  at  a  definite 
place  at  a  definite  time  and  for  a  definite  purpose.  He  real- 
ized further,  as  every  great  strategist  has  realized,  that  his 
work  was  not  finished  until  everything  had  been  done  that  was 
necessary  to  be  done  and  that  could  be  done.     By  the  time 


NAPOLEON  223 

Napoleon  had  finished  with  the  mutinous  National  Guard, 
there  was  nothing  further  to  be  done,  and  the  mutiny  had 
been  quelled  thoroughly  and  completely.  It  has  often  been 
stated  that  Napoleon  ruined  France.  It  must  not  be  forgotten 
that  on  this  occasion  Napoleon  saved  France,  and  also  that 
he  did  so  several  times  aftei^ward. 

As  affairs  in  northern  Italy  were  in  very  unsatisfactory 
condition  because  of  the  presence  there  of  the  allied  forces  of 
Austria  and  Piedmont,  and  the  ineffective  operations  against 
them  of  the  general  commanding  the  French  forces.  Napoleon 
was  sent  to  take  his  place,  and  to  carry  out  the  plan  of  opera- 
tions that  he  had  originally  submitted  to  the  government. 
By  this  plan,  Jourdan  and  Moreau  were  to  operate  separately 
and  yet  cooperatively  in  Germany,  while  Napoleon  was  to 
separate  the  Austrians  and  Piedmontese  in  Italy,  then  drive 
the  Austrians  out  of  Italy,  then  advance  through  the  Austrian 
Tyrol  into  Germany,  and  join  Moreau  and  Jourdan  in  an  at- 
tack on  Vienna. 

Napoleon  reached  Nice  on  March  27,  1796,  and  found  the 
French  army  widely  dispersed,  thoroughly  discouraged,  al- 
most destitute,  and  with  their  communications  to  France  run- 
ning along  the  coast  of  the  Mediterranean,  parallel  to  those  of 
the  enemy  and  therefore  everywhere  exposed.  He  at  once 
made  an  eloquent  appeal  to  his  men,  promising  to  lead  them 
to  victory  immediately  and  to  provide  for  all  their  wants. 
The  soldiers  of  France  at  this  time  were  ardent  and  patriotic, 
and  willing  to  undergo  all  privations  and  to  brave  all  dangers* 
— provided  they  were  competently  led.  They  responded  to 
Napoleon's  appeal  immediately  and  sincerely. 

To  meet  this  enthusiastic  band,  led  and  inspired  by  the 
ardent  but  exact  genius  of  Napoleon,  a  half-hearted  Austrian 
army  under  an  old,  inefficient,  and  lethargic  general,  ad- 
vanced. The  natural  result  followed.  On  April  12,  two 
days  after  the  Austrians  descended  from  the  Apennines,  Napo- 
leon defeated  them  in  battle ;  and  on  the  following  day  he  de- 
feated the  Piedmontese.     A  few  more  decisive  victories  oc- 


224  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

curred,  after  which  the  King  of  Sardinia  withdrew  altogether 
from  the  coalition  against  France,  and  left  the  Austrians  alone 
to  fight  against  Napoleon. 

Napoleon  instantly  advanced  against  the  Austrians.  On 
May  10  he  arrived  before  the  town  of  Lodi,  which  was  held  by 
10,000  Austrians.  To  reach  the  town,  he  had  to  cross  a 
bridge  that  was  defended  by  twenty  pieces  of  artillery,  and 
that  could  have  been  cut  by  the  Austrians  if  they  had  been 
prompt  enough.  Napoleon  was  more  prompt  than  the  Aus- 
trian general,  and  advanced  across  the  bridge  before  it  had 
been  cut,  he  himself  at  the  head,  animating  his  men  by  his 
example.  As  a  result  the  column  dashed  along  the  bridge  in 
the  face  of  a  terrible  fire,  overcame  all  opposition,  and  car- 
ried the  enemies  batteries  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  The 
enemy  retreated  at  once  to  the  eastward,  and  Napoleon  en- 
tered Milan  at  the  head  of  his  victorious  army. 

At  Milan,  Napoleon  at  once  took  upon  himself  the  task  of 
statesmanship,  and  sought  to  secure  the  fruits  of  the  con- 
quests he  had  made.  But  the  news  of  his  success  excited  the 
jealousy  of  the  French  government,  and  caused  it  to  send  him 
orders  to  divide  his  army  into  two  parts :  to  give  up  the  com- 
mand of  half  of  it  to  Kellerman,  who  was  to  remain  in  the 
north  of  Italy  and  observe  the  Austrians,  and  to  advance  him- 
self with  the  remaining  half  upon  Rome  and  then  upon 
Naples.  Napoleon,  seeing  the  suicidal  nature  of  this  division 
of  forces  and  diffusion  of  effort,  resigned  his  command. 
Pending  the  receipt,  however,  of  the  reply  of  the  government, 
he  resolved  to  drive  the  Austrians  out  of  Ital}';  and  to  that 
end  he  immediately  advanced  against  them,  after  addressing 
to  his  soldiers  one  of  the  most  eloquent  military  appeals  in 
history.  But  on  the  day  he  quitted  Milan,  a  revolt  occurred 
in  his  rear,  Pavia  being  seized  and  the  garrison  put  to  death. 
Without  an  instant's  hesitation,  and  without  stopping  the 
march  of  his  army.  Napoleon  hastened  to  Pavia  with  a  small 
but  sufficient  force.  At  the  head  of  this  force  he  broke  open 
the  gates,  advanced  within  the  city,  delivered  it  up  to  the 


NAPOLEON  225 

pillage  of  his  troops,  ordered  the  municipal  officers  to  be  shot, 
and  immediately  extinguished  the  insurrection.  At  two  other 
places  he  carried  out  a  similar  policy,  and  secured  similar 
results. 

The  Austrians,  under  Beaulieu,  were  now  drawn  up  beyond 
the  IMincio  River  in  a  line  approximately  north  and  south  and 
facing  west,  flanked  on  the  right  by  Lake  Garda  and  on  the 
left  by  the  fortress  of  Mantua,  The  enemy's  wings  being  thus 
protected,  Napoleon  attacked  his  center,  but  while  making 
demonstrations  against  his  line  of  retreat.  The  Austrians, 
remembering  the  terrible  charge  at  Lodi,  gave  way  very  soon; 
and  the  Austrian  general,  fearful  of  the  movement  against 
his  communications,  retired  beyond  the  Adige  River.  Part 
of  his  left  wing,  however,  became  dispersed,  and  the  remainder 
took  refuge  in  Mantua.  Napoleon  decided  at  once  to  besiege 
Mantua.  So  long  as  this  city  was  held  by  the  strong  force  of 
13,000  men  that  now  held  it,  Napoleon  could  not  advance 
beyond  it,  to  carry  out  his  campaign  against  Vienna,  because 
he  would  leave  a  military  enemy  in  his  rear.  Furthermore, 
he  could  not  rely  on  the  support  of  any  large  number  of  Ital- 
ians in  the  vicinity,  because  they  realized  the  danger  of  taking 
the  part  of  the  side  that  might  ultimately  be  defeated. 

In  July  the  Austrians  sent  to  the  relief  of  Mantua  an  army 
60,000  strong  and  commanded  by  Wunnser.  Against  it  Napo- 
leon had  only  30,000,  10,000  of  whom  were  besieging  13,000 
in  Mantua.  He  instantly  abandoned  the  siege  and  advanced 
against  the  Austrians.  They  were  advancing  in  two  columns. 
Napoleon  attacked  the  weaker  and  repulsed  it,  and  then  at- 
tacked the  stronger  and  threw  it  back  with  a  loss  of  fifty  guns 
and  12,000  men.  He  thus  defeated  completely  the  army  of 
relief. 

In  the  following  month  a  second  relieving  army,  under 
Wurmser,  advanced  again,  this  time  also  in  two  columns. 
Napoleon  again  (in  September)  defeated  one  column  and 
then  the  other;  but  in  this  campaign  the  defeated  column 
under  Wurmser  himself  had  to  take  refuge  in  Mantua,  and 


226  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

thus  add  to  the  garrison  about  10,000  additional  mouths  to 
feed. 

Napoleon  now  earnestly  besought  more  troops  and  guns, 
for  he  saw  that  Austria  realized  the  necessity  of  relieving 
Mantua.  Six  weeks  later  Austria's  third  and  most  deter- 
mined attempt  was  made.  In  the  six  weeks'  interval  Napoleon 
exercised  all  his  genius  as  a  statesman  in  spreading  a  propa- 
ganda of  liberty  in  Italy.  He  opposed  the  French  government 
in  its  foolish  project  of  embarking  on  a  war  with  Rome  and 
Naples,  and  forced  it  (though  without  convincing  it)  to  con- 
tinue a  war  of  the  utmost  vigor  against  Austria,  in  which  the 
first  accomplishment  must  be  the  capture  of  Mantua. 

The  third  army  of  relief  also  advanced  in  two  columns ;  but 
it  was  under  the  command  of  a  general,  Alvinzi,  who  was  far 
more  wise  and  quick  than  Wurmser,  and  opposed  to  Napoleon 
a  resistance  so  able  and  so  stubborn  that  the  powers  of  Napo- 
leon and  his  ragged  but  enthusiastic  army  were  taxed  to  the 
utmost.  In  the  final  battles  near  Arcole,  however,  he  de- 
feated Alvinzi  and  drove  him  back. 

In  January,  1797,  the  fourth  and  last  army  of  relief  was 
sent,  again  under  Alvinzi.  He  made  a  determined  attack  on 
the  plateau  of  Rivoli  with  a  superior  force,  but  under  the  dis- 
advantage that  in  order  to  reach  the  plateau  he  had  to  dis- 
pense with  both  cavalry  and  artillery.  In  the  battle  that 
followed,  the  French  infantry,  though  greatly  outnumbered, 
were  supported  by  artillery  and  cavalry,  an  advantage  that 
outweighed  the  mere  numerical  inferiority,  and  in  conse- 
quence were  able  to  throw  back  the  Austrians  quickly  and 
decisively.  On  February  2,  the  flag  of  the  Republic  was  fly- 
ing over  Mantua,  the  north  of  Italy  was  clear  of  Austrians, 
and  Napoleon  was  free  to  leave  Italy  and  carry  out  his  cam- 
paign against  Vienna. 

Napoleon  then  advanced  to  the  northeastward,  and  won  a 
succession  of  victories  against  easily  defeated  and  demoralized 
enemies,  and  finally  signed  preliminaries  of  peace  with  Aus- 
tria at  Leoben,  less  than  one  hundred  miles  from  Vienna.    At 


NAPOLEON  227 

this  time  Napoleon  knew  when  to  exercise  moderation,  though 
later  in  life  he  did  not.  He  showed  it  in  the  preliminaries  of 
peace  signed  at  Leoben,  on  April  18  and  by  his  moderation 
brought  about  a  condition  in  which  Austria  withdrew  from 
the  coalition  against  France  and  left  Great  Britain  as  her 
only  enemy.  The  defeat  of  Austria,  and  the  consequent 
abandonment  of  her  hostile  attitude  toward  France,  saved  the 
Republic,  and  therefore  the  cause  of  liberty  in  Europe.  For 
this  France  was  indebted  wholly  to  the  strategy  of  Napoleon. 

The  final  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  at  Campo  Formio  on 
October  3,  1797.  Of  the  original  six  enemies  of  the  Republic 
only  one  now  remained — Great  Britain,  the  most  powerful  of 
all.  Napoleon  realized  that  there  would  be  a  fight  to  the 
death  between  her  and  France,  and  conceived  the  plan  of 
attacking  her  by  attacking  Egypt,  thus  threatening  the  com- 
munications between  England  and  India  and  menacing  India 
herself.  He  presented  his  plan  to  the  Directory  and  secured 
its  approval,  which  suggests  that  neither  Napoleon  nor  the 
Directory  estimated  correctly  the  importance  of  the  fact  that 
the  British  M^ere  superior  at  sea.  Except  for  brief  periods, 
the  British  navy  had  been  superior  to  the  French  for  several 
centuries,  and  it  was  overwhelmingly  superior  at  this  time. 
The  effect  of  the  Revolution  had  been  subversive  of  that  or- 
derly discipline  and  that  patient  carefulness  and  skill  that  are 
needed  to  manage  naval  instruments  and  equipments,  and  in 
addition  most  of  the  competent  officers,  belonging  as  they  did 
to  well-born  families,  had  been  forced  out  of  the  service,  while 
some  had  been  beheaded.  On  the  other  hand,  the  British  navy 
as  a  whole  was  in  a  condition  of  completeness  and  efficiency 
that  had  never  been  surpassed.  Its  Mediterranean  fleet  was 
under  the  command  of  Nelson. 

Napoleon  set  sail  from  Toulon  on  May  19,  1798,  with  about 
38,000  veteran  troops,  a  large  corps  of  mathematicians,  geolo- 
gists, antiquarians,  chemists,  etc.,  embarked  in  a  fleet  of 
transports,  and  guarded  by  thirteen  ships-of-the-line.  It  is 
interesting  to  note  that  this  expedition  had  a  double  pur- 


228  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

pose, — conquest  and  exploration, — and  that  Napoleon,  there- 
fore, departed  from  his  usual  straight  line  of  conduct  and 
tried  to  do  two  things  at  one  time.  By  good  fortune,  he  suc- 
ceeded in  reaching  Egypt  without  being  caught  by  Nelson, 
and  arrived  at  Alexandria  on  July  1.  He  immediately 
marched  on  Cairo,  and  soon  met  the  Mamelukes,  who  charged 
on  him  with  their  customary  impetuosity,  but  met  the  same 
fate  as  cavalry  usually  have  when  charging  on  infantry  and 
artillery  properly  commanded  and  trained.  Napoleon  got  to 
work  at  once  on  his  project  of  seducing  the  Egyptians  to  the 
French  Republican  cause  by  false  promises  of  many  kinds, 
when  he  suddenly  received  information — which  should  not 
have  surprised  him — that  the  fleet  he  had  left  at  Aboukir  Bay 
had  been  attacked  by  Rear- Admiral  Nelson  and  destroyed  on 
August  1,  1798. 

Napoleon  was  now  in  a  position  that  was  not  only  humil- 
iating and  dangerous,  but  ridiculous.  He  would  not  have 
pardoned  any  general  for  getting  into  such  a  position  in  land 
operations.  His  communications  had  been  cut,  and  because 
of  circumstances  that  were  almost  inevitable.  This  shows 
that,  while  Napoleon  was  one  of  the  greatest  military  strate- 
gists that  ever  lived,  he  was  an  exceedingly  poor  naval  strate- 
gist. It  also  shows  something  immeasurably  more  important, 
which  is  that  no  man  can  be  a  strategist  in  any  department 
of  strategy  unless  he  understands  thoroughly  all  the  factors 
in  the  problem  which  one  encounters  in  that  department. 
Napoleon  could  apply  to  naval  strategy  as  much  mentality, 
energy,  and  ardor  as  he  could  to  military  strategy;  but  he 
understood  accurately,  clearly,  and  thoroughly  every  factor 
involved  in  military  strategy,  while  he  understood  almost  none 
of  the  factors  employed  in  naval  strategy.  Napoleon  doubt- 
less took  the  advice  of  naval  officers  in  naval  matters;  but, 
as  he  himself  decided  what  was  to  be  done,  he  was  not  very 
much  more  competent  to  act  than  a  layman  would  be  who 
tried  to  perform  a  surgical  operation  under  the  advice  of  a 
surgeon-.    This  throws  light  on  the  attempts  of  civilians,  to. 


NAPOLEON  229 

direct  na'ixil  and  military  operations,  and  explains  the  use- 
less loss  of  life  they  have  occasioned. 

Napoleon  then  conducted  a  campaign  in  Syria,  which  was 
made  disastrous  by  the  British  fleet  acting  in  conjunction  with 
the  Turks  when  Napoleon  besieged  Acre.  After  his  failure  at 
Acre  he  retreated  precipitately  into  Egypt,  and  there  suc- 
ceeded in  destroj^ing  a  Turkish  force  that  had  landed  at  Abou- 
kir. 

Some  time  before  this  he  had  received  word  that  war  had 
broken  out  again  on  the  Continent,  and  that  Russia,  Austria, 
Sardinia,  and  Naples  had  joined  a  coalition  with  Great  Brit- 
ain against  the  French  Republic.  Realizing  the  failure  of  his 
Egj-ptian  campaign,  and  seeking  an  opportunity  to  retrieve  his 
fortunes,  he  sailed  for  France  on  August  24,  1799,  with  a  few 
of  his  best  officers ;  deserting  the  soldiers  to  whom  he  had  prom- 
ised so  much,  and  who,  for  his  sake,  had  faced  hunger  and 
thirst  and  pestilence  and  wounds  and  death. 

At  this  time  the  affairs  of  France  were  in  a  precarious  con- 
dition. Military  operations  had  not  been  successful ;  there 
was  tremendous  discontent  throughout  the  country;  and  Na- 
poleon was  the  only  man  who  stood  high  in  public  favor.  He 
was  received  with  great  enthusiasm  and  was  shortly  able  to 
bring  about  a  coup  d'etat  whereby  the  Directory  was  abol- 
ished and  a  consular  government  established  in  its  stead,  with 
himself  as  First  Consul.  In  discharging  the  duties  of  that 
office,  which  was  practically  that  of  Dictator,  Napoleon 
showed  the  same  grasp  of  the  situation,  the  same  talent  for 
detail,  the  same  energj^  ardor,  industry,  and  endurance,  that 
he  had  shown  in  discharging  the  duties  of  general.  He  showed 
also  the  same  arbitrarj^  spirit  and  the  same  tremendous  con- 
fidence in  himself ;  and  he  achieved  a  success  and  accomplished 
a  good  for  France  of  as  high  an  order  of  importance. 

He  soon  made  overtures  for  peace  to  both  Great  Britain  and 
Germany,  but  by  both  his  overtures  were  repelled.  Similar 
overtures  to  Russia,  which  was  at  that  time  irritated  against 
Great  Britain  and  Austria,  were  followed  by  Russia's  aban- 


230  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

donment  of  the  coalition.  This  left  Great  Britain  and  Aus- 
tria as  France's  only  important  enemies.  There  was  a  large 
French  force  now  in  Germany  under  Moreau,  and  another 
besieged  at  Genoa  under  Massena.  The  appearance  of  a  Brit- 
ish fleet  in  April,  1800,  was  a  preconcerted  signal  for  the  Aus- 
trians  to  attack  Genoa  and  thus  cut  off  all  communications 
with  France. 

Meanwhile,  the  campaign  in  Germany  proceeded  somewhat 
to  the  advantage  of  the  French,  largely  because  of  a  lack  of 
cooperation  among  the  Austrian  forces ;  but  no  decisive  results 
occurred.  In  this  condition  of  affairs.  Napoleon  decided  to 
take  the  field  himself.  To  this  end  he  concentrated  a  force 
of  about  40,000  men  near  Dijon,  from  which  position  he  could 
advance  into  either  Austria  or  Italy.  On  the  6th  of  May  he 
left  Paris.  On  the  14th  he  began  the  passage  of  the  Great 
St.  Bernard  at  the  head  of  this  force,  dragging  cannon  in  hol- 
lowed trunks  of  trees  through  the  snow.  He  forced  his  way 
by  dint  of  courage  and  energy  and  ingenuity,  and  suddenlj^ 
he  emerged  into  northern  Italy,  bringing  artillery — to  the 
great  astonishment  of  the  Austrian  general  there.  Napoleon 
arrived  at  Milan  on  the  2d  of  June,  and  on  the  14th  fought 
the  battle  of  Marengo. 

Napoleon  took  many  risks  with  the  disposition  of  his  forces 
in  the  interval  which  might  have  proved  fatal  if  the  Austrian 
general  had  been  as  active  as  Napoleon  was.  But  Napoleon 
would  not  have  taken  those  risks  had  he  not  realized  the  inef- 
ficiency of  the  Austrian  general.  The  Austrians  fought  the 
battle,  of  course,  with  all  the  bravery  and  determination  that 
could  be  expected ;  and  they  did  not  break  until  they  received 
a  sudden  and  unexpected  assault  from  cavalry  supported  by 
artillery.  They  then  broke  into  a  rout,  and  disaster  and  car- 
nage followed.  This  battle  compelled  the  Austrians  again  to 
retire  to  the  eastward  of  the  Mincio  Eiver. 

Meanwhile,  the  naval  domination  of  Great  Britain,  which 
ultimately  was  to  prove  the  backbone  of  the  resistance  of 
Europe  to  Napoleon,  had  excited  great  jealousy  among  the 


NAPOLEON  231 

maritime  powers  of  Europe,  who  had  formed  a  League  of 
Armed  Neutrality  to  oppose  her.  The  issue  between  Great 
Britain  and  these  powers  was  finally  decided  by  a  naval  battle 
off  Copenhagen,  in  which  Vice-Admiral  Lord  Nelson,  on  April 
2,  1801,  destroyed  virtually  all  the  defenses  of  the  town,  both 
fixed  and  floating.  This  victory  caused  an  almost  immediate 
dissolution  of  the  League. 

Affairs  did  not  come  to  a  crisis  between  the  French  and 
Austrian  armies  in  Germany  until  the  battle  of  Hohen- 
linden  on  December  3,  1800.  An  interesting  feature  of  the 
campaign  was  the  fact  that  Napoleon  sent  orders  to  the  French 
General  Moreau  to  follow  a  certain  plan  of  operations;  that 
Moreau  protested,  submitted  another  plan,  and  asked  permis- 
sion to  take  a  lower  rank  if  Napoleon  insisted  on  his  own  plan ; 
and  that  Napoleon,  with  true  strategic  judgment,  yielded  to 
Moreau.  The  battle  of  Hohenlinden  was  ended  in  disaster  to 
the  Austrians,  mainly  because  of  the  extremely  bad  strategy 
of  the  Austrian  commander.  The  battle  was  followed  by  the 
Treaty  of  Luneville  on  February  9,  1801.  This  left  Great 
Britain  the  only  surviving  member  of  the  coalition.  Bona- 
parte now  realized  that  the  victory  of  Nelson  at  Copenhagen, 
and  the  consequent  dissolution  of  the  Confederacy  of  Neutrals, 
made  it  impossible  for  him  then  to  ruin  British  commerce. 
In  consequence  of  all  the  conditions  then  prevailing.  Great 
Britain  and  France  signed  the  Treaty  of  Amiens  in  March, 
1802. 

By  the  treaties  of  Luneville  and  Amiens  the  French  Repub- 
lic was  acknowledged  by  all  Europe.  It  is  worthy  of  note  that 
a  feeble  directory  had  been  replaced  by  a  strong  Republic,  and 
that  France  had  been  saved  against  the  combined  assaidt  of 
the  greatest  monarchies  in  Europe  by  one  agency  ordy — the 
strategy  of  Napoleon. 

The  Treaty  of  Amiens  contained  the  provision  that  Eng- 
land should  surrender  Malta.  The  British  did  not  surrender 
Malta,  and  Napoleon  made  tremendous  accusations  against 
her  for  this  reason.    But  the  British  can  hardly  be  blamed 


232  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

with  reason;  because  it  soon  became  apparent  that  Napoleon 
was  still  actively  at  work  on  his  projects  against  Egypt  and 
India,  that  he  was  not  himself  keeping  faith  in  many  matters, 
and  that  his  enormous  success  in  upbuilding  French  maritime 
and  naval  power  threatened  the  naval  supremacy  of  England. 
He  even  sent  an  expedition  that  captured  San  Domingo ;  and 
by  securing  from  Spain  a  large  tract,  called  Louisiana,  and 
then  selling  it  to  the  United  States,  he  gave  good  grounds 
for  the  suspicion  that  he  was  projecting  an  aggressive  mari- 
time policy.  When,  finally.  Napoleon  sent  an  expedition 
to  India,  though  apparently  for  mere  exploration,  when 
French  papers  spoke  of  the  ease  with  which  Egypt  could  be 
reconquered,  and  when  the  advance  of  French  prestige 
through  all  of  continental  Europe  had  become  apparent,  the 
British  Cabinet  decided  not  to  give  up  Malta,  War  was  de- 
clared in  May,  1803,  between  Great  Britain  and  France. 
Then  began  a  struggle  which  lasted  until  the  battle  of  Water- 
loo, in  which  virtually  all  the  powers  of  Europe,  though  not 
always  at  the  same  time,  made  war  against  Napoleon. 

After  the  declaration  of  war,  the  invasion  of  England  be- 
came the  .intense  preoccupation  of  Napoleon ;  and  to  accom- 
plish it  he  embarked  on  the  greatest  strategic  enterprise  that 
had  ever  been  undertaken.  He  realized,  of  course,  that  he 
could  not  send  an  invading  force  across  the  Channel,  unless 
it  were  supported  by  a  French  fleet  superior  to  any  British 
fleet  that  might  be  in  the  Channel  at  that  time.  He  realized 
that  he  should  have  to  create  a  great  addition  to  the  French 
fleet,  therefore,  and  a  large  flotilla  of  transports.  Of  the  two, 
the  enlargement  of  the  fleet  was  the  more  difficult.  He  finally 
collected  near  Boulogne  about  fifteen  hundred  transports  and 
about  150,000  men.  The  British  naturally  got  information 
of  his  preparations,  and  many  of  them  were  much  alarmed; 
but  the  government  itself,  while  it  appreciated  the  danger, 
took  such  measures  to  counteract  it  that  it  never  regarded  the 
situation  as  really  perilous.  Napoleon  finally  adopted  the 
plan  of  endeavoring  to  lure  the  principal  part  of  the  British 


NAPOLEON  233 

fleet  away  from  the  Channel  by  sending  a  large  fleet  westward 
to  threaten  British  possessions  in  the  West  Indies.  This  was 
a  plan  similar  to  that  of  many  strategic  operations  on  land; 
but  Napoleon  understood  all  the  factors  in  land  campaigns, 
while  he  did  not  understand  those  in  naval  campaigns.  For 
this  reason,  he  hampered  the  operations  of  Admiral  Ville- 
neuve  considerably  by  ill-advised  instructions.  Whether  they 
hampered  the  admiral  to  such  a  degree  as  to  be  the  main  cause 
of  the  final  failure,  however,  it  is  difficult  to  decide. 

Villeneuve  started  for  the  West  Indies,  and  Nelson  started 
in  pursuit.  Meanwhile  Napoleon  was  pressing  his  prepara- 
tions near  Boulogne,  in  order  to  be  able  to  dash  across  the 
Channel  as  soon  as  the  French  fleet  should  return,  having  left 
Nelson  in  the  West  Indies.  Villeneuve  returned,  but  allowed 
himself  to  be  brought  to  battle  on  July  22,  1805,  with  the 
result  that  he  went  for  repairs  to  Cadiz,  where  he  arrived  on 
August  20.  Napoleon  realized  at  once  that  his  scheme  to 
invade  England  had  been  ruined.  He  realized  also  that  it 
had  been  ruined  by  the  same  man  Nelson,  who  had  ruined  his 
Egyptian  campaign  and  had  broken  up  the  Confederacy  of 
Neutrals,  and  that  these  three  occurrences  showed  a  British 
supremacy  upon  the  sea  that  precluded  any  reasonable  antici- 
pation of  conquering  England.  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose, 
however,  that  he  realized  that  this  supremacy  of  Great 
Britain  on  the  seas  was  to  threaten  seriously  his  success  upon 
the  Continent;  and  it  is  quite  certain  that  he  did  not  appre- 
ciate fully  the  importance  of  the  predominant  sea  power  of 
Great  Britain. 

Napoleon  has  been  criticized  by  many  for  ever  harboring 
seriously  the  idea  of  invading  England.  It  has  often  been 
contended  also  that  he  did  not  really  intend  to  do  so,  and  that 
the  collecting  of  large  forces  near  Boulogne,  and  the  man- 
oeuvering  of  his  fleet,  were  simply  parts  of  a  feint  to  hide  his 
real  intentions — a  march  into  Germany.  But  it  must  not  be 
forgotten  that,  even  if  the  project  failed,  he  suffered  no  great 
harm ;  because  his  army  could  be  used,  and  was  used,  for  the 


234  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

other  purpose.    In  other  words,  Napoleon  had  two  alternative 
plans,  as  he  often  had. 

As  soon  as  Napoleon  heard  that  Villeneuve  had  gone  to 
Cadiz,  he  started  with  the  utmost  possible  promptness,  and 
marched  with  the  utmost  possible  speed  against  the  Austrians, 
under  General  Mack,  who  was  about  to  advance  through  the 
Black  Forest  toward  the  French  frontier.  So  rapid  was  Na- 
poleon's movement,  so  unsuspecting  was  Mack,  and  so  little 
information  did  he  get  from  his  intelligence  department,  that 
he  was  taken  by  surprise  near  Ulm  and  his  army  enveloped. 
As  a  result  he  was  forced  to  surrender  his  entire  force  on 
October  20. 

The  battle  of  Trafalgar,  in  which  the  British  under  Nelson 
defeated  the  French  and  Spanish  fleets,  occurred  the  following 
day,  and,  though  it  was  not  then  realized,  sounded  the  death- 
knell  of  the  empire  of  Napoleon. 

While  marching  to  Ulm,  Napoleon  violated  the  neutrality 
of  Prussia  by  marching  over  Prussian  ground.  This  insolent 
act,  combined  with  many  other  causes,  one  of  which  was  the 
gradually  rising  wrath  of  the  Prussians  against  the  feeble 
neutrality  of  their  king,  forced  the  king  to  assert  the  rights 
of  Prussia,  to  make  an  alliance  with  the  Czar  of  Russia, 
and  then  to  declare  war  against  Napoleon.  But  the  king's 
previous  inaction  had  put  the  Prussian  army  and  the  country 
in  such  a  condition  that  he  was  wholly  unprepared;  so  that 
he  now  added  to  his  crime  of  unpreparedness  the  crime  of 
going  to  war  before  his  unpreparedness  had  been  overcome. 

Russia  and  Austria  now  joined  their  forces,  and  soon  col- 
lected an  allied  army  of  about  100,000  men  near  Austerlitz, 
while  the  French  numbered  about  80,000.  The  actions  of  the 
Allies  at  this  time  seem  to  have  been  marked  by  vague  precip- 
itancy rather  than  exact  celerity;  for  a  little  waiting  would 
have  enabled  their  forces  to  be  increased  by  those  of  the  Arch- 
duke Charles,  who  was  hurrying  up  from  Italy,  and  by  a 
certain  Russian  corps  then  marching  to  join  them;  and 
their  forces  would  have  been  augmented  vastly  if  the  Allies 


NAPOLEON  235 

had  avoided  battle  until  such  time  as  the  Prussian  army 
could  have  been  got  ready  and  sent  to  join  them.  The  precip- 
itancy seems  to  have  been  caused  mainly  by  the  Czar,  who  was 
determined  to  force  a  general  engagement.  This  engagement 
took  place  on  December  2,  1805,  at  Austerlitz. 

The  French  had  about  80,000  men  and  the  Allies  100,000 ; 
but  the  French  were  commanded  by  Napoleon,  and  Napoleon 
had  under  him  Lannes  and  Soult  and  Bernadotte  and  iMurat. 
The  battle  was  fought  with  the  utmost  courage  on  both  sides, 
but  with  strategic  and  tactical  skill  by  only  one  side.  The 
result  was  that  the  Russian  center  was  pushed  off  the  plateau 
on  which  it  had  taken  a  stand ;  and  the  Russian  left,  which 
had  charged  down  on  the  French  right,  was  attacked  on  the 
flank  and  rear. 

The  Russians  now  retreated  to  the  north.  Austria  signed 
an  ignominious  peace,  and  Napoleon  became  supreme  in 
southern  Germany  and  Italy.  His  prestige  had  now  increased 
to  such  a  point  that  he  was  able  to  marry  several  of  his  rela- 
tives to  persons  of  royal  or  noble  blood,  to  make  his  brother 
Louis,  King  of  Holland  and  his  brother  Joseph,  King  of 
Naples,  to  form  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  and  to  abolish 
the  Holy  Roman  Empire.  Against  one  nation,  however,  he 
was  helpless,  and  that  nation  was  the  British ;  for  Nelson  had 
defeated  Villeneuve  disastrously  at  the  battle  of  Trafalgar  on 
October  21,  and  thus  dispelled  forever  all  hope  of  overcoming 
Great  Britain's  mastery  of  the  sea,  and  consequent  control  of 
all  its  trade  routes.  Napoleon  then  resorted  to  various  meas- 
ures of  declared  blockade,  which  had  little  ultimate  effect 
other  than  of  inflicting  great  hardships  on  the  people  of  Eng- 
land, and  equal  and  in  some  cases  greater  hardships  on  the 
maritime  countries  of  the  Continent. 

Finally  the  Prussian  king  started  his  ill-trained  and  ill-com- 
manded army  against  the  highly  trained  and  superbly  com- 
manded army  of  Napoleon. 

The  result  was  that  the  Prussian  king  suddenly  discovered, 
about  October  12,  that  a  French  army  corps  was  between  him 


236  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

and  his  base  of  supplies.  He  attempted  to  drive  them  from 
his  line  of  communications,  but  Napoleon  fell  with  overpow- 
ering numbers  upon  a  large  detachment  of  his  force  at  Jena, 
while  Davoust  fell  upon  the  main  force  at  Auerstadt  near  by. 
Both  battles  took  place  on  October  14,  were  decisive  victories 
for  the  French,  and  forced  the  Prussians  to  sign  terms  of 
peace  that  were  not  only  ignominious  but  almost  ruinous.  One 
of  the  most  humiliating  features  of  the  situation,  which  soon 
developed,  was  that  Napoleon  entered  Berlin,  and  that  it  was 
from  Berlin  that  he  issued  on  November  21,  1806,  his  first 
famous  decree,  the  "Berlin  Decree,"  proclaiming  the  British 
Isles  in  a  state  of  blockade  and  prohibiting  all  commerce  and 
correspondence  with  them. 

The  treaty  of  peace  was  not  signed,  however,  until  after  the 
Russians  had  been  brought  to  battle.  The  Russian  army  could 
not  be  brought  to  a  decisive  battle  at  once,  but  it  was  finally 
met  and  defeated,  though  not  decisively,  on  February  8,  at 
Eylau.  This  battle  left  Napoleon  with  an  army  demoralized 
by  privation,  surrounded  by  hostile  forces  in  a  hostile  coun- 
try in  the  winter,  and  under  conditions  that  every  day  of  sus- 
pended operations  made  more  difficult.  Fortunately  for 
Napoleon,  the  Russian  general  committed  a  strategic  blunder 
by  which  Napoleon  was  enabled  to  engage  him  at  Friedland 
on  June  14  with  a  greatly  superior  force.  The  victory  was  so 
complete  as  to  discourage  the  Russian  emperor  completely, 
and  to  induce  him  to  join  with  the  King  of  Prussia  in  a  treaty, 
which  was  signed  with  Napoleon  on  July  8,  at  Tilsit,  on  a  raft 
in  the  Niemen  River.  By  this  treaty  the  Czar  became  practi- 
cally an  ally  of  Napoleon,  and  the  King  of  Prussia  lost  nearly 
half  of  his  dominions. 

Preliminary  to  this  treaty  and  other  treaties,  and  during 
the  discussions  of  all  treaties,  Napoleon  showed  that  quickness 
of  decision,  that  ability  to  cajole  and  threaten  and  persuade 
at  the  proper  time,  which  mark  the  great  diplomatist;  and 
without  that  ability  he  could  not,  of  course,  have  made  the 
advantageous  treaties  that  he  did  make.     Napoleon's  entire 


NAPOLEON  237 

success  was  due  to  the  combination  of  all  these  qualities ;  and 
Napoleon  Bonaparte  would  never  have  been  the  Napoleon  of 
history  had  he  not  been  a  diplomatist  and  a  statesman  as  well 
as  a  strategist.  This  fact  must  not  blind  us,  however,  to  the 
more  important  fact  that  his  greatness  did  not  rest  at  bottom 
upon  his  diplomacy/  or  his  statesmanship,  hut  on  his  strategy. 
In  other  words,  the  most  important  element  in  Napoleon's 
career — as  in  the  career  of  Thutmose  III,  Alexander,  Caesar, 
and  the  others  whose  names  head  certain  chapters  in  this 
book — was  strategy.  Now,  these  men  contributed  more  than 
any  equal  number  of  other  men  to  the  establishment  of  stable 
government  in  the  world. 

Perhaps  it  would  not  be  logical  to  deduce  from  this  that  the 
most  important  factor  in  the  establishment  of  stable  govern- 
ment has  been  strategy.  But  it  would  be  logical  to  deduce 
that  strategy  has  been  an  agency  as  important  as  to  be  im- 
measurable, and  that  there  is  no  good  ground  for  declaring 
that  any  other  agency  has  been  more  important.  The  govern- 
ment of  every  civilized  country  was  established  originally  by 
military  force  directed  by  strategy,  and  was  maintained  after- 
ward by  statesmanship  and  diplomacy  supported  by  strategy. 
Which  of  the  three  has  been  the  most  important  it  would  be 
useless  to  discuss;  but  it  cannot  be  gainsaid  with  reason  that 
of  the  three  strategy  was  the  first  to  act,  and  that  the  others 
followed. 

Napoleon  had  now  reached  the  culmination  of  his  rapid  and 
tremendous  rise,  and  was  about  to  start  gradually  upon  that 
fall  which  ended  with  such  abruptness  at  Waterloo.  After 
the  peace  at  Tilsit,  France  and  Russia  seemed  the  most  im- 
portant countries  in  the  world,  and  England  seemed  to  be 
threatened  with  disaster,  because  her  assertiveness  on  the  sea 
had  roused  against  her  the  opposition  of  all  the  powers  of 
continental  Europe.  Napoleon's  first  act  in  the  long  series 
that  brought  about  his  final  downfall  was  his  invasion  of 
Spain  and  Portugal. 

To  complete  his  continental  blockade  of  England,  Napoleon 


238  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTINa 

deemed  it  necessary  thiat  Portugal,  on  account  of  her  large 
sea-front  and  her  geographical  position,  should  be  brought 
under  French  control.  He  therefore  took  steps  to  invade  Por- 
tugal; and  in  order  to  accomplish  this  he  formed  a  plot 
whereby  he  obtained  the  actual  cooperation  of  Spain,  and 
with  it,  of  course,  her  permission  to  march  his  invading  army 
through  her  territory.  At  this  time  the  government  of  Spain 
was  excessively  corrupt;  the  queen's  favorite  was  the  real 
ruler  of  the  kingdom,  and  the  queen's  son,  whom  she  declared 
on  one  occasion  to  be  not  the  king's  son,  had  acquired  a  popu- 
larity in  Spain  that  was  entirely  undeserved.  Napoleon  sent 
an  army  under  Junot  that  captured  Lisbon  on  November  30, 
1807,  but  too  late  to  secure  the  royal  family,  for  it  had  already 
embarked  upon  the  British  fleet. 

Nominally  as  a  support  to  this  expedition,  Napoleon  had 
sent  five  armies  into  Spain;  and  it  was  not  imtil  they  had 
seized  the  principal  fortress  in  northern  Spain,  and  Murat  was 
found  to  be  advancing  toward  Madrid,  that  the  Spanish  gov- 
ernment realized  the  situation.  Then  the  king  and  queen  and 
Godoy,  the  actual  ruler  of  Spain,  resolved  on  flight ;  but  they 
were  stopped  by  an  insurrection,  and  the  king  was  compelled 
to  abdicate  in  favor  of  his  reputed  son.  Now,  this  son  was  not 
only  a  scoundrel,  but  a  coward ;  and  so,  instead  of  rallying  the 
nation  to  its  own  defense,  which  he  could  have  done,  he  tried 
to  make  terms  with  Napoleon.  The  result  of  all  this  was  that 
Napoleon  in  June  put  his  own  brother,  Joseph,  on  the  throne 
of  Spain.  The  Spanish  nation  rose  in  revolt,  and  for  some 
time  with  considerable  success.  Meanwhile,  Austria,  noting 
the  menace  to  the  Catholic  religion  and  the  Bourbon  family 
in  Napoleon's  invasion  of  Spain  and  Portugal,  and  taking 
advantage  of  the  large  army  that  Napoleon  was  required  to 
keep  there,  declared  war  against  him  in  the  spring  of  1809. 

Noting  the  gathering  of  the  storm  before  it  broke,  foresee- 
ing that  he  would  have  to  go  to  war  with  Austria,  and  realiz- 
ing the  desirability  of  crushing  all  armed  hostility  in  his  rear. 
Napoleon  himself  went  into  Spain,  and,  by  a  series  of  masterly 


NAPOLEON  231) 

and  rapid  movements  of  the  Napoleonic  kind,  crushed  out  all 
rebellion,  at  least  temporarily.  He  then  hastened  to  Paris  and 
prepared  to  turn  his  arms  on  Austria. 

He  was  informed  of  Austria's  declaration  of  war  while  in 
Paris  in  April,  1809,  and  left  the  following  day  to  join  his 
forces  in  Germany.  At  this  time,  Berthier,  who  had  been  an 
excellent  chief  of  staff,  but  did  not  prove  himself  an  excellent 
commander-in-chief,  was  in  command  of  the  French  forces 
near  Augsburg,  and  Davoust  was  at  Ratisbon,  about  seventy- 
six  miles  distant.  On  April  16  the  Austrian  Archduke  Charles, 
at  the  head  of  an  army  126,000  strong,  forced  the  passage  of 
the  Isar  River.  Had  he  possessed  the  strategic  ability  of  Na- 
poleon, he  would  instantly  have  crushed  Davoust,  who  had 
only  60,000  men,  before  Berthier  could  have  come  to  his  assist- 
ance, and  then  he  would  have  crushed  Berthier.  Instead  of 
this,  he  did  nothing  decisive.  Napoleon  arrived  on  the  scene 
at  four  o'clock  on  the  following  morning,  the  17th  of  April. 
He  instantly  united  the  scattered  forces  of  his  army.  In 
three  victorious  battles  on  three  successive  days,  April  20,  21, 
and  22,  he  divided  the  Austrian  forces,  and  then  drove  them 
back  on  the  Danube.  On  the  day  following,  April  23,  at  the 
end  of  an  extraordinary  five  daj'^s'  campaign,  the  Austrians 
withdrew  across  the  Danube,  having  lost  50,000  prisoners. 
Three  weeks  later  Napoleon  slept  in  the  palace  of  the  Austrian 
emperor  in  Vienna. 

But  on  IMay  21  and  22  he  fought  a  battle  with  the  Austrians 
near  the  villages  of  Aspem  and  Essling  that  gave  him  no  vic- 
tory, in  which  he  sustained  grave  losses,  and  that  not  only 
weakened  his  material  forces  but  greatly  impaired  his  repu- 
tation and  prestige.  On  the  night  of  May  21,  in  the  face  of 
a  strong  force,  he  crossed  the  Danube  River  on  temporary 
bridges  where  it  is  divided  by  the  island  of  Lobau.  For  a 
whole  day  the  French  fought  desperately  against  superior 
numbers,  cut  off  from  the  possibility  of  retreat  by  the  de- 
struction of  their  bridges.  In  the  night  reinforcements  were 
sent  across,  but  not  in  adequate  force;  so  that  after  another 


240  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

day  of  fighting  Napoleon  had  to  withdraw  from  the  left  or 
northern  side  of  the  Danuhe  to  the  island  of  Lobau.  He  re- 
tired defeated  and  with  a  knowledge  in  his  own  mind  and  in 
that  of  his  officers  that  he  had  not  planned  the  operation  with 
his  customary  foresight,  and  that  he  personally  had  left  the 
field  of  battle  under  circumstances  that  suggested  flight. 

The  French  and  Austrian  forces  confronted  each  other  for 
six  weeks,  separated  only  by  the  branch  of  the  Danube,  sixty 
yards  wide,  that  runs  north  of  the  island  of  Lobau.  The  Aus- 
trians  fortified  their  position  and  made  preparations  to  oppose 
the  French,  supposing  that  they  would  cross  by  the  original 
bridge  opposite  Essling,  which  Napoleon  had  ordered  to  be 
repaired.  But  Napoleon  had  the  bridge  repaired  in  order 
to  deceive  the  Austrians,  for  he  intended  to  cross  lower  down 
by  temporary  bridges  that  he  had  constructed.  He  crossed 
in  the  night  of  the  4th  and  5th  of  July,  took  the  Austrians 
at  a  disadvantage,  and  compelled  them  to  change  their  plans 
and  dispositions.  The  5th  was  spent  in  manceuvering,  but  at 
daybreak  of  the  6th  was  begun  a  pitched  battle  that  is  known 
as  the  battle  of  Wagram.  The  Austrians  succeeded  in  throw- 
ing back  the  French  left  wing,  and  almost  in  throwing  back 
the  right;  but  Napoleon  realized  that  in  order  to  accomplish 
this  they  must  have  weakened  their  center.  So  he  attacked 
their  center  with  artillery,  then  with  infantry,  and  then  with 
cavalry,  and  succeeded  in  breaking  through  their  line.  The 
Austrians  then  withdrew  from  the  field;  but  the  French  had 
lost  35,000  in  killed  and  wounded  and  were  unable  to  pursue. 

Though  this  battle,  as  well  as  the  previous  one,  had  been 
really  indecisive.  Napoleon  and  Austria  determined  to  con- 
clude the  war.  A  treaty  was  signed  on  October  14,  1809,  by 
which  Austria  agreed  to  discontinue  all  commercial  relations 
with  England,  and  to  recognize  all  the  changes  that  had  taken 
place  or  might  take  place  in  Spain  and  Portugal.  On  March 
10,  1810,  a  daughter  of  the  Emperor  of  Austria  became  the 
wife  of  the  Emperor  of  the  French. 

Meanwhile,  the  continental  blockade  of  England  was  caus- 


NAPOLEON  241 

ing  serious  embarrassment  not  only  in  England  but  to  certain 
continental  powers,  especially  Russia.  This  fact,  and  certain 
others  growing  out  of  the  treaty  of  Tilsit,  brought  about  a 
gradual  but  distinct  change  for  the  worse  in  the  feeling  be- 
tween Alexander  and  Napoleon.  After  two  years  of  prepa- 
ration a  rupture  occurred,  preceded  on  March  24,  1812,  by  a 
treaty  of  alliance  between  Russia  and  Sweden.  On  the  9th  of 
May  Napoleon  left  Paris  for  Dresden,  the  rendezvous  of  the 
allies  (France,  Austria  and  Prussia),  and  opened  negotiations 
with  the  Czar.  These  bearing  no  fruit,  he  declared  war  on 
the  22d  of  June  and  joined  his  army. 

This  army  was  the  finest  and  largest  that  France  had  ever 
sent  bej^ond  her  borders,  and  amounted  to  nearly  half  a  mil- 
lion combatants  and  1200  pieces  of  artillery'.  On  the  24th  the 
French  army  crossed  the  Niemen  River  without  opposition. 
On  the  28th  it  entered  Wilna,  the  ancient  capital  of  Lithuania. 
It  continued  to  advance,  still  without  meeting  opposition, 
until  the  28th  of  July,  when  it  entered  Witepsk.  Most  of  Na- 
poleon's generals  now  advised  him  to  go  no  farther;  but  Na- 
poleon could  not  be  dissuaded.  He  spent  the  first  two  weeks 
of  August  here ;  and  during  this  time  the  two  Russian  armies, 
which  Napoleon  had  been  able  to  disunite,  had  reunited  at 
Smolensk,  a  large  town  on  the  Dnieper  River  surrounded  with 
fortifications.  In  this  strong  position  the  Russian  commander- 
in-chief  resolved  to  make  a  stand.  Napoleon  had  endeavored 
to  get  Smolensk  before  the  enemy  did,  but  for  some  reason 
(possibly  because  Napoleon  himself  had  lost  some  of  his 
youthful  celerity)  he  had  failed  to  do  it,  and  it  now  became 
necessary  to  capture  the  place  against  a  strong  resistance. 
The  Russians  did  resist  for  one  day;  but  they  retreated  dur- 
ing the  night-time,  after  setting  fire  to  the  city  and  to  some 
immense  magazines.  Napoleon  took  possession  of  the  town, 
his  troops  much  disappointed  at  finding  only  a  heap  of  ruins 
where  they  had  expected  to  find  good  quarters. 

It  was  now  the  middle  of  August,  and  nearly  all  of  Napo- 
leon 's  generals  advised  him  to  stop  at  Smolensk,  reorganize  his 


242  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

army,  bring  up  provisions  and  reinforcements,  and  wait  until 
the  spring  before  renewing  the  campaign.  Knowing  the  Na- 
poleon of  previous  campaigns,  it  seems  incredible  that  Napo- 
leon should  have  failed  to  estimate  the  situation  correctly  and 
to  realize  that  the  strategy  of  the  Russians  was  Fabian,  and 
that  their  intention  was  to  lure  him  on  farther  and  farther,  in 
the  hope  that  his  army  would  eventually  be  reduced  by  sick- 
ness and  discouragement  and  starvation.  But  it  seems  clear 
that  by  this  time  the  originally  almost  perfect  judgment  of 
Napoleon  had  been  spoiled  by  an  excessive  confidence  in  him- 
self, and  that  the  essential  faculty  of  self-correction  had  been 
seriously  impaired.  Therefore  he  advanced  toward  Moscow. 
On  the  7th  of  September  he  came  to  battle  with  the  Russians 
who  were  posted  on  a  series  of  hills  near  the  village  of  Boro- 
dino, on  the  Moskwa  River,  a  position  covered  by  intreneh- 
ments  and  redoubts.  The  opposing  forces  were  nearly  evenly 
matched  numerically,  being  perhaps  130,000  each;  while  the 
Russians  had  the  advantage  of  position  and  the  French  had 
the  advantage  of  superior  leadership  and  experience.  The 
battle  was  bitterly  contested,  but  at  the  end  the  Russians  were 
forced  to  abandon  the  field,  beaten  at  all  points. 

On  the  14th  of  September  the  French  entered  Moscow,  and 
Napoleon  took  up  his  abode  in  the  Kremlin,  anciently  the  res- 
idence of  the  Czar.  Suddenly  fires  appeared  in  different  parts 
of  the  city.  Great  importance  was  not  at  first  attached  to 
them;  and  it  was  not  until  the  following  day  that  serious 
measures  were  taken  to  repress  them.  These  were  without 
avail,  and  by  the  16th  the  fire  had  increased.  On  succeeding 
days  it  continued  to  increase,  and  by  the  evening  of  the  20th 
nine  tenths  of  Moscow  was  in  ashes. 

It  seems  that  Napoleon  now  realized  the  magnitude  of  his 
danger.  His  decision  was  Napoleonic — to  advance  at  once  on 
St.  Petersburg.  But  his  generals  would  not  agree  to  this :  on 
the  contrary,  they  advised  retreat.  As  a  result,  neither  plan 
was  adopted,  and  the  French  remained  in  Moscow  for  forty 
days,  until  the  19th  of  October !    On  that  day  Napoleon  evac- 


NAPOLEON  243 

uated  Moscow  and  started  on  his  retreat,  the  horrors  of  which 
it  is  not  necessary  to  detail.  For  the  purpose  of  this  book  it  is 
simply  necessary^  for  us  to  realize  that  only  a  small  portion  of 
Napoleon's  army  ever  recrossed  the  Niemen  River,  that  the 
whole  expedition  was  a  disastrous  failure,  and  that  the  main 
cause  was  Napoleon's  refusal  (or  possibly  his  inability)  to 
estimate  the  situation  with  an  unbiased  mind.  Even  after  he 
had  been  caught  in  Moscow,  and  almost  up  until  the  day  he 
left  it,  he  was  continually  expecting  favorable  replies  to  pro- 
posals of  peace  that  he  had  forwarded  to  the  Czar. 

Napoleon  arrived  at  Paris  on  December  18.  He  found  that 
the  war  in  Spain  was  still  going  on,  not  altogether  unfavorably 
to  the  French,  and  that  the  Senate,  the  court  and  the  capital, 
though  dismayed  by  the  disaster  of  the  Russian  campaign, 
seemed  still  loyal  and  obsequious.  The  conscription  of  1813 
had  been  called  out,  and  a  formidable  army  would  soon  be  at 
his  disposal  to  check  any  advance  of  the  Russians. 

But  the  disaster  in  Russia  had  awakened  the  hopes  and 
stimulated  the  courage  of  all  the  cowed  but  resentful  govern- 
ments of  the  continent.  The  Emperor  Alexander,  in  a  proc- 
lamation of  February  10,  1813,  invited  the  members  of  the 
Confederation  of  the  Rhine  to  throw  off  the  yoke  of  France ; 
and  twelve  days  later,  in  another  proclamation,  he  called  on 
the  people  of  Germany  to  rise  en  masse  against  Napoleon. 
Prussia  responded  almost  at  once,  and  Sweden  followed. 
France  immediately  raised  a  large  army  for  the  coming  cam- 
paign, and  put  forth  the  utmost  energy  of  all  kinds.  The  sol- 
diers of  the  new  army,  however,  were  youthful  and  untrained. 

Napoleon  at  once  assumed  the  offensive,  and  on  "Slay  2 
engaged  the  allies  near  Lutzen.  In  this  battle,  as  in  nearly 
all  his  previous  ones.  Napoleon's  genius  as  a  tactician,  and  his 
ability  to  perceive  with  absolute  clearness  and  correctness, 
even  in  the  excitement  of  the  crisis  of  a  battle,  what  the  actual 
situation  was,  and  what  ought  to  be  done,  brought  victory  to 
his  standards.  The  battle  was  trained  principally  by  artillery, 
which  was  always  Napoleon's  favorite  arm;  but  the  victory 


244  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

could  not  be  pushed  as  far  as  would  otherwise  have  been  the 
case,  because  of  lack  of  sufficient  cavalry.  Some  military  writ- 
ers consider  the  victory  of  Lutzen  as  one  of  Napoleon's  great- 
est achievements,  because  he  gained  it  with  an  army  most  of 
whom  were  raw  and  half-disciplined  conscripts,  and  many  of 
whom  were  boys. 

Napoleon  then  occupied  Dresden,  threw  a  bridge  over  the 
Elbe  River,  and  marched  across  it  to  attack  the  Russians  and 
Prussians  at  Bautzen,  where  they  were  drawn  up  on  a  range 
of  hills.  The  whole  of  the  20th  of  May  was  spent  in  manoeu- 
vers  and  partial  combats,  and  on  the  21st  the  actual  battle 
was  fought.  Napoleon  began  it  by  simultaneous  attacks 
against  both  flanks  of  the  enemy;  but,  owing  to  the  great 
length  of  the  line  and  the  many  intervening  hills,  he  could  not 
watch  the  movements,  or  order  the  troops  under  his  own  imme- 
diate command  to  advance,  until  he  knew  that  the  movements 
on  the  flanks  were  successful.  While  waiting,  and  being  over- 
come by  fatigue,  he  fell  asleep.  At  length,  hearing  fresh 
sounds  of  artillery,  his  attendants  woke  him;  whereupon  Na- 
poleon, noting  the  direction  of  movement  of  the  sounds,  real- 
ized that  the  attack  was  successful,  and  instantly  ordered  his 
center  forw^ard.  This  attack  decided  the  fate  of  the  battle; 
but  the  enemy  retreated  in  order,  leaving  neither  cannon  nor 
prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  French,  an  accomplishment 
they  were  able  to  effect  partly  because  with  their  superiority 
in  cavalry,  and  partly  because  of  their  position. 

Napoleon  had  won  two  successes ;  but  his  army,  even  his  gen- 
erals were  tired  of  war ;  all  of  Europe  was  at  war  against  him, 
and  it  was  apparent  that  he  would  have  to  get  some  important 
reinforcements  or  be  defeated.  Under  these  conditions,  he 
agreed  to  an  armistice  on  June  4,  which  was  later  extended 
until  August  10.  He  received  reinforcements,  and  reorgan- 
ized his  army ;  but  so  did  his  enemies,  and  to  a  greater  degree. 
On  August  12  Austria  declared  war,  and  announced  her  adhe- 
sion to  the  alliance  of  Russia  and  Prussia.  Napoleon  took  his 
station  at  Dresden,  and  prepared  to  meet  attacks  which  he 


NAPOLEON  245 

divined  were  to  come  from  three  directions,  the  south,  the  east, 
and  the  north:  the  main  army  of  the  allies,  under  Schwartz- 
enburg,  from  the  south;  the  Prussians,  under  Blucher,  from 
the  east ;  and  the  Swedes,  under  Bemadotte,  from  the  north. 
The  allies  had  about  half  a  million  men,  and  Napoleon  about 
half  of  that  number. 

The  allies  by  this  time  had  learned  much  about  Napoleon's 
tactics,  and  their  generals  had  become  veterans  in  war.  One 
thing  they  had  learned  was  that  it  was  much  better  to  fight 
against  Napoleon's  lieutenants  than  against  Napoleon.  They 
could  fight  against  his  lieutenants  on  equal  terms;  but  no  one 
of  their  generals  could  equal  Napoleon  in  that  extraordinary 
rapidity  and  correctness  of  decision  and  action  which  enabled 
him  to  move  large  forces  more  rapidly  than  they,  and  concen- 
trate them  more  quickly  at  given  points. 

Napoleon  sent  Oudinot  and  then  Ney  to  meet  the  army  of 
the  north,  but  they  were  successively  defeated.  Napoleon 
himself  advanced  to  the  east  against  Blucher.  The  main  army 
of  the  allies  at  once  advanced  from  the  south,  expecting  to  get 
to  Dresden  before  Napoleon  could  return;  but  Napoleon  de- 
feated Blucher,  returned  with  incredible  swiftness  to  Dres- 
den, and  on  August  26  and  27  hurled  them  back.  Unfortu- 
nately for  Napoleon,  he  was  taken  suddenly  ill  at  the  end  of 
August  28,  and  had  to  delegate  the  pursuit  of  the  allies  to 
Vandamme.  Thereupon  Vandamme  was  himself  enveloped 
and  destroyed,  and  the  fugitives  escaped. 

Napoleon's  army  was  now  worn  down  to  a  dangerous 
degree,  and  he  was  threatened  by  three  powerful  enemies. 
Against  these  enemies  he  exercised  all  his  marvelous  tactical 
abilit}'  in  a  succession  of  endeavors  to  catch  one  force  alone, 
but  without  success.  Finally  he  ascertained  that  Schwartz- 
enburg  was  circling  around  from  the  south  to  get  between  him 
and  Paris ;  and  that  Blucher  was  marching  to  join  Bernadotte 
north  of  Napoleon,  and  with  Bemadotte  to  join  with 
Schwartzenburg.  Realizing  his  danger,  Napoleon  first  sent 
Murat  to  Leipzig  to  hold  Schwartzenburg  while  he  advanced 


246  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

upon  Blucher.  But  he  could  not  catch  Blucher.  Therefore, 
on  October  12,  after  some  days  of  perplexity,  he  reversed  his 
plan,  and  marched  to  Leipzig,  hoping  to  catch  Schwartzen- 
burg  before  he  was  joined  by  Bernadotte  and  Blucher.  On 
October  15  he  entered  Leipzig,  and  on  October  16  engaged 
Schwartzenburg  in  battle.  But  he  was  too  late,  for  during 
the  battle  Bernadotte  and  Blucher  came  up  and  made  their 
junction,  and  Napoleon  had  to  fight  with  all.  He  was  not 
tactically  defeated  in  the  terrible  battle  of  Leipzig  that  fol- 
lowed on  the  18th ;  but,  since  he  was  not  tactically  successful, 
he  was  strategically  defeated,  because  he  needed  a  tactical 
victory  to  save  him  from  a  future  defeat,  surrounded  as  he 
was  b}^  enemies  superior  in^force.  On  the  17th,  instead  of 
retreating,  which  he  then  might  have  done  in  safety,  he  sent  a 
letter  to  the  Austrian  emperor,  hinting  at  concessions.  But 
it  was  too  late :  his  enemies  realized  that  they  had  him  in  their 
power.  His  overtures  were  spurned,  and  the  allies,  now  re- 
inforced, defeated  him  strategically  on  the  18th,  and  forced 
him  to  retreat  toward  Paris. 

At  this  time  all  France  except  Napoleon  was  bent  on  peace. 
Had  Napoleon  not  lost  his  ability  to  estimate  a  military  situ- 
ation with  correctness,  had  he  not  become  poisoned  with  suc- 
cess, and  had  he  been  really  a  patriot  he  could  have  saved  his 
throne  then  by  agreeing  to  the  offers  of  the  allies  made  in 
December,  1813,  and  February,  1814.  In  fact,  when  in  Paris 
on  February  4  he  did  give  Caulaincourt  carte  hlanche  to  treat 
with  the  allies;  but  unfortunately,  he  soon  afterward  heard 
that  the  allies  had  divided  their  forces,  and  he  seized  what  he 
thought  was  an  opportunity  to  destroy  the  force  under 
Blucher,  then  marching  on  Paris.  At  first  he  was  successful, 
for  with  incredible  swiftness  and  force  he  gained  three  victo- 
ries in  three  battles  fought  on  February  10,  11,  and  14,  and 
stopped  Blucher 's  advance.  But  the  conditions  were  too  un- 
favorable for  even  the  genius  of  Napoleon  to  triumph  over; 
and  after  seven  weeks  of  wonderfully  swift  and  skilful  move- 
ments, directed  with  the  strategic  intention  of  cutting  the 


NAPOLEON  247 

allies'  communications  behind  them,  he  learned  that  the  in- 
vaders were  nearing  Paris,  and  turned  to  fight  a  decisive  bat- 
tle before  its  walls.  But  the  enemy  had  three  days'  start,  and 
before  Napoleon  could  reach  Paris,  Paris  had  surrendered. 
This  she  did  on  March  31. 

Even  then,  this  immeasurably  strong  and  resolute  man  re- 
fused to  admit  that  he  was  beaten,  and  tried  to  continue  the 
struggle.  But  his  marshals  would  no  longer  support  him,  and 
they  induced  him  to  accept  terms  of  unconditional  surrender 
which  they  had  tried  in  vain  to  have  made  more  gentle.  On 
April  6  Napoleon  renounced  the  thrones  of  France  and  Italy 
and  five  days  later  the  treaty  was  signed  awarding  him  the 
sovereignty  of  the  little  island  of  Elba,  a  body-guard,  and  an 
income.  Napoleon  drove  south  through  France,  through  a 
bitterly  resentful  population  and  took  up  his  residence  in  Elba. 

The  government  of  Louis  XVIII  started  in  with  a  policy 
that  was  so  flavored  with  the  surroundings  and  atmosphere  of 
the  old  regime  as  to  offend  most  of  the  people  almost  from  the 
beginning,  and  to  force  on  them  the  suspicion  that  all  the  evils 
which  they  had  fought  against  in  the  Revolution  were  about  to 
return,  and  that  all  the  sacrifices  of  the  nation  had  been  made 
in  vain.  So  great  a  spirit  of  antagonism  to  the  government 
did  this  bring  about  that  in  less  than  a  year  Napoleon  was 
able  to  leave  Elba  and  make  a  triumphal  journey  through 
France,  not  only  unopposed,  but  acclaimed,  and  to  take  up  his 
residence  in  the  Tuileries.  This  he  did  on  the  evening  oJ 
March  20,  1815,  borne  in  on  the  shoulders  of  the  populace,  the 
king  and  his  court  having  that  morning  fled. 

Napoleon  proceeded  with  his  customary  energy,  skill,  and 
success,  to  establish  himself  anew  upon  the  imperial  throne. 
To  make  himself  the  more  secure  he  assumed  the  role  of  lover 
of  peace  and  liberty,  caused  a  new  constitution  to  be  framed, 
secured  an  overwhelming  vote  in  favor  of  its  adoption,  and  on 
June  1  took  the  oath  to  obey  it,  in  the  presence  of  a  great 
assembly. 

But  Europe  rose  in  arms.    Great  Britain,  Austria,  Russia, 


248 


THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 


and  Prussia  bound  themselves  each  to  put  150,000  men  in  the 
field.  Their  forces  soon  began  to  gather.  The  first  gathering 
was  in  Belgium,  where  in  June  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  com- 
manding a  mixed  force  of  English,  Dutch,  Belgians,  and  Han- 
overians, and  Blucher,  commanding  a  homogeneous  Prussian 


if/V 

y 

„^7^!en^ 

/\\      \ 

xVS"               iSf*-"*^^           .                               //Ill 

,__5^        \  V'^' 

^^^^^M^ 

\    J 

^-^fMauA 

Wffe      y/^             \ 

—  r^ 

>^4wB3ne3 

/ChsLrlem^i^ 

J^rfenduT 

?k          /"^ 

From  Creasy's   "Fifteen   Decisive   Battles   of 

the    World." 
By   permission   of   Harper   &    Brothers. 

army,  held  a  long  and  straggling  line.  Napoleon  by  this  time 
had  gathered  an  army  of  about  125,000  men,  which  was  infe- 
rior to  the  combined  forces  of  Wellington  and  Blucher,  but 
which  he  nevertheless  decided  to  attack.  True  to  his  strategic 
principles,  he  acted  with  the  greatest  promptness,  realizing  the 
necessity  of  beating  Wellington  and  Blucher  before  the  Rus- 
sians and  Austrians  should  get  into  the  field,  and  also  of  de- 
feating either  Wellington  or  Blucher  before  they  could  unite. 
With  this  end  in  view,  he  took  his  station  near  Charleroi 
on  the  northern  side  of  the  Sambre  River,  but  on  June  15, 
though  he  had  hoped  to  be  there  on  the  14th.  He  was  ready 
to  give  battle  on  the  16th ;  but  by  this  time,  his  approach  had 


NAPOLEON  249 

become  known,  the  English  and  Prussian  armies  were  draw- 
ing together,  and  by  noon  Blucher  had  concentrated  90,000 
men  at  Ligny,  about  fifteen  miles  northeast  of  Charleroi,  while 
Wellington  was  hurrying  troops  to  Quatre  Bras,  about  fifteen 
miles  northwest  of  Ligny  and  perhaps  twenty  miles  north  of 
Charleroi. 

Brussels  was  about  thirty  miles  north  of  Quatre  Bras. 
Napoleon  did  not  know  that  Blucher  was  so  near  and  in  such 
force,  and  supposed  that  the  Prussians  were  widely  dispersed. 
Accordingly,  he  split  his  army  into  two  divisions,  giving  the 
left  wing  to  Ney,  with  orders  lo  push  on  toward  Quatre  Bras, 
and  the  right  wing  to  Grouchy,  with  orders  to  advance  toward 
Ligny ;  while  he  kept  command  of  a  large  reserve,  with  which 
he  could  reinforce  either  Ney  or  Blucher,  as  circumstances 
might  direct.  His  reckoning  was  upset  when  Grouchy  found 
Blucher  present  in  such  force ;  but  Napoleon  immediately 
made  up  his  mind  to  destroy  Blucher,  assisting  his  force  and 
Grouchy 's  with  additional  troops,  which  he  ordered  Ney  to 
send.  Napoleon  was  successful  in  his  battle  with  Blucher  at 
Ligny  on  June  16,  but  not  sufficiently  so — largely  because  a 
detachment  which  he  had  ordered  Ney  to  send,  Ney  called 
back  before  it  had  joined  in  the  battle.  Napoleon  then  over- 
estimated the  disaster  to  Blucher  which  he  had  inflicted,  and 
so  failed  to  exert  as  much  promptness  as  otherwise  he  would 
have  exerted  in  advancing  toward  Wellington,  who  had  fallen 
back  to  a  position  at  Waterloo  about  half  way  between  Brus- 
sels and  Quatre  Bras,  and  about  twelve  miles  west  of  Wavre, 
to  which  Blucher  had  retired.  This  was  unfortunate  for  him 
under  the  circumstances ;  for  Blucher  had  not  retreated  east- 
ward in  disorder,  as  Napoleon  imagined,  but  northward  and 
toward  Wellington  rather  than  away  from  him.  The  result 
was  that  during  the  battle  of  Waterloo,  on  June  18,  Blucher 
reinforced  Wellington,  and  turned  the  scale  decisively  and 
forever  against  Napoleon. 

Napoleon  saved  republicanism  in  France,  and  therefore  in 
Europe;  and,  though  he  left  France  smaller  than  he  had 


250  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

found  her,  and  impoverished  in  every  way,  he  left  the  French 
a  great  nation,  and  not  a  conquered  nation,  as  they  would 
have  been  if  Napoleon  had  not  lived.  Many  people  blame 
Napoleon  for  all  the  Napoleonic  wars.  Those  people  forget 
that,  although  Napoleon  was  responsible  for  the  later  wars, 
the  original  wars  were  caused  by  the  French  Revolution,  and 
that  the  Revolution  was  caused  by  the  misgovernment  of 
France  and  the  intelligence  and  spirit  of  the  French  people, 
who  rose  in  revolt  against  it. 

The  career  of  Napoleon  furnishes  perplexing  illustrations 
of  the  facts  that  a  m-an  who  is  primarily  a  great  strategist 
may  leave  no  permanent  monument  to  his  strategy,  but  many 
imperishable  monuments  to  his  statecraft;  that  a  man  may 
practise  strategy  (or  any  art)  with  surpassing  skill,  and  yet 
contribute  nothing  novel  or  useful  to  the  art  itself ;  that  a  man 
may  gain  all  that  the  world  can  give,  and  yet  close  his  life  in 
prison,  an  exile  from  the  world ;  that  a  man 's  life  as  a  whole 
may  be  an  ignominious  failure  regarded  from  a  personal 
standpoint,  and  yet  be  successful  in  a  high  degree,  regarded 
from  the  impersonal  standpoint  of  achievement  and  the  ad- 
vancement of  the  human  race ;  that  a  man  may  be  almost  des- 
titute of  morality  of  any  kind,  and  yet  do  more  good  to  the 
world  than  harm ! 

The  ultimate  influence  of  a  man  of  genius  does  not  depend 
so  much  on  the  personal  character  of  the  man  himself  as  on 
the  cause  in  which  his  genius  is  enlisted. 

Fortunately  for  the  world,  the  efforts  of  men  of  genius  have 
generally  been  enlisted  on  the  side  of  the  establishment  of 
good  government  and  the  attainment  of  the  greatest  good  for 
the  greatest  number. 


CHAPTER  XV 

FROM    NAPOLEON   TO    MOLTKE 

AFTER  Napoleon,  no  great  strategist  appeared  until 
the  conflict  between  Prussia  and  Austria  in  1866 
showed  that  another  genius  had  stepped  upon  the 
stage  of  war.  The  greatest  writer  on  strategy,  however, 
Clausewitz,  lived  in  this  interval  of  time. 

During  the  years  between  there  were  several  wars,  but  only 
two  that,  from  the  standpoint  of  strategy,  can  be  called  im- 
portant. These  were  the  Crimean  "War,  between  Russia  on 
^ne  side  and  Turkey,  France,  and  England  on  the  other,  in 
1854-55,  and  the  Civil  War  in  the  United  States,  which  was 
waged  in  1861-65.  Neither  war  was  fruitful  of  great  devel- 
opment in  strategy,  though  both  were  marked  with  those  in- 
stances of  valor  and  endurance,  and  that  persistence  of  efl^ort 
of  large  bodies  of  men  acting  together  in  a  common  cause,  that 
have  marked  most  wars.  Of  the  two,  the  Civil  War  was  the 
more  important  historically,  both  in  political  results  and 
strategical  illustrations. 

The  Civil  War  broke  out  in  the  early  part  of  1861.  From 
the  dawn  of  history  to  the  end  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  there 
had  been  a  gradual  and  progressive  change  in  the  methods  of 
warfare,  due  to  the  gradual  increase  in  the  number  and  the 
power  of  weapons  of  offense  and  the  material  adjuncts  of 
defense.  The  spears  and  bows  of  the  savage  had  been  devel- 
oped gradually,  but  only  as  bows  and  spears;  for  the  cross- 
bow was  only  a  bow,  and  the  catapult  and  ballista  did  not 
differ  greatly  from  it.  The  rude  skins  and  hides  used  on 
shields  and  in  protecting  covering  for  the  body  had  been 
gradually  developed  into  armor  and  shields  of  steel;  the  use 

251 


252  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

of  stone  and  bone  and  then  of  bronze  in  weapons  had  ^own 
into  the  use  of  steel;  battering-rams  for  occasional  use  had 
been  devised  and  used,  and  horses  had  come  into  employment 
in  the  form  that  we  call  cavalry.  The  greatest  single  change 
that  had  taken  place  in  warfare  had  been  caused  by  the  in- 
vention and  employment  of  the  gun. 

That  this  had  made  a  considerable  change  in  warfare  cannot 
be  denied;  nevertheless  the  change  that  it  made  in  strategy 
or  tactics  was  not  so  great  as  some  imagine,  because  it  merely 
increased  the  velocity  and  penetrative  power  of  projectiles 
and  the  range  over  which  they  could  be  fired.  The  armies  of 
Napoleon,  like  the  armies  of  Thutmose,  moved  by  means  of  the 
legs  of  men  and  horses ;  the  men  and  horses  in  Napoleon 's  day 
could  march  no  faster  than  those  in  the  days  of  Thutmose, 
and  both  the  men  and  horses  were  subject  to  identical  limita- 
tions as  to  distances  that  could  be  traversed,  and  had  identical 
requirements  in  the  way  of  food.  Almost  the  only  radical 
difference  in  Napoleon 's  time  lay  in  the  use  of  the  gun  and  the 
necessity  for  making  and  providing  powder.  There  was  far 
less  difference  between  the  conditions  of  warfare  on  land  in 
the  days  of  Thutmose  and  those  in  the  days  of  Napoleon,  than 
between  the  conditions  in  the  days  of  Napoleon  and  the  condi- 
tions now. 

On  the  sea  far  greater  changes  had  come  about.  There  was 
greater  difference  between  the  vessels  of  war  in  Napoleon's 
day  and  the  vessels  of  war  in  Thutmose 's  day  than  there  was 
between  the  armies  of  those  epochs.  In  Egypt's  palmy  days, 
though  occasional  trips  were  made  from  Egypt  or  Phoenicia 
even  into  the  Atlantic,  such  trips  were  rare  indeed;  but  in 
Napoleon's  time  large  fleets  of  men-of-war  cruised  over  all 
the  world,  showed  the  flags  of  their  countries  in  the  great 
naval  and  commercial  harbors,  and  transported  large  armies 
over  great  ocean  spaces. 

Between  the  time  of  Napoleon  and  the  breaking  out  of  our 
Civil  War  in  1861,  the  use  of  the  steamship,  and  of  mechanism 
generally,  had  become  established  in  all  civilized  countries 


FROM  NAPOLEON  TO  MOLTKE      253 

and  incorporated  in  the  daily  life.  The  electric  telegraph 
had  also  come  into  employment;  iron  and  steel  of  excellent 
quality  were  produced  in  quantities ;  steamships  traversed  the 
ocean  and  railroad  trains  traversed  the  land.  Muskets  and 
cannon  had  increased  in  size  and  power,  but  otherwise  had  not 
changed  materially. 

Because  of  the  progress  occasioned  by  the  development  of 
mechanism,  the  Civil  War  was  fought  under  conditions  that 
were  more  different  from  the  conditions  in  the  days  of  Napo- 
leon than  were  the  conditions  of  Napoleon  from  those  of 
Thutmose.  In  the  days  of  Napoleon,  and  before,  the  speed 
of  movement,  and  in  almost  an  equal  degree  the  speed  of  con- 
veying information  and  giving  instructions,  were  governed 
by  the  speed  of  movement  of  a  man  or  a  horse;  but  in  the 
Civil  War  large  masses  of  troops  were  transported  by  railroad 
trains,  and  information  and  instructions  were  transmitted  in- 
stantaneously by  the  electric  telegraph.  These  new  condi- 
tions profoundly  influenced  the  tactical  movements  of  troops, 
and  the  conditions  under  which  the  strategical  plans  of  each 
side  were  made  and  carried  out.  Nevertheless,  we  see  the  same 
strategical  efforts  to  outflank  the  enemy;  to  threaten  his  com- 
munications, his  supplies,  and  his  way  of  retreat;  to  confuse 
him  by  feints;  to  ascertain  his  weak  point,  and  to  launch  a 
powerful  blow  against  that  weak  point,  that  we  see  in  the 
operations  of  Napoleon  and  Thutmose,  and  in  those  of  the 
other  strategists  who  waged  war  in  the  intervening  centuries. 

The  weakest  point  in  the  situation  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Civil  War  was  on  the  Southern  side.  It  was  in  the  line  of 
communication  between  the  Confederacy  and  Europe,  by 
which  the  Confederacy  could  send  cotton  to  Europe,  and  re- 
ceive in  return  from  Europe  arms,  munitions,  and  supplies. 
This  point  was  made  weaker  by  the  fact  that  the  Confederate 
Navy  was  inferior  to  the  Union  Navy.  The  Confederates  en- 
deavored to  overcome  this  inferiority  by  rebuilding  and  ar- 
moring the  large  steam  frigate  Merrimac,  realizing  that  if 
they  could  produce  a  warship  that  could  easily  whip  any 


254  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

other,  she  and  similar  vessels  could  overcome  the  wooden  ves- 
sels of  the  Union  navy  and  prevent  any  blockade  of  the  South- 
em  coast.  They  realized  also  that  the  Mcrrimac  might  even 
shell  such  cities  as  New  York  and  Boston,  and  even  go  up  the 
Potomac  River  to  Washington. 

On  the  very  day  of  her  departure  from  the  Norfolk  Navy 
Yard,  March  8,  1862,  the  Merrimac  destroyed  almost  immedi- 
ately two  large  Union  men-of-war,  the  Cumherland  and  the 
Congress.  This  created  a  profound  and  justifiable  alarm  on 
the  Union  side,  and  a  corresponding' elation  on  the  Confederate 
side;  but  on  the  following  day  the  Monitor  defeated  the  Mer- 
rimac  and  ruined  the  whole  Confederate  scheme.  It  did  even 
more,  because  it  made  it  possible  for  the  North  to  do  to  the 
South  just  what  the  South  had  intended  to  do  to  the  North. 
It  did  even  more  still ;  because  it  showed  to  the  world  that  the 
United  States  had  produced  a  warship  that  was  superior  to 
any  other  then  existing  in  the  world,  and  that  could  be  re- 
produced in  large  numbers  in  a  short  time,  and  therefore  pre- 
vent any  foreign  power  from  enforcing  any  inimical  policy 
on  our  coast.  The  result  was  that  Great  Britain  did  not 
recognize  the  Confederacy,  a  fairly  close  blockade  of  the 
Southern  coast  was  maintained,  and  the  Confederate  army 
was  so  enfeebled  from  lack  of  munitions  and  supplies,  and  the 
Confederate  government  was  so  embarrassed  from  lack  of 
money,  that  the  South  had  to  give  up  the  struggle. 

The  profound  effect  of  the  battle  between  the  Monitor  and 
the  Merrimac  was  not  realized  at  the  time;  with  the  result 
that  the  main  effort  on  the  Union  side  was  devoted,  not  to 
breaking  down  the  weakest  part,  the  Confederate  line  of 
communication  to  Europe,  but  to  breaking  down  the  strongest 
part — the  Confederate  army.  Both  sides  fought  the  war  with 
splendid  courage,  energy,  and  devotion,  and  in  the  latter  part 
of  the  war  with  great  tactical  and  strategical  skill.  During 
the  major  part  of  the  war,  however,  most  of  the  participants, 
even  among  the  higher  officers,  were  so  inexperienced  and  un- 
trained (especially  on  the  Northern  side),  and  the  generals 


FROM  NAPOLEON  TO  MOLTKE      255 

were  so  interfered  with  (especially  on  the  Northern  side)  by 
the  President  and  by  an  ignorant  and  impulsive  public  opin- 
ion, that  they  were  somewhat  in  the  position  that  a  pugilist 
would  be  in,  if  some  bystander  or  bystanders  were  continually 
interfering  with  the  movements  of  his  ainns  and  legs. 

The  result  was  that  a  war  which  under  proper  strategical 
direction  would  have  been  decided  in  a  very  short  time,  and 
with  a  comparatively  slight  loss  of  blood  and  money,  dragged 
along  for  four  heart-rending  years. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

MOLTKE 

MOLTKE  was  made  chief  of  staff  of  the  Prussian 
army  in  January,  1858.  He  was  then  nearly  fifty- 
eight  years  old,  but  he  was  just  beginning  his  career. 

We  have  confined  our  attention  thus  far  in  this  book  to  the 
great  geniuses  in  strategy.  It  has  been  noticeable  that  the 
subordinate  commanders  under  those  great  geniuses  fre- 
quently sufi'ered  reverses  when  they  acted  on  their  own  re- 
sponsibility, and  not  under  the  immediate  direction  of  their 
superiors.  Napoleon  said,  in  speaking  of  his  generals: 
' '  They  do  not  understand  my  system. ' ' 

The  reason  doubtless  was  that  those  great  geniuses  saw 
something  in  war  that  their  subordinates  did  not  see:  they 
saw  something  that  they  had  not  been  trained  to  see,  that  no- 
body told  them  to  see,  and  that  they  were  able  to  see  solely 
with  that  peculiar  mental  eye  which  is  part  of  the  make-up  of 
— a  genius. 

The  sole  training  of  soldiers  and  sailors  of  aU  grades,  up  to 
the  time  of  Moltke,  had  been  in  wielding  the  weapons,  and  in 
manceuvering  the  organizations  of  men  who  wielded  the 
weapons  that  existed  at  the  time  they  lived.  A  soldier,  for 
instance,  had  been  taught  and  trained  to  handle  his  spear  or 
bow  or  sword  or  musket;  a  colonel  had  been  taught  and 
trained  (mostly  by  experience)  to  manoeuver  his  regiment  of 
soldiers ;  a  captain  in  the  navy  to  manceuver  his  ship ;  a  gen- 
eral to  manoeuver  his  division,  corps,  or  army ;  and  an  admiral 
to  manoeuver  his  squadron  or  fleet. 

The  training  in  armies  and  navies  has  always  been  better 
than  the  training  in  any  other  walks  of  life,  for  the  reason 

256 


MOLTKE  257 

that  they  have  been  the  only  vocations  for  which  a  nation  has 
selected  boys  and  youths,  and  given  them  a  system  of  training 
that  began  in  the  impressionable  period  of  youth  and  lasted 
throughout  their  lives ;  and  the  result  has  been  that  when  Alex- 
ander or  Caesar  or  Nelson  or  Napoleon  has  told  a  subordinate 
commander  to  take  his  command  to  a  certain  place,  and  to  ma- 
nceuver  it  in  such  and  such  a  way  against  such  and  such  an 
enemy,  the  duty  has  been  skilfully  performed. 

Yet,  if  one  of  those  subordinate  commanders  found  himself 
in  a  situation  in  which  he  himself  had  to  decide  alone  where  to 
take  his  force,  and  when,  and  what  to  do  with  it  when  he  got 
there,  he  found  himself  confronted  with  a  situation  that  he 
had  not  been  trained  to  meet.  He  was  in  a  situation  some- 
what like  that  in  which  a  soldier  would  be  who  had  been 
trained  to  be  merely  a  skilful  and  accurate  marksman,  and 
who  could  be  relied  upon  to  hit  a  target,  provided  that  lie  A^as 
told  what  target  to  fire  at  and  its  distance,  if  he  found  him- 
self on  a  battlefield  and  compelled  to  rely  on  himself  to  select 
the  best  target  and  ascertain  its  distance. 

Moltke  seems  to  have  conceived  the  idea  that  this  difficulty 
could  be  obviated  by  giving  officers  careful  training  in  tactics 
and  strategy  as  well  as  in  drills,  manoeuvers,  transportation, 
etc. ;  and  that,  though  it  was  ordinarily  supposed  that  the  only 
means  by  which  an  officer  could  receive  training  in  tactics  and 
strategy  was  in  actual  war,  that  nevertheless  a  great  deal  could 
be  accomplished  by  giving  officers  theoretical  instruction,  and 
imparting  to  them  what  Mahan  so  well  calls  "preparedness  of 
mind." 

To  this  end,  he  instituted  schools  of  instruction  in  which 
officers  were  exercised  at  solving  hypothetical  problems.  For 
instance,  you  are  at  such  and  such  a  place,  commanding  a 
force  composed  of  so  and  so;  the  instructions  you  have  re- 
ceived have  been  to  accomplish  so  and  so;  you  receive  unex- 
pected information  that  a  force  of  the  enemy,  consisting  of 
so  and  so,  was  seen  at  a  certain  place  at  a  certain  time,  march- 
ing in  such  and  such  a  direction.     What  do  you  do  ?     Moltke 


258  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

devoted  himself,  as  Colonel  Maude  expresses  it,  to  the  "adap- 
tation of  strategical  and  tactical  methods  to  changes  in  arma- 
ment and  the  methods  of  communication,  to  the  training  of 
staff  officers  in  accordance  with  the  methods  worked  out,  to 
the  perfection  of  the  arrangements  for  the  mobilization  of  the 
army,  and  to  the  study  of  European  politics  in  connection 
with  the  plans  for  campaign  that  might  become  necessary. ' ' 

Moltke  evidently  realized  in  1858  that  the  tremendous  im- 
provements produced  in  the  civilized  world  by  the  progress 
of  the  phj'sical  and  mechanical  arts  and  sciences,  especially 
in  the  matters  of  transportation,  communication,  and  im- 
proved weapons,  would  have  so  enormous  an  influence  in  the 
next  war  that  the  nation  that  entered  the  war  better  prepared 
to  utilize  those  improvements  than  her  enemy  would  have  a 
great  advantage.  He  also  realized  that,  though  a  savage 
tribe  could  get  ready  for  war  in  a  very  short  time,  and  though 
even  Napoleon  did  not  need  a  long  time  to  get  an  army  ready, 
yet  that  in  order  to  prepare  the  more  highly  specialized 
weapons  of  1858,  in  order  to  adapt  railroad  sj'stems  to  the 
transportation  of  armies,  in  order  to  organize  a  military  tele- 
graph service,  in  order  to  do  all  the  things  necessary  in  so 
thorough  a  way  that,  when  war  should  be  declared,  he  would 
have  an  actual  machine  actually  ready  for  his  purpose,  a  long 
and  laborious  period  of  preparation  in  advance  would  be  re- 
quired. 

It  has  often  been  said  that  Moltke  cannot  be  compared 
favorably  with  strategists  like  Napoleon,  for  the  reason  that 
in  the  three  wars  in  which  he  was  the  dominant  figure  he 
never  found  himself  in  situations  such  as  Napoleon  often 
found  himself  in,  and  from  which  Napoleon  extricated  him- 
self by  means  of  those  brilliant  and  rapid  combinations  and 
manoeuvers  that  made  Napoleon  Bonaparte  the  Napoleon  of 
history.  This  doubtless  is  true ;  and,  in  fact,  it  can  hardly  be 
imagined  that  a  man  seventy  years  old,  as  IMoltke  was  in  the 
war  between  France  and  Prussia,  would  be  capable  of  those 
feats  of  rapidity  and  endurance  that  characterized  the  youth- 


MOLTKE  259 

ful  Alexander  and  Napoleon.  But  it  may  be  pointed  out  that 
the  reason  why  Moltke  never  found  himself  in  such  situations 
was  that  Moltke  had  prevented  them  from  existing.  Moltke 
introduced  into  the  art  of  war  an  element  almost  entirely  new 
— the  element  of  peace  strategy,  the  element  of  utilizing  in 
peace  the  strategic,  tactical,  and  logistical  skill  of  officers,  in 
preparing  plans  of  campaign  for  all  probable  situations  or 
combinations  of  situations;  so  that,  when  war  broke  out,  in- 
stant action  was  possible — and  not  only  instant  action,  but 
orderly  action;  no  part  interfering  with  any  other  part,  but 
all  the  parts  working  together,  as  in  any  other  machine,  to 
the  attainment  of  one  purpose. 

The  result  was  that,  when  war  broke  out  with  France  in 
1870,  we  do  not  see  on  Prussia's  part  any  of  that  confused 
and  disordered  excitement,  any  of  that  hysterical  enthusiasm, 
any  of  that  wild  rush,  that  had  characterized  all  wars  before, 
except  possibly  the  wars  of  Julius  Casar.  On  the  contrary, 
we  see  a  tremendous  engine  start  smoothly  when  the  button 
is  pressed,  and  operate  smoothly  until  all  is  over.  Then  we 
see  it  quietly  come  to  rest  again.  There  was  a  neatness,  an 
artistic  finish,  in  Prussia's  wars  with  Austria  and  France  that 
had  never  been  seen  before.  There  was  also  a  promptness  in 
finishing  the  wars  that  had  never  been  seen  before.  Many 
wars  of  immeasurably  less  importance,  and  immeasurably  in- 
ferior in  the  number  and  power  of  the  forces  engaged,  have 
dragged  along  for  years ;  like  our  Civil  War,  and  in  a  greater 
degree  the  Thirty  Years'  War  that  made  Germany  almost  a 
wilderness.  But,  in  the  war  with  Austria,  the  Prussian  army 
defeated  the  Austrian  decisively  in  seventeen  days  after  war 
began;  and,  in  the  war  with  France,  the  Prussians  defeated 
the  French  at  Sedan  and  received  the  surrender  of  Napoleon 
III  in  forty-five  days. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  in  either  war  Prussia  was 
fighting  a  foe  supposed  to  be  inferior.  Austria  was  a  nation 
with  a  larger  population,  spread  over  a  larger  area,  and  with  a 
greater  historic  past.     France  was  governed  by  a  nephew  of 


260  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

Napoleon  the  Great,  and  was  esteemed  by  the  world  at  large 
to  be  the  greatest  military  country  on  the  earth.  Both  coun- 
tries had  large  armies,  and  these  armies  were  supposed  to  be 
highly  trained.  But  they  had  been  trained  under  old  meth- 
ods, and  Moltke's  army  had  been  trained  under  new  methods. 
The  soldiers  of  Austria  and  France  were  as  brave  and  endur- 
ing as  Moltke's,  and  the  officers  were  as  skilful  in  manoeuver- 
ing  the  various  units.  The  real  difference  lay  where  the  real 
difference  has  always  lain,  when  decisive  victories  have  been 
gained  over  equal  or  superior  forces :  it  lay  at  the  top.  The 
difference  lay  in  the  mind  that  prepared  Moltke's  army  and 
the  minds  that  prepared  the  Austrian  and  French  armies. 

The  condition  of  the  Austrian  and  French  armies  was  like 
the  condition  in  which  most  men  get  in  middle  life,  a  condi- 
tion of  approximate  automaticity.  By  middle  life  most  men 
have  "learned  their  jobs,"  and  proceed  thereafter  to  act  al- 
most automatically.  Most  men  leave  school  with  a  feeling  of 
relief  because  they  will  not  have  to  study  any  more.  The 
greatest  single  difficulty  that  the  Torpedo  Station  at  Newport 
had  to  meet,  and  later  the  War  College,  was  the  reluctance  of 
officers  to  "go  to  school."  This  reluctance  is  easily  under- 
stood, for  the  reason  that  studying  a  new  thing  always  re- 
quires a  degree  of  mental  effort  that  is  very  considerable; 
while  the  degree  of  mental  effort  required  later  in  utilizing 
the  knowledge  gained  is  much  less,  because  it  is  of  an  inferior 
order.  The  mental  effort  required  of  a  learner  at  the  piano  is 
greater  than  the  mental  effort  exercised  afterward  by  even 
the  most  expert  pianist.  The  difference  between  the  two  is 
related  to  the  difference  between  the  scientist  and  the  artist. 
For,  while  it  is  true  that  the  work  of  the  artist  is  the  only 
work  that  bears  fruit  that  is  apparent, — while  it  is  true  that 
it  is  the  finished  product,  the  beautiful  painting,  the  perfected 
invention,  the  decisive  battle,  that  appeals  to  men, — yet  never- 
theless the  mental  effort  that  originated  each  is  the  greatest 
mental  effort  involved  in  the  entire  performance,  and  under- 
lies each  one  as  its  foundation. 


MOLTKE  261 

Like  most  foundations,  also,  it  is  hidden  from  view  and 
usually  forgotten. 

Moltke  seems  to  have  realized  this;  but,  whether  he  did  or 
not,  he  actually  saved  the  minds  of  the  officers  of  the  Prussian 
army,  or  rather  those  of  a  certain  selected  group,  from  auto- 
maticity.  He  kept  their  minds  in  good  working  order,  and 
along  a  line  that  he  himself  prescribed;  with  the  result  that 
all  of  these  officers  became  strategists  and  tacticians  (though, 
of  course,  in  vary-ing  degrees),  and  could  be  relied  upon  to 
carry  out  a  task,  if  simply  told  what  the  task  was,  and  without 
the  need  of  receiving  detailed  orders  or  of  remaining  under 
supervision.  This  permitted  decentralization  to  a  degree  un- 
known before,  and  enabled  each  officer  in  high  command  to 
trust  each  subordinate  to  carry  out  the  details  of  his  indi- 
vidual task,  and  to  devote  his  own  time  and  attention  to  the 
great  problem  before  him  as  an  entirety. 

The  first  war  in  which  Moltke  became  engaged  after  assum- 
ing the  duties  of  chief  of  staff  was  the  one  with  Denmark, 
about  the  duchies  of  Schleswig  and  Holstein.  Into  the  merits 
and  demerits  of  the  Schleswig-Holstein  controversy,  out  of 
which  no  country  emerged  with  any  honor,  and  only  Prussia 
emerged  with  any  material  gain,  it  is  not  within  the  province 
of  this  book  to  enter.  As  a  result  of  the  controversy,  Prussia 
and  Austria  combined  against  Denmark,  and  sent  an  army  of 
45,000  men  into  Holstein,  which  is  south  of  Schleswig,  as 
Schleswig  is  of  Denmark.  Moltke  was  a  firm  believer  in  the 
efficacy  of  enveloping  operations,  and  an  advocate  of  using 
them  whenever  a  preponderance  of  force  or  of  skill  rendered 
them  safe.  He  therefore  recommended  a  plan  that  entailed 
a  movement  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  Danes,  pointing  out 
that  a  mere  victory  over  them  would  enable  them  to  retreat  to 
the  islands  of  Alsen  and  Funen,  where  they  would  be  better 
fitted  to  resist,  because  they  could  receive  the  assistance  of 
their  fleet.  He  was  not  sent  with  the  invading  army,  however, 
and  his  plan  was  mismanaged  in  execution,  with  the  result 
that  the  Danes  did  retreat  to  the  islands.    Moltke  was  sent  to 


262  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

the  front  on  April  30,  as  chief  of  staff  to  the  commander-in- 
chief;  and,  on  his  advice,  a  system  of  operations  was  at  once 
instituted,  whereby  the  island  of  Alsen  was  attacked  and  cap- 
tured. As  a  consequence,  a  treaty  of  peace  was  soon  after- 
ward signed,  by  which  the  King  of  Denmark  ceded  all  his 
claims  on  Schleswig  and  Holstein,  as  well  as  Lauenberg,  to  the 
Emperor  of  Austria  and  the  King  of  Prussia. 

But  the  resulting  situation  was  obviously  only  a  temporary 
one,  because  it  aggravated  the  already  disturbed  condition 
among  the  German  states,  and  brought  about  additional  causes 
of  friction  between  Austria  and  Prussia.  Austria  had  long 
regarded  Pinissia  as  a  too  aggressive  minor  state,  and  had  re- 
sented her  rapidly  rising  importance,  with  its  threat  against 
Austria  as  the  dominant  power  of  Germany;  while  Prussia 
regarded  Austria  as  an  enemy  of  the  movement  to  unite  Ger- 
many. During  the  two  years  that  followed  the  peace  with 
Denmark,  actual  enmity  rapidly  developed  between  Prussia 
and  certain  North  German  states  on  one  side,  and  Austria  and 
the  South  German  states  on  the  other  side. 

Even  in  Prussia,  however,  and  even  in  Berlin,  and  even  in 
the  army,  there  was  no  enthusiasm  for  war  with  Austria,  and 
little  approval  of  the  aggressive  policy  of  the  government. 
But  the  government,  inspired  by  Bismarck,  persisted  even  to 
the  point  of  increasing  the  army  and  ordering  supplies  and 
munitions  without  authority  from  Parliament.  On  the  Aus- 
trian side,  on  the  contrary,  while  perhaps  there  was  no  en- 
thusiasm, there  was  perfect  unity  of  purpose:  for  both  Aus- 
tria and  the  people  of  South  Gennany  were  highly  embittered 
against  the  Prussians.  The  fact,  therefore,  that  Prussia  tri- 
umphed in  the  war,  while  the  forces  on  the  two  sides  were 
virtually  equal,  was  not  because  of  national  unity  on  the  one 
side  and  lack  of  it  on  the  other,  but  because  of  superior 
strategy — Moltke  's  strategy. 

On  June  15,  1866,  Prussia  demanded  of  Hanover,  Hesse, 
and  Saxony  that  they  should  restore  their  armies  to  a  peace 
standard  and  remain  neutral,  under  penalty  of  losing  their 


MOLTKE  ,      263 

independence.  These  countries  rejected  this  demand,  and  the 
next  day  Prussia  invaded  all  of  them.  This  act  began  the 
war.  Moltke  had  acquired  considerable  prestige  in  the  war 
with  Denmark,  with  the  result  that  his  plan  of  operations 
against  Austria  was  accepted.  Like  most  great  plans,  it  was 
simple  in  principle,  but  worked  out  carefully  in  detail;  the 
details  conforming  to  the  general  plan,  and  the  general  plan 
being  of  such  a  nature  that  practical  details  could  be  worked 
out  successfully,  and  yet  conform  to  the  general  plan. 

By  this  general  plan,  the  Prussians  were  to  advance  at  once 
toward  the  south  into  Bohemia,  on  the  northern  edge  of  Aus- 
tria, with  the  major  part  of  their  force,  leaving  only  a  com- 
paratively small  force  of  about  48,000  men  to  deal  with  the 
states  of  North  and  South  Germany.  To  carry  it  out  would 
be  to  violate  what  has  been  deemed  by  some  to  be  a  cardinal 
principle  of  strategy — that  one  must  not  leave  an  enemy  in 
his  rear.  But  Moltke 's  intimate  knowledge  of  all  the  military 
and  political  conditions  enabled  him  to  perceive  that,  in  the 
situation  as  it  actually  existed  at  the  time,  taking  into  ac- 
count the  inferior  training,  equipment,  and  unreadiness  of 
the  Austrian  army,  he  could  probably  inflict  a  fatal  blow  on 
Austria  in  a  very  short  time,  and  that  then  the  hostile  Ger- 
man states  would  be  very  glad  to  yield. 

One  feature  of  the  campaign  against  Austria  that  strate- 
gists and  writers  on  strategy  are  apt  to  ignore  is  the  fact  that 
the  Prussians  had  had  the  foresight  to  adopt,  some  time  be- 
fore, a  new  invention — a  breech-loading  "needle-gun";  and 
that  the  Austrians  had  not  had  that  foresight.  Strategists 
and  writers  on  strategy  have,  in  most  cases,  shown  a  tendency 
to  belittle  the  effect  of  mechanical  and  scientific  improvements 
in  weapons  and  appliances,  and  to  give  all  the  credit  for  vic- 
tories to  the  manoeuvering  of  the  forces  engaged,  both  in  the 
strategical  operations  preceding  battle  and  in  the  tactical 
operations  during  battle.  This  is  natural,  of  course;  but,  at 
the  same  time,  it  may  be  pointed  out  that,  inasmuch  as  the 
only  effect  of  a  gun  in  the  hands  of  a  soldier  is  to  hit  an 


.264  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

enemy  with  its  bullet,  a  ^n  in  the  hands  of  a  soldier  which 
is  twice  as  good  as  the  gun  in  the  hands  of  his  opponent  makes 
him  almost  as  effective  as  two  against  that  other  soldier;  and 
that,  since  to  get  a  virtual  preponderance  in  ability  to  hurt 
an  enemy  is  the  ultimate  aim  of  strategy,  the  adoption  of  an 
improved  weapon  is  just  as  much  an  effort  of  strategy  as  is 
the  adoption  of  any  line  of  march,  or  combination  of  marches, 
or  other  movements  in  actual  operations.  The  adoption  of  a 
new  weapon  in  time  of  peace  is,  of  course,  an  operation  of 
preparation  strategy,  rather  than  of  war  strategy;  but  the 
fruit  of  Moltke's  life  was  to  make  preparation  strategy  more 
important  than  war  strategy. 

The  Prussians  invaded  Saxony  at  once,  occupying  Dresden 
and  Leipzig  on  June  18  and  19.  They  then  advanced  in  five 
principal  columns,  which  later  combined  in  three,  to  form  the 
Army  of  the  Elbe  on  the  west,  the  First  Army  under  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  in  the  center,  and  the  Second  Army  under 
the  Crown  Prince  on  the  east.  The  armies  advanced  over 
difficult  mountain  paths,  but  were  not  molested  until  they 
emerged  from  them  into  the  plains  of  Bohemia.  The  forces 
on  both  sides  were  about  250,000,  the  Prussian  being  some- 
what more  numerous,  and  much  better  armed,  supplied,  or- 
ganized, and  trained.  A  number  of  minor  battles  occurred 
in  the  latter  part  of  June,  caused  by  unsuccessful  attempts 
of  the  Austrians  to  prevent  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  from  unit- 
ing with  the  First  Army,  and  to  prevent  the  junction  with 
them  of  the  Second  Army.  But  on  June  30  the  Army  of  the 
Elbe  and  the  First  Army,  with  the  King  of  Prussia  person- 
ally in  command,  appeared  before  the  enemy,  who  were  con- 
centrated near  the  fortress  of  Koniggratz  and  the  village  of 
Sadowa;  while  the  Second  Army,  under  the  Crown  Prince, 
was  close  at  hand  to  the  eastward. 

The  Austrian  army  was  drawn  up  with  its  back  to  the 
Elbe.  Their  position  had  been  carefully  strengthened,  but 
its  selection  seems  somewhat  unwise,  from  the  fact  that  the 
river  was  directly  behind  them  and  made  retreat  more  diffi- 


MOLTKE  265 

cult  for  the  Austrians  if  they  should  be  defeated.  About 
midnight  of  July  2,  the  Prussian  king  resolved  to  attack 
early  on  the  following  day,  and  sent  an  order  to  the  Crown 
Prince  to  assault  the  enemy's  right  flank  as  soon  as  prac- 
ticable— about  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  as  estimated.  In 
the  early  forenoon  the  Prussian  main  force,  commanded  by 
the  king  himself,  consisting  of  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  and  the 
First  Army,  made  a  determined  frontal  attack,  which  con- 
tinued without  intermission  until  noon,  by  which  time  the 
supply  of  artillery  ammunition  was  running  low;  and  yet  no 
ground  had  been  gained.  The  situation  of  the  Prussians  was 
much  like  that  of  the  English  under  Wellington  at  Waterloo, 
when  Wellington  exclaimed:  "Oh,  for  night  or  Blucher!" 
And,  as  at  Waterloo,  the  looked-for  reinforcements  did  come 
in  on  the  enemy's  right  flank,  and  turned  a  doubtful  and  ter- 
rible contest  into  a  decisive  victory. 

The  victory  was  so  decisive  that  Austria,  the  acknowledged 
dominant  power  of  Germany  for  many  centuries,  signed  an 
armistice  only  nineteen  days  afterward,  confirmed  it  on  August 
23  by  the  Treaty  of  Pragaie,  consented  to  the  dissolution  of 
the  South  German  Confederation  and  virtually  accepted  all  the 
changes  proposed  by  Prussia.  Prussia  forthwith  formed  the 
North  German  Confederation,  which  made  all  the  North  Ger- 
man states  virtually  her  subject  states,  with  their  foreign  af- 
fairs under  her  control  and  their  military  forces  under  her 
command. 

The  next  war  in  which  Moltke  was  concerned  was  one  with 
France.  Napoleon  III  was  emperor,  and  maintained  himself 
in  power  by  his  skilful  and  unscrupulous  catering  to  the 
vanity  and  love  of  pleasure  of  the  French  people,  especially 
the  mob.  The  brilliant  success  of  the  French  armies  in  the 
Crimean  and  Italian  wars,  the  beauty  of  the  empress,  and  the 
splendor  of  the  Exposition  held  in  Paris  in  1867,  at  which  the 
emperor  entertained  the  Emperor  of  Russia  and  the  King  of 
Prussia  as  his  guests,  convinced  the  French  (and  almost  the 


266  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

whole  civilized  world)  that  France  was  the  greatest  nation  in 
Europe  and  Napoleon  III  the  greatest  sovereign. 

Outwardly  France  was  a  very  great  and  highly  civilized 
nation,  and  the  French  army  the  equal  of  the  armies  of  Napo- 
leon the  Great.  But  the  government  was  corrupt,  the  people 
kept  in  good  humor  by  false  pretenses,  and  the  whole  struc- 
ture ready  to  fall  at  the  first  determined  blow.  The  French 
people,  believing  the  government  strong  and  the  army  the  best 
in  the  world,  thirsted  for  glory  and  looked  with  jealousy  on 
the  rising  power  of  Prussia.  The  emperor  felt  the  same  jeal- 
ousy; but  it  is  hardly  conceivable  that  he  did  not  know  that 
the  German  army  was  superior  to  the  French,  both  in  num- 
bers and  training.     It  is  certain  that  Moltke  knew  it. 

Into  the  details  of  the  quarrel  that  brought  about  the  rup- 
ture it  is  not  necessary  to  enter  here.  The  only  fact  that  need 
be  stated  is  that  on  July  19,  1870,  France,  the  entire  nation 
enthusiastically  concurring,  declared  war  against  Prussia. 

Moltke  had  been  making  plans  for  a  war  with  France  ever 
since  1857,  and  had  perfected  arrangements  for  the  mobiliza- 
tion and  transport  of  the  army  to  the  frontier  between  France 
and  Germany,  which  were  revised  annually  to  meet  all  the 
changing  conditions  that  were  continually  taking  place;  with 
the  result  that  when,  on  July  15,  he  received  the  secret  order 
to  mobilize  the  army,  his  plans  were  fully  ready.  They  were 
followed  afterward,  with  only  such  changes,  from  time  to 
time,  as  the  situations  that  arose  demanded.  But  so  well  had 
Moltke  been  able  to  divine  what  the  French  opening  move- 
ments would  be,  by  reason  of  his  intense  study  of  the  problem 
in  all  its  phases,  that  the  changes  necessitated  were  few  and 
easily  made. 

On  the  other  hand,  France,  despite  the  military  ardor  of 
her  people,  their  intense  desire  for  glory,  their  hatred  of  Prus- 
sia, and  their  knowledge  that  a  war  must  come  some  day,  was 
wholly  unprepared.  The  French  Minister  of  War  reported  to 
the  emperor  that  the  army  was  ready  "to  the  last  button  of 


MOLTKE  267 

the  gaiters."  Subsequent  events  proved  that  the  army  was 
not  ready,  and  that  he  did  not  even  know  that  it  was  not 
ready ;  while  the  phrase  he  used  showed  that  his  thoughts  had 
been  more  engaged  by  the  material  requirements  of  the  army 
than  by  its  strategic  plans  of  operations. 

The  emperor  assembled  150,000  men  at  Metz,  100,000  at 
Strasburg,  and  50,000  at  Chalons,  the  three  places  constituting 
points  of  a  triangle  on  the  frontier  east  of  Paris ;  Metz  being 
the  northern  point,  Strasburg  the  southern  or  southeastern 
point,  and  Chalons  the  western  point.  Moltke  concentrated 
nearly  the  entire  German  army  in  one  locality  south  of 
Mayence.  Napoleon's  general  plan  was  to  go  in  person  with 
the  150,000  from  Metz  to  Strasburg,  combine  with  the  100,000 
there,  and  then,  with  the  combined  force  of  about  250,000,  to 
invade  Germany  in  the  vicinity  of  Strasburg.  The  plan  of 
IMoltke  was  to  resist  the  invasion  that  he  expected  would  most 
probably  be  in  that  vicinity;  and,  in  case  he  was  ready  to 
strike  sooner,  to  advance  into  France,  and  then  to  wheel  his 
entire  force  to  the  right  and  north,  so  as  to  drive  the  French 
north  and  break  their  communications  with  Paris.  The  Prus- 
sian army  consisted  of  three  armies,  aggregating  considerably 
more  than  400,000  men,  besides  which  were  about  100,000  that 
were  left  behind  in  Prussia,  in  case  Austria  should  seize  the 
opportunity  to  attack. 

The  Prussian  plans  were  so  much  the  more  complete,  and 
the  arrangements  for  carrying  them  into  effect  were  so  much 
the  more  thorough,  that  the  result  became  apparent  before  a 
battle  had  been  fought ;  for  the  Prussians  advanced  actually 
into  France  before  the  French  had  got  their  forces  together. 
The  first  important  battle  was  on  August  6  at  Worth,  a  few 
miles  inside  the  frontier  on  the  French  side,  in  which  the 
crown  prince,  in  command  of  the  Third  Army,  attacked  the 
forces  of  Marshal  MacIMahon  before  MacMahon  had  collected 
them  all  in  readiness,  and  defeated  him  so  thoroughly  that 
the  retreat  became  a  rout,  and  many  French  fled  into  Stras- 
burg.    This  battle  was  brought  on  prematurely,  and  not  ex- 


268  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

actly  according  to  Moltke's  plans;  for  he  had  desired  that 
MacMahon's  retreat  should  be  cut  off,  and  MacMahon  forced 
to  surrender.  On  the  same  day,  a  battle  was  fought  at 
Spicheren,  farther  to  the  north  and  west,  which  also  resulted 
favorably  to  the  Prussians,  and  which,  with  the  battle  of 
Worth,  effectually  prevented  any  junction  between  MacMahon 
and  Bazaine.  The  emperor  was  then  with  Bazaine  at  Metz; 
but  he  left  Metz  on  August  14,  and  joined  MacMahon. 

The  Germans  now  made  a  general  advance  of  all  three 
armies  into  France.  Bazaine  endeavored  to  retire  from  Metz 
toward  Paris;  but  the  First  Army  overtook  his  rear  guard, 
and  brought  on  a  battle  which,  though  minor,  destroyed  Ba- 
zaine's  last  opportunity  to  retreat,  without  exposing  his  flank 
to  attack.  Meanwhile  the  Second  Army  had  crossed  the 
Moselle  River,  on  which  Metz  was  situated,  and  moved  oppo- 
site Metz.  A  series  of  operations  now  took  place,  which  cul- 
minated near  Gravelotte,  on  August  18,  in  one  of  the  most 
important  battles  of  history.  In  this  battle  the  armies  had 
changed  the  directions  in  which  they  faced,  the  French  facing 
westward  and  the  Germ'ans  facing  eastward;  a  change  that 
made  the  prospect  for  the  defeated  party  more  difficult  than 
it  would  otherwise  have  been.  The  French  fought  the  battle 
with  their  accustomed  and  hereditary  ardor  and  courage ;  but 
they  were  utterly  routed  nevertheless;  their  army  being 
broken  and  defeated,  and  Bazaine  forced  to  withdraw  his 
army  of  nearly  200,000  men  within  the  walls  of  Metz.  It  is 
to  be  noted  that  Moltke  had  manceuvered  his  armies  in  such  a 
way  as  to  force  Bazaine  into  Metz,  in  order  that  he  might 
hold  him  securely  there,  and  have  the  rest  of  his  army  free 
to  march  to  Paris. 

Moltke  (or  more  exactly  the  king  on  Moltke's  recommenda- 
tion) detailed  about  160,000  men  to  detain  Bazaine  in  Metz, 
and,  with  the  rest  of  the  army,  prepared  to  advance  toward 
Paris.  But  the  amazing  news  then  came  that  MacMahon  was 
marching  by  a  northerly  route  to  the  relief  of  Metz,  thus  leav- 
ing the  way  to  Paris  entirely  open :  a  plan  devised  by  the 


MOLTKE  269 

Prime  Minister  Palikao,  indorsed  by  the  Empress  Eugenie, 
and  opposed  strongly  by  MaciMahou!  As  soon  as  Moltke  be- 
came convinced  that  the  information,  though  incredible,  was 
nevertheless  correct,  he  determined  to  move  to  the  north  in- 
stead of  on  Paris,  and  attack  MacMahon  before  he  could  unite 
with  Bazaine.  In  this  he  was  successful,  with  the  result  that 
MacMahon  was  brought  to  battle  near  Sedan  on  September  1, 
while  virtually  surrounded,  and  forced  to  surrender  his  entire 
command.  The  French,  repulsed  wherever  they  attempted  to 
break  through  the  ring  around  them,  were  driven  into  the 
little  fortress  of  Sedan,  the  emperor  among  them.  He  sur- 
rendered with  the  rest  on  September  2. 

On  August  31  and  September  1  Bazaine  made  a  desperate 
effort  to  break  the  German  line  round  Metz,  in  order  to  join 
MacMahon ;  but  the  sortie  was  unsuccessful,  and  he  was  com- 
pelled to  withdraw  again  into  what  had  become  the  prison  of 
his  army. 

The  war  had  now  been  decided,  but  the  French  people  were 
not  sufficient!}^  versed  in  strategy  to  realize  it;  and  an  awful 
amount  of  useless  loss  of  life  resulted.  The  Germans  marched 
on  Paris  and  besieged  it,  meanwhile  maintaining  the  siege  of 
Metz,  realizing  that  the  fall  of  both  cities  was  merely  a  ques- 
tion of  time.  The  French  showed  an  amount  and  a  degree  of 
skill  and  courage  and  devotion  that  would  have  been  of  the 
highest  possible  value,  if  exercised  during  the  years  preceding 
the  war,  but  which  now  were  worse  than  useless,  and  resulted 
merely  in  a  series  of  disastrous  minor  battles,  and  in  humilia- 
tion and  suffering  of  all  kinds. 

Metz  surrendered  on  October  27,  the  surrender  including 
173,000  men  and  three  marshals.  The  people  of  Paris  de- 
fended their  city,  and  the  other  people  of  France  harassed 
the  besiegers  until  January  26,  1871,  when  hostilities  were 
suspended.  On  January  28  an  armistice  was  signed,  and  on 
February  26  a  preliminary  treaty  of  peace. 

The  extraordinary  quickness  and  completeness  of  the  Ger- 
man victory  was  due  almost  wholly  to  the  superior  training 


270  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

in  strategy  of  the  German  officers.  Henderson  says :  * '  Even 
the  French  generals  of  divisions  and  brigades  had  had  more 
actual  experience  [in  war]  than  those  who  led  the  German 
army  corps.  Compared  with  the  German  rank  and  file,  a 
great  part  of  their  non-commissioned  officers  and  men  were 
veterans,  and  veterans  who  had  seen  much  service.  Their 
chief  officers  were  practically  familiar  with  the  methods  of 
moving,  supplying,  and  manoeuvering  large  masses  of  troops; 
their  marshals  were  valiant  and  successful  soldiers.  And  yet, 
the  history  of  modern  warfare  records  no  defeats  so  swift  and 
complete  as  those  of  Koniggratz  and  Sedan.  The  great  host 
of  Austria  was  shattered  in  seven  weeks ;  the  French  imperial 
army  was  destroyed  in  seven  weeks  and  three  days ;  and  to  all 
intents  and  purposes  the  resistance  they  had  offered  was  not 
much  more  effective  than  that  of  a  respectable  militia.  But 
both  the  Austrian  and  the  French  armies  were  organized  and 
trained  under  the  old  system.  Courage,  experience,  and  pro- 
fessional pride  they  possessed  in  abundance.  Man  for  man  in 
all  virile  qualities,  neither  officers  nor  men  were  inferior  to 
their  foes.  But  one  thing  their  generals  lacked,  and  that  was 
education  for  war.  Strategy  was  almost  a  sealed  book  to 
them."  Also:  "Moltke  committed  no  mistake.  Long  be- 
fore war  had  been  declared,  every  possible  precaution  had 
been  made.  And  these  included  much  more  than  arrange- 
ments for  rapid  mobilization,  the  assembly  of  superior  num- 
bers completely  organized,  and  the  establishment  of  maga- 
zines. The  enemy's  numbers,  armaments,  readiness,  and  effi- 
ciency had  been  submitted  to  a  most  searching  examination. 
Every  possible  movement  that  might  be  made,  however  un- 
likely, had  been  foreseen;  every  possible  danger  that  might 
arise,  however  remote,  discussed  and  guarded  against."  Also : 
"That  the  Prussian  system  should  be  imitated,  and  her  army 
deprived  of  its  monopoly  of  high  efficiency,  was  naturally 
inevitable.  Every  European  state  has  to-day  its  college,  its 
intelligence  department,  its  schools  of  instruction,  and  its 
course  of  field  manoeuvers  and  field  firing. ' ' 


MOLTKE  271 

The  unprecedented  despatch  with  which  this  war  and  the 
war  with  Austria  were  settled,  the  long  period  of  time  during 
which  the  causes  operated  that  brought  on  the  wars,  the  facts 
that  the  armies  had  had  nothing  to  do  with  bringing  on  the 
wars,  and  that  the  wars  had  been  brought  on  by  the  people 
themselves,  bring  to  our  minds  the  analogy  so  often  pointed 
out  between  the  usefulness  of  surgery  and  the  usefulness  of 
war.  In  both  cases,  causes  that  are  harmful  to  healthful  liv- 
ing bring  about  an  unhealthful  condition,  and  in  both  cases 
this  unhealthful  condition  is  removed  (or  the  attempt  is  made 
to  remove  it)  by  means  that  are  very  painful  and  very  bloody, 
and  that  leave  the  patient  in  a  weakened  condition  for  a  con- 
siderable time  thereafter.  If  this  analogy  be  at  all  correct, 
we  are  forced  to  admit  that  any  means  that  can  quicken  the 
surgical  operation  in  one  case,  or  the  progress  of  war  in  the 
other  case,  must  be  beneficial. 

There  seems  no  reasonable  doubt  that  Moltke  did  more  to 
shorten  wars  than  did  any  other  man  in  history.  It  is  true 
that  the  shortening  of  the  wars  has  been  paid  for  by  long  and 
laborious  and  expensive  periods  of  preparation.  Whether  the 
shortening  of  w^ars  is  worth  the  cost  or  not,  we  have  no  exact 
means  of  determining;  but  those  people  who  inveigh  against 
the  "burden  of  militarism"  should,  in  all  fairness,  realize 
that,  without  that  burden,  the  world  would  be  in  the  position 
that  it  was  in  when  protracted  wars  like  the  Hundred  Years' 
War  and  the  Thirty  Years'  War  cursed  the  human  race. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

PROM    MOLTKE   TO    TOGO 

SINCE  Moltke,  no  genius  in  the  art  of  strategy  seems  to 
have  arisen,  and  no  great  contributor  to  its  science  has 
been  recognized,  though  several  wars  have  occurred. 
It  is  possible,  however,  that,  after  the  records  of  the  present 
war  shall  have  been  gone  over  carefully,  it  may  be  found  that 
a  strategist  really  great  was  on  one  side  or  the  other. 

The  first  important  war,  from  the  standpoint  of  strategy, 
was  that  between  China  and  Japan,  which  was  waged  in  the 
years  1894  and  1895.  It  is  important  mainly  because  it  illus- 
trates the  fact  that,  if  a  nation  has  the  military  instinct  and 
character,  it  can  in  a  short  while  attain  proficiency  in  the 
technical  arts  of  modem  war  and  become  a  great  fighting 
force.  Only  forty  years  before,  China  and  Japan  had  been 
on  about  the  same  plane  in  the  elements  of  material  civiliza- 
tion, but  the  Chinese  nation  was  much  the  more  numerous. 
The  Japanese,  however,  not  having  gone  through  protracted 
periods  of  peace,  had  not  lost  their  mental  alertness,  and  had 
long  realized  the  danger  to  their  national  existence  that  was 
indicated  by  the  powerful  men-of-war  from  Europe  and  Amer- 
ica that  visited  the  Orient. 

The  result  was  that  immediately  after  Commodore  Perry's 
visit  and  virtual  ultimatum  in  July,  1853,  the  Japanese  be- 
stirred themselves  to  acquire  education  and  training,  espe- 
cially in  the  mechanic  arts.  They  bestirred  themselves  with 
an  energy,  a  foresight,  and  a  clearness  of  purpose  that  have 
no  parallel  in  history ;  so  that,  when  they  finally  came  to  war 
with  China  in  1894,  they  had  an  army  and  a  navy  that  was 
much  better  in  equipment  and  training  than  China's.  The 
Chinese  fought  as  bravely  as  the  Japanese,  but  they  suffered 

272 


FROM  MOLTKE  TO  TOGO  273 

a  humiliating  defeat,  nevertheless.  The  most  important  bat- 
tle was  a  naval  battle  off  the  Yalu  River  on  September  17, 
1894.  This  battle  showed  what  several  modern  naval  battles 
have  shown — that,  because  of  the  superior  concentration  of 
power  in  ships  as  compared  with  armies,  decisions  are  won 
more  quickly,  and  with  much  smaller  loss  of  life.  Some 
Chinese  vessels,  escaping  to  the  naval  base  at  Wei-Hai-Wei, 
were  followed  by  the  Japanese.  The  forts  there  being  taken 
soon  by  the  Japanese  troops,  the  Chinese  vessels  were  all  cap- 
tured, and  the  issue  of  the  war  decided.  The  treaty  of  peace 
was  signed  at  Shimonoseki  on  April  17,  1895. 

The  next  important  war  was  that  between  the  United  States 
and  Spain,  which  broke  out  in  1898.  The  cause  was  the  bad 
condition  of  affairs  in  Cuba,  and  the  cause  of  this  was  the 
tyrannical  misrule  of  Spain.  Not  only  was  the  condition  bad 
to  such  a  degree  as  to  make  Cuba  an  international  nuisance, 
especially  to  the  United  States,  but  it  continued  year  after 
year,  and  without  any  reasonable  hope  of  betterment.  The 
reason  why  the  conditions  continued  so  long  was  the  bad 
strategical  handling  of  the  Spanish  troops  on  the  island;  for 
there  were  more  than  enough  troops  to  keep  the  insurgents  in 
subjection.  But  a  good  strategical  handling  of  the  troops 
could  not  be  expected  under  a  government  so  inefficient  as  that 
of  Spain,  for  inefficient  government  and  inefficient  strategy 
usually  go  together.  The  war  was  precipitated  by  the  explo- 
sion of  the  U.  S.  S.  Maine  in  Havana  harbor :  another  illustra- 
tion of  the  fact  that,  while  the  causes  of  yiiost  wars  are  power- 
ful and  profound,  they  often  lie  passive  until  some  exciting 
occurrence  acts  like  a  spark  to  gunpowder. 

Few  wars  more  unwise  than  this  war,  on  the  part  of  Spain, 
have  ever  occurred.  Not  only  was  Spain  inferior  to  the 
United  States  in  naval  power,  but  she  was  at  a  great  strategi- 
cal disadvantage,  because  Cuba  was  nearer  to  the  United 
States  than  to  herself.  It  is  inconceivable  that  the  govern- 
ment of  Spain  had  so  little  strategical  knowledge  and  insight 
as  not  to  know  that  a  war  with  the  United  States  would  be 


274  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

disastrous  to  Spain ;  but  it  is  certain  that  the  people  of  Spain 
were  so  ignorant  of  strategy  that  they  did  not  know  it.  It 
VMS  fundamentally  because  of  lack  of  strategical  knowledge 
among  the  Spa7iish  people  that  the  nation  went  to  war. 

The  Spanish  government  itself  endeavored  to  keep  at  peace ; 
but,  like  many  other  governments,  they  were  unable  to  do 
this  because  of  the  attitude  of  the  pe'ople.  The  position  of 
the  Spanish  government  was  somewhat  like  that  of  Napoleon 
III  in  1870.  These  two  illustrations  and  many  others  show 
the  great  danger  to  a  country  of  ignorance  of  strategy  among 
its  people.  A  grasp  of  the  elements  of  strategy  by  the  people 
of  a  country  is  just  as  important  to  the  safety  of  the  country, 
■as  a  whole,  as  is  a  knowledge  of  the  elements  of  hygiene  to 
the  health  of  its  individuals. 

The  first  battle  was  a  naval  battle  in  Manila  Bay  on  May  1. 
This  battle,  from  the  standpoint  of  strategy,  was  one  of  the 
most  interesting  in  history;  not  because  it  illustrated  good 
strategy,  but  because  it  illustrated  bad  strategy.  I  was  pres- 
ent at  the  battle  as  navigator  of  the  Petrel;  and,  as  I  had 
taken  up  my  station  aloft,  I  had  a  perfect  view  of  all  that 
happened.  We  had  expected  that  the  Spanish  fleet  would  be 
found  in  such  a  position  in  the  bay  that  it  would  be  supported 
by  the  guns  on  the  shores  of  the  bay.  We  knew  th-at  there 
were  four  large  guns,  much  more  powerful  than  any  in  our 
fleet,  mounted  in  elevated  positions,  supported  by  many  other 
guns,  and  possessed  of  ideal  facilities  for  quick  and  accurate 
aiming;  and  we  knew  also  that  the  combined  power  of  the 
shore  batteries  and  the  ship  batteries  was  far  in  excess  of  the 
power  of  all  we  had.  But,  to  our  amazement  and  delight,  we 
found  that  the  Spanish  fleet,  which  of  itself  was  inferior  to 
ours,  had  anchored  in  a  part  of  the  bay  where  the  guns  of  the 
city  could  not  help  them  in  the  slightest !  The  result  was  the 
destruction  of  the  Spanish  fleet  and  the  consequent  helpless- 
ness of  Manila.  This  does  not  mean  helplessness  against  our 
artillery  fire,  but  helplessness  against  an  effective  blockade, 
which  Dewey  immediately  instituted. 


FROM  MOLTKE  TO  TOGO  275 

The  ardent  and  methodical  attack  of  Dewey  was  strategi- 
cally and  tactically  correct.  This,  combined  with  our  better 
gunner)^  and  our  superiority  in  force,  was  the  cause  of  the  re- 
sult. That  all  the  Spanish  ships  should  have  been  sunk,  while 
almost  no  damage  was  received  by  the  American  ships,  has 
excited  great  astonishment;  but  it  is  not  a  matter  for  aston- 
ishment at  all.  As  the  tables  in  Chapter  IV  show,  a  force 
originally  superior  becomes  increasingly  superior,  and  to  a 
degree  depending  on  the  degree  of  original  superiority.  At 
the  battle  of  Manila,  the  principal  part  of  our  superiority  in 
force  was  superiority  in  gunnery.  Astonishment  has  often 
been  expressed  that  we  hit  the  Spanish  ships  so  many  times, 
while  they  hit  us  so  seldom :  astonishment  has  been  expressed 
that  it  should  have  been  possible  to  make  so  many  misses  as 
the  Spanish  did.  But  it  should  be  remembered  that  a  ship 
occupies  but  a  small  part  of  the  field  of  view,  and  that  the 
chance  of  hitting  it  is  extremely  small,  unless  a  gun  is  pointed 
at  it  correctly;  and  also  that  there  are  thousands  of  ways  in 
which  to  point  a  gun  incorrectly,  but  only  one  way  of  point- 
ing it  correctly.  This  may  seem  a  digression  from  the  subject 
of  strategy,  but  really  it  is  giving  an  illustration;  for  the 
study  of  strategy,  like  the  study  of  gunnery,  is  simply  a 
study  of  how  to  find  the  only  right  path  to  pursue  out  of 
countless  wrong  pa,ths. 

Spain  sent  a  fleet  across  the  ocean  to  Cuba  in  response  (it 
must  be)  to  the  feeling  that  "someone  must  do  something"; 
for  what  that  fleet  could  do  effectively  on  the  coast  of  the 
United  States  against  a  superior  fleet  is  not  clear  now,  and  it 
could  not  have  seemed  clear  even  then  to  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment. On  May  19  the  Spanish  fleet  went  into  Santiago  har- 
bor, where  it  was  blockaded  for  several  weeks  by  an  American 
fleet  of  superior  power  under  Admiral  Sampson.  Finally  it 
was  ordered  out  by  the  Spanish  government,  though  its  only 
possible  fate  was  complete  destruction.  Complete  destruction 
it  received — about  an  hour  being  sufficient  to  accomplish  it. 
This  was  on  July  3. 


276  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

These  two  battles  virtually  decided  the  war,  though  subse- 
quent small  land  operations  in  both  the  Philippines  and  Cuba 
were  undertaken  afterward,  to  give  the  coup  de  grace. 

The  main  results  of  the  war,  brief  and  comparatively 
bloodless  as  it  was,  were  as  important  as  those  of  any  war  in 
history,  and  much  more  important  than  the  results  of  many 
wars  that  were  long  and  bloody ;  and  they  supply  an  illustra- 
tion of  the  important  fact  that,  as  a  rule,  the  ultimate  conse- 
quences of  short  and  decisive  wars  have  been  the  most  impor- 
tant. The  main  single  result  of  the  Spanish  war  was  that  the 
United  States  emerged  from  the  position  of  a  second-rate 
power  into  the  first  rank  among  the  nations  of  the  earth.  By 
reason  of  the  facts  that  the  United  States  was  the  richest 
country  in  the  world  (except  Great  Britain),  that  it  had  long 
stood  in  the  first  rank  in  the  matter  of  individual  intelligence 
of  the  people,  and  that  its  form  of  government  was  ideally 
higher  than  any  other,  it  cannot  truthfully  be  denied  that  the 
rise  of  the  United  States  was  an  advantage,  and  a  very  great 
advantage,  to  mankind.  Though  there  were  several  factors 
that  led  to  our  success  in  the  war,  it  is  obvious  that  the  great- 
est single  one  was  strategy. 

An  interesting  fable  was  bom  shortly  after  the  battle  of 
Manila,  to  the  effect  that  at  the  subsequent  bombardment  of 
the  city,  on  August  13,  the  British  fleet  placed  itself  between 
the  German  and  the  American  fleets  in  the  harbor.  The  in- 
teresting part  of  the  fable  is  not  the  fable  itself,  but  the  fact 
that  belief  in  it  exists  broadcast  to-day.  No  such  occurrence 
happened;  and  yet,  I  am  credibly  informed  that  the  story 
has  been  accepted  by  historians  in  general  and  incorporated 
permanently  in  history ! 

The  war  with  Spain  was  followed,  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States,  by  a  war  with  the  Filipinos,  who  had  been 
grievously  oppressed  by  the  Spaniards,  and  now  s'eized  the  op- 
portunity, as  they  thought,  to  get  their  independence.  Be- 
cause the  United  States  government  did  not  decide  quickly 
whether  or  not  to  take  the  Philippines,  the  insurrection  as- 


FROM  MOLTKE  TO  TOGO  277 

sumed  large  proportions,  and  was  consequently  quelled  with 
difficulty  and  considerable  loss  of  life.  The  main  argument 
against  taking  them  was  that  mere  conquest  did  not  give  us 
the  right.  Of  course,  we  realized  finally  that,  if  we  did  not 
assume  the  governnment  of  the  islands,  the  various  savage 
tribes  would  fight  against  each  other  for  it,  and  establish  a 
condition  of  barbarism  in  place  of  the  comparative  civiliza- 
tion of  the  Spanish  rule;  whereas  we  would  give  them  a  gov- 
ernment much  more  civilized  than  that  of  the  Spaniards. 

The  next  war  (October,  1899,  to  May,  1902)  was  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  Boer  Republic  in  South  Africa — 
caused,  as  many  wars  have  been,  by  a  difference  in  opinion  as 
to  what  was  right  and  what  was  wrong.  In  this  case,  the 
difference  was  in  regard  to  certain  matters  in  dispute  be- 
tween the  government  of  the  Boer  Republic  and  certain  sub- 
jects of  Great  Britain  who  resided  in  the  Boer  Republic  and 
owned  property  there.  Since  there  was  no  other  way  to  de- 
cide the  question  except  the  oldest  way,  that  of  resorting  to 
force,  force  was  resorted  to. 

It  may  be  pointed  out,  in  passing,  that  when  any  individual, 
in  even  the  most  enlightened  nation,  is  compelled  to  do  a  thing 
that  he  thinks  he  ought  not  to  be  compelled  to  do,  or  to  refrain 
from  doing  a  thing  that  he  thinks  he  has  a  right  to  do,  force 
is  resorted  to  just  as  much  as  when  two  nations  go  to  war. 

Great  Britain  had  the  advantage,  of  course,  of  immeasur- 
ably greater  strength ;  but  the  Boer  Republic  had  the  strategic 
advantage  in  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  had  to  send  troops 
and  supplies  over  the  great  ocean  distance  between  her  and 
South  Africa.  It  was  inevitable  that  Great  Britain  should 
triumph  in  the  end;  but  the  war  lasted  for  more  than  two 
years  and  a  half.  The  war  is  interesting  from  the  fact  that, 
in  the  early  part  of  the  war,  the  strategy  of  the  Boers  was 
better  than  that  of  the  British,  although  the  British  forces 
were*  mostly  those  of  the  regular  army  and  navy.  The  trouble 
with  the  British  forces  seems  to  have  been  that  the  officers  in 
the  higher  commands  were  suffering  from  what  I  beg  le^ve  to 


278  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

call  automaticity ;  that  is,  they  acted  automatically  along  the 
line  in  which  they  had  been  trained,  and  used  methods  suitable 
to  war  with  armies  like  themselves  and  in  the  close!}'  popu- 
lated districts  of  continental  Europe,  instead  of  devising 
methods  suitable  for  fighting  the  rapidly  moving  and  fre- 
quently dispersed  guerrilla  bands  of  the  Boers.  They  man- 
oeuvered  in  somewhat  the  same  way  as  General  Braddock  did, 
in  fighting  the  Indians  in  North  America,  during  the  Seven 
Years'  War.  The  Boers,  on  the  contrary,  adopted  methods 
that  were  efficacious  under  the  conditions  that  actually 
existed. 

This  war  is  interesting  strategically,  therefore,  as  exempli- 
fying a  truth  which  is  often  overlooked — that  each  contestant 
in  a  war  always  has,  or  ought  to  have,  a  definite  mission  to 
accomplish,  and  that  fighting  is  merely  a  means  of  accomplish- 
ing it.  It  is  the  task  of  strategy  to  ascertain  definitely  what 
is  the  actual  mission ;  then  to  estimate  the  actual  difficulties  in 
the  way  of  accomplishing  it,  and  the  actual  facilities  at  hand 
for  accomplishing  it ;  then  to  make  the  decision  as  to  what  to 
do;  and  then  (and  not  until  then)  to  inaugurate  operations. 

The  next  war  was  the  so-called  Boxer  War,  one  of  the  most 
peculiar  wars  of  history.  It  began  and  ended  in  1900,  and 
was  caused  by  a  number  of  acts  on  the  part  of  certain  Euro- 
pean powers,  and  the  consequent  revolt  of  a  comparatively 
small  number  of  Chinese  against  it.  Russia  had  taken  Port 
Arthur  and  much  adjacent  territory;  Germany  had  leased 
Kiaochau,  virtually  by  compulsion,  and  gained  great  conces- 
sions in  the  Province  of  Shantung ;  France  was  seeking  in- 
creased privileges  in  parts  of  China  near  Tonquin ;  and  Great 
Britain  had  obtained  a  lease  from  China  of  Wei-Hai-Wei  on 
the  south  shore  of  the  gulf  of  Pechili,  and  thus  gained  com- 
mand of  the  water  approach  to  Pekin.  Prince  Tuan,  an 
athlete,  and  the  head  of  a  large  following  in  China  who  had 
taken  up  athletic  exercises  and  called  themselves  Boxers, 
headed  a  revolt.  Following  customs  of  great  antiquity,  the 
Boxers  committed  a  number  of  atrocities.     Finally  they  made 


FROM  MOLTKE  TO  TOGO  279 

an  attack  on  the  foreign  legations  at  Pekin,  in  which  even  the 
Chinese  imperial  troops  eventually  took  part. 

The  civilized  world  rose  in  alarm,  and  fortunately  took 
prompt  action.  Very  considerable  forces  were  sent  to  the 
vicinity  of  Pekin ;  and  in  August  the  allied  troops,  consisting 
of  Americans,  British,  Germans,  French,  Austrians,  Italians, 
and  Japanese,  under  the  command  of  the  German  Field  Mar- 
shal von  Waldersee,  marched  on  Pekin.  Pekin  was  cap- 
tured on  the  14th,  and  a  note  agreeing  to  the  demands  of  the 
powers  was  signed  by  the  Chinese  authorities  in  December. 

From  the  standpoint  of  strategy,  the  most  interesting  single 
fact  this  war  brought  out  was  the  admirable  condition,  train- 
ing, and  general  eifectiveness  of  the  Japanese  army.  Before 
this  war  it  had  been  known,  in  a  general  way,  that  the  Japa- 
nese were  bestirring  themselves  to  acquire  military  and  naval 
skill;  but  it  was  not  at  all  realized  that  they  had  achieved 
success.  It  seemed  to  be  the  consensus  of  opinion  that,  of  all 
the  forces  of  the  great  civilized  countries  that  marched  to- 
gether on  Pekin,  the  Japanese  were  better  than  any  other 
except  the  German.  This  fact  has  peculiar  interest  when 
viewed  in  confiection  with  the  extraordinary  lack  of  strategi- 
cal foresight  of  the  Russians  when  they  engaged  in  their  war 
with  Japan,  onl}'  four  years  later. 

A  very  important  provision  of  the  treaty  between  China 
and  Japan,  which  closed  the  war  in  1895,  was  that  the  Liao- 
tung  peninsula,  including  Port  Arthur,  should  go  into  the 
possession  of  the  Japanese.  Russia,  France,  and  Germany 
prevented  this  from  being  accomplished;  and  finally  Russia 
herself  secured  possession  of  the  Liao-tung  peninsula,  and  es- 
tablished at  Port  Arthur,  at  its  southern  end,  the  most  power- 
ful fortress  in  the  Orient^  and  one  of  the  most  powerful  in  the 
world.  At  the  same  time,  the  Russians  gradually  spread 
themselves  through  Manchuria,  strengthened  their  naval  base 
at  Vladivostok,  and  completed  a  line  of  railway  from  St. 
Petersburg  through  Siberia  and  Manchuria  to  Vladivostok, 


280  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

with  a  branch  line  running  southwest  from  Harbin  to  Port 
Arthur. 

Meanwhile,  on  January  30,  1902,  an  agreement  was  made 
between  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  whereby  it  was  mutually 
agreed  that  if  either  party  became  involved  in  a  war  in  safe- 
guarding the  interests  that  both  parties  recognized  in  main- 
taining the  independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  China 
and  Corea,  the  other  party  should  remain  neutral,  and  en- 
deavor to  prevent  any  third  part 3^  from  joining  in  hostilities 
against  its  ally;  but  that,  should  a  third  party  join  in  such 
hostilities,  the  other  party  would  come  to  its  ally's  aid.  This 
treaty  evidently  strengthened  Japan's  position  in  case  of  a 
war  with  Russia ;  and,  as  such  a  war  was  obviously  coming,  it 
possibly  had  that  intention. 

Negotiations  were  begun  by  Japan  with  Russia,  in  1903, 
with  a  view  to  inducing  Russia  to  cease  her  continuing  en- 
croachments in  Corea;  Corea  being  so  close  to  Japan  that 
Japan  very  properly  considered  that  Russia's  increasing  in- 
fluence there  was  a  menace  to  her  national  security.  Russia 
adopting  the  policy  of  polite  evasion  and  delay,  Japan  in-, 
structed  her  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  on  February  6, 
1904,  to  ask  for  his  passports.  This  was  not  a  declaration  of 
war,  but  it  was  an  announcement  that  friendly  diplomatic 
relations  had  been  broken,  and  it  ought  to  have  roused  Russia 
to  instant  warlike  preparation.     It  did  not. 

As  the  empire  of  Japan  was  contained  within  the  Japanese 
islands,  it  is  obvious  that  if  the  Russian  government  had  cor- 
rectly estimated  the  strategic  situation,  it  would  have  realized, 
long  before  matters  had  come  to  this  crisis,  that  the  most  ef- 
fective attack  against  Japan  would  be  a  naval  attack ;  because 
the  Russian  navy  was  much  larger  than  the  Japanese,  and  if 
it  brought  the  Japanese  navy  to  battle  and  defeated  it,  Russia 
would  gain  complete  command  of  the  sea  between  Japan  and 
the  mainland  of  Asia,  and  render  Japan  helpless  against  Rus- 
sian aggressions  in  Manchuria  and  Corea,  for  the  reason  that 


FROM  MOLTKE  TO  TOGO  281 

she  would  be  unable  to  send  any  troops  across  the  water.  At 
this  time  th-e  Russian  naval  force  in  Asia  was  approximately 
equal  to  that  of  the  Japanese,  consisting  principally  of  seven 
battleships,  seven  protected  cruisers  and  twenty-five  destroyers 
in  Port  Arthur,  three  large  armored  cruisers  and  a  smaller 
cruiser  at  Vladivostok,  and  one  large  protected  cruiser,  the 
Variag,  with  the  gunboat  Korietz  at  Chemulpo.  Thus  Russia 
had  her  main  force  divided  into  three  parts,  a  highly  inefficient 
arrangement,  when  war  broke  out.  Japan  had  six  battleships, 
eight  armored  cruisers,  thirteen  protected  cruisers  and  nine- 
teen destroyers,  besides  smaller  craft,  all  grouped  together. 

The  Japanese  immediately  took  advantage  of  the  situation, 
with  correct  strategic  insight  and  promptness,  for  they  de- 
spatched three  expeditions  almost  immediately :  a  naval  ex- 
pedition against  the  Russian  fleet  anchored  outside  of  Port 
Arthur;  a  naval  expedition  against  the  Russian  ships  at 
Chemulpo,  and  an  accompanying  convoy  of  troops,  for  landing 
there  and  initiating  military  operations.  All  three  expedi- 
tions were  successful. 

On  the  night  of  February  8-9  ten  Japanese  destroyers 
made  a  determined  torpedo  attack  on  the  unsuspecting  Rus- 
sian squadron  at  Port  Arthur,  with  the  result  that  the  battle- 
ships Retvisan  and  Csarevitch  and  the  cruiser  Pallada  were 
torpedoed  and  so  seriously  injured  that  a  long  time  in  port 
was  needed  to  repair  them.  These  battleships  were  the  most 
powerful  in  the  squadron,  and  the  Pallada  was  a  vessel  of 
6630  tons  displacement.  On  the  following  day  Admiral  Togo 
engaged  the  other  vessels  of  the  Russian  squadron  at  long 
range,  and  succeeded  in  inflicting  considerable  damage;  but 
he  wisely  refrained  from  getting  under  fire  of  the  Russian 
guns  on  shore.  Meanwhile,  a  squadron  of  Japanese  vessels, 
under  Vice-Admiral  Uriu,  arrived  at  Chemulpo  and  sank  the 
Russian  protected  cruiser  Variag  and  the  gunboat  Korietz  in 
a  battle  in  the  offing,  while  the  transports  landed  their  troops. 
These  troops  at  once  marched  to  Seoul,  the  capital  of  Corea, 
and  captured  it. 

The  war  between  Russia  and  Japan  is  one  of  the  most  in- 


989 


THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 


struetive  wars  of  histor}':  because  of  the  great  distance  sep- 
arating one  of  the  belligerent  countries  from  its  fighting 
forces,  the  large  forces  engaged  on  both  sides,  and  the  fact 
that  land  and  naval  forces  cooperated  to  a  degree  and  with  an 
effectiveness  never  known  before.  It  is  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant wars  because  it  established  on  a  firm  basis,  and  for 
the  first  time  in  many  thousands  of  years,  the  people  of  a 
non-Aryan  race  in  the  first  rank  of  the  nations  of  the  world. 
From  the  standpoint  of  strategy,  it  is  interesting  for  two  rea- 
sons: the  fact  that  the  conditions,  occasioned  by  the  use  of 
new  weapons,  methods,  and  appliances,  were  more  different 
from  the  conditions  of  previous  wars  than  had  ever  hap- 
pened before ;  and  because  it  is  one  of  the  best  illustrations  in 
history  of  the  defeat  of  a  superior  force  by  the  use  of  good 
strategy  against  bad  strategy. 

The  fundamental  strategic  error  of  the  Russian  government 
was  in  underestimating,  first,  the  military  and  naval  power  of 
the  Japanese,  and,  second,  the  probability  of  war.  These  two 
errors  even  the  most  loyal  friend  of  Russia  must  admit  were 
wholly  inexcusable,  and  caused  wholly  inexcusable  loss  of 
life,  money,  and  prestige.  It  is  impossible  also  to  justify  the 
continued  aggressiveness  of  the  Russians  in  Manchuria  and 
Corea,  especially  when  these  aggressions  were  followed  by  a 
failure  properly  to  support  them  after  they  had  been  chal- 
lenged. Both  the  aggressions  and  the  failure  to  support 
them  show  the  same  kind  of  overbearing  and  yet  fundamen- 
tally weak  character  that  Spain  showed  after  the  days  of 
Charles  V.  A  nation  that  is  really  strong,  like  a  man  who  is 
really  strong,  is  rarely  brutal  and  aggressive.  Where  strong 
countries  have  been  aggressive,  they  have  always  supported 
their  aggressions  with  adequate  force,  as  Rome  did;  and  in 
virtually  all  cases  they  have  established  governments  over  the 
victims  of  their  aggressions  that  were  better  in  every  way 
than  the  governments  thej^  had  had  before.  Nations  and  men 
that  are  both  brutal  and  weak  are  not  only  despicable  but 
harmful. 


FROM  MOLTKE  TO  TOGO  283 

Both  Russia  and  Japan  now  began  to  rush  troops  to  eastern 
Manchuria:  Russia  by  way  of  the  trans-Siberian  railroad, 
Japan  by  way  of  the  Sea  of  Japan  and  Corea.  Having  com- 
mand of  the  sea,  Japan  landed  troops  on  the  western  coast  of 
Corea  to  the  number  of  about  45,000,  under  General  Kuroki, 
and  marched  them  north  unresisted  to  the  Yalu  River,  which 
forms  the  northwestern  boundary  of  Corea  between  it  and 
Manchuria.  This  was  the  First  Army.  Across  the  Yalu 
River  was  a  comparatively  small  force  of  Russians.  Instead 
of  withdrawing  this  small  force.  General  Kuropatkin,  the 
Russian  commander-in-chief,  ordered  it  to  hold  the  line  of  the 
Yalu.  The  result  was  a  bloody  battle,  in  which  the  Japanese 
attacked  the  Russians  both  in  front  and  on  the  left  flank,  in- 
flicting a  decisive  defeat.  This  was  the  first  land  battle  of 
the  war.  It  did  not  have  a  great  effect  physically,  but  it  did 
morally;  because  it  proved  to  the  world,  and  especially  to  the 
Russians,  that  it  was  possible  for  the  Japanese  pagans  ("mon- 
keys," the  Russians  called  them)  to  defeat  European  Chris- 
tians in  a  modern  war.  The  battle  occurred  on  the  first  of 
May,  1904. 

Japan  now  went  ahead  with  preparations  for  sending  its 
Second  Army  to  Manchuria,  and  meanwhile  endeavored  by 
naval  operations  to  secure  the  immobility  of  the  Russian  fleet 
in  the  harbor  of  Port  Arthur,  and  prevent  any  interference 
by  it  with  Japanese  transports  carrying  supplies  and  troops. 
To  this  end,  three  attempts  were  made  to  block  the  narrow 
exit  from  the  harbor.  These  attempts  were  made  under  cir- 
cumstances of  the  greatest  difficulty  and  danger ;  and  the  first 
two  were  so  disastrously  unsuccessful  that  men  other  than 
men  of  great  determination  would  have  been  deterred.  On 
the  night  of  Ma}^  2,  however,  the  harbor  was  partially  blocked 
by  sinking  five  steamers  in  the  channel. 

During  the  following  night  the  Second  Japanese  Army, 
under  General  Oku,  began  to  land  at  Pitszewo,  on  the  eastern 
side  of  the  peninsula  of  Liao-tung.  After  landing,  on  May  5, 
the  Second  Army  pushed  westward,  driving  the  Russians  be- 


284  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

fore  them.  Finally,  on  the  26th  of  May,  a  great  battle  was 
fought  at  Kinchou,  and  the  town  was  captured.  Just  south 
of  Kinchou  is  a  narrow  neck  of  land,  a  mile  and  three  quarters 
broad,  that  connects  the  promontory  with  the  mainland.  It  is 
low  on  each  side;  but  near  the  center  a  high  ridge  rises  that 
culminates  in  a  point  about  350  feet  high,  called  Nanshan, 
An  army  holding  this  point  blocks  passage  either  way.  The 
position  was  strongly  fortified  with  all  the  most  modem  means 
to  protect  it  against  attack  both  night  and  day.  It  was  fi- 
nally taken  by  the  Japanese,  who  then  pressed  forward  and, 
on  May  30,  took  possession  of  Dalny,  a  base  of  great  value  for 
prosecuting  attack  on  Port  Arthur,  which  lay  southwest. 

It  being  evident  now  to  the  Russians  that  the  Japanese 
plan  was  to  take  Port  Arthur,  they  sent  a  Russian  army  of 
about  35,000  men  to  recover  Kinchou  and  Nanshan,  and  then 
go  to  its  assistance.  In  consequence  a  battle  took  place  at 
Telissu,  on  June  14,  in  which  the  Japanese,  under  Oku,  out- 
flanked the  Russians  and  drove  them  northward  with  great 
loss  in  personnel  and  material. 

Meanwhile,  the  two  Japanese  battleships  Hatsuse  and 
Yashima  struck  mines  off  Port  Arthur,  and  sank.  Since  the 
Japanese  had  only  six  first-class  battleships,  this  was  a  terrible 
loss;  and  the  strategic  effect  on  both  sides  of  knowledge  that 
it  had  happened  would  have  been  so  considerable  that  the 
Japanese  determined  to  prevent  that  knowledge  from  spread- 
ing. This  they  succeeded  in  doing,  though  they  could  not 
prevent  rumors  from  getting  abroad.  It  was  not  known  defi- 
nitely until  the  end  of  the  war  that  this  disaster  had  occurred. 

On  August  10  Admiral  Vitgeft  left  Port  Arthur  with  his 
squadron,  with  the  intention  of  forcing  his  way  to  a  junction 
with  the  armored  cruiser  squadron  at  Vladivostok.  A  battle 
between  him  and  Togo  ensued  that  afternoon,  which  was 
brought  to  a  crisis  by  the  bursting  of  a  Japanese  shell  against 
the  conning-tower  of  the  flagship  Csarevitch.  This  killed  the 
Russian  admiral,  jammed  the  steering-gear  of  the  ship,  and 
created  such  confusion  in  the  squadron  that  it  promptly  re- 


FROM  MOLTKE  TO  TOGO  285 

treated  back  to  Port  Arthur,  leaving  the  Japanese  in  full 
command  of  the  sea. 

Meanwhile  the  Russian  squadron  at  Vladivostok,  consisting 
of  three  large  armored  cruisers,  made  a  number  of  excursions 
unto  the  Sea  of  Japan,  sinking  and  capturing  Japanese  mer- 
chantmen and  successfully  eluding  Kamimura's  squadron. 
Finally  Admiral  Kamimura  caught  them,  on  the  14th  of 
August.  A  running  fight  ensued,  in  which  the  Russian  ship 
Rurik  was  sunk,  and  the  other  two  were  so  seriously  injured 
that  they  were  unable  to  take  any  part  afterward  in  the  war. 

Immediately  after  the  capture  of  Dalny,  the  Japanese  had 
begun  to  pour  troops  into  it,  with  the  result  that  they  soon 
had  three  divisions  there,  under  the  command  of  Nogi,  and 
constituting  the  Third  Army.  They  then  landed  the  Fourth 
Army,  under  Nozu,  at  Takushan  on  the  south  coast  of  Man- 
churia, between  the  Liao-tung  peninsula  and  the  mouth  of  the 
Yalu  River,  and  between  the  first  and  second  armies.  By  the 
close  of  June  the  First,  Second,  and  Fourth  Armies,  under 
Field  Marshal  Oyama,  were  fully  deployed  and  ready  to  ad- 
vance to  the  north,  to  clear  the  Russians  from  the  littoral  and 
force  them  into  the  mountains  of  Manchuria.  Five  heavy 
engagements  soon  resulted,  fought  between  the  26th  of  June 
and  the  last  day  of  July,  in  which  the  Japanese  acted  uni- 
formly on  the  offensive  and  were  uniformly  victorious. 

Then  followed  the  great  battle  of  Liao-yang,  which  lasted 
from  August  25  to  September  3,  in  which  the  Russians  had 
about  220,000  engaged  and  the  Japanese  200,000.  The  Rus- 
sians being  strongly  intrenched,  the  Japanese  made  little  im- 
pression on  their  front,  and  finally  attempted  to  turn  their 
left  flank.  Kuropatkin  sent  a  strong  counter-flanking  force; 
but  (mainly  on  account  of  incompetence  on  the  part  of  the 
Russians)  the  operation  was  unsuccessful.  The  Japanese,  in 
planning  this  campaign,  had  expected,  it  seems,  that  Nogi's 
army  would  have  finished  its  task  at  Port  Arthur  before  the 
campaign  developed  thus  far,  and  would  have  been  able  to 
contribute  a  strong  effort  on  the  Japanese  left  flank,  and  pre- 


286  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

vent  any  such  counter-flanking  operation  as  Kuropatkin  had 
attempted.  This  shows  the  strategic  importance  of  hokling 
on  to  a  position  like  that  of  Port  Arthur,  even  though  it  may 
eventually  fall,  provided  that  the  maintenance  of  the  siege 
necessitates  the  employment  of  a  sufficient  force  of  the  enemy. 

After  his  unsuccessful  counter-flanking  attempt,  Kuropat- 
kin withdrew  north  to  Mukden.  On  the  9th  of  October  he 
started  an  offensive  with  about  250,000  men,  attempting  a 
flanking  operation  with  his  right  flank  in  order  to  get  posses- 
sion of  Liao-yang;  but,  after  a  week's  fighting,  he  was  driven 
back  with  enormous  losses  of  all  kinds.  He  set  forth  again 
on  January  25,  1905,  but  was  defeated  at  the  battle  of  Hei- 
kautai  and  driven  back. 

Meanwhile  the  siege  of  Port  Arthur  was  continued;  but  it 
was  not  until  July  31,  1904,  that  the  Japanese  captured  the 
positions  commanding  the  fortress  and  advanced  close  enough 
to  make  a  direct  assault.  Bombardment  began  on  August  7; 
but  the  defense  had  now  so  strengthened  their  positions  that 
the  Japanese  accomplished  little,  and  were  compelled  to  resort 
to  stereotyped  siege  operations.  Finally,  on  November  30,  203 
Meter  Hill  was  taken,  and  a  post  of  observ^ation  thus  secured 
from  which  the  Japanese  heavy  artillery  could  be  accurately 
directed  against  the  Russian  warships  in  the  harbor.  The 
Russians,  in  consequence,  had  to  sink  those  warships.  The 
surrender  of  Port  Arthur  followed,  on  January  2,  1905. 

After  the  battle  of  Heikautai,  Kuropatkin  received  con- 
tinuous and  enormous  reinforcements  from  Russia,  thanks  to 
the  skill  and  energy  of  the  only  Russian  who  emerged  from 
the  Russian  war  with  great  renown,  Prince  Khilkoff,  the 
Minister  of  Ways  and  Communications.  The  Japanese  real- 
ized, in  consequence,  the  necessity  of  defeating  Kuropatkin 
as  decisively  as  possible  and  as  quickly  as  possible;  with 
the  result  that  they  finally  brought  him  to  battle  at  Mukden. 
Kuropatkin 's  force  was  probably  in  excess  of  300,000,  and 
protected  by  defenses  of  the  most  complete  and  effective 
character.     The   Japanese   army   probably  numbered  nearly 


FROM  MOLTKE  TO  TOGO  287 

400,000;  a  new  army,  the  Fifth,  having  been  added,  and 
Nogi  's  army  having  come  up  from  Port  Arthur.  Nogi  's  army 
was  put  by  Marshal  Oyama,  the  commander-in-chief,  into 
a  position  on  the  left  flank,  but  well  to  the  rear,  in  the  de- 
sire to  prevent  knowledge  of  its  presence  coming  to  the  Rus- 
sians. The  armies  now  advanced,  the  Fifth  Army  on  the  Jap- 
anese right  attacking  the  Russian  left  flank,  and  the  Third 
Army  under  Nogi  awaiting  the  order  to  sweep  around  the 
Russian  right  flank.  Wlien  the  center  and  flank  attacks  had 
fully  developed,  Nogi  swept  around,  and  descended  on  Muk- 
den from  the  northwest,  seriously  threatening  the  enemy 's  line 
of  retreat.  IMeanwhile,  Kuropatkin,  not  knowing  of  Nogi's 
presence,  had  sent  a  large  force  against  the  Japanese  Fifth 
Army,  and  could  not  recall  them  to  oppose  Nogi  until  too  late. 
The  result  was  that  Kuropatkin,  after  extricating  his  forces 
with  great  difficulty,  retreated  north  of  Mukden  (March, 
1905). 

Meanwhile  the  Russian  fleet,  under  Admiral  Rozhdest- 
vensky,  was  coming  out  to  contest  the  command  of  the  sea 
with  the  Japanese  fleet  under  Togo.  The  Russian  fleet  con- 
sisted of  about  forty  vessels,  counting  supply  vessels,  etc.,  and 
it  seems  doubtful  whether  the  fleet  could  ever  have  got  out  to 
the  Orient  if  the  governments  of  all  the  countries  in  whose 
harbors  the  fleet  anchored  had  strictly  observed  their  obliga- 
tions as  neutrals.  Togo  took  up  a  position  of  waiting  near  the 
island  of  Tsushima,  at  the  southwestern  entrance  to  the  Jap- 
anese Sea,  realizing  that  the  Russian  fleet  must  go  by  that 
position  or  else  go  through  the  straits  of  Tsuguru,  which 
easily  could  be  mined.  Sending  out  his  scouts,  he  received 
information  of  the  enemy's  fleet  at  5  a.m.  on  the  27th  of 
]\Iay.  In  the  battle  that  resulted  the  Russians  had  eight  bat- 
tleships, the  Japanese  five,  one  of  which  was  almost  useless; 
the  Russians  had  three  coast-defense  ships,  the  Japanese  one ; 
the  Russians  had  nine  destroyers,  the  Japanese  twenty;  the 
Russians  nine  cruisers  and  the  Japanese  eight  armored  cruis- 
ers and  ten  protected  cruisers,  etc.     There  is  no  recognized 


288  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

standard  by  which  to  compare  the  two  forces;  but  I  person- 
ally am  inclined  to  the  opinion  that  the  Japanese  superiority 
in  small  vessels  did  not  compensate  for  their  inferiority  in 
the  matter  of  battleships. 

The  result  of  the  battle  was  one  of  the  most  disastrous  and 
speedy  defeats  in  history,  only  two  of  the  Russian  vessels 
escaping.  The  fate  of  the  battle  was  decided  in  not  more  than 
an  hour,  though  the  battle  as  a  whole  was  not  concluded  until 
the  following  day.  The  obvious  cause  of  the  speedy  defeat 
was  the  fact  that  the  Japanese,  by  reason  of  superior  gunnery, 
hit  the  Russians  more  often  than  the  Russians  hit  them. 
While  there  are  many  reasons  for  the  Japanese  superiority 
in  gunnery,  the  principal  single  reason  was  that  the  Japanese 
had  had  the  foresight  and  energy  to  equip  their  guns  with  the 
new  naval  telescope  sight,  the  invention  of  the  author  of  this 
book,  and  to  train  the  men  in  its  use ;  while  up  to  that  time 
the  Russians  had  not  done  so. 

This  is  only  one  illustration  among  millions  of  the  para- 
mount advantage  of  always  being  prepared  for  every  probable 
emergency. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

ANTE   BELLUM 

AFTER  the  war  between  Russia  and  Japan  had  ended, 
army  and  navy  officers  the  world  over  began  to  spec- 
ulate as  to  the  nations  between  which  the  next  war 
would  be.  As  Germany  had  not  been  at  war  since  1871, 
while  each  of  the  other  great  nations  had  been  at  war  since 
then,  and  as  (very  roughly  speaking)  nations  have  usually 
gone  to  war  about  once  each  generation,  we  felt  quite  sure 
that  Germany  would  be  one  of  the  contestants.  This  convic- 
tion was  increased  by  Germany's  evident  preparedness,  and 
the  fact  that  Great  Britain,  France  and  Russia  were  evidently 
trying,  though  not  successfully,  to  keep  pace  with  her.  The 
armaments  of  all  the  great  countries,  including  the  United 
States  and  Japan,  increased  rapidly  in  magnitude,  and  still 
more  rapidly  in  cost. 

The  reasons  why  they  increased  in  cost  even  more  than  in 
magnitude  were  mainly  that  the  use  of  highlj^  scientific  in- 
struments and  specialized  weapons  had  become  a  requirement, 
largely  because  of  the  increase  in  the  use  of  them  by  Germany ; 
that  both  armies  and  navies  needed  many  grades  of  enlisted 
men  of  higher  technical  education  than  they  needed  before, 
and  these  men  demanded  higher  pay;  and  that  the  require- 
ments in  the  way  of  efficient  but  complicated  organizations 
necessary  for  handling  fleets  and  armies  with  the  speed  and 
precision  necessary  to  utilize  them  fully,  brought  into  being 
much  larger  and  more  highly  paid  staffs,  not  only  in  the  war 
offices  and  admiralties,  but  in  the  field  and  in  the  fleets.  The 
press  of  all  the  great  countries  groaned  with  complaints  about 
the  increasing  financial  burden,  and  were  filled  with  interrog- 

289 


290  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

atories  as  to  what  was  the  cause  of  the  increasing  rage  for 
armament.  The  cause  was  perfectly  plain :  the  evident  prep- 
arations of  Germany  for  war,  the  war  lust  of  her  population, 
which  had  not  been  to  war  for  more  than  a  generation,  and 
the  historically  proved  policy  of  aggression  of  the  German 
people. 

It  became  increasingly  evident  to  army  and  navy  officers 
that  the  next  war  in  which  Germany  would  become  engaged 
would  be  one  of  a  scope  and  a  rate  of  destruction  of  life  and 
property,  per  unit  of  time,  such  as  had  never  been  seen  before. 
As  the  years  went  by  it  became  increavsingly  evident  also  that, 
when  the  time  came,  Germany  would  be  much  better  prepared 
than  any  other  country,  and  that  there  was  grave  danger  of 
Germany's  playing  the  part  of  imperial  Rome  after  the 
war,  the  rest  of  the  world  playing  the  part  of  vassal  states. 
The  principal  single  reason  why  the  rest  of  the  world  remained 
so  inert,  in  plain  sight  of  Germany's  preparations,  was  the 
spread  of  the  pacifist  movement.  This  movement  was  only  a 
repetition  of  many  in  the  past  that  had  taken  place  in  wealthy 
countries ;  but,  by  reason  of  the  increased  facilities  for  print- 
ing and  mailing,  it  spread  much  more  rapidly  than  any  like 
movement  had  ever  spread  before.  It  constituted  almost  an 
invitation  to  Germany  to  take  what  she  wanted;  because  it 
dangled  Opportunity  before  her  eyes  and  said  to  her  in  effect : 
' '  Though  we  are  rich  and  you  are  poor,  we  will  not  even  pre- 
pare to  resist  an  aggression  on  your  part,  except  in  the  wholly 
improbable  case  that  you  should  forcibly  attack  us.  If  you 
actually  do  that,  then  we  will  defend  ourselves  bravely." 

Germany's  preparations  increased  at  a  speed  and  with  a 
precision  and  effectiveness  unprecedented  in  history.  Of 
course,  preparations  for  the  kind  of  war  that  Germany  in- 
tended could  not  proceed  unless  accompanied  with  govern- 
mental, commercial,  industrial,  and  scientific  developments  of 
all  sorts.  In  fact,  the  period  from  1871  to  1914  was  an  era  of 
tremendous  progress  in  Germany  in  all  fields  of  activity. 
"William  I  remained  Emperor  until  1888,  when  he  died  and 


292  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

was  succeeded  by  his  son,  Frederick  III,  who  reigned  for 
three  months  only,  and  was  succeeded  by  his  son,  William  II. 
Bismarck  was  made  the  first  Imperial  Chancellor  by  William 
I;  and  he  remained  in  that  position  until  1890,  when  he  was 
dismissed  by  William  II. 

The  developments  that  took  place  in  Germany  have  been 
the  marvel  of  the  world ;  and  well  they  may  be,  for  even  Rome 
never  introduced  so  many  and  so  important  reforms  in  so 
short  a  time.  These  reforms  covered  all  departments  of  the 
national  life,  but  most  of  them  may  be  classed  under  the  head- 
ing, utilitarian.  This  does  not  mean  that  there  was  not  a  great 
advance  in  Germany  in  music  and  science;  but  it  does  mean 
that  even  the  advance  in  those  activities  had  a  utilitarian 
tinge. 

We  must  remember  that  the  Germans,  and  especially  the 
Prussians,  were  virtually  on  the  eastern  edge  of  the  civiliza- 
tion of  Europe,  and  in  closer  contact  with  the  Slavs  and 
Turanians  of  eastern  Europe  than  were  the  western  nations; 
that  they  were  of  almost  the  pure  Germanic  stock,  and  were 
not  a  combination,  like  the  French,  who  were  a  mixture  of 
Gauls,  Celts,  and  Italians;  and  we  must  remember  especially 
that  the  original  Germanic  tribes,  even  in  the  time  of  Caesar, 
were  of  a  coarser  fiber  than  even  the  Gauls  of  France.  We 
must  also  remind  ourselves  that,  from  1640  till  1871,  the  Ger- 
mans and  the  Prussians  had  gone  through  a  distinct  career 
of  increasing  prosperity,  which  was  built  on  the  ideas  and 
methods  of  the  Great  Elector,  and  continued  without  inter- 
mission, except  possibly  during  the  reigns  of  Frederick  Wil- 
liam III  and  Frederick  William  IV;  and  that,  even  in  the 
reign  of  Frederick  William  III,  the  Prussians  had  achieved 
great  glory  by  the  conduct  of  Blucher  and  his  troops  at  the 
battle  of  Waterloo.  We  must  also  remember  that,  while  the 
immediate  cause  of  the  prosperity  that  each  individual  German 
enjoyed  was  the  improvements  made  in  the  economic,  indus- 
trial, and  transportational  systems,  yet  these  were  all  madte 
possible  by  the  unification  first  of  Prussia  and  then  of  Ger- 


ANTE  BELLUM  293 

many;  and  that  these  unifications  were  due  dflrectly  to  suc- 
cessful war. 

Books  have  been  written  about  the  many  measures  that  the 
government  of  Germany  adopted  and  carried  through  for  the 
welfare  of  the  people.  If  we  read  of  these  measures,  we  are 
apt  to  become  confused  by  their  multiplicity  and  complexity. 
There  are  two  possible  explanations,  however,  which  suggest 
that  the  matter  may  not  be  so  complicated  as  it  seems. 

One  explanation  is  that  the  government  adopted  for  solving 
its  civil  problems  the  ''estimate  of  the  situation"  method, 
which  the  German  general  staff  invented  many  years  ago,  fo>r 
solving  military  problems.  By  this  method  each  problem  is 
divided  into  four  parts : 

1.  The  mission — that  is,  the  distinct  end  that  it  is  desired 
to  attain. 

2.  The  difficulties  in  the  way. 

3.  The  facilities  on  hand,  or  attainable,  for  accomplishing 
the  mission. 

4.  The  decision. 

Looked  at  from  a  scientific  standpoint,  it  will  be  seen  that 
this  method  is  divisible  into  two  parts;  the  first  part  (the  first 
three  steps)  being  analytical  and  the  second  part  synthetic, 
or  constructive.  It  can  be  seen  also  that  it  is  somewhat  anal- 
ogous to  the  feat  of  Professor  Helmholtz,  who  analyzed  a 
sound  into  its  fundamental  tone  and  its  over-tones,  and  then, 
by  means  of  appropriate  apparatus,  synthesized  a  number  of 
different  tones  into  that  sound  and  into  other  sounds. 

Another  and  more  obvious  explanation  is  suggested  by  the 
organization  of  an  army  or  a  battleship.  For  an  army  or  a 
battleship  is  an  integral  part  of  a  nation,  composed  of  human 
beings,  subjected  to  the  same  necessities  and  animated  by  the 
same  desires  as  the  human  beings  in  the  nation  itself.  Now, 
an  army  or  a  battleship  in  order  to  carry  out  its  purposes, 
must  be  divided  into  various  branches ;  each  of  these  branches 
must  be  divided  into  divisions,  and  each  of  these  divisions 
must  be  divided  into  sub-divisions ;  and  eyery  branch,  division, 


294  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

and  sub-division  must  be  placed  under  a  responsible  head  or 
chief.  Furthermore,  all  the  branches  and  divisions  and  sub- 
divisions must  be  so  coordinated  that  they  can  be  combined 
together  and  made  to  form  one  coherent  organization,  under 
one  man  at  its  head.  With  these  ideas  in  mind,  it  is  easy  to 
see  how  the  analj'^tical  German  mind  analyzed  the  multitudi- 
nous problems  into  their  component  parts,  and  then  synthe- 
sized or  constructed  the  means  whereby  the  problem  would  be 
solved.  And  we  can  see  also  that,  being  permeated,  as  the 
Germans  hereditarily  were,  with  the  military  instinct,  it  was 
not  hard  for  them  to  make  what  might  almost  be  called  an 
army  out  of  the  whole  German  nation. 

It  may  seem  that  the  explanations  just  attempted  are  some- 
what labored  and  far-fetched.  Possibly  they  are ;  but  we  can- 
not deny  that  the  whole  structure  of  the  German  gevemment, 
and  the  whole  structure  of  the  German  nation,  show  the  evi- 
dence of  careful  analysis  and  able  synthesis,  and  that  the  struc- 
ture of  the  German  nation  is  essentially  military.  Possibly  the 
most  obvious  sign  of  its  military  character  is  the  training 
through  which  everyone  is  put  for  whatever  vocation  he  is  to 
fill,  and  the  insistence  that  every  man  at  the  head  of  every  or- 
ganization, large  or  small,  must  be  fitted  by  training  to  per- 
form its  duties  well,  and  must  have  given  evidence  of  his  abil- 
ity by  previous  work  of  the  same  character. 

Possibly  it  may  seem  foolish  to  suggest  that  Germany  is 
alone  in  having  experts  at  the  head  of  the  departments  of 
the  government ;  and  yet,  the  naked  fact  stands  out,  clear  and 
plain,  that  Germany  is  the  only  great  country  that  has  ever 
accomplished  or  very  seriously  attempted  it.  Possibly  ancient 
Rome  and  modem  Japan  have  come  the  nearest  to  Germany 
in  this  particular.  In  the  other  great  countries  of  the  world, 
the  army  and  the  navy  are  the  only  organizations  in  which  it 
is  seriously  attempted  to  restrict  the  leadership  of  the  various 
branches  and  divisions  of  the  government  to  men  skilled  in 
their  duties;  and  in  many  countries  political  influences  pre- 
vent this  in  even  the  army  and  navy. 


ANTE  BELLUM  295 

The  Germans  came  to  pride  themselves  excessively  on  their 
"efficiency,"  and  to  believe  themselves  superior  to  all  other 
people  in  the  world.  Feeling  in  this  way,  it  did  not  take  them 
long  to  proclaim  their  superiority,  and  their  desire  to  prove 
it.  In  their  own  estimation,  they  did  prove  it  by  the  records 
they  made  in  increasing  the  productiveness  of  their  soil,  and 
improving  nearly  all  their  activities,  especially  their  manu- 
factures, exports,  steamship  lines,  foreign  trade,  and  in  gen- 
eral all  enterprises  in  which  cooperation  among  many  people 
was  required.  It  was  not  a  long  step  from  this  to  feeling  that, 
if  they  could  surpass  the  other  nations  in  these  particulars, 
and  if  they  could  within  a  few  years  build  up  a  navy  from 
almost  nothing  to  the  position  of  the  second  navy  in  the 
world,  they  could  literally  beat  all  the  world  militarily;  be- 
cause their  army  was  more  superior  to  any  other  army  than 
was  any  other  activity  in  Germany  to  its.  corresponding  activ- 
ity in  any  other  country. 

With  such  a  history  as  Germany  had,  and  with  the  essen- 
tially barbarous  characteristics  of  the  German  people,  it  is 
easy  to  see  why  Germany,  during  all  the  years  between  1871 
and  1914,  should  have  prepared  for  war.  Wonder  has  been 
expressed  that  she  kept  out  of  war  so  long.  The  explanation 
is  that  the  favorable  combination  of  events  did  not  occur  si- 
multaneously with  a  plausible  excuse  until  the  Archduke  Fer- 
dinand was  shot  in  Servia  on  June  28,  1914. 

War  was  declared  on  the  1st  of  August,  and  Germany  was 
ready;  not  only  in  "the  last  button  of  the  gaiters,"  but  in 
everything;  especially  in  the  things  most  difficult  to  be  ready 
in — that  is,  strategic  plans,  both  general  and  detailed. 

But  the  world  was  unprepared,  except  one  organization — 
the  British  navy.  Wliy  the  world  was  unprepared  may  be 
explained  on  the  same  grounds  as  can  be  explained  the  unpre- 
paredness  of  many  nations  that  in  the  past  were  forced  to  rush 
into  war  unprepared.  The  explanation  is  simply  that  the 
nations  had  not  had  the  strategic  insight  necessary  to  discern 
the  danger,  and  therefore  lacked  the  wisdom  to  prepare.    They 


296  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

were  like  the  five  foolish  virgins  in  the  Bible.  And  yet  Ger- 
many's preparations  were  perfectly  plain;  in  fact,  Germany 
made  little  effort  to  conceal  them,  though  she  was  able,  by 
means  of  paid  agents  in  all  the  countries  to  do  as  the  barbaric 
German  tribes  had  done  centuries  before — to  make  her  future 
antagonists  believe  in  her  peaceful  intentions,  or  at  least  to 
close  their  eyes.  Such  methods  had  succeeded  with  possible 
antagonists  in  the  time  of  Csesar;  and  they  succeeded  with 
Great  Britain,  France,  Russia,  and  the  United  States  nineteen 
centuries  later. 

Meanwhile,  in  Great  Britain  much  progress  in  all  ways  had 
been  made.  Perhaps  the  most  important  single  steps  were 
taken  in  1900,  when  the  Australian  Federation  was  formed, 
and  in  1909,  when  the  South  African  Union  was  formed.  In 
1910  Great  Britain  had  five  self-governing  colonies,  Canada, 
New  Zealand,  Newfoundland,  the  Commonwealth  of  Austra- 
lia, and  the  South  African  Union.  Besides  these  self-govern- 
ing colonies,  Great  Britain  had  many  dependent  colonies  scat- 
tered over  the  world.  In  addition,  she  possessed  India,  the 
most  important  of  all,  inhabited  by  a  population  of  three  hun- 
dred millions. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  this  empire  had  been  established  by 
naval  and  military  power,  directed  by  strategy. 

Queen  Victoria  died  in  1901,  and  left  Great  Britain  in  a 
condition  of  prosperity  that  was  considered  then  to  be  very 
secure,  but  that  we  now  know  was  insecure. 

Many  causes  contributed  to  the  prosperity :  the  main  causes 
being  the  character  of  the  people,  the  climate,  and  (most  im- 
portant of  all)  the  enormous  improvements  effected  in  the  con- 
ditions of  living  by  inventions  in  engineering  and  mechanics, 
notably  those  that  increased  the  certainty  and  speed  of  trans- 
portation and  communication. 

It  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  most  writers,  except  technical 
writers,  show  little  appreciation  of  the  tremendous  assistance 
to  the  progress  of  civilization  that  very  simple  mechanical 
and  electrical  inventions  have  imparted,  and  seem  to  fail  to 


ANTE  BELLUM  297 

realize  tliat  the  principal  difference  between  modem  civiliza- 
tion and  ancient  civilization  is  not  any  difference  in  the  people 
but  merely  in  the  use  of  mechanical  and  electrical  appliances. 
There  is  no  evidence  that  the  human  machine  is  any  better 
than  it  was  in  the  days  when  the  pyramids  were  built,  or  when 
the  Greeks  held  their  Olympian  games.  There  is  no  evidence 
now  of  any  brain  better  than  that  of  Caesar ;  we  have  no  poet 
greater  than  Homer,  no  orator  greater  than  Demosthenes,  no 
sculptor  greater  than  Praxiteles.  But  the  ancient  Egyptians 
had  no  electric  railways;  the  Assyrians  did  not  possess  the 
wireless  telegraph;  Homer  did  not  have  the  advantage  of  a 
typewriter;  and  Charles  V  lived  a  life  of  squalor  compared 
with  that  of  a  moderately  prosperous  resident  of  any  modern 
city. 

Victoria  was  succeeded  by  Edward  VII.  He  had  always 
been  popular  with  the  people,  though  his  private  life  had  not 
been  strictly  puritanical,  and  he  was  supposed  to  have  trod 
the  primrose  path  of  dalliance  for  some  years.  But  when  he 
came  to  the  throne  he  was  sixty  years  of  age,  and  the  fresh 
exuberance  of  early  youth  had  passed.  He  had  always  been 
supposed  to  be  a  trifler ;  but  as  a  king  he  showed  that  he  was 
a  trifler  only  in  trifles.  His  career  as  king  surprised  both 
friends  and  enemies:  because  he  proved  to  be  the  man  that 
was  required,  the  man  needed  to  remedy,  as  far  as  he  could, 
the  feminine  mistakes  of  his  mother's  reign — an  excessive 
shrinking  from  war,  a  fatuous  trust  in  the  notion  that  war  had 
passed  away. 

Edward  received  the  unofficial  title  of  Peacemaker  from  the 
people;  and  yet,  he  really  was  not  a  peacemaker  in  the  sense 
in  which  they  used  the  word.  While  not  a  man  of  exceptional 
ability,  he  was,  like  some  other  indolent  and  pleasure-loving 
men,  able  to  see  things  from  a  distance,  unconfused  by  details. 
Of  course,  he  had  had  the  advantage  of  long  training  in  antici- 
pation of  his  task,  and  had  had  all  possible  opportunities  for 
getting  correct  information  from  all  sources.  But,  after  all 
allowances  have  been  made,  it  can  hardly  be  denied  that  Ed- 


298  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

ward  made  a  more  correct  estimate  of  the  situation  than  did 
the  professional  statesman  of  his  kingdom,  who  did  little 
things  well,  but  who  failed  so  utterly  on  important  things  as 
almost  to  ruin  the  empire.  His  principal  achievement  was  the 
establishment  of  the  Triple  Entente,  which  included  Great 
Britain,  France,  and  Russia.  It  cannot  justly  be  claimed  that 
he  originated  the  idea,  or  was  the  only  man  concerned  in  it; 
and  yet,  there  can  be  no  question  that  the  Triple  Entente  was 
largely  brought  about  by  him.  Certain  it  is  that  he  has  always 
received  the  principal  credit  for  it. 

Unfortunately,  he  died  before  many  things  had  been  done 
that  should  have  been  done.  Whether,  if  he  had  lived,  he 
would  have  succeeded  in  rousing  the  country  to  a  realization 
of  her  peril,  we  do  not  know.  Two  important  occurrences  in 
his  reign  were  the  Second  Hague  Conference  in  1907  and  the 
resulting  Declaration  of  London. 

The  First  Hague  Peace  Conference  in  1899  had  drawn  up  a 
comprehensive  ' '  International  Convention  with  Respect  to  the 
Laws  and  Customs  of  War  on  Land,"  designed  to  check  the 
severity  of  military^  belligerents,  and  it  had  been  ratified  by 
the  great  powers.  One  of  the  chief  objects  of  the  Second  Con- 
ference, in  1907,  was  the  preparation  of  a  similar  code,  to 
apply  to  war  on  the  sea.  The  first  attempt  to  do  this  had  been 
made  in  1856  by  the  signers  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris.  In  this 
treaty  four  important  rules  had  been  agreed  to ;  but  the  vast 
increase  in  size,  power,  and  complexity  of  both  maritime  com- 
merce and  of  navies  made  more  definite  agreements  necessary ; 
and  these  the  Second  Hague  Peace  conference  attempted  to 
efi'ect.  The  conference  was  unable  to  do  this  wholly ;  but  it  did 
provide  for  an  international  prize  court  to  which  were  to  be 
referred  certain  classes  of  questions. 

It  soon  became  apparent,  however,  that  this  prize  court 
would  have  no  basis  of  law  or  agreement  to  start  from.  To 
provide  this  Great  Britain  invited  the  representatives  of 
seven  other  great  powers  to  meet  in  conference,  "in  order  to 
arrive  at  an  agreement  as  to  what  are  the  generally  recog- 


ANTE  BELLUM  299 

nized  practices  of  International  Law,  within  the  meaning  of 
The  Hague  Convention." 

The  representatives  deliberated  in  London  between  Decem- 
ber, 1908,  and  February,  1909.  The  result  was  the  Declara- 
tion of  London.  This  declaration  was  divided  into  seventy-one 
articles,  arranged  in  nine  chapters,  headed  ' '  Blockade  in  Time 
of  "War,"  "Contraband  of  War,"  "Unneutral  Service," 
"Destruction  of  Neutral  Prizes,"  "Transfer  to  a  Neutral 
Flag,"  "Enemy  Character,"  "Convoy,"  "Resistance  to 
Search,"  "Compensation"  and  "Final  Provisions." 

Most  of  the  Conventions  of  the  Second  Peace  Conference 
concerning  war  contain  a  clause  to  the  effect  that  they  "are 
only  applicable  between  the  Contracting  Powers,  and  only  if 
all  the  belligerents  are  parties  to  the  Convention, ' '  and  the  first 
sentence  of  Article  66  of  the  Final  Provisions  of  the  Declara- 
tion of  London  reads :  ' '  The  signatory  powers  undertake  to 
insure  the  mutual  observance  of  the  rules  contained  in  the  pres- 
ent Declaration  in  any  war  in  which  all  the  belligerents  are 
parties  thereto. ' '  This  is  noteworthy :  for  many  people,  not 
knowing  it,  not  knowing  that  the  declaration  of  London  had 
not  been  ratified  even  by  Great  Britain,  that  some  of  the  con- 
ventions of  the  Second  Peace  Conference  had  not  been  ratified 
by  several  countries,  and  that  Convention  XII,  creating  an 
international  prize  court,  had  not  been  ratified  by  any  coun- 
try when  the  World  War  broke  out,  have  criticized  certain 
acts  as  being  contrary  to  the  Declaration  and  the  conventions 
of  the  Second  Peace  Conference. 

The  Declaration  aroused  great  opposition  in  England,  both 
from  the  Chambers  of  Commerce,  which  thought  that  the  Dec- 
laration would  operate  unfavorably  to  British  commerce  in 
any  war  in  which  Great  Britain  would  be  a  neutral,  and  also 
from  the  navy,  which  thought  that  the  Declaration  would 
operate  unfavorably  to  the  navy  in  any  war  in  which  Great 
Britain  would  be  a  belligerent.  Since  Great  Britain  had  the 
greatest  maritime  commerce  and  the  greatest  nav^^;  since  it 
was  apparent  to  army  and  navy  men  that  the  coming  war  with 


800  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

Germany  could  not  be  delayed  much  longer ;  since  the  nation 
next  to  Great  Britain  in  both  naval  power  and  maritime  com- 
merce was  Germany;  since  Germany  and  Great  Britain  nat- 
urally viewed  the  subject  from  directly  opposite  points  of 
view;  and  since  the  subject  was  absolutely  vital  to  both 
nations,  the  interest  aroused  was  intense. 

The  Declaration  of  London  was  not  ratified,  however,  and 
therefore  it  accomplished  nothing  of  a  definite  character;  but 
the  failure  to  ratify  it  brought  into  startling  relief  the  fact 
that  the  governments  of  the  eight  great  maritime  and  naval 
nations  had  found  it  impossible  to  agree  on  the  most  important 
and  most  controversial  questions  regarding  maritime  warfare, 
and  that  the  whole  international  law  situation  in  regard  to 
war  on  the  sea  was  therefore  indefinite  and  va^e!  This 
meant  that  in  case  of  any  war  between  great  maritime  coun- 
tries, questions  of  the  utmost  importance  and  involving  pos- 
sible war  would  almost  certainly  arise  between  belligerents 
and  neutrals,  and  international  law  could  provide  no  adequate 
basis  of  mutual  understanding  or  of  law,  for  reaching  an 
agreement.  This  condition  makes  the  inertness  of  the  great 
maritime  nations  just  before  1914,  and  even  in  the  early  part 
of  that  year,  the  more  difficult  to  understand. 

King  George  and  Queen  Mary  were  crowned  on  June  22, 
1911,  and  six  months  later  they  went  to  India,  where  they  were 
crowned  Emperor  and  Empress  of  India  at  Delhi,  amid 
pageants  of  great  splendor.  This  circumstance,  and  the  gen- 
eral state  of  affairs  throughout  the  country,  betokened  a  pow- 
erful empire  and  prophesied  great  longevity.  It  was  rein- 
forced in  the  following  year,  by  an  Imperial  Conference  at 
London,  where  the  representatives  of  the  five  self-governing 
dominions,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  Newfoundland,  Canada, 
and  South  Africa,  met  in  consultation  on  imperial  questions 
and  the  consideration  of  the  military  and  naval  defense  of  the 
empire.  Nothing  else  on  earth  seemed  so  stable  as  the  British 
Empire. 

Yet  the  British  Empire  was  on  the  brink  of  a  crisis  in  which 


ANTE  BELLUM  301 

it  almost  went  down  to  ruin,  and  from  wliich  it  was  barely 
saved  by  an  occurrence  that  nobody  expected — the  sudden 
interposition  of  the  United  States. 

Throughout  the  reign  of  Victoria  and  afterward,  the  people 
of  Great  Britain,  including  their  politicians,  who  competed 
with  each  other  in  trying  to  win  popularity  by  prophesying 
smooth  and  pleasant  things,  had  been  concentrating  their 
attention  on  internal  matters,  and  neglecting  the  safety  of 
national  life ;  just  as  many  a  man  has  devoted  himself  to  the 
making  of  money,  or  the  pursuit  of  pleasure,  until  a  physician 
has  warned  him  that  he  was  putting  his  life  in  danger.  There 
were  a  few  men,  like  Field  Marshal  Lord  Roberts,  Field  Mar- 
shal Lord  Kitchener,  many  army  and  navy  officers,  and  a 
handful  of  thinkers  and  writers  who  pointed  out  that  the  na- 
tional life  was  in  grave  peril.  These  men  were  not  gifted  with 
any  special  knowledge  or  with  any  special  insight :  they  were 
merely  men  who  were  not  so  engrossed  in  their  own  private 
affairs  as  to  be  unable  to  think  of  other  things,  and  who  were 
not  so  lacking  in  courage  as  to  be  afraid  to  tell  the  people 
unpleasant  facts. 

These  men,  of  whom  Lord  Roberts  was  the  principal,  told 
the  people  of  England  repeatedly,  insistently,  and  emphati- 
cally that  Germany  was  arming  to  attack  Great  Britain.  They 
called  the  attention  of  the  people  of  England  to  things  printed, 
not  only  in  German  newspapers  and  magazines,  but  in  care- 
fully written  books,  which  showed  that  the  Germans  had  come 
to  believe  themselves  a  people  far  superior  in  ability,  charac- 
ter, and  courage  to  any  other  people  in  the  world,  and  to  feel 
that  it  was  bad  for  the  world  that  they  should  be  kept  in  a 
position  that  they  thought  one  of  inferiority  in  comparison 
with  that  held  by  Great  Britain.  These  men  gave  proofs  that 
the  Germans  considered  that  the  people  of  Russia,  France, 
and  England  were  decadent,  mentally  and  morally,  and  yet 
held  a  standing  in  the  world  far  higher  than  Germany 's,  and 
possessed  much  more  in  land  and  wealth.  These  men  proved 
that  Germany,  having  easily  conquered  France,  and  knowing 


302  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

tlie  corrupt  condition  of  affairs  in  Russia,  regarded  France 
and  Russia  as  almost  negligible,  except  in  so  far  as  they  might 
give  assistance  to  Great  Britain.  They  showed  that  Germany 
felt  aggrieved  that  Great  Britain  held  the  sovereignty  of  one 
quarter  of  all  the  land  in  the  world,  and  was  mistress  of  the 
sea,  while  Germany  (a  much  more  noble  country,  according  to 
their  views)  was  hemmed  in  on  all  sides,  and  lacked  "a  place 
in  the  sun." 

These  men  proved  that  Germany  realized  that  all  the 
national  success  she  had  ever  got  had  been  got  by  the  sword; 
and  that  many  Germans  declared  that  if,  at  certain  critical 
times,  the  Germans  had  devoted  themselves  to  practical  affairs, 
as  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Holland  had  done,  instead  of  to 
dreams  in  philosophy,  poetry  and  religion,  Germany  would 
then  occupy  a  place  like  England's.  They  showed  that  these 
ideas,  under  the  inspiration  of  men  like  Treitschke,  were  not 
held  as  academic  principles,  but  were  becoming  living  realities, 
and  spurring  the  people  to  revolt.  They  showed  that  the  Ger- 
man army  was  very  much  better  than  any  other  army  in  the 
world,  not  only  because  it  was  larger,  but  also  because  it  was 
more  efficient ;  and  that  the  German  navy,  which  only  twenty- 
five  years  before  had  been  almost  negligible,  was  now  second 
in  size  to  the  British,  and  at  least  as  efficient  and  possibly  more 
so.  They  pointed  out  the  unparalleled  expansion  of  German 
commerce  all  over  the  world,  and  the  superior  efficiency  of  the 
German  government,  and  expressed  their  opinion  that  if  Ger- 
many should  go  to  war  with  Russia,  France,  and  Great  Brit- 
ain combined,  she  would  have  an  excellent  chance  of  victory. 
They  also  showed  that  victory  would  mean  the  ruin  of  the 
British  Empire  and  the  world  dominance  of  the  German. 

The  man  who  exerted  himself  the  most  to  convince  England 
of  her  danger  was  Lord  Roberts.  His  arguments  and  appeals 
were  received  by  the  mob  with  jeers  and  insults,  and  by  even 
the  better  classes  with  ill-disguised  impatience.  Many  harsh 
remarks  were  made  about  him,  the  average  of  which  might  be 
expressed  in  the  words,  ' '  He  is  an  old  fool. ' '    Yet  Roberts  was 


ANTE  BELLUM  303 

right  and  the  rest  were  wrong !  The  treatment  of  Lord  Rob- 
erts by  the  British  people,  whom  he  had  served  so  well,  is  one 
of  the  most  deplorable  facts  in  history.  That  Great  Britain 
has  made  expiation  for  it  is  also  one  of  the  clearest  facts  of  his- 
tory. She  has  expiated  it  by  the  death  of  the  best  of  her 
young  manhood;  by  the  impoverishment  of  the  kingdom;  by 
the  untold  suffering,  physical,  mental,  and  spiritual,  of  every 
man,  woman,  and  child;  by  everything  that  is  deplorable  in 
national  life,  except  national  ruin  itself. 

That  Great  Britain  should  have  gone  on  as  she  did,  even  to 
the  day  when  she  declared  war  on  Germany,  is  a  thing  that 
cannot  be  explained.  We  know  that  Assyria  fell  before  the 
barbarian  Persian;  that  Persia  fell  before  the  barbarian 
Greek ;  and  that  Rome  fell  before  the  barbarian  Alaric :  but  all 
those  countries  were  decadent  countries,  and  we  accept  the 
fact  of  their  decadence  as  the  explanation  of  their  fall.  But 
was  Great  Britain  decadent f  Germany  said  she  was;  and  the 
fact  that  Great  Britain  so  nearly  fell,  and  was  saved  only  by 
the  unexpected  interposition  of  the  United  States,  gives  im- 
portance to  the  question. 

Yet  Great  Britain  was  not  decadent  in  the  sense  that 
Assyria  and  Persia  and  Egypt  were ;  for  Great  Britain  was  in 
the  very  flower  of  a  civilization  supposed  to  be  the  most  beau- 
tiful the  world  had  ever  seen. 

The  answer  to  the  question  is  dependent,  of  course,  on  the 
definition  of  the  word  decadent.  In  default  of  an  agreement 
as  to  that  definition,  we  cannot  decide  whether  Great  Britain 
was  decadent  or  not ;  but  we  can  easily  decide  whether,  during 
the  first  fourteen  years  of  the  twentieth  century,  the  British 
acted  as  worthy  descendants  of  Harold  and  Alfred  and  the 
Black  Prince,  and  Marlborough  and  Nelson  and  William  Pitt. 

Of  all  the  departments  of  the  British  government,  the  only 
department  ready  was  the  navy.  The  army  was  not  ready; 
and  no  one  in  England  who  had  paid  any  attention  to  national 
matters  expected  that  she  would  be  ready,  in  case  the  thing 
happened  that  did  happen.    That  the  army  did  well  after  the 


304  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

emergency  had  arisen,  the  applause  of  the  whole  world  testi- 
fies. But  the  glory  it  achieved  was  at  the  cost  of  sacrifices  that 
should  not  have  been  necessary,  and  that  have  made  England 
endure  unutterable  remorse. 

The  navy  was  wonderfully  ready,  though  not  so  ready  as  the 
German;  and  the  officers  and  men  of  the  navy  covered  them- 
selves and  the  navy  and  the  country  with  the  greatest  measure 
of  glory  that  the  country  as  a  whole  has  a  right  to  claim;  for 
before  the  war  the  country  had  shown  the  foresight  and  the 
patriotic  spirit  necessary  to  build  and  maintain  a  navy  ade- 
quate to  her  defense.  As  to  her  navy,  Great  Britain  did  not 
have  to  be  driven  into  a  corner  before  she  made  ready  to  pro- 
tect her  national  life  and  the  lives  of  her  women  and  children. 

Yet  the  navy  itself  was  not  all  it  should  have  been ;  not  from 
any  fault  of  the  navy,  but  from  the  same  fault  as  that  mainly 
responsible  for  the  unprepared  condition  of  Great  Britain  in 
other  departments. 

The  unreadiness  of  the  British  nav;^^,  as  compared  with  the 
German,  seems  to  have  no  other  explanation  than  the  fact  that, 
somewhat  less  than  a  hundred  years  before  the  war,  the  politi- 
cians had  become  so  strong  in  Great  Britain,  and  had  been  able 
to  impress  the  people  so  thoroughly  with  the  idea  that  "the 
military  should  be  subordinate  to  the  civil  authority,"  that 
they  adopted  the  practice  of  putting  untrained  civilians  at  the 
head  of  the  army  and  the  navy.  They  made  the  people  believe 
(and  possibly  made  themselves  believe)  that  it  was  not  neces- 
sary to  have  men  at  the  head  of  the  army  and  the  navy  who 
were  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  army  and  the  navy ;  giv- 
ing out  the  idea  that  untrained  ministers  could  direct  the  army 
and  navy  successfully,  provided  they  were  men  of  superior 
intelligence;  and  that  whatever  professional  knowledge  they 
might  lack  they  could  easily  get  from  professional  advisers. 

They  neglected  to  point  out  that  the  "professional  advis- 
ers" could  be  ignored,  that  a  minister  untrained  in  technical 
matters  would  not  be  competent  to  make  the  best  selection  of 
professional  advisers,  and  that  the  scheme  actually  promoted 


ANTE  BELLUM  305 

irresponsibility.  For  the  minister  could  always  shift  the 
blame  for  any  miscarriage  to  his  professional  advisers;  and 
these  professional  advisers  would  be  perfectly  safe,  because 
they  were  responsible  only  to  the  minister  himself !  They  also 
failed  to  point  out  that  ministers,  untrained  in  the  profession 
of  arms,  might  appoint  assistants  whose  qualifications  were  the 
tact  and  suavity  of  the  courtier,  rather  than  the  force  and 
austerity  of  the  warrior. 

No  evidence  that  it'ould  he  accepted  in  a  court  of  law  has 
ever  been  given  which  would  establish  the  reasonableness  of 
the  proposition  that  untrained  men  can  manage  great  profes- 
sional organizations  with  real  success.  Certain  it  is  that  man- 
aging an  army  or  a  navy  is  a  business,  in  the  sense  as  that  in 
which  managing  a  factory  can  be  said  to  be  a  business,  or 
keeping  a  shop  or  conducting  a  hotel,  or  administering  a  rail- 
road; and  virtually  all  of  these  businesses  are  conducted  by 
men  who  knew  them  intimately.  Certain  it  is,  also,  that  in 
this  war  the  head  of  the  Admiralty  made  two  bloody  mistakes 
that  a  man  knowing  the  naval  business  intimately  would  not 
have  made. 

Certain  it  is,  also,  that  the  mere  fact  of  army  and  navy 
officers  knowing  that  they  would  never  be  allowed  to  decide 
important  strategic  questions  took  away  from  them  not  only 
that  interest  in  the  higher  part  of  their  profession  which  they 
should  have  had,  but  also  the  strategic  training  they  would 
otherwise  have  gained.  Certain  it  is,  also,  that  strategic 
training  and  the  resulting  strategic  ability  were  lost  to  Great 
Britain;  because  nobody  but  army  and  navy  officers  could 
possibly  attain  it,  and  no  other  people  did.  Certain  it  is, 
therefore,  that  the  government  of  Great  Britain  for  nearly  one 
hundred  years  lacked  the  kind  of  council  it  should  have  had. 
Almost  certain  it  is  that,  if  the  government  had  not  lacked 
that  counsel,  Great  Britain  would  not  have  lapsed  into  unpre- 
paredness,  and  would  not  have  gone  through  the  agony  she  has 
gone  through. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  this  was  the  first  great  war  in  which 


306  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

the  British  navy  was  not  headed  by  a  naval  officer;  that  in 
each  war  in  which  it  was  headed  by  a  naval  officer  it  showed 
more  dash,  resourcefulness,  and  strategic  ability  than  did  any 
of  its  adversaries;  that  in  this  war  it  showed  less  dash  and 
resourcefulness  and  strategic  ability  than  the  German  navy; 
and  that  the  German  navy  was  headed  by  a  naval  officer. 

It  is  a  principle  fundamental  to  the  efficient  handling  of 
every  organization  that  the  man  at  its  head  should  have  been 
specially  trained  for  his  task. 

Even  more  than  Great  Britain,  in  proportion  to  her  danger 
from  Germany,  France  became  increasingly  unprepared  for 
war  as  war  drew  near.  In  1889  the  requirement  for  compul- 
sory military  service  had  been  reduced  from  five  to  three  years. 
In  1905  the  period  of  service  was  reduced  to  two  years.  This 
fact,  taken  in  connection  with  the  increase  in  socialistic  agita- 
tion, the  absence  of  any  commanding  personality  that  could 
direct  the  energies  of  the  people  for  more  than  a  very  short 
time,  the  lack  of  continuous  interest  in  public  affairs,  the  in- 
tense factionalism,  and  the  ardent  pursuit  of  pleasure  by  all 
classes,  was  of  sinister  importance ;  because  Germany  was 
meanwhile  straining  every  faculty  to  acquire  the  military- 
power  wherewith  to  crush  France.  Finally,  however,  it  was 
realized  that,  in  view  of  the  menace  of  Germany,  it  was  im- 
portant that  France  and  England  should  come  to  a  friendly 
understanding.  In  1903  visits  were  interchanged  between  the 
rulers ;  then  an  Anglo-French  Convention  was  signed  in  1904. 
By  this  convention  many  long-standing  disputes  were  ami- 
cably adjusted,  and  some  new  arrangements  were  agreed  to. 

In  June,  1905,  M.  Delcasse  retired  from  the  Foreign  Office, 
a  post  he  had  held  for  seven  years.  A  few  days  before,  the 
dismaying  news  had  been  received  of  the  sudden  and  total 
destruction  of  the  fleet  of  France 's  ally,  Russia,  by  a  Japanese 
fleet  of  equal  size.  Since  Delcasse 's  retirement  was  supposed 
to  be  caused  by  German  influence,  because  of  his  opposition  to 
German  interference  in  Morocco,  the  two  incidents  had  a 
depressing    effect  on  the  people.     For  the  fact  was  known 


ANTE  BELLUM  307 

(though  the  people  shut  their  eyes  to  realizing  its  importance) 
that  Germany  was  exercising  an  enormous  influence  on  France 
and  in  France;  that  she  was  utilizing  all  the  resources  of  an 
astute,  far-seeing,  and  ruthless  diplomacy  to  weaken  the  na- 
tion; and  that  the  people  were  too  much  occupied  with  small 
factional  disputes  and  personal  pleasures  to  take  proper 
measures  to  avert  the  national  danger  that  intelligent  persons 
knew  to  be  impending. 

As  both  a  cause  and  an  effect  of  all  the  conditions,  the  politi- 
cian in  France  had  come  into  power  which,  though  usually 
brief  in  the  case  of  each  individual,  was  tremendous  and  tre- 
mendously injurious.  Ministries  succeeded  one  another  with 
bewildering  rapidity ;  there  being,  for  instance,  fourteen  Min- 
isters of  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  fifteen  years  between  1879  and 
1894,  and  six  in  the  following  fifteen  years.  Furthermore,  the 
ministers  and  their  subordinates  acquired  and  maintained 
their  offices,  not  because  they  were  capable  experts,  but  be- 
cause crowds  of  excitable  people  voted  for  them.  The  only 
agencies  of  the  government  that  were  even  partially  free  from 
political  influences  were  the  army  and  the  navy ;  the  War  and 
Navy  Departments  themselves  being  far  from  free.  The  navy 
suffered  more  than  the  army,  mainly  because  of  the  pernicious 
activities  of  Camille  Pelletan,  Minister  of  Marine,  who  nul- 
lified the  navy's  work  of  many  years  and  the  expenditure  of 
hundreds  of  millions  of  francs,  and  brought  about  a  condition 
of  inefficiency,  disorganization,  and  discouragement  which  the 
succeeding  years  of  extra  effort  have  not  yet  been  able  to  over- 
come. That  one  man  should  have  been  able  to  accomplish  so 
much  harm  showed  a  deplorable  national  condition ;  because 
the  fact  that  the  mischief  was  being  done  was  a  matter  of 
common  knowledge. 

The  French  people  saw  more  clearly  the  necessity  of  keep- 
ing their  army  effective  than  their  navy ;  for  it  was  the  French 
army  to  which  France  was  indebted  for  her  national  security 
and  the  place  she  held  in  the  forefront  of  the  nations.  Never- 
theless they  allowed  even  the  army  to   fall  far  below  the 


308  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

standard  of  efficiency  set  by  their  only  military  rival,  Ger- 
many. Nevertheless,  they  carelessly  observed  the  Germans 
increase  their  army  in  size,  and  exercise  it  in  war  manoeuvers 
of  unprecedented  magnitude,  well  knowing  that  that  army 
was  being  increased  in  size  and  effectiveness  for  the  sole  pur- 
pose of  fighting  France  and  Russia  and  any  allies  they  might 
secure.  Nevertheless,  they  concentrated  whatever  of  attention 
they  gave  to  public  matters  on  little  factional  disputes. 
Nevertheless,  the  individual  Frenchman  concerned  himself 
almost  wholly  with  his  private  affairs  and  his  private  pleas- 
ures. Nevertheless,  the  individual  man  and  woman  continued 
to  dance  on  the  very  edge  of  the  abyss  of  national  disaster. 

On  August  1,  1914,  Prussia  repeated  her  performances  of 
1864,  1866,  and  1870,  by  precipitating  a  war  against  nations 
whom  she  knew  to  be  unprepared,  at  a  time  when  she  felt  that 
she  herself  had  become  sufficiently  prepared  to  overcome  the 
disproportion  against  her  in  material  resources. 

That  she  did  this  was  unjustifiable.  But  was  it  justifiable 
for  the  other  nations  to  permit  her  to  do  it  1  It  is  unjustifiable 
for  burglars  to  rob  houses;  but  does  this  fact  make  it  justi- 
fiable for  municipal  authorities  to  permit  'burglary?  The 
record  of  Germany  was  perfectly  well  known,  and  so  was  her 
policy.  Many  writers,  like  Treitschke,  had  described  it 
clearly;  many  declarations  of  Bismarck  and  the  Kaiser  had 
emphasized  it ;  and  many  incidents  like  that  of  Agadir  had 
shown  that  the  policy  was  alive,  and  ready  to  be  put  into  active 
operation  as  soon  as  a  favorable  opportunity  should  arrive. 

But  the  Thomas  Jeffersons  and  William  J.  Bryans  of  France 
had  been  doing  their  work  successfully.  The  orators  of 
France  had  told  sweet  stories  to  people  who  wished  to  have 
such  stories  told  them.  Suddenly  the  storm  broke,  and  France 
plunged  into  the  valley  of  the  shadow  of  death.  The  story  of 
France  being  led  to  war  like  a  lamb  to  the  slaughter  would 
be  incredible,  had  it  not  so  often  been  told  before ;  had  it  not 
been  told  so  short  a  time  before  by  Denmark  and  by  Austria 
and  by  France  herself;  had  it  not  been  told  many  centuries 


ANTE  BELLUM  309 

before  by  Egypt  and  Assyria  and  Babylon  and  Greece  and 
Rome;  by  every  great  country  which  became  decadent  and 
then  fell ;  by  every  tribe  and  town  and  nation,  great  or  small, 
that  failed  to  obey  the  law  of  self -protection. 

The  flash  of  a  pistol  in  Serbia  on  June  28,  1914,  started  an 
explosion  that  statesmen  and  military  and  naval  men  all  over 
the  world  recognized  instantly  as  an  explosion  that  must  be 
followed  by  others;  so  intimately  connected  were  the  piles  of 
national  explosives,  and  so  sensitive  to  shock  was  the  explosive 
in  each  pile.  The  explosives  first  affected  were  those  in  Serbia 
and  Austria;  next,  those  in  Germany  and  Russia;  next,  those 
in  France;  next,  those  in  England.  By  August  5  all  had  ex- 
ploded, and  Germany  and  Austria  were  at  war  with  Russia, 
France  and  England.  Germany  being  fully  prepared,  Aus- 
tria fairly  prepared,  and  the  others  unprepared,  the  tremen- 
dous advantage  of  the  initiative  and  the  offensive  went  to  Ger- 
many and  Austria.  Germany  violated  the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium and  took  the  easiest  road  to  France.  This  was  a  crime, 
but  it  was  not  unexpected  (or  it  should  not  have  been)  ;  for 
violations  of  neutrality  and  of  treaties  were  as  old  as  history, 
and  as  much  to  be  expected  as  burglaries  and  murders. 

In  the  United  States,  during  the  period  between  1870  and 
1914,  the  progress  in  the  development  of  commerce,  industry, 
and  invention  had  been  greater  than  in  any  other  country, 
and  the  spread  of  pacifism  had  also  been  greater.  The  great 
spread  of  pacifism  was  due  mainly  to  two  causes — the  influence 
of  the  doctrines  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  and  the  absorption  of 
the  people  in  the  pursuit  of  wealth,  which  the  enormous  devel- 
opment of  the  country  facilitated  and  encouraged.  The  result 
was  a  condition  of  unpreparedness  far  in  excess  of  that  in 
any  European  country. 

Many  inventions  of  instruments  and  methods  pertaining  to 
war  were  made  in  the  United  States,  of  which  the  greatest  was 
the  airplane  made  by  Professor  Samuel  Langley  and  the 
Wright  Brothers.  The  next  most  important,  probably,  was 
an  invention  for  using  airplanes  for  discharging  torpedoes, 


310  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

which  the  author  patented  in  July,  1912.  The  fact  that  every 
warlike  operation  is  an  endeavor  to  bring  destructive  forces 
to  a  certain  point  before  the  enemy  bring  their  destructive 
forces  there,  combined  with  the  fact  that  the  airplane  could 
carry  destructive  forces  more  quickly  than  any  other  means, 
showed  strategists,  when  the  first  successful  flight  was  made 
by  the  Wright  Brothers  in  1903,  that  a  new  instrument  of 
war  had  been  born.  It  also  showed  that  it  behooved  each  na- 
tion to  develop  the  warlike  capabilities  of  that  instrument  at 
once,  in  order  to  be  ready  for  the  next  war. 

When  the  Great  War  broke  out  on  August  1,  1914,  the 
degree  of  the  unpreparedness  of  the  United  States  was  amaz- 
ing, as  I  know  from  personal  and  intimate  knowledge.  For  I 
was  Aid  for  Operations,  a  position  analogous  to  that  of  chief 
of  staff  in  the  army,  and  the  principal  adviser  of  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy.  Naturally,  I  did  all  I  could  to  get  the  navy 
ready.  The  fact  that  the  two  greatest  naval  and  maritime 
countries  in  the  world  were  at  war,  that  the  United  States  was 
the  greatest  neutral  countrj^  and  that  the  manufacturers  and 
merchants  of  the  United  States  would  endeavor  to  sell  to  both 
sides,  combined  with  the  chaotic  condition  of  international 
law  as  applied  to  neutrals  and  belligerents  at  sea  (as  evi- 
denced by  the  failure  of  the  Declaration  of  Loudon),  made  it 
plain  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  the  United  States  to  keep 
out  of  the  war.  I  had  a  meeting  of  the  General  Board  called 
at  half  past  nine  in  the  forenoon  of  the  first  of  August,  1914; 
and  we  drew  up  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  urging 
certain  measures.  Accompanying  the  letter  of  the  General 
Board,  I  sent  a  letter  urging  its  careful  consideration,  signed 
by  myself  as  Aid  for  Operations.  This  was  the  first  measure 
for  preparedness,  I  believe,  that  was  taken  in  the  United 
States. 

On  November  9,  1914,  I  wrote  an  official  letter  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy,  reporting  that  the  navy  was  "unprepared 
for  war, ' '  and  showing  that,  in  the  actual  condition  of  affairs, 
"if   this   country   avoids  war   during   the   next   five   years, 


ANTE  BELLUM  311 

it  will  be  accomplished  only  by  a  happy  combination  of  high 
diplomatic  skill  and  rare  good  fortune. ' '  About  the  same  time 
Representative  Gardner  introduced  a  resolution  in  Congress 
to  investigate  the  condition  of  the  army  and  navy ;  but,  as  the 
Congress  was  Democratic,  his  resolution  failed.  On  December 
17,  1914,  I  testified  officially  before  the  Naval  Committee  of 
the  House  of  Representatives  that  it  would  take  ' '  at  least  five 
years"  to  get  our  navy  ready  to  fight  effectively  against  any 
great  naval  power. 

The  only  immediate  effect  of  my  efforts  was  to  bring  about 
such  a  feeling  against  me,  on  the  part  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  that  I  had  to  resign  my  position  and  turn  my  duties 
over  to  an  officer  whose  ideas  and  personality  were  more  ac- 
ceptable to  him.  But  the  report  of  my  testimony  to  Congress, 
and  the  fact  that  I  was  forced  to  resign,  caused  considerable 
excitement  throughout  the  countrj^;  because  the  position  that 
I  occupied  made  me  the  official  expert  in  such  matters.  The 
appropriations  that  Congress  made  immediately  afterward  for 
the  navy  were  larger  than  any  ever  made  before  in  this 
country. 

A  condition  of  great  restlessness  ensued  in  certain  sections 
of  the  country,  in  an  endeavor  to  initiate  measures  for  pre- 
paredness. The  Navy  League  had  been  started  many  years  be- 
fore, and  had  done  much  to  secure  appropriations  for  the  navy 
from  Congress.  The  National  Security  League  was  formed  in 
December,  1914,  and  the  American  Defense  Society  in  August, 
1915,  by  persons  in  private  life,  in  order  to  rouse  the  country 
to  the  dangers  that  impended.  These  patriotic  organizations 
and  a  few  civilians,  at  the  head  of  whom  were  Theodore  Roose- 
velt, Eliliu  Root,  Senator  Lodge,  and  Representative  Gardner, 
instituted  a  vigorous  propag:anda.  This  propaganda  took  on 
new  energy  when  the  Lusitania  was  sunk  by  a  German  sub- 
marine on  May  7,  1915.  On  April  6,  1917,  the  United  States 
declared  war  against  Germany. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE  WORLD  WAR 

IT  may  seem  absurd  to  omit  from  a  book  on  strate^  a 
detailed  account  of  the  operations  of  the  World  War  that 
has  just  ended;  but  would  it  not  be  more  absurd  at  the 
present  time,  when  all  the  facts  of  the  war  are  not  yet  known, 
to  attempt  to  do  this,  or  to  draw  any  but  the  most  general 
strategic  deductions  from  it? 

As  the  general  trend  of  operations  during  the  War  is  famil- 
iar to  most  people,  it  is  not  absurd  to  point  out,  however,  that, 
while  this  war  involved  greater  numbers  of  men  on  both  sides 
than  any  previous  war,  weapons  of  greater  destructive  power 
and  more  rapid  and  sure  means  of  transportation  and  com- 
munication, yet  the  general  methods  followed  were  like  those 
of  Thutmose  III,  Alexander,  and  the  rest.  We  see  the  same 
endeavor  to  bring  destructive  forces  to  positions  of  strategic 
importance ;  the  same  endeavor  to  find  the  weak  point,  to  make 
flank  attacks,  to  feint  at  the  line  of  communication  or  attack 
it,  to  feint  at  the  line  of  retreat  or  attack  it;  the  same  en- 
deavor to  hold  a  force  of  the  enemy  with  a  part  of  one 's  own 
force  while  dealing  an  important  blow  with  another  part;  the 
same  endeavor  to  envelop  and  capture  the  enemy. 

The  distinctive  peculiarity  of  this  war  was  that  it  brought 
to  a  climax  the  use  of  new  weapons  and  the  resulting  use  of 
new  methods  for  handling  the  organizations  that  used  those 
weapons.  It  was  a  climax  of  the  progress  that  had  been  going 
on  since  the  days  when  primeval  men  fought  with  fists  and 
clubs  and  stones.  The  World  War  was  no  more  intense,  for 
each  individual  employed  in  it,  than  were  countless  fights 
between  individuals  and  small  tribes  in  primeval  days;  and 

312 


THE  WORLD  WAR  313 

the  pain  and  fear  and  danger  and  anger  were  no  greater.  The 
Great  War  differed  from  a  fight  between  two  primeval  sav- 
ages, not  in  nature,  but  in  degree;  and,  although  the  armies 
on  each  side  were  the  outcome  of  five  thousand  years  of  devel- 
opment, those  armies  as  fighting  machines  were  not  so  efficient 
as  were  the  two  primeval  savages.  Great  effort  had  been  made 
to  devise  weapons  and  methods  by  which  greater  numbers  of 
men  and  weapons  could  be  handled  as  units,  in  the  same  way 
that  the  primeval  savage  handled  himself  as  a  unit,  but,  of 
course,  no  such  result  had  been  even  approximately  secured; 
and  the  greater  the  number  of  men  whose  handling  as  a  unit 
was  attempted  in  any  case,  the  greater  the  difficulty,  and  the 
smaller  the  degree  of  success  achieved. 

Leaving  aside  the  moral  aspects  of  the  question,  there  can  be 
little  doubt  that  the  strategy  of  the  Germans  was  better  than 
that  of  the  Allies,  This  was,  of  course,  an  inevitable  result  of 
the  fact  that  the  Germans  had  devoted  more  time  and  mental 
effort  to  the  work  of  preparing  for  the  war  than  the  Allies 
had.  It  cannot  be  too  strongly  emphasized  that  what  is  some- 
times called  the  miMtary  machine,  or  the  naval  machine,  is  in 
fact  a  real  machine ;  and  that  in  any  war  the  most  powerful 
machine  must  win.  The  Germans  had  designed  and  prepared 
the  better  machine,  in  the  sense  that  it  was  the  more  efficient ; 
but  it  was  not  the  more  powerful,  because  it  was  the  smaller. 

The  clearest  indication  of  a  superior  strategy  on  the  part  of 
the  Germans  is  the  fact  that  the  Germans  acted  on  the  offensive 
for  almost  the  whole  war;  and  that,  therefore,  on  the  land  the 
war  was  carried  on  in  the  territories  of  her  enemies  and  not  in 
her  own ;  and  that  on  the  sea  the  territorial  waters  of  Germany 
were  not  invaded,  except  for  brief  periods. 

On  the  land  the  Germans  had  the  advantage  of  what  are 
sometimes  called  interior  lines,  while  their  enemies  worked  on 
exterior  lines,  and  therefore  had  longer  distances  to  traverse. 
In  addition  the  Germans  had  unity  of  command  throughout 
the  war ;  whereas  the  Allies  did  not  have  unity  of  command  for 
the  forces  of  the  different  nations  until  its  closing  months. 


314  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

In  the  matter  of  brave  fighting,  persistent  effort,  and  heroic 
endurance,  no  good  reason  can  be  found  for  adjudging  the 
men  on  either  side  to  be  superior  to  the  men  on  the  other  side. 
As  has  often  been  noted  in  this  book,  it  has  been  the  history 
of  most  wars  that  in  mere  fighting,  courage,  and  endurance, 
little  difference  among  great  bodies  of  men  has  been  recorded. 

On  the  sea  the  Germans  showed  their  strategic  insight  by 
attacking  the  British  navy  in  its  most  vulnerable  part,  that  is, 
below  the  water  line  of  the  ships.  They  did  this  by  means  of 
torpedoes  fired  from  submarines;  and  the  skill  displayed  by 
the  commanders  of  the  submarines,  together  with  the  ex- 
cellence of  the  submarines  themselves,  show  that  the  scheme 
had  been  worked  out  most  carefully  in  advance.  Had 
the  Germans  confined  the  efforts  of  their  submarines  to  sink- 
ing vessels  of  war,  we  have  no  means  of  knowing  what  would 
have  been  the  outcome  of  the  struggle ;  but  we  do  know  that 
the  fact  of  their  using  submarines  for  sinking  merchant-ves- 
sels without  warning  brought  the  United  States  into  the  war 
on  the  Allies'  side,  and  produced  a  preponderance  of  mate- 
rial resources  on  their  side,  which  resulted  in  defeating  Ger- 
many. 

Looking  at  the  question  from  the  standpoint  of  what  has 
been  called  hindsight,  it  seems  that  the  attack  of  submarines 
against  unwarned  merchant-vessels  was  a  blunder.  It  does 
not  seem,  however,  to  have  been  a  blunder  of  strategy  so 
much  as  a  blunder  of  statesmanship.  From  the  standpoint  of 
strategy  alone,  the  use  of  the  submarines  against  merchant- 
ships  seems  to  have  been  not  only  justifiable  but  advantageous. 
Strategy,  however,  is  not  concerned  with  any  questions  except 
those  connected  intimately  with  fighting  itself;  and  the  mere 
fact  that. such  use  of  the  submarines  was  strategically  advan- 
tageous does  not  relieve  the  statesman  from  the  charge  of 
blundering  in  employing  it.  Strategy  is  the  servant  of  states- 
manship, and  its  task  is  to  do  well  what  statesmanship  de- 
mands that  it  do.  The  tasks  of  statesmanship  and  strategy, 
though  they  should  be  mutually  assisting,  are  nevertheless 


THE  WORLD  WAR  315 

distinct,  as  will  be  pointed  out  more  fully  in  another  chapter. 
In  order  that  they  may  assist  each  other  with  the  maximum 
efficiency,  the  statesman  and  the  strategist  should  work  to- 
gether in  harmony ;  and  in  order  that  they  may  work  together 
in  harmony,  each  should  thorouglily  understand  his  own  do- 
main of  effort,  the  domain  of  the  other,  and  the  borderland 
between  them.  To  accomplish  this,  the  statesman  and  the 
strategist  should  continually  and  intimately  confer. 

Possibly,  in  Germany,  the  statesmen  and  the  naval  strate- 
gists did  not  confer  with  a  sufficient  degree  of  intimacy  and 
mutual  understanding:  in  fact,  the  memoirs  of  von  Tirpitz 
indicate  that  they  did  not.  About  this  question  we  have  little 
trustworthy  information  now ;  but  one  fact  seems  clear,  and 
that  is  that  the  German  statesmen  underestimated  the  proba- 
bility that  the  United  States  would  enter  into  the  war.  The 
German  statesmen  seem  to  have  been  convinced  that  the  people 
of  the  United  States  were  so  wholly  engrossed  in  money-mak- 
ing, and  so  thoroughly  under  the  influence  of  the  doctrines  of 
Jefferson,  that  they  would  endure  any  insults,  and  continue 
blind  to  any  national  danger  from  Germany.  The  German 
statesmen  seem  to  have  deceived  themselves  into  the  belief 
that  the  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Bryan,  was  a  representative 
American,  and  that  the  inspiring  teachings  of  George  Wash- 
ington and  Theodore  Roosevelt  no  longer  had  power  to  rouse 
the  people. 

The  fact  that  the  German  strategy  seems  to  have  been  ex- 
ceedingly good,  and  the  German  statesmanship  faulty,  indi- 
cates that  the  strategists  of  Germany  knew  their  task  better 
than  the  statesmen  knew  their  task.  This  has  been  the  case 
in  nearly  all  countries,  and  is  explainable  by  the  fact  that  in 
those  countries  naval  and  military  men  have  been  educated 
from  childhood  under  careful  government  supervision  for 
their  tasks,  while  statesmen  have  not  been  similarly  educated 
for  their  tasks. 

Before  the  war  the  Germans  had  very  cleverly  designed 
their  sea  defense  and  offense,  and  the  mutual  cooperation  of 


316  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

their  submarine  mines,  submarine  vessels,  and  surface  vessels 
of  war.  The  submarine  mines  prevented  the  access  of  enemy- 
vessels  to  the  coast,  and  powerful  surface  vessels  prevented 
counter-mining  of  the  submarine  mines  by  enemy  small  ves- 
sels of  light  enough  draft  to  enter  the  mined  waters ;  with  the 
result  that  German  submarines  were  able  to  pass  unhindered 
through  thickly  sown  mine  areas  from  their  bases  out  into 
deep  water,  and  then  return.  The  British  navy  found  itself 
virtually  helpless  against  this  interlocking  system,  and  was 
compelled  to  resort  to  operations  on  an  enormous  scale  to  off- 
set the  depredations  of  a  small  number  of  German  subma- 
rines. 

The  author  of  this  book  pointed  out  publicly  two  months 
after  the  United  States  entered  the  war — that  is,  in  June, 

1917,  and  repeatedly  afterwards  until  he  was  stopped  by  of- 
ficial orders — that  the  interlocking  system  could  be  beaten  by 
flying  over  it  with  airplanes ;  that  airplanes  were  not  hampered 
by  submarine  mines  or  by  submarine  vessels;  and  that  air- 
planes could  attack  the  German  naval  bases  with  bombs  and 
sink  the  German  ships  with  torpedoes.  The  author  is,  of 
course,  a  biased  witness  in  this  case ;  but  it  seems  to  him  that 
this  plan  was  perfectly  feasible,  and  that  if  it  had  been  carried 
out  promptly  (as  it  could  have  been),  the  entire  naval  force 
of  Germany  (including  her  submarines)  could  have  been  de- 
stroyed, Germany  crippled  utterly,  and  the  war  brought  to  a 
sudden  close.  In  fact,  preparations  to  carry  out  this  plan 
were  under  way  when  the  armistice  was  signed  in  November, 

1918.  Too  late. 

Doubtless  many  lessons  of  strategic  importance  will  be  gath- 
ered when  all  the  records  of  the  war  have  been  carefully  gone 
over.  But  it  is  doubtful  whether  there  will  be  much  value  in 
making  the  elaborate  and  detailed  investigations  that  have 
been  made  after  previous  wars,  for  the  reason  that  the  next 
great  war  will  probably  be  so  different  from  the  last  one  that 
it  may  be  unwise  to  concentrate  much  attention  on  its  de- 
tailed operations.     It  will  probably  be  wiser  to  try  to  discern 


THE  WORLD  WAR  317 

the  character  of  the  next  war  than  the  details  of  the  last  war. 

The  most  important  factor  in  making  a  change  between  the 
two  will  probably  be  the  airplane.  In  the  last  war  it  was 
used  in  a  subordinate  capacity  only;  but  the  probability  seems 
to  be  that  in  the  next  war  the  airplane  (including  the  tor- 
pedoplane),  by  reason  of  its  enormous  speed  over  great  dis- 
tances and  the  large  amount  of  liigh  explosives  it  can  carrj', 
will  be  one  of  the  most  important  factors  (if  not  the  most  im- 
portant factor)  in  the  war. 

If  so,  the  next  war  will  be  more  different  from  the  last  war 
than  any  other  war  has  ever  been  from  the  war  preceding  it. 


PART  III 
STRATEGY 


CHAPTER  XX 

STRATEGY   IN   PEACE 

IN  what  we  have  read  thus  far  in  these  pages,  nearly  all 
of  the  interest  and  importance  have  lain  in  the  actual 
movements  of  land  and  naval  forces,  and  especially  in 
the  battles  in  which  they  were  engaged.  Little  has  been  in 
evidence  of  preparations  before  the  wars  of  which  the  battles 
formed  the  critical  parts;  but  it  is  obvious  that  preparations 
must  have  been  made.  It  is  obvious  also  that  those  prepara- 
tions had  great  influence  on  the  results  of  the  battles,  and 
therefore  of  the  wars.  Even  primeval  savage  tribes  made 
preparations  not  only  of  a  material  kind  in  laying  in  supplies, 
securing  weapons,  and  assuring  the  safety  of  the  women  and 
children,  but  also  in  stirring  up  the  martial  ardor  of  the  war- 
riors. When  the  Swiss  in  Csesar's  time  decided  to  move  west 
through  Gaul,  they  instituted  preparations  that  lasted  a  year, 
mainly  in  the  matter  of  sowing  large  crops  and  in  laying  in 
supplies  from  them ;  and  when  Genghis  Khan  started  west  on 
his  benevolent  expedition,  he  also  made  preparations,  part  of 
which  was  leaving  all  the  women  and  children  behind. 

Nevertheless,  until  the  time  of  Moltke,  the  preparations  of 
even  the  largest  armies  were  of  a  simple  kind.  The  greatest 
care  and  foresight  that  we  see  were  in  the  preparations  of 
Julius  Cae.sar  for  invading  Gaul,  and  the  outfitting  of  the 
Invincible  Armada.  Wlien  Moltke  became  chief  of  staff,  the 
complexity  of  civilization  had  become  so  great,  and  the  capa- 
bilities of  modem  mechanism  for  assisting  the  warrior  had 
become  so  evident,  that  the  value  of  making  long  and  careful 
preparation  was  discerned  by  his  intelligence.  The  awful 
magnitude  of  the  task  entailed  w^ould  have  appalled  most  men, 

321 


322  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

and  Moltke  seems  to  have  been  the  only  man,  save  one,  who 
realized  the  occasion  and  rose  to  it.  The  exception  was  Roon, 
who  was  Minister  of  War  and  the  immediate  superior  of 
Moltke. 

But,  great  as  were  the  complexity  and  difficulty  of  prepar- 
ing for  war  in  1870,  they  rapidly  became  greater  after  Moltke 
died  and  the  years  went  by.  Railroads  increased  in  number, 
speed,  and  carrying  power;  steamships  did  the  same,  but  to  a 
much  greater  degree;  the  wireless  telegraph  came  into  prac- 
tical use ;  guns  became  not  only  more  powerful  and  of  greater 
range,  but  of  greater  difficulty  to  handle ;  the  naval  telescope 
sight  gave  a  precision  to  naval  gunnery,  with  consequent  in- 
crease of  destructive  power  to  ships-of-war,  that  resulted  in 
increasing  their  size  and  therefore  their  cost  and  complexity ; 
the  submarine  torpedo  became  a  weapon  of  such  practical  use- 
fulness that  destroyers  had  to  be  built  in  increasing  numbers 
to  carry  them ;  the  submarine  vessel  became  practically  use- 
ful, so  that  many  submarines  had  to  be  built,  and  officers  and 
men  trained  to  handle  them  both  singly  and  in  flotillas;  the 
musket  of  the  soldier  increased  in  range,  penetrating  power, 
and  speed  of  fire,  and  so  in  a  greater  degree  did  machine-guns 
of  various  kinds ;  and  large  guns  became  so  improved  in  rapid- 
ity of  fire  as  to  increase  enormously  the  amount  of  ammuni- 
tion needed  for  them,  an  increase  that  was  even  more  pro- 
nounced with  small  arms  and  machine-guns.  All  this  increase 
in  the  number  and  power  of  mechanisms  was  accompanied 
with  an  enormous  increase  in  their  complexity,  and  therefore 
in  the  skill  required  to  operate  them,  and  therefore  in  the 
number  and  the  trained  skill  of  the  operators.  Inasmuch  as 
all  the  battleships,  eruisers,  destroyers,  submarines,  infantry 
regiments,  artillery  batteries,  cavalry  squadrons,  scouts,  en- 
gineers, etc.,  could  not  be  handled  effectively  without  drill, 
systems  of  drills  had  to  be  devised  and  afterward  put  into 
effect,  whereby  in  every  vessel,  in  every  company,  and  in  every 
organization  of  whatever  kind,  each  individual,  high  or  low, 
was  continually  exercised  in  the  performance  of  his  duties; 


STRATEGY  IN  PEACE  323 

and  whereby  also,  after  all  the  various  units  and  various 
groups  of  units  had  been  trained  and  drilled,  whole  fleets  and 
whole  armies  were  trained  and  drilled  in  exercising  as  en- 
tireties. 

Of  course,  all  the  exercises  had  to  be  carried  on  with  the 
utmost  possible  seriousness,  and  after  the  most  careful  prep- 
aration in  every  case;  in  order  not  only  that  they  should  be 
carried  on  skilfully  as  matters  of  tactics,  but  that  they  should 
be  of  such  a  kind,  and  carried  on  in  such  a  way,  as  to  get  the 
most  beneficial  results  as  matters  of  strategy. 

It  is  obvious  that,  in  order  to  exercise  a  ship,  one  must  first 
procure  the  ship ;  that,  in  order  to  exercise  a  soldier  with  his 
rifle,  one  must  first  procure  the  soldier  and  his  rifle.  After 
the  ship  in  the  one  case,  and  the  soldier  with  his  rifle  in  the 
other  case,  have  been  procured,  they  must  then  be  drilled ;  that 
is,  logistics  having  secured  the  material,  tactics  must  handle 
it.  But  what  agency  is  going  to  arrange  that  logistics  shall 
get  the  material  and  that  tactics  shall  handle  it  ?     Strategy. 

It  is  apparent  that,  in  order  to  arrange  that  logistics  shall 
provide  the  material,  and  especially  to  arrange  what  material 
logistics  shall  provide,  the  task  of  strategy  is  difficult.  And 
it  is  also  apparent  that,  in  order  to  arrange  that  tactics  shall 
handle  the  material,  and  to  direct  the  ways  in  which  tactics 
shall  handle  the  material,  the  task  of  strategy  is  difficult.  It 
is  apparent  also  that  the  first  task  of  strategy  is  to  decide 
what  material  logistics  shall  supply;  second,  to  see  that  logis- 
tics does  supply  it ;  third,  to  decide  in  what  ways  tactics  shall 
handle  the  various  kinds  of  material ;  and,  fourth,  to  see  that 
tactics  does  so  handle  them.  In  dealing  with  both  logistics 
and  tactics,  therefore,  the  first  thing  for  strategy  to  do  is  to 
plan,  and  the  second  is  to  execute.  Of  these  two  tasks,  only 
the  first  is  distinctively  the  task  of  strategy;  for  the  second, 
that  of  executing,  is  mainly  left  to  the  logistical  officers  in  one 
case,  and  to  the  tactical  officers  in  the  other  case. 

This  means  that  the  planning  of  strategy  is  mainly  the 
planning  of  the  work  that  logistics  and  tactics  are  to  do. 


324  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

Strategy  says,  for  instance,  that  it  wants  a  battleship  of  a 
certain  power,  speed,  and  steaming  distance,  and  tells  logistics 
to  provide  it.  Logistics  tells  the  constructors  to  design  and 
build  the  hull,  the  ordnance  officers  to  design  and  construct  the 
battery  and  armor,  and  the  engineers  to  design  and  make  the 
engines.  Similar  principles  govern  the  relations  between 
strategy  and  tactics,  and  they  apply  to  all  the  preparations, 
great  and  small,  whereby  in  time  of  peace  strategy  prepares 
for  war. 

It  will  be  noted  that,  although  we  use  the  technical  terms 
strateg3^,  logistics,  and  tactics  here,  they  are  merely  technical 
terms  as  applied  to  a  special  art,  and  indicate  the  same  suc- 
cessive steps  as  follow  each  other  in  every  undertaking  in  life : 
planning  to  do,  securing  the  means  wherewith  to  do,  and  doing. 

We  have  seen  how  the  progress  of  warfare,  beginning  with 
the  warfare  between  two  men  who  used  their  fists  alone,  has 
been  gradually  developed  and  complicated  by  the  invention 
and  use  of  means  to  assist  and  supplement  the  fists  during 
more  than  five  thousand  years.  The  use  of  the  human  arms 
being  not  only  to  inflict  blows  with  the  fists,  but  also  to  parry 
blows  from  the  antagonist's  fists,  they  have  always  been  em- 
ployed, not  only  for  striking,  but  also  for  parrying.  To  sup- 
plement the  use  of  the  arm  in  parrying,  the  shield  was  invented 
before  the  time  when  recorded  history  began;  the  shield  dif- 
fering from  the  arm  in  the  sense  that  it  was  used  to  oppose 
resistance  only,  and  not  to  inflict  blows.  So,  in  the  develop- 
ment of  armies  and  navies,  the  employment  of  troops  and  ves- 
sels to  parry  an  attack  by  interposing  themselves  in  the  line 
of  the  attack,  was  supplemented  by  various  kinds  of  shields; 
such  as  armor  of  hide  and  steel  on  the  bodies  of  men  and 
horses,  defensive  edifices,  walls  and  ramparts,  and  heavy 
plates  of  specialized  steel,  secured  on  the  outside  of  the  struc- 
tures of  ships  and  forts. 

It  is  plain,  therefore,  that  the  highly  complicated  armies 
and  navies  that  fought  the  last  Great  War  were  merely  the 
developments  of  primeval  fighters,  and  differed  from  them 


STRATEGY  IN  PEACE  325 

not  in  kind  but  in  degree.  In  the  same  way,  the  modern  city 
of  New  York  differs  from  a  savage  village ;  for  in  both  we  see 
human  beings  essentially  alike,  living  together  in  houses,  di- 
vided into  families,  subsisting  on  food  and  water,  and  gov- 
erned by  such  rules  as  are  necessary,  in  order  that  those  bodies 
of  people  may  live  together  in  comparative  tranquillity.  To 
render  this  possible,  a  highly  complex  condition  of  society  has 
had  to  be  developed.  For  some  reason  of  which  we  are  not 
apprised,  certain  tribes  (only  a  few)  achieved  civilization  and 
built  cities,  and  a  very  few  have  developed  into  great  nations. 
Those  great  nations  have,  both  as  a  cause  and  an  effect,  devel- 
oped highl}'  complicated  armies  and  highly  complicated  navies. 
We  do  not  know  why  it  should  be,  but  it  seems  to  be  a  fact 
that  no  nation  has  ever  been  able  to  attain  a  high  degree  of 
civilization,  or  to  maintain  it  afterward,  without  developing  a 
highly  complicated  army  and  navy.  A  nation  seems  to  have 
natural  enemies,  as  a  man  does,  these  enemies  being  both  ex- 
ternal and  internal.  In  the  case  of  a  nation,  the  enemies  are 
foreign  nations  and  barbarians  outside,  and  unruly  elements, 
now  comprised  under  the  general  name  of  "  bolsheviki, "  inside. 
In  the  case  of  a  man,  his  enemies  are  other  men  outside  and 
noxious  bacilli  inside.  In  all  cases,  strength  is  needed  to  over- 
come the  external  and  internal  enemies,  and  live  in  health. 

The  simple  club  gave  way  to  weapons  that  consisted  of  more 
than  one  part,  and  gradually  to  weapons  and  appliances  con- 
sisting of  many  parts;  that  is,  to  what  we  call  machines. 
Now,  a  fundamental  characteristic  of  a  machine  is  that  the 
various  parts  are  not  mere  aggregations  of  like  parts,  as  are 
the  straws  bundled  together  in  a  broom,  but  complicated  ar- 
rangement of  dissimilar  parts,  having  different  functions,  but 
acting  together  under  a  common  directing  head,  for  the  ac- 
complishment of  a  common  purpose.  Such  a  machine  is  the 
arm  of  a  man,  and  such  a  machine  is  his  entire  body.  The 
body  of  a  man,  however,  is  of  so  much  higher  an  order  of  ex- 
cellence than  any  machine  ever  devised  by  man  that  it  is  not  to 
be  described  hj  the  word  machine  so  accurately  as  by  the  word 


326  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

organism.  No  man  has  ever  yet  created  an  organism,  but  he 
has  invented  and  developed  many  machines. 

The  ordinary  conception  of  the  word  machine  is  of  an  ap- 
paratus, such  as  a  steam  engine,  made  mostly  of  iron  and 
brass ;  but  this  is  only  one  kind  of  machine.  One  of  the  defi- 
nitions of  machine  in  the  Standard  Dictionary  is:  "The 
organization  of  the  powers  of  any  complex  body :  as,  the  ma- 
chine of  government";  so  that  an  organization  of  human  be- 
ings is  as  much  a  machine  as  a  steam  engine  is.  And  if  this 
organization  includes  men  who  handle  machines  of  iron  and 
brass,  and  if  those  machines  of  iron  and  brass  are  essential  to 
the  attainment  of  the  end  in  view  of  the  organization,  those 
men  and  those  machines  of  iron  and  brass  are  parts  of  the 
complete  machine,  just  as  the  engine  of  an  automobile  is  part 
of  the  automobile,  which  itself  is  a  machine.  From  this 
point  of  view,  a  navy  is  a  machine;  and  so  is  an  army. 

We  now  see  that  the  work  of  peace  strategy  is  to  prepare 
war  machines:  that  the  work  of  peace  strategy  in  any  nation 
is  to  prepare  a  naval  machine  and  a  military  machine.  And 
it  is  a  little  more  than  that:  it  is  to  prepare  one  great  ma- 
chine, of  which  the  principal  parts  are  a  naval  machine  and 
a  military  machine,  which  will  work  together  for  the  common 
purpose  of  the  nation ;  just  as  the  separate  parts  of  the  naval 
machine  work  together  for  the  attainment  of  the  task  allotted 
to  the  navy,  and  as  the  separate  parts  of  the  military  machine 
work  together  for  the  attainment  of  the  task  allotted  to  the 
army. 

It  is  an  obvious  fact  that  there  is  in  no  country  any  other 
machine  comparable  in  cost,  complexity,  and  importance  with 
its  national  defense  machine.  Therefore  it  is  evident  that  in 
no  other  single  work  of  the  nation  is  there  so  much  need  for 
accurate  and  energetic  work,  and  therefore  for  trained  char- 
acter and  skill.  For  it  may  be  pointed  out  that,  if  two  cou7i- 
tries  go  to  war,  the  result  of  the  war  will  depend  on  the  rela- 
tive effectiveness  of  the  two  machines  that  they  put  forth, 
and  upon  nothing  else  whatever;  because  the  effectiveness  of 


STRATEGY  IN  PEACE  327 

each  machine  is  a  product  of  all  the  factors  of  strength  and 
skill,  of  material  and  personnel,  that  go  to  make  them  up. 
When  two  pugilists  meet  in  the  arena,  or  when  two  great 
armies  meet  on  the  field  of  battle,  or  two  great  fleets  meet  on 
the  ocean,  the  battle  has  already  been  decided.  Mortals  do 
not  know  how  it  has  been  decided;  but  this  is  because  they 
do  not  know  what  are  the  relative  degrees  of  efficiency  and 
strength  of  the  two  machines. 

We  see,  therefore,  that  the  work  of  strategy  in  peace  is  to 
produce  a  national  defense  machine,  and  that  the  first  stage 
in  the  production  is  to  design  it.  As  the  machine  consists 
primarily  of  two  cooperating  machines,  a  navy  and  an  army, 
and  as  in  every  country  the  amount  of  money  to  be  spent  on 
national  defense  varies  with  the  wealth  and  strategic  position 
of  the  country,  the  first  thing  to  decide  in  each  country  is 
whether  the  navy  or  the  army  shall  be  the  major  machine,  and 
have  the  major  part  of  the  money  expended  on  it.  In  Great 
Britain,  the  United  States,  Japan,  Australia,  and  Argentine, 
it  seems  obvious  that  the  navy  should  be  the  major  part  of  the 
machine ;  and  that  in  France  and  other  European  continental 
countries  the  army  should  be  the  major  part.  Because  of 
the  facts  that  three  quarters  of  the  earth  is  covered  with 
water,  and  that  the  greatest  countries  will  in  the  future  be 
countries  that  border  on  the  ocean,  it  seems  probable  that  in 
every  great  country  the  navy  will,  in  the  future,  be  the  major 
part  of  the  machine.  The  coming  of  aeronautics  will  tend  to 
make  this  probability  the  greater,  because  aeronautics  will 
extend  the  power  of  navies  much  more  than  it  will  extend  the 
power  of  armies.  It  is  not  improbable,  however,  that  aero- 
nautics may  become  such  a  powerful  factor  in  war  that  it  will 
become  a  separate  branch  and  not  an  accessory  to  an  army  or 
a  navy.  If  this  should  come  to  pass,  the  national  defense  ma- 
chine will  consist  of  three  parts  instead  of  two. 

In  designing  the  machine  or  any  of  its  parts,  the  strategist 
will  naturally  follow  a  course  such  as  any  man  follows  in  de- 


328  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

signing  an  engine,  planning  a  house,  or  embarking  on  any- 
undertaking  whatever ;  that  is,  he  will  consider  carefully  what 
the  machine  is  intended  to  accomplish,  what  are  the  difficul- 
ties in  the  way,  such  as  cost,  etc.,  and  what  are  the  means  that 
he  has  available,  such  as  money,  material  on  hand,  etc.  After 
considering  these  three  factors,  he  will  design  the  machine. 

In  naval  and  military  affairs,  this  process,  as  has  been  fre- 
quently stated  in  this  book,  is  gone  through  by  following  a 
method  that  was  devised  by  the  German  general  staff,  called 
the  estimate  of  the  situation  method.  By  it  every  military 
or  naval  problem — in  fact,  many  problems  in  daily  life — may 
be  solved.  It  is  perhaps  the  greatest  single  contribution  to 
strategy  ever  made;  and  it  is,  furthermore,  a  great  contribu- 
tion to  civilization  in  general,  and  one  of  which  people  might 
profitably  avail  themselves  more  often  than  they  do.  It  is 
applicable  strategically  not  only  to  any  great  problem,  such  as 
the  designing  of  the  military  or  naval  machine,  but  also  to 
each  one  of  the  great  divisions  and  subdivisions  into  which 
every  great  problem  becomes  ultimately  divided  as  we  proceed 
with  its  solution.  An  essential  beauty  of  it  is  that  it  enables 
one  to  solve  any  problem  unconfused  by  details,  leaving  the 
details  to  be  solved  later  as  separate  though  similar  problems. 
It  enables  one,  for  instance,  to  plan  a  navy  as  a  whole,  uncon- 
fused by  the  details  of  each  kind  of  ship,  or  kind  of  base, 
or  kind  of  organization;  and  then  to  make  for  each  of  these 
problems  a  separate  estimate  of  the  situation. 

Of  course,  the  United  States  navy  was  not  designed  in  this 
way;  but  that  is  a  misfortune,  and  it  accounts  for  the  hap- 
hazard way  in  which  it  grew,  and  the  enormous  amount  of 
money  that  it  cost.  If  an  engineer  should  build  an  engine  with- 
out making  any  plans  for  it  beforehand,  but  by  simply  making 
a  number  of  parts  and  then  putting  them  together  afterward, 
he  would  produce  a  result  somewhat  like  that  actually  pro- 
duced in  our  navy.  In  the  last  few  years  this  state  of  affairs 
has  been  improved  upon,  largely  through  the  teachings  of  our 
Naval  War  College.     A  better  machine  is  the  result. 


STRATEGY  IN  PEACE  329 

As  an  aid  to  designing  an  army,  and  to  a  greater  degree  a 
navy,  abundant  use  has  been  made  in  later  years  of  war 
games.  Moltke  realized  that  in  time  of  peace  officers  got  no 
training  for  war  except  in  manoeuvering  their  companies,  regi- 
ments, divisions,  and  corps,  in  what  may  be  called  "parade- 
ground  tactics";  and  that  it  was  possible  for  an  officer  to 
handle  his  men  with  excellent  skilly  and  yet  have  no  clear  idea 
in  his  mind  as  to  why  he  was  moving  them  about,  or  as  to  what 
he  would  do  with  them  against  an  actual  enemy.  He  realized 
that  such  an  officer  would  be  skilful  in  the  way  in  which  a 
swordsman  would  be  skilful,  who  could  brandish  his  sword 
with  strength  and  quickness,  but  who  had  never  met  an  actual 
opponent,  even  in  the  fencing-room.  He  therefore  devised 
problems  in  which  tactical  situations  and  strategical  situations 
were  stated ;  and  officers  were  required  to  solve  them :  that  is, 
each  officer  was  required  to  state  in  writing  what  he  would  do 
in  each  situation. 

In  this  way,  Moltke  gave  each  officer  a  training  comparable 
to  the  training  that  a  fencer  gets  by  being  pitted  against  an 
antagonist  in  the  fencing-room :  for  the  mind  of  each  officer 
was  confronted  with  the  necessity  of  overcoming  an  active 
enemy,  and  therefore  of  having  to  take  into  account  his  prob- 
able and  possible  moves,  and  his  own  facilities  for  meeting 
them.  He  was  also  compelled  to  come  to  a  prompt  decision  as 
to  what  he  would  do.  To  aid  in  solving  some  of  the  problems, 
or  parts  of  the  problems,  the  Kriegspiel,  or  war-game,  was  in- 
vented, in  which  the  actual  forces  engaged  were  represented 
in  miniature,  and  made  to  fight  against  each  other  in  mimic 
battles,  under  certain  carefully  prescribed  rules  that  tried  to 
take  into  account  all  the  varying  conditions  and  sequence  of 
incidents  that  were  probable. 

The  usefulness  of  the  war-game  in  designing  the  naval  or 
military  machine,  or  parts  of  it,  lies  mainly  in  the  fact  that  in 
any  given  game,  different  kinds  of  ships,  or  different  kinds  of 
military  organizations,  or  weapons,  can  be  introduced,  and 
mimic  battles  fought  out,  or  mimic  operations  conducted,  with 


330  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

the  idea  of  ascertaining  which  kind  of  ship  or  organization  or 
weapon  is  the  best.  The  analogy  is  evident,  of  course,  be- 
tween this  way  of  using  the  war-game  and  the  experimental 
department  of  every  large  manufacturing  institution ;  for  it  is 
the  intention  of  most  experiments,  at  least  in  their  earliest 
stages,  to  try  out  large  schemes,  and  parts  of  large  schemes, 
with  models  that  represent  them  in  miniature. 

In  designing  the  national  defense  machine,  or  any  of  its 
parts,  it  is  obvious  that  the  persons  who  make  the  experi- 
ments, and  afterward  the  design,  should  be  experts;  that  is, 
they  should  be  experts  if  the  best  results  are  to  be  obtained 
for  the  money  allotted.  That  the  designing  has  often  been 
made  by  people  with  almost  no  knowledge  of  the  subject, 
however,  has  been  the  history  of  all  navies,  except  perhaps  the 
German  and  Japanese.  In  designing  our  navy,  for  instance, 
the  people  who  designed  the  navy  as  a  whole  have  usually 
been  members  of  Congress;  though  the  people  who  have  de- 
signed the  individual  ships,  guns,  etc.,  have  been  experts. 
For  this  reason,  the  individual  ships  and  guns  have  been  bet- 
ter than  the  navy  as  a  whole.  The  Congressmen  have  de- 
signed the  machine  as  a  whole,  and  the  experts  the  little  parts. 

The  naval  or  military  machine  having  been  designed  as  a 
whole  by  Congressmen  (that  is,  it  having  been  decided,  for 
instance,  that  the  navy  should  consist  of  so  many  ships  of  such 
and  such  classes,  and  of  so  many  officers  and  men  of  such  and 
such  classes),  the  actual  building  of  the  machine  has  been 
carried  on  by  experts  in  the  various  departments.  That  is, 
ordnance  officers  have  built  the  guns  and  gun-carriages;  con- 
structors have  built  the  ships;  engineer  officers  have  con- 
structed the  forts  in  the  army  and  the  engines  in  the  navy; 
electrical  officers  have  made  the  electrical  apparatus,  etc.  This 
part  of  the  task,  the  actual  mechanical  work,  and  even  the  de- 
signing of  the  mechanisms,  does  not,  of  course,  fall  within  the 
province  of  strategy,  but  of  logistics. 

But,  while  the  purely  logistical  details  of  vessels,  forts, 
guns,  etc.,  may  be  decided  by  men  skilled  in  designing  such 


STRATEGY  IN  PEACE  331 

details,  we  cannot  too  clearly  hold  it  in  our  minds  that  the 
design  of  the  machine  as  a  whole  must  be  made  by  experts 
who  comprehend  the  mission  of  the  machine  as  a  whole,  the 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  accomplishing  the  mission,  and  the 
means  available  for  accomplishing  it — ^that  is,  by  strategists. 
After  the  macliine  as  a  whole  has  been  produced,  there  is  a 
work  that  this  machine  as  a  whole  can  accomplish,  and  this 
work  is,  in  its  ultimate  effect,  strategic.  The  barbarians  in 
all  history  have  been  defeated  because  civilized  men  brought 
against  them  machines  that  wrought  ultimately  their  strategic 
defeat.  It  is  true  that  these  machines  (for  instance,  batter- 
ing-rams, ballista,  and  muskets)  were  not  of  themselves 
strategic  machines,  but  rather  mechanical  machines.  Never- 
theless, they  were  brought  into  use  to  accomplish  strategic 
purposes,  and  were  designed  in  their  basic  features  by  men 
who  understood  their  strategic  usefulness.  Had  they  been 
designed  by  men  who  did  not  have  this  understanding,  they 
would  have  been  ineffective  strategically,  no  matter  how  ex- 
cellent they  were  mechanically. 

The  climax  of  the  development  of  war  appliances  occurred 
in  the  last  Great  War,  when  the  Germans  brought  to  bear 
against  the  Allies,  on  both  the  land  and  the  sea,  weapons  and 
scientific  mechanisms  that  were  better  than  the  Allies  had. 
While  this  statement  is  true  of  both  the  armies  and  the  navies, 
it  is  more  strikingly  true  in  regard  to  the  navies,  especially 
in  regard  to  the  German  navy  and  the  British  navy.  The 
British  navy  was  the  most  powerful  navy  in  the  world,  and  it 
held  the  longest  continuous  record  of  success  of  any  military 
or  naval  organization  in  the  world ;  whereas  the  German  navy 
was  comparatively  new — had,  in  fact,  been  considered  a  first- 
class  navy  for  hardly  ten  years,  and  held  no  record  of  achieve- 
ment whatever.  Yet  at  the  battle  of  Jutland,  as  shown  con- 
clusively by  Admiral  Jellicoe's  book,  "The  Grand  Fleet,"  the 
German  naval  machine  proved  itself  to  be  better  than  the 
British,  although  it  was  not  so  large. 

Even  the  German  machine  was  defective,  however,  in  that 


332  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

there  had  not  been  incorporated  in  it  (in  any  adequate  de- 
gree) the  greatest  new  agency  in  warfare  invented  since  the 
gun — the  flying-macliine.  In  Germany  this  first  appeared  in 
the  form  of  the  Zeppelin  dirigible  balloon,  and  in  the  United 
States  in  the  form  of  the  airplane.  Both  had  been  developed 
to  the  point  of  practicability  before  August,  1914,  the  Zep- 
pelin in  the  higher  degree.  The  first  serious  development  of 
the  airplane  by  a  government  was  in  Italy,  the  next  in  Ger- 
many, and  the  next  in  England ;  so  that  when  the  war  opened 
both  types  were  available,  but  the  Zeppelin  the  more  so.  The 
exigencies  of  the  war  developed  the  airplane  more  rapidly  than 
they  did  the  dirigible  balloon,  so  that  by  the  end  of  the  war 
there  was  a  tremendous  aviation  corps  in  each  army  and  navy, 
and  important  results  were  gained  by  them.  In  fact,  the  re- 
sults were  so  great  that  one  is  inclined  to  marvel  that  Germany 
had  not  used  a  greater  degree  of  foresight  in  developing  the 
airplane  before  the  war  began,  for  she  had  shown  a  foresight 
unprecedented  since  the  time  of  Moltke  in  her  preparations 
for  the  war. 

With  regard  to  countries  other  than  Germany,  one  does  not 
incline  to  marvel,  because  they  showed  little  war  foresight  of 
any  kind.  As  to  Germany,  the  simplest  explanation  seems  to 
be  that  her  attention  had  been  so  wholly  engrossed  with  the 
preparations  she  had  already  made,  culminating  in  the  pro- 
duction of  a  really  practical  submarine,  her  preparations  had 
been  so  complete  before  the  advent  of  the  airplane,  and  the 
material  at  her  disposal  was  so  wholly  obligated  by  the  re- 
quirements of  existing  weapons  and  appliances,  that  she  had 
hardly  the  time  or  the  means  for  adequately  developing  the 
airplane  in  addition.  Before  the  war  had  finished,  however, 
it  was  clear  that  if  the  countries  of  either  the  Teuton  or  the 
Allied  side  had  estimated  correctly  the  possibilities  of  the  air- 
plane, and  had  developed  it  as  energetically  as  they  could 
have  done,  that  side  would  have  won  the  victory,  and  quickly ; 
with  great  saving  in  lives  and  suffering  and  money. 

Before  the  war  there  had  been  considerable  discussion  in 


STRATEGY  IN  PEACE  333 

Great  Britain  as  to  the  advisability  of  reorganizing  the  Ad- 
miralty, and  making  it  more  like  the  German  Admiralty ;  but 
this  was  not  done,  except  in  a  small  degree.  Judged  by  the 
results  as  shown  in  the  battle  of  Jutland,  by  the  success  of 
the  submarine,  and  by  the  fact  that  the  British  Admiralty 
later  did  adopt  a  system  that  is  virtually  a  general  staff  sys- 
tem, the  German  system  was  the  better.  Now,  by  the  German 
system  the  planning  of  the  navy  was  done  entirely  by  the  gen- 
eral staff,  that  is,  by  strategists. 

The  result  of  the  competitive  test  of  the  two  systems  in  war 
was  exactly  what  could  have  been  expected,  as  Admiral  Jelli- 
coe's  book  and  certain  public  statements  of  Admiral  Beatty 
abundantly  set  forth.  If  the  British  navy  had  been  as  well  de- 
signed strategically  as  the  German  navy,  there  would  not  have 
been  that  deficiency  in  destroyers,  submarines,  and  aircraft, 
and  that  comparative  inefficiency  of  armor-piercing  shell,  pro- 
tective decks,  and  searchlights,  that  Jellicoe  points  out.  It 
may  be  answered  that  strategy  has  nothing  whatever  to  do 
with  the  kind  of  armor  on  the  side  of  a  ship  or  the  kind  of 
steel  of  which  a  shell  is  made.  To  this  the  answer  may  be 
that  if,  in  any  navy,  strategy  has  no  voice  in  these  matters, 
the  results  will  be  such  as  were  with  the  British  na\y  at  the 
battle  of  Jutland;  but  that  if  strategic  experts  do  control  in 
these  matters,  they  will  see  to  it  that  the  logistical  officers 
supply  the  strategically  best  material  that  can  be  supplied; 
and  a  Grand  Fleet  will  not  be  handicapped  by  inadequacy  in 
small  craft  and  defective  material,  and  made  unable  to  achieve 
victory  over  a  much  smaller  fleet. 

It  may  be  pointed  out  here  that  a  logistical  officer  is  not  so 
immediately  concerned  with  victory  or  defeat,  does  not  so 
clearly  apprehend  the  factors  that  secure  it,  and  is  not  so 
much  on  edge  as  a  strategical  officer,  whose  whole  life  is  spent 
in  the  endeavor  to  attain  actual  victory  under  the  strategical 
conditions  that  the  next  war  will  bring  forth. 

It  is  important  for  us  to  see  clearly  that,  no  matter  how  well 
designed  the  various  parts  of  any  machine  may  be  (such  as  a 


334  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

navy  or  an  army,  or  a  national  defense  machine  comprising 
both),  the  ultimate  value  of  the  machine  is  what  the  machine 
as  a  whole  can  do.  "The  strength  of  a  chain  is  the  strength 
of  the  weakest  link."  This  is  an  old  saying,  and  it  may  be 
applied  without  much  qualification  to  any  machine,  and  even 
to  any  man  when  subjected  to  great  strain.  No  matter  how 
fine  armor  a  ship  may  have,  or  how  powerful  her  guns,  or 
how  magnificent  her  engines,  she  is  very  weak  below  the  water- 
line,  and  will  be  disabled  and  perhaps  sunk  if  penetrated 
there :  no  matter  how  perfect  she  is  in  other  ways,  a  compara- 
tively small  disablement  to  her  engines,  boilers,  pumps,  or 
condensers  will  restrict  and  perhaps  destroy  her  mobility :  no 
matter  how  strong  a  man  otherwise  may  be,  a  weak  heart 
will  reduce  his  strength,  sometimes  to  zero,  if  ever  his  strength 
is  sorely  taxed.  Therefore  it  is  essential  that  a  navy  or  an 
army  shall  be  designed  as  a  whole,  and  its  parts  designed 
afterward ;  as  is  the  procedure  in  the  case  of  a  ship  or  a  house, 
or  any  thing  constructed  in  the  usual  line  of  business.  For 
the  same  reason  that  nobody  but  an  expert  architect  can  de- 
sign a  house,  that  nobody  but  an  expert  constructor  can  de- 
sign a  ship,  and  that  nobody  but  an  expert  engineer  can  design 
an  engine,  so  nobody  but  an  expert  strategist  can  design  that 
great  strategic  machine,  an  army  or  a  navy. 

In  thinking  of  the  designing  of  the  military  or  naval  ma- 
chine, we  must  not  forget  that  the  men  are  the  most  important 
part  of  each  machine ;  and  that,  therefore,  the  numerous  ques- 
tions that  come  up  in  regard  to  the  men,  not  only  the  details 
of  the  organizations  but  the  total  numbers  needed,  should  be 
decided  by  the  requirements  of  strategy,  as  interpreted  by  ex- 
perts in  that  art. 

Apologies  are  hereby  tendered  for  dilating  at  such  length 
on  what  may  seem  an  obvious  proposition.  The  excuse  is  the 
paramount  importance  of  the  subject,  the  fact  that  the  prin- 
ciple involved  has  never  been  recognized  in  this  country,  and 
the  further  fact  that  in  consequence  enormous  sums  of  money 
have  been  wasted. 


STRATEGY  IN  PEACE  335 

While  the  most  important  part  of  the  work  of  desiring 
the  machine  must  be  along  the  regular  lines  of  planning, 
much  attention  (that  will  probably  have  to  increase  as  time 
goes  on)  must  be  devoted  to  the  production  of  new  appliances, 
especially  of  new  offensive  weapons.  It  is  obvious  that  if 
one  side  can  bring  into  a  war,  ready  for  use  and  with  men 
trained  to  use  it,  an  absolutely  new  weapon,  a  tremendous  ad- 
vantage will  be  gained;  because  the  other  side  will  not  know 
how  to  protect  themselves  against  it.  Examples  of  this 
dimly  apprehended  truth  are  numerous  in  history;  but  the 
most  startling  examples  are  the  M&rrimac  and  the  Monitor. 
It  is  true  that  before  the  Merrimac  appeared  at  Hampton 
Roads  the  Northerners  knew  that  she  was  being  prepared; 
but  they  did  not  know  it  long  enough  in  advance  to  enable 
them  to  oppose  any  resistance  worthy  of  the  name;  with  the 
result  that  the  Merrimac  destroyed  the  Cumberland  and  the 
Congress  on  the  very  day  that  she  left  the  Norfolk  Navy 
Yard,  and  threatened  to  destroy  the  ships  of  the  Union  navy 
in  succession,  bombard  our  coast  cities,  and  prevent  any  block- 
ade of  the  Confederate  coast.  If  she  had  accomplished  this, 
victory  in  the  war  would  have  gone  to  the  Southern  side. 
But,  fortunately,  John  Ericsson,  many  years  before,  had  de- 
signed a  type  of  vessel  that  he  called  a  Monitor;  and,  not  long 
after  the  war  began,  he  had  persuaded  the  Union  government 
to  make  a  contract  vnth.  him  for  its  construction,  and  to  detail 
a  crew  to  man  her.  The  victory  of  the  Monitor  over  the  Mer- 
rimac on  the  day  following  the  destruction  of  the  Cumberland 
and  Congress  turned  the  scales  the  other  way,  and  assured 
victory  for  the  Union  in  the  war. 

Similar  cases,  which  are  next  in  order  of  importance,  oc- 
curred during  the  war  just  ended,  in  which  the  Germans 
brought  into  use  weapons  that  their  antagonists  did  not  know 
existed — such  as  the  long-range  mortars  that  dropped  high 
explosives  on  top  of  the  Belgian  forts,  and  appliances  for 
using  noxious  gasas.  In  addition,  they  had  improved  the 
submarine  and  the  art  of  mine-laying  to  a  degree  far  beyond 


336  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

that  which  they  had  permitted  to  be  known;  with  the  result 
that  the  magnificent  British  navy,  almost  in  sight  of  its  own 
coast,  was  comparatively  helpless  against  them.  The  Ger- 
mans had  also  developed  their  spy  system  to  a  degree  unheard 
of  before,  and  therefore  new ;  so  that  during  the  early  stages 
of  the  war  the  Allies,  and  especially  the  British,  found  them- 
selves fighting  against  secret  enemies  within  their  own  borders. 

The  fact  that  the  Germans  went  down,  finally,  in  disastrous 
defeat  must  not  beguile  us  into  making  the  illogical  inference 
that  w'e  have  nothing  to  learn  in  strategy  from  them.  We 
must  in  honesty  admit  that  the  Germans  have  been  preceptors 
in  strategy  to  all  the  world  since  the  time  of  Moltke,  and  that 
the  fact  that  the  German  nation  directed  the  strategy  of  the 
German  anny  and  navy  to  evil  ends  does  not  impugn  the  ex- 
cellence of  the  strategy.  Many  bad  men  have  had  great 
talents  and  devoted  those  talents  to  evil  ends;  but  this  fact 
does  not  blind  logical  men  to  the  fact  that  those  bad  men 
had  talents.  It  is  an  axiom  in  strategy  that  one  must  learn 
all  he  can  from  his  enemies,  and  that  it  is  the  height  of  folly 
to  underestimate  an  enemy  in  any  way.  Exactly  how  many 
new  things  we  shall  be  able  to  learn  from  the  Germans  in  mat- 
ters of  strategy  we  shall  not  know  until  all  the  history  of  the 
war  has  been  written  and  the  campaigns  analyzed;  but  we 
know  now,  and  we  have  known  for  more  than  four  years,  that 
the  Germans  showed  the  world  how  enormous  is  the  value  of 
bringing  new  weapons  and  appliances  suddenly  and  unexpect- 
edly into  use  at  the  beginning  of  a  war. 

The  Germans  could  not  have  done  this  except  under  the 
guidance  and  inspiration  of  strategists,  whose  vision  took  into 
account  not  only  the  operations  of  fleets  and  armies,  but  the 
scientific  and  the  mechanical  appliances  which  it  was  the  effort 
of  those  operations  to  bring  to  bear  against  an  enemy.  This 
shows  that  at  the  present  day  the  strategist  who  completely 
fulfils  his  mission  must  he  to  a  considerable  degree  an  engineer, 
and  must  have  enough  of  the  inventor  in  his  composition  to 
he  possessed  of  an  imagination  that  will  enable  him  to  visual- 


STRATEGY  IN  PEACE  337 

ize  the  possibilities  of  new  methods  and  appliances  that  may  he 
proposed.  If,  like  CoBsar,  he  can  invent  instruments  and 
methods  and  original  plans  himself,  let  his  country^ 's  enemies 
beware. 

The  machine  having  been  designed  and  built,  the  next  step 
is  to  prepare  it  for  use.  As  far  as  the  activities  of  strategy 
are  concerned,  this  preparation  is  almost  wholly  of  the  per- 
sonnel ;  because  the  preparing  of  the  material  engines  and  ap- 
pliances is  the  task  of  logistics,  though  it  must  be  performed 
to  the  satisfaction  of  strategy. 

The  task  of  preparation  divides  itself  naturally  into  two 
parts — tactical  preparation  and  strategical  preparation. 

The  tactical  preparation  is  that  needed  to  insure  that,  in  the 
day  of  battle,  each  gun's  crew,  each  engine-room  force,  each 
signal  force,  each  destroyer,  each  submarine,  each  vessel  of 
every  kind,  each  division  of  vessels,  each  squadron  of  vessels, 
and  the  fleet  itself  shall  be  manoeuvered  skilfully;  and  that 
similarly  each  squad,  each  company,  each  regiment,  each  divi- 
sion, each  corps,  each  army  shall  be  manoeuvered  skilfuUy; 
and  that  in  the  aeronautical  branch  each  unit  and  each  force, 
of  whatever  kind  or  whatever  size,  shall  be  manoeuvered  as  a 
unit  skilfully.  The  principal  single  reason  for  the  victories 
of  Alexander,  in  fighting  against  enemies  greatly  superior  in 
numbers,  and  possessed  of  similar  weapons,  was  the  splendid 
precision  with  which  the  Grecian  phalanx  could  be  manoeu- 
vered. As  an  army  is  merely  a  machine,  Alexander  had  a 
better  machine  than  Darius;  a  machine  that  was  better  bal- 
anced, less  clumsy  to  direct,  and  less  easily  broken  to  pieces. 

The  larger  the  forces  that  one  handles,  the  greater  the  ne- 
cessity for  drill,  because  the  greater  difficulty  is  in  the  way. 
A  man  can  be  trained  in  a  short  time  to  handle  a  club  or 
sword  or  spear :  it  takes  a  longer  time  to  train  him  to  handle 
a  group  of,  say,  ten  men,  armed  with  clubs  and  swords  and 
spears.  It  takes  him  a  longer  time  to  learn  to  handle  a  hun- 
dred men  so  armed,  or  to  handle  ten  men  armed  with  more 


338  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

complicated  weapons,  sucli  as  muskets.  That  is,  it  takes  him 
a  longer  time  to  learn  to  handle  them  with  the  same  degree  of 
skill  and  consequent  effectiveness.  In  fact,  he  can  never 
learn  to  handle  a  large  complex  organization  quite  as  effi- 
ciently, in  proportion  to  its  size,  as  a  small  and  simple  one, 
for  the  reason  that  his  capacity  as  a  man  remains  the  same, 
whereas  the  difficulties  of  the  task  increase.  Let  anybody 
watch  the  lightning-like  movements  of  the  point  of  a  skilled 
fencer's  foil,  and  then  observe  the  sluggish  manoeuvers  of 
even  the  best  drilled  fleet,  or  army  corps,  and  the  truth  of  this 
remark  will  become  apparent  to  him. 

The  distinctive  difference  between  a  club  or  sword  and  a 
fleet  or  army  is  that  the  club  or  sword  is  a  rigid  unit,  whose 
parts  cooperate  with  absolute  perfection;  whereas  a  fleet  or 
army  is  a  machine  whose  parts  are  held  together  loosely  in- 
stead of  rigidly,  and  with  the  handicap  of  great  complexity 
and  consequent  liability  to  fail  in  some  part  at  almost  any 
moment.  The  whole  endeavor  of  tactical  drills,  on  land  or  sea 
or  in  the  air,  is  to  make  all  the  various  parts  cooperate  as 
well  as  possible.  The  father  of  Frederick  the  Great  was  hated 
because  of  his  harsh  persistency  in  the  drill  of  his  soldiers; 
but  when  his  son  hurled  one  of  his  divisions  against  one  of  the 
loosely  tied  divisions  of  his  enemy,  the  blow  was  like  the  blow 
of  a  club  against  a  bundle  of  fagots.  Similarly,  the  dashing 
Mamelukes  of  the  Egyptian  desert  threw  themselves  in  vain 
against  the  sides  of  Napoleon's  squares  of  thoroughly  drilled 
though  half-ragged  troops. 

The  tactical  drills  of  armed  forces  are  within  the  domain  of 
tactics  rather  than  of  strategy ;  nevertheless  their  nature  must 
be  prescribed  by  strategy,  or  they  will  serve  no  useful  pur- 
pose. It  is  a  well  known  fact  in  naval  and  military  history 
that  many  tactical  drills  and  many  tactical  formations  and 
manoeuvers  were  not  devised  under  competent  strategical  di- 
rection, and  that  in  consequence  they  were  not  strategically 
effective,  and  had  to  be  discarded  in  the  next  war,  and  often 
after  some  great  disaster.     An  analogous  case  is  that  of  ad- 


STRATEGY  IN  PEACE  339 

hering  to  methods  that  were  tactically  good  at  one  time  or 
under  one  set  of  conditions,  but  not  good  at  a  later  time,  after 
new  weapons  had  been  introduced,  or  when  the  conditions 
under  which  war  was  waged  had  considerably  altered.  Strat- 
egy must  see  to  it  that  tactics  keeps  its  methods  adapted  to  all 
the  changing  conditions  of  the  times. 

After  the  various  organizations  have  attained  some  degree 
of  proficiency  in  manceuvering,  tactical  exercises  are  held, 
which  differ  from  tactical  drills  in  the  sense  that  they  have  an 
object  in  view  beyond  mere  successful  manceuvering.  These 
tactical  exercises  are  usually  so  conducted  that  parts  of  a  fleet 
or  army  are  pitted  against  other  parts,  and  manoeuver  for 
tactical  advantage,  and  sometimes  fire  blank  charges  at  each 
other.  By  this  means,  they  not  only  simulate  actual  battles, 
but  gain  practice  in  handling  the  various  weapons,  ascertain- 
ing the  range  of  the  enemy  under  varying  conditions,  moving 
large  masses  of  men  or  vessels,  etc.,  and  test  out  systems  of 
fire-control,  transmission  of  orders  and  information,  etc.,  un- 
der circumstances  as  close  to  those  of  battle  as  can  be  got  with- 
out using  actual  projectiles  and  killing  men  and  injuring 
ships.  These  tactical  exercises  are  sometimes  very  exciting 
indeed;  and  they  are  always  interesting  and  always  contain  a 
very  considerable  element  of  danger.  No  fleet  and  no  army 
can  be  prepared  for  war  without  such  exercises,  any  more  than 
a  pugilist  can  be  prepared  for  a  prize  fight  without  engaging 
in  boxing  bouts. 

In  order  that  tactical  exercises  may  be  of  such  a  character 
as  to  convey  the  most  valuable  lessons  and  impart  the  best 
training  to  meet  the  probable  circumstances  of  the  next  war, 
they  have  to  be  carefully  planned  beforehand,  both  in  their 
general  character  and  in  the  details;  and  this  planning,  of 
course,  is  the  task  of  strategy.  The  planning  is  usually  done 
by  the  general  stafiP  at  the  Admiralty  or  War  Office,  or  by  the 
staffs  of  the  commanders  of  the  forces  that  are  exercising.  In 
either  case,  the  staff  frequently  assist  themselves  with  the 
game-board,  and  play  games  beforehand  that  represent  in 


340  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

miniature  the  exercises  they  are  planning.  Occasionally  an 
exercise  as  actually  carried  out  is  a  selection  made  from  many 
games  that  have  been  played  on  game-boards,  or  is  a  combina- 
tion of  several.  The  tactical  exercises  are  sometimes  at  the 
end  of  strategical  exercises,  in  which  forces  that  have  been 
separated  from  each  other  by  great  distances  are  brought  to- 
gether after  a  series  of  strategical  operations  more  or  less  pro- 
longed, and  are  then  made  to  manoeuver  against  each  other; 
just  as  forces  do  after  being  brought  together  from  a  dis- 
tance in  real  war. 

Strategical  exercises  for  both  armies  and  fleets  are  the  larg- 
est operations  carried  on  on  the  surface  of  the  earth,  except 
strategic  operations  in  actual  war.  Armies,  consisting  some- 
times of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  men,  with  mortars  and 
cannon  and  supplies  and  munitions  and  engineering  imple- 
ments and  hospital  appliances,  are  moved  over  hundreds  of 
miles,  partly  on  railroad  trains  and  partly  on  foot,  and  sud- 
denly brought  within  sight  of  each  other  on  a  mimic  field  of 
battle.  In  the  Continental  armies,  and  in  those  of  Japan  and 
Argentine,  the  utmost  possible  importance  is  attached  to  these 
operations  by  the  nation;  great  expense  is  incurred;  and  the 
undivided  attention  of  all  the  forces  engaged  is  concentrated 
on  the  operations,  not  only  during  their  actual  continuance, 
but  during  many  weeks  and  sometimes  months  before.  In 
fact,  the  whole  period  of  time  between  one  series  of  grand 
manceuvers  and  the  next  is  one  of  preparation  for  the  next. 
By  this  sj^stem,  the  training  of  an  army  and  of  its  various 
parts  becomes  definite  and  forward-looking;  it  ceases  to  be 
perfunctory  and  becomes  objective;  automaticity  is  pre- 
vented; and  the  minds  of  all  are  kept  in  a  continual  state  of 
activity  and  expectancy. 

The  strategic  exercises  of  navies  are,  of  course,  on  a  much 
larger  scale,  because  of  the  greater  power  of  the  units  em- 
ployed, the  greater  speed  at  which  they  move,  and  the  greater 
distances  that  they  traverse.  A  strategic  exercise  that  would 
involve,  for  instance,  an  attack  by  the  United  States  fleet  on 


STRATEGY  IN  PEACE  341 

the  coast  of  Portugal  would  extend  over  the  entire  Atlantic 
Ocean;  and  a  strategic  exercise  involving  an  attack  on  the 
coast  of  China  would  cover  a  great  part  of  the  Atlantic,  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama,  and  most  of  the  North  Pacific  Ocean. 
Over  these  large  areas,  dreadnoughts,  costing  more  than  $20,- 
000,000  each,  would  move,  accompanied  by  hosts  of  cruisers, 
destroyers,  submarines,  aircraft,  and  auxiliaries  of  all  kinds. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  such  large  strategic  exercises  as 
these  have  never  been  carried  out,  except  in  chart  manceuvers, 
as  distinguished  from  strategic  exercises.  Many  strategic  ex- 
ercises have  been  held,  however,  in  which  fleets  manceuvered 
over  the  spaces  between  England  and  Gibraltar,  and  between 
Boston  and  the  West  Indies. 

Strategic  exercises,  ending  in  tactical  contacts,  are  the  cul- 
mination of  the  work  of  strategy,  in  peace.  They  bring  to  a 
climax  all  the  work  of  the  strategist,  the  logistician,  and  the 
tactician,  in  designing  the  naval  or  the  military  machine,  and 
in  preparing  it  for  war.  In  order  that  the  exercises  may  be 
of  the  maximum  value  in  simulating  the  conditions  of  war, 
and  therefore  in  gaining  the  most  valuable  strategic,  logisti- 
cal, and  tactical  experience  possible,  the  reserves  must  be 
called  out,  and  the  navy  or  army  put  on  a  war  footing;  for 
otherwise  a  condition  quite  untiTie  as  a  picture  of  war  will  be 
made,  difficulties  that  would  appear  in  war  will  not  appear, 
and  the  whole  performance  will  lack  adequacy  and  complete- 
ness, and  therefore  truthfulness. 

For  this  reason,  the  grand  manceuvers  in  the  Continental 
armies,  and  in  the  most  important  European  navies,  have  been 
preceded  by  a  mobilization  of  the  entire  military  or  naval 
forces,  and  all  arrangements  have  been  made  to  simulate  war 
as  accurately  as  possible.  The  strategists  of  the  principal  Eu- 
ropean armies  and  navies,  ever  since  the  day  of  Moltke,  have 
realized  that  when  a  nation  enters  into  war  the  preparations 
she  has  made  before  the  war  in  designing,  building,  and  pre- 
paring her  national  defense  machine  are  the  determining  fac- 
tors, and  the  only  determining  factors,  as  to  the  way  in  which 


342  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

that  machine  will  operate  during  the  war.  After  a  war  has 
begun,  the  two  contesting  machines  are  like  two  pugilists  who 
have  started  to  fight.  It  is  too  late  then  to  rectify  any  mis- 
takes or  supply  any  omissions. 

This  being  the  case,  does  it  not  seem  a  matter  of  the  com- 
monest kind  of  common  sense  to  have  the  designing  and  pre- 
paring of  an  army  and  a  navy  made  under  the  guidance  of 
strategy,  interpreted  and  carried  out  by  experts?  When 
hundreds  of  millions  are  spent  on  national  defense,  why  not 
try  to  get  the  greatest  amount  of  defense  in  return  ? 

The  prime  necessity  in  any  naval  or  military  machine  is,  of 
course,  that  it  shall  be  ready  to  start  on  war  operations  as 
soon  as  a  war  breaks  out ;  for  otherwise  it  may  be  defeated  im- 
mediately by  a  machine  that  is  ready,  as  the  French  army  was 
in  1870  by  the  Prussian.  In  the  days  not  long  gone  by,  before 
the  great  industrial  movement  had  filled  navies  and  armies 
with  almost  an  infinity  of  complicated  apparatus  of  all  kinds, 
a  navy  or  an  army  could  quickly  and  easily  pass  from  a 
peace  footing  to  a  war  footing.  Moltke  was  the  first  man  to 
realize  adequately  the  additional  requirements  in  the  way  of 
preparation  entailed  by  the  progress  of  civilization;  and  he 
met  them  by  organizing  and  training  a  body  of  officers  who 
should  have  charge  of  making  the  numerous  and  complicated 
preparations  needed.  To  this  body  of  men,  which  now  exist 
in  every  considerable  navy  and  army,  the  name  general  staff 
has  been  given  in  our  language.  The  United  States  army 
had  no  such  body  of  men  until  about  the  year  1902,  when 
Elihu  Root  as  Secretary  of  War  succeeded  in  having  a  gen- 
eral staff  established  for  the  army,  against  strenuous  opposi- 
tion from  politicians.  Politicians  naturally  saw  in  a  general 
staff  a  curb  to  their  activities  in  managing  such  matters  as 
the  composition  of  the  army,  the  selection  of  officers  for  high 
positions,  the  distribution  of  army  posts  throughout  the  coun- 
try, etc. 

But  the  navy  was  unable  to  secure  a  general  staff  because 
of  political  opposition;  so  that,  when  the  probability  of  our 


STRATEGY  IN  PEACE  343 

becoming  involved  in  the  World  War  became  manifest,  a  situ- 
ation highly  dangerous  arose.  As  Aid  for  Operations,  I 
was  responsible,  under  the  Secretary,  for  the  strategy  of  the 
navy.  After  the  war  broke  out  in  August,  1914,  the  danger 
of  our  navy  being  dragged  into  war  while  unprepared  became 
so  alarming  that  I  secretly  induced  Representative  Ilobson  to 
introduce  a  provision  into  the  Naval  Appropriation  Bill  for 
a  general  staff.  To  avoid  opposition,  we  agreed  not  to  use  the 
word  general  staff,  and  to  use  instead  tlie  words  "Office  of 
Naval  Operations."  The  provision  was  eventually  adopted 
and  incorporated  in  the  Naval  Appropriation  Bill  and  ap- 
proved by  the  President,  though  in  a  somewhat  emasculated 
form.  In  March,  1916,  in  the  course  of  official  testimony  be- 
fore the  House  Naval  Committee,  I  made  an  argument  in 
favor  of  putting  into  the  pending  appropriation  bill  those 
provisions  pertaining  to  the  Office  of  Naval  Operations  that 
had  been  left  out  of  the  previous  bill,  and  at  the  same  time 
informed  the  committee  that  I  was  the  author  of  the  provi- 
sion which  Mr.  Hobson  had  introduced.  My  plea  was  heeded ; 
and  the  bill,  as  eventually  passed  and  approved  by  the  Presi- 
dent in  August,  1916,  contained  virtually  all  the  provisions 
originally  suggested.  This  gave  the  navy  a  general  staff, 
though  it  was  not  called  by  that  name.  The  Navy  Depart- 
ment, of  course,  obeyed  the  law ;  and  the  result  was  that  when 
the  United  States  navy  entered  the  Great  War  in  April,  1917, 
it  entered  fairly  well  prepared,  and  with  an  organization  that 
could  handle  the  navy  effectively. 

It  may  seem  out  of  place  in  a  book  of  this  kind  to  recount 
a  personal  experience;  it  may  seem  an  exhibition  of  mere 
vanity.  Perhaps  it  is ;  but  I  have  decided  to  narrate  it  for  the 
following  reasons : 

(1)  Personal  experiences,  when  narrated  in  connection  with 
an  important  matter,  have  great  efficacy  in  bringing  the  main 
points  of  what  might  otherwise  seem  an  academic  question 
into  clear  relief. 

(2)  One  of  the  objects  of  this  book  is  to  impress  upon  the 


344  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

people  of  the  country  the  importance  of  strategy,  and  the  ne- 
cessity of  a  comprehension  of  its  elementary  principles  by  the 
voters  of  the  nation.  Now,  this  personal  experience  is  irre- 
futable proof  that  no  such  knowledge  existed  before  the  war; 
for,  if  it  had  existed,  it  would  not  have  been  necessary,  in 
order  to  insure  the  national  safety,  for  the  officer  who  occu- 
pied the  highest  position  in  the  navy  to  risk  his  commission 
and  jeopardize  his  entire  professional  career  by  secretly  in- 
fluencing Congress,  and  thereby  deliberately  disobeying  the 
United  States  navy  regulations. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

STRATEGY   IN    WAR 

WE  have  seen  that  the  effort  of  strategy  in  peace  is 
to  design,  build,  and  prepare  a  national  defense 
machine.  When  two  nations  go  to  war,  therefore, 
they  put  forward  two  machines  to  operate  against  each  other ; 
in  practice,  two  naval  machines  operate  against  each  other, 
and  two  military  machines  operate  against  each  other. 

The  simplest  conception  of  two  fleets  or  two  armies  operat- 
ing against  each  other  is  that  the  two  fleets  range  opposite 
each  other  in  parallel  columns,  and  shoot  at  each  other  across 
the  space  between;  or  that  two  armies  line  up  against  each 
other,  face  to  face,  and  shoot  across  the  space  between.  Ac- 
tual battles  of  this  kind  have  been  fought;  but,  as  a  rule, 
fleets  and  armies  have  been  brought  into  battles  as  a  result  of 
an  attempt  by  one  side  or  the  other  to  begin  the  battle  with 
a  tactical  advantage  of  some  kind. 

The  tactical  advantage  desired  has  usually  been  of  the  na- 
ture of  concentration  upon  an  inferior  force  or  part  of  the 
enemy,  so  placed  that  it  could  receive  but  little  assistance  from 
other  parts  of  the  force.  If  the  enemy  force  has  been  divided 
into  separated  parts,  the  endeavor  has  usually  taken  the  form 
of  an  attack  on  one  of  the  separated  parts  by  a  force  stronger 
than  itself;  if  the  enemy  force  has  been  concentrated,  the 
endeavor  has  usually  taken  the  form  of  an  attack  on  one  of 
his  flanks  or  his  line  of  communications,  or  an  attempt  to  pene- 
trate his  line.  In  case  the  enemy  is  concentrated,  but  is  infe- 
rior in  numbers,  skill,  or  otherwise,  the  endeavor  has  sometimes 
been  to  envelop  or  surround  him.  Obviously,  if  envelopment 
or  surrounding  can  be  effected,  greater  results  can  be  obtained 

345 


346  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

than  by  any  other  form  of  attack,  because  the  enemy  is  thereby 
immobilized.     Obviously  also,  it  is  more  difficult  to  achieve. 

Attention  may  be  here  invited  to  Tables  I  and  II  (pages 
58  and  60),  which  show  why  it  is  desirable  to  attack  two 
separated  parts  of  any  enemy  rather  than  both  together ;  and 
why  success  may  be  achieved,  even  if  the  aggregate  of  those 
two  forces  is  greater  than  the  attacking  force. 

We  can  see  this  clearly  if  we  consult  Table  I,  and  note  that, 
if  two  forces  each  aggregating  1000  were  in  each  other's  vicin- 
ity, and  if  the  entire  force  A  was  able  to  engage  half  of  B, 
or  500,  it  would  whip  half  of  B,  and  have  841  remaining  with 
which  to  engage  the  other  half  (500)  of  B.  Reference  to 
the  end  of  the  third  period  in  this  table  shows  also  that  if  a 
force  of  789  engages  a  force  of  523,  it  will  have  569  left  after 
the  other  has  been  reduced  to  zero.  Therefore,  a  force  of 
1000  that  engages  two  forces  of  500  separately  will  have  more 
than  500  left,  after  those  two  forces  have  been  reduced  to  zero ; 
whereas,  if  it  engages  both  when  they  are  united,  both  sides 
will  be  gradually  reduced  to  zero,  remaining  equal  all  the 
time. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  how  this  simple  fact  is  the  key  to 
most  of  the  operations  of  strategy  and  tactics;  how  (the  me- 
chanical tools  in  the  way  of  men,  ships,  guns,  torpedoes,  and 
equipment  having  been  supplied)  the  key  to  their  successful 
use  is  simply  to  take  advantage  of  all  opportunities  of  isolat- 
ing one  part  of  the  enemy's  force  from  the  rest,  and  then  at- 
tacking one  of  the  parts  with  a  force  superior  to  it.  Oppor- 
tunities lacking,  one  must,  of  course,  try  to  create  opportuni- 
ties by  inducing  the  enemy  to  detach  some  part  of  his  force, 
under  circumstances  in  which  you  ean  attack  it,  or  the  weak- 
ened main  body,  with  a  superior  force.  Naturally,  ane  must 
try  to  prevent  a  similar  procedure  by  the  enemy. 

This  does  not  mean  that  the  sole  effort  of  operations  is 
finesse  in  either  strategy  or  tactics;  sometimes  the  sole  effort 
is  t3  force  a  pitched  battle  by  the  side  that  feels  superior,  and 
to  avoid  a  pitched  battle  by  the  side  that  feels  inferior.     Be- 


STRATEGY  IN  WAR  347 

fore  the  actual  inferiority  or  superiority  has  been  ascertained, 
however,  the  strategy  of  each  commander  is  to  bring  about  a 
situation  in  which  his  force  shall  have  the  advantage.  The 
advantage  having  been  gained  and  recognized  (or  an  advan- 
tage existing  and  being  recognized),  strategy  insists  on  forc- 
ing a  battle,  for  the  reason  that  every  contest  weakens  the 
loser  more  than  it  does  the  winner. 

This  does  not  mean  that  it  is  alwaj^s  wise  to  engage  a 
weaker  force  that  is  temporarily  separated  from  its  main 
body.  It  is  readily  understandable,  for  instance,  that  it 
would  be  unwise  in  two  cases : 

(1)  A  case  in  which  the  weaker  force  were  so  little  weaker, 
and  were  part  of  a  force  so  much  larger  than  the  total  of  the 
smaller  force,  that  the  gain  as  between  the  two  forces  ac- 
tually engaged  would  not  be  great  enough  to  compensate  for 
the  loss  entailed.  For  instance,  a  reference  to  Table  I  shows 
that  an  A  force  of  1000  engaging  a  B  force  of  800  would  have 
569  left  when  B  was  reduced  to  zero.  This  is  impressive; 
but  if  the  B  force  of  800  were  a  part  of  a  total  B  force  of 
2000 — in  other  words,  if  there  were  another  B  force  of  1200 
near  at  hand — A  would  have  569  left  with  which  to  oppose 
1200,  a  proportion  little  less  advantageous  than  the  propor- 
tion he  started  with— 1000  to  2000. 

(2)  A  case  in  which  the  B  force  may  have  divided  with  the 
express  purpose  of  luring  A  to  attack ;  arrangements  having 
been  made  whereby  an  inferior  B  force  would  simply  hold 
the  A  force  until  the  rest  of  the  B  force  could  come  to  its 
assistance;  arrangements  having  been  also  made  that  this 
should  be  accomplished  before  the  detached  part  of  B  should 
get  very  badly  damaged. 

Attention  is  invited  to  Table  II,  which  is  a  continuation  of 
Table  I.  It  represents  what  would  happen  if  a  force  of  1000 
should  fight  separately  two  forces,  one  of  800  and  the  other 
of  200.  In  column  1,  A  is  supposed  to  have  engaged  the 
force  of  200  first,  and  so  to  have  become  reduced  to  970  (see 
Table  I)  and  to  engage  800  afterward.     In  column  2,  A  is  sup- 


348  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

posed  to  have  engaged  800  first,  thereby  becoming  reduced  to 
569  (see  Table  I),  and  then  to  engage  the  force  of  200.  The 
table  indicates  that  it  makes  no  practical  difference  whether 
A  engages  the  stronger  or  the  weaker  force  first. 

Column  3  shows  that  a  force  of  841  (the  part  remaining 
after  the  force  of  1000  had  annihilated  a  force  of  500)  would 
have   653   left   after   annihilating   a   second   force   of    500. 


,B' 


Fi^.l 

A 

..^B 

M. 

^^^* 

A 

FJg.Z 
...B 

A'...--'"  ,£' 


Taken  in  connection  with  columns  1  and  2,  this  indicates  that 
it  is  easier  to  defeat  two  separated  equal  forces  than  two  sep- 
arated unequal  forces  of  the  same  aggregate  value;  that  the 
weakest  way  in  which  to  divide  a  force  is  into  equal  parts. 
This  fact  is  mathematically  demonstrated  by  Mr.  F.  W.  Lan- 
chester  in  a  recent  book  called  "Air  craft  in  Warfare." 

The  act  of  engaging  the  separate  parts  of  a  force  is 
usually  spoken  of  as  "concentration";  but  the  word  "isola- 
tion" seems  better,  for  the  reason  that  the  advantage  results 
from  the  fact  that  the  part  attacked  is  isolated  from  and 
unsupported  by  the  other  parts.  This  case  is  represented  by 
Fig.  1,  in  which  A  and  A'  fire  on  B,  which  is  unsupported  by 
B'.  The  case  in  which  B  is  supported  by  B'  is  indicated  in 
Fig.  2,  That  there  is  no  advantage  in  merely  "concentrat- 
ing" on  B  is  shown  by  Table  III;  for,  while  B  is  rapidly  re- 
duced in  power  by  the  concentrated  fire  of  A  and  A',  and  A 


STRATEGY  IN  WAR 


349 


and  A'  are  more  slowly  reduced  by  the  fire  of  B,  B'  is  not  re- 
duced at  all,  and  continues  to  fire  at  A  and  A',  and  therefore 
to  reduce  their  power. 

TABLE  III 

fiiisJJI  aggregate....  1000 

Value  of  offensive  at  beginning ■<  g    —  500  5 

i  gi  —  500  I  aggregate — 1000 

I  Ai-    In  1  aggregate....    50 

Damage  done  in  first  period  by A -^  ~    Vnl 

Ibi=    50  J  aggregate....    50 

I  4i  =  !^2J  aggregate....  900 '] 

Valued  offensive  power  at  end  of  first  period ■<  „    ~  Ann  \  >■ 

[|i  =  500  I  aggregate....  900  | 

I  fi=    4^  (aggregate....    90  ] 

Damage  done  in  second  period  by .s  ij    —    aji  !  > 

Lii=    |^(  aggregate....    90  | 

In  reading  accounts  of  strategical  and  tactical  operations 
we  see  three  words  used  continually :  force,  quickness,  and 
direction.  The  word  force  as  here  used  is  not  force  in  the 
engineering  or  mathematical  sense,  but  denotes  material 
masses  in  the  sense  of  numbers  of  soldiers  and  numbers  and 
sizes  of  ships  and  guns.  It  is  comparable  to  the  weight  of  a 
club;  while  quickness  means,  of  course,  speed  of  movement. 
Therefore,  the  three  words  that  we  see  used  so  constantly  in 
military  annals  mean  the  same  things  as  do  the  factors  in 
any  blows  that  are  struck:  mass,  velocity,  and  direction. 

The  effect  of  anj-  blow  is  overcoming  resistance.  It  is  meas- 
ured in  mechanics  by  the  mass  that  delivers  the  blow  and 
the  square  of  the  velocity  with  which  it  strikes.  The  mathe- 
matical formula  is  E  =  V2M  V^.  In  this  formula,  M  is  the 
mass  of  the  weapon  that  delivers  the  blow,  and  is  proportional 

to  the  weight.  Mathematically  speaking,  m  =  -^,  where  w  is 
the  weight  and  g  is  the  acceleration  of  gravity.  Whenever 
a  blow  overcomes  the  resistance  of  a  body,  it  does  it  by  virtue 
of  the  energy,  or  work,  stored  up  in  it,  which  is  expended  in 
doing  work  in  overcoming  the  resistance  of  the  resisting  body. 
If  a  club  breaks  in  the  skull  of  a  man,  or  an  arrow  pierces  his 
flesh,  or  a  rifle  projectile  penetrates  the  armor  of  a  battle- 


350  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

ship,  the  energy  is  expended  in  overcoming  the  resistance  of 
the  skull,  the  flesh,  or  the  armor  through  a  given  distance. 
The  office  of  the  skull,  flesh,  or  armor  is  to  protect  vital 
parts  from  such  blows,  and  its  duty  is  well  performed  in  pro- 
portion to  its  strength;  and  this  strength  consists  largely  in 
such  an  arrangement  of  its  molecules  that  parts  contiguous 
to  that  which  receives  the  blow  can  come  to  its  assistance.  If 
the  strength  is  small,  little  resistance  is  offered;  but  if  the 
resisting  strength  is  great,  as  in  the  armor  of  a  battleship,  the 
parts  adjacent  to  the  part  that  receives  the  blow  come  quickly 
to  its  assistance,  and  resist  the  attempt  of  the  projectile  to 
break  the  part  struck  away  from  the  contiguous  parts,  and 
force  it  to  the  rear. 

We  see  here  one  phase  of  the  so-called  "contest  between 
guns  and  armor"  that  began  with  the  making  of  pointed 
weapons  and  the  answering  making  of  shie'lds.  The  reason  for 
making  weapons  pointed  was  a  realization  of  the  fact  that  the 
smaller  the  area  attacked  the  less  resistance  could  be  opposed. 
It  was  realized  that  by  concentrating  the  blow  on  a  small  area, 
the  total  resistance  to  penetration  would  be  less  than  if  a 
larger  area  were  allowed  to  oppose  resistance.  The  idea  was 
exactly  the  same  as  that  of  concentrating  attack  upon  a  sep- 
arated portion  of  the  enemy  before  the  other  parts  could  come 
to  its  assistance.  It  was  realized,  at  the  same  time,  that  by 
giving  great  speed  to  the  weapon,  say  a  spear,  the  parts  sur- 
rounding the  place  attacked  would  have  less  time  to  come  to  its 
assistance,  and  penetration  would  be  more  surely  effected.  In 
other  words,  the*  effect  of  sharpening  the  point  of  a  spear  and 
giving  the  spear  great  speed  were  identical :  to  effect  penetra- 
tion by  isolating  the  part  struck  from  other  parts  that  might 
assist  it.  If  you  will  look  at  a  pane  of  glass  that  has  been  hit 
by  a  stone,  and  another  that  has  been  hit  by  a  rifle-ball  which 
went  through  it  at  a  great  speed,  you  will  see  in  the  first  case 
a  number  of  cracks,  as  evidence  of  a  partially  successful  en- 
deavor on  the  part  of  the  glass  near  to  the  part  struck  to  come 
to  the  assistance  of  that  part ;  and  you  will  see  a  smooth  hole 


STRATEGY  IN  WAR  351 

in  the  second  case,  as  evidence  of  a  less  successful  attempt  at 
resistance,  due  to  lack  of  time.  And  if  you  will  examine  the 
hole  punched  in  armor  by  a  rifle  projectile,  you  will  see  con- 
vincing evidence  of  the  tenacity  with  which  the  metal  all 
around  the  hole  tried  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  the  part 
struck. 

These  considerations  show  that,  in  making  any  attack,  as  in 
striking  any  blow,  speed  is  necessary,  to  prevent  neighboring 
parts  from  coming  to  the  assistance  of  the  part  attacked ;  and 
equally  that,  in  resisting  any  attack  or  blow,  speed  is  necessary 
in  order  to  bring  up  quickly  all  neighboring  parts  to  the 
assistance  of  the  part  attacked. 

In  the  operations  between  two  hostile  forces,  the  greater 
the  concentration  of  any  force,  the  greater  its  cohesive 
strength,  and  therefore  the  greater  its  ability  both  to  give 
and  to  resist  blows :  on  the  other  hand,  the  greater  the  disper- 
sion of  any  force,  the  less  its  strength  and  therefore  the  less  its 
striking  and  resisting  power,  because  of  the  difficulty  of  attain- 
ing mutual  assistance  among  the  various  parts.  For  this  rea- 
son, strategists  endeavor  that  military  and  naval  forces  shall 
enter  battles  in  concentrated  form;  that  is,  with  the  various 
parts  in  supporting  distance  of  each  other.  If  two  armies  or 
two  fleets  could  be  concentrated  in  two  points,  they  could  be 
brought  into  collision  with  each  other,  with  the  result  that  the 
army  or  the  fleet  possessing  the  greater  energy  would  instemtly 
overcome  the  other.  It  is,  of  course,  impracticable  at  the  pres- 
ent day  to  concentrate  them  so  perfectl}^;  but  it  is  the  office 
of  strategy,  assisted  by  tactics,  to  approach  this  condition  as 
closely  as  the  practical  limitations  of  logistics  and  tactics  will 
permit. 

The  ideal  concentration  can  be  more  readily  approached  in 
fleets  than  in  armies;  because  greater  destinictive  powers  can 
be  carried  in  individual  units,  and  therefore  (under  the  prac- 
tical limitations  of  money  expended)  fewer  units  used;  and 
for  the  further  reason  that  these  units,  being  made  of  steel, 
are  much  more  rigid  and  coherent  units  than  are  the  compar- 


352  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

atively  loosely  tied  organizations  that  compose  armies.  This 
enormous  concentration  gives  enormous  strength ;  but  the  very 
concentration,  the  very  fact  of  putting  so  much  into  so  few 
highly  specialized  units,  makes  injuries  the  more  difficult  to 
repair  in  time,  and  increases  the  importance  of  victory  or 
defeat. 

If  there  is  so  much  value  in  concentration  for  both  offense 
and  defense,  it  may  be  asked  why  fleets  and  armies  cannot  be 
kept  concentrated  during  war.  The  answer  is  that  fleets  and 
armies  cannot  be  kept  concentrated  during  time  of  peace,  so 
that  when  the  war  starts  they  are  already  separated,  and 
must  remain  so,  until  their  commanders  are  able  to  concen- 
trate them ;  and  that,  even  after  that,  the  various  minor  opera- 
tions that  have  to  be  carried  on,  the  necessity  for  sending  out 
scouting  expeditions,  supported  by  fighting  forces,  to  ascertain 
the  position  and  movements  of  the  enemy,  and  the  logistical 
and  tactical  difficulties  in  the  way  of  moving  large  forces, 
especially  on  land,  necessitate  a  large  force  being  divided  a 
very  great  part  of  the  time.  The  period  immediately  after  the 
breaking  out  of  a  war  is  apt  to  be  the  most  critical  period  of 
the  war,  because  the  force  that  concentrates  the  more  quickly 
can  gain  great  advantages  by  attacking  portions  of  the  enemy 
before  they  can  be  joined  together.  Important  instances  of 
this  were  the  activities  of  the  British  fleet  in  Nelson's  time  in 
watching  outside  of  the  great  French  naval  ports  of  Brest, 
Rochefort  and  Toulon,  and  preventing  those  forces  from 
emerging  and  forming  a  great  fleet,  which  might  later  get  into 
the  English  Channel  and  convoy  an  invading  army  across. 
Another  important  instance  occurred  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  in  1870,  in  which  the  Prussians,  by  concentrating  more 
quickly  than  the  French,  were  able  to  prevent  MacMahon  and 
Bazaine  from  uniting,  and  then  to  defeat  each  one  while  iso- 
lated from  the  other. 

On  the  sea,  after  a  fleet  has  once  been  concentrated,  there 
is  less  difficult}^  in  keeping  it  together  while  moving  from  one 
place  to  another  than  with  an  army,  because  the  sea  is  not  cut 


STRATEGY  IN  WAR  353 

up  into  roads,  as  the  land  is,  and  fleets  are  therefore  not  re- 
ctrieted  to  certain  narrow  lanes,  as  armies  usually  are.  Fur- 
thermore, a  fleet  can  carrj'-  its  supplies  with  it,  and  mostly 
inside  of  the  fighting  ships  themselves;  whereas  an  army's  sup- 
plies and  munitions  have  to  accompany  it  in  separate  wagons, 
which  take  up  a  great  deal  of  space  and  need  guards  to  pro- 
tect them.  Additional  difficulties  with  armies  are  the  fact  that 
an  army  fights  in  the  direction  in  which  the  men  face  and 
march,  the  accompanying  fact  that  the  lines  in  which  they  fight 
are  now  very  long  by  reason  of  the  numbers  engaged,  and  the 
further  fact  that  the  columns  in  which  they  march  are  so  very 
long  that  an  army  does  not  march  in  one  long  column  but  in 
several.  If  these  columns  can  maech  on  roads  so  close  that  the 
columns  are  within  supporting  distance  of  each  other,  and  yet 
so  far  apart  that,  if  need  be,  the  columns  may  be  deployed 
(that  is,  formed  in  line  of  battle),  the  danger  from  separation 
is  not  great.  But  if,  as  often  happens,  the  positions  and  direc- 
tions of  the  roads  and  the  character  of  the  land  in  between 
them  are  such  as  to  occasion  wide  separation  of  the  columns, 
then  danger  exists  that  one  column  may  be  attacked  when  the 
others  cannot  come  to  its  assistance. 

This  same  difference  between  the  surface  of  the  sea  and 
the  surface  of  the  land  concerns  the  line  of  retreat,  which  is 
always  one  of  the  many  sources  of  anxiety  of  a  commander. 
On  the  sea  or  in  the  air,  a  defeated  fleet  may  retreat  in  almost 
any  direction;  but  on  the  land  a  defeated  army  can  retreat 
with  order  along  certain  definite  roads  only.  Furthermore, 
the  line  of  communication  of  an  army  with  its  base,  and  by 
which  it  receives  its  supplies,  may  run  in  an  unfavorable  di- 
rection from  the  center  of  the  army,  in  which  case  the  army 
may  not  be  able  to  retreat  along  its  lines  of  communications,  if 
defeated.  The  line  of  communications  may  even  run  approx- 
imately parallel  with  the  line  in  which  the  army  faces  to  fight, 
and  therefore  approximately  perpendicular  to  the  line  along 
which  it  may  be  forced  to  retreat.  Unfavorable  conditions 
may  possibly  occur  on  the  sea  during  the  day-time:  for  the 


354  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

hostile  and  victorious  fleet  may  even  get  between  the  defeated 
fleet  and  its  base,  as  the  British  fleet  seems  almost  to  have  done 
at  the  end  of  the  battle  of  Jutland.  But  with  the  coming  of 
night  even  a  defeated  fleet,  if  not  too  much  injured,  as  Rojes- 
vensky  's  was,  may  steam  around  the  hostile  ships  and  get  back 
to  its  base,  as  the  Germans  did  from  Jutland. 

One  of  the  curious  and  interesting  facts  connected  with 
warfare  is  the  way  in  which  the  defensive  and  the  offensive 
have  been  alternately  favored  by  successive  improvements  in 
appliances  and  methods.  There  seems  to  have  been  a  contest 
between  the  offensive  and  defensive  in  warfare,  analogous  to 
the  contest  between  guns  and  armor.  As  a  rule,  improvements 
for  defense  followed  improvements  for  offense,  as  the  inven- 
tion of  the  shield  followed  the  invention  of  the  club  and  the 
spear,  and  as  the  invention  of  armor  for  ships  followed  the 
production  of  guns  that  could  pierce  unarmored  ships.  That 
this  should  have  been  so  is  not  surprising,  and  is  merely  one 
instance  among  thousands  of  the  tendency  of  men  not  to  take 
precautions  until  taught  by  harsh  experience  to  do  so. 

We  can  hardly  conceive  of  a  war,  or  even  of  a  fight  between 
two  men,  in  which  during  most  of  the  time,  one  party  is  not 
taking  the  offensive  and  the  other  the  defensive,  even  though 
the  two  parties  alternate  in  their  activities.  When  any  im- 
provement has  been  made  in  weapons,  it  has  naturally  first 
favored  the  offensive;  and  similarly,  when  any  improvement 
has  been  made  in  such  appliances  as  shields,  armor  or  subma- 
rine mines,  it  has  first  favored  the  defensive.  Nevertheless, 
every  improvement  in  weapons,  say  in  muskets,  has  given 
great  advantage  to  the  defense,  because  it  has  enabled  the 
defensive  to  use  a  more  powerful  fire  against  an  offensive 
attack;  and  every  improvement  in  m.eans  and  methods  of 
defense  has  been  utilized  by  the  attacker.  For  instance,  sav- 
ages use  shields  while  making  attacks,  and  battleships,  in  even 
the  most  aggressive  assault,  wear  thick  armor  on  their  sides. 

The  discussion  as  to  which  is  the  more  powerful  activity  in 
war,  the  defensive  or  the  offensive,  is  more  than  5,000  years 


STRATEGY  IN  WAR  355 

old.  Of  course,  there  is  much  to  say  in  favor  of  each.  The 
most  important  considerations  are  that  the  defensive  can 
select  its  own  position,  can  protect  itself  by  such  things  as 
ramparts  and  submarine  mines,  and  (being  in  a  state  of  com- 
parative rest  and  protection)  can  use  its  weapons  with  more 
precision  than  can  an  attacking  force,  which  must  be  most  of 
the  time  advancing  and  exposed;  while  the  offensive  has  the 
advantage  that  it  can  select  its  own  time,  method,  and  locality 
of  attack,  and  can  therefore  make  its  plans  beforehand  and 
get  ready  to  execute  them.  Added  to  this,  the  mere  fact  of 
movement,  of  pressing  forward  to  attack,  imparts  a  great 
moral  and  nerve  stimulant  to  the  men.  One  of  the  curious 
facts  in  the  last  war  is  that  although  both  forces,  especially 
the  Germans,  endeavored  continually  to  take  the  offensive,  the 
war  had  in  one  way  a  more  defensive  character  on  both  sides 
than  any  war  in  recent  history,  because  the  greater  part  of 
both  sides  found  themselves  during  the  greater  part  of  the  war 
in  trenches.  A  curious  fact  in  connection  with  this  is  that  in 
his  book  ' '  On  War  To-day, ' '  Bemhardi  had  declared  that  in  a 
Central  European  war  such  conditions  would  be  "hardly 
likely"  to  prevail. 

Another  curious  phase  of  the  development  of  warfare  is  that, 
while  new  weapons  have  been  produced,  almost  no  weapons 
ever  used  before  have  ever  wholly  been  discarded.  In  the 
World  War,  for  instance,  men  fought  against  each  other  with 
not  only  the  most  highly  specialized  and  scientific  instruments 
that  the  intellects  of  all  the  world  could  devise,  but  with  their 
fi^ts  and  feet  and  clubs  and  bayonets ;  while  many  of  the 
highly  specialized  means  were  merely  revivals  in  improved 
forms  of  old  contrivances :  for  instance,  the  highly  specialized 
submarine  was  a  development  of  submarine  vessels  moved  by 
hand  power  in  our  Civil  War;  the  mortars  that  attacked  the 
tops  of  the  Belgian  forts  were  developments  of  the  old  bal- 
lista ;  and  poison  gas  was  an  improvement  on  the  ancient  Chi- 
nese stink-pot. 

While  fleets  and  armies  operate. with  the  same  end  in  view — 


356  THE,  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

the  destruction  of  the  enemy 's  machine — and  while  the  strate- 
gic principles  under  which  both  operate  are  identical,  their 
methods  of  tactical  operation  and  logistical  preparation  and 
supply,  are  of  course,  quite  diii'erent.  The  main  difference  in 
the  tactical  handling  lies  in. the  fact  that  armies  fire  their  guns 
in  the  direction  in  which  they  advance,  whereas  fleets  fire 
theirs  in  a  direction  approximately  perpendicular  to  it.  The 
first  important  consequences  of  this  difference  is  that  hostile 
armies  cannot  both  advance  far  after  they  begin  to  fire  at  each 
other,  whereas  fleets  continue  to  advance.  In  fact,  fleets  con- 
tinue to  advance  with  as  much  speed  as  is  practicable  and 
safe;  for  the  reason  that,  if  one  fleet  can  get  a  position  in 
advance  of  the  other,  it  will  secure  an  advantage  in  using  tor- 
pedoes; because  the  fleet  that  is  to  the  rear  will  run  into  tor- 
pedoes, whereas  the  fleet  that  is  ahead  will  run  away  from 
them. 

Another  important  difference  between  the  conduct  of  an 
army  and  that  of  a  fleet,  in  actual  operations,  is  that  an  army, 
being  extended  in  a  long  line  and  liable  to  attacks  at  any 
points  which  the  enemy  may  select,  it  is  usually  necessary  to 
have  behind  the  line  large  reserve  forces  that  can  be  sent  to  any 
threatened  points.  In  some  operations,  the  reserve  has  been 
the  main  striking  part,  and  in  that  sense  the  most  important 
part  of  the  whole  force ;  as  in  prosecuting  an  offensive  when 
the  weak  points  of  an  enemy's  force  have  been  sought  out  by 
forces  ahead,  and  the  reserve  held  in  readiness  to  be  hurled 
against  a  selected  spot  when  found.  On  the  sea,  however,  the 
fact  that  a  fleet  must  be  kept  in  motion,  and  very  rapid  motion, 
added  to  the  fact  that  no  circumstances,  such  as  mountains  or 
rivers,  prevent  the  extension  of  the  column,  makes  it  difficult 
and  undesirable  to  station  any  reserve  on  the  side  opposite 
from  the  enemy.  For  this  reason,  and  for  the  reason  that  a 
fleet  is  a  much  more  highly  organized  machine  than  an  army, 
a  naval  battle  is  usually  much  more  decisive  than  a  battle  on 
land,  and  therefore  a  more  important  factor  in  deciding  the 
ultimate  defeat  or  victory  of  a  nation.     This  has  always  been 


STRATEGY  IN  WAR  357 

the  case ;  and  it  is  becoming  increasingly  more  so,  as  ships  be- 
come more  and  more  powerful,  more  and  more  complicated, 
and  more  and  more  difficult  to  repair  when  injured.  This  is 
analogous  to  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  animal  kingdom, 
in  which  the  more  highly  organized  the  animal,  the  more  easily 
it  is  killed  or  seriously  injured. 

When  Csesar  was  operating  in  Gaul,  when  Napoleon  was 
operating  in  Egypt,  and  even  when  Dewey  was  operating  in 
the  Philippines,  the  actual  operations  of  war  were  almost 
wholly  under  the  control  of  the  commander  on  the  spot ;  but 
the  advent  of  the  wireless  telegraph  has  made  possible  such 
rapidity  and  certainty  of  communication,  even  between  mov- 
ing vehicles  on  sea  and  land  and  in  the  air,  that  the  general 
staff  at  home  can  keep  in  fairly  constant  touch  with  fleets  and 
armies;  and  since  hy  these  means  they  can  become  informed 
of  many  important  movements  nearly  as  soon  as  the  com- 
mander-in-chief himself,  and  may  have  more  sources  of  infor- 
mation than  he  on  some  questions,  the  general  staff  at  home 
can  exercise  much  greater  control  than  formerly. 

This  condition  has  its  advantages,  of  course ;  but  it  has  the 
extremely  dangerous  disadvantage,  that  superior  authority  at 
home  is  under  the  constant  temptation  of  interfering  unduly 
with  the  commander  on  the  spot ;  with  the  consequent  danger 
of  giving  him  orders  based  on  information  that  he  may  know 
to  be  erroneous  or  too  old,  and  putting  him  in  the  dilemma  of 
either  disobeying  orders  or  playing  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.  The  danger  exists  not  only  between  the  authorities  at 
home  and  the  forces  in  the  field  or  on  the  sea  and  in  the  air, 
but  also  between  separate  parts  of  the  same  force. 

As  the  complexity  and  size  of  fighting  forces  has  increased, 
and  the  difficulty  of  unity  of  action  and  purpose  has  in  conse- 
quence increased,  and  as  improved  facility  of  communication 
has  not  sufficed  wholly  to  overcome  the  difficulties,  a  method 
called  indoctrination  has  come  into  use,  whereby  it  is  at- 
tempted to  imbue  all  the  members  of  a  fighting  force  with 
such  an  understanding  of  the  end  in  view,  and  such  loyalty 


358  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

to  the  cause,  that  the  men  will  do  what  they  ought  to  do  in 
emergencies  without  receiving  specific  orders.  Good  examples 
of  the  working  of  indoctrination  can  be  read  of  in  Admiral 
Jellicoe's  account  of  the  battle  of  Jutland.  In  this  battle  it 
was  impossible  for  him  to  direct  all  the  various  parts  of  his 
force,  or  even  to  know  exactly  what  was  happening.  Never- 
theless the  cruiser  squadrons  and  the  destroyer  and  submarine 
flotillas,  and  even  individual  vessels  took  the  initiative  in 
many  important  emergencies,  and  did  what  their  indoctrina- 
tion led  them  to  see  that  Admiral  Jellicoe  would  want  them 
to  do. 

A  formal  acceptance  of  the  idea  of  indoctrination — in  fact, 
the  proposition  itself — is  fairly  new;  nevertheless  we  see  ad- 
mirable illustrations  of  its  being  carried  out  in  practice  under 
the  inspiration  of  Nelson  at  the  battles  of  Trafalgar  and  the 
Nile,  Nelson  spoke  of  his  officers  and  himself  as  a  "band  of 
brothers."  They  were;  and  because  of  this,  and  because  of 
Nelson's  continuous  and  intimate  communion  with  them,  the 
increasing  interest  that  naturally  arose  in  the  great  events  in 
which  they  were  engaged,  and  the  exact  information  of  all  as 
to  Nelson's  plans  and  aims,  that  "band  of  brothers"  was 
actually  indoctrinated,  though  none  of  them  had  ever  heard 
of  indoctrination. 

A  navy  or  army  that  is  thoroughly  prepared  goes  into  war 
and  starts  on  a  war  in  accordance  with  certain  general  plans 
that  have  been  prepared  by  the  general  staff  long  before.  But 
a  general  plan  is  not  a  fixed  thing  made  of  steel,  like  a  railroad 
track,  but  a  flexible  thing,  capable  of  being  adapted  to  emer- 
gencies as  they  arise ;  and  it  usually  exists  in  connection  with 
many  alternate  plans,  devised  in  advance  to  meet  different 
contingencies  that  have  been  foreseen.  Nevertheless,  the  num- 
ber of  things  that  may  happen  in  a  campaign  is,  humanly 
speaking,  infinite;  so  that  new  situations  continually  arise, 
that  must  be  dealt  vidth  by  means  that  must  be  mentally  de- 
vised and  cannot  be  automatically  produced.  In  other  words, 
situations  arise  that  have  to  be  dealt  with  strategically  as  new. 


STRATEGY  IN  WAR  359 

situations;  and  problems  are  therefore  presented  which  have 
to  be  solved  as  new  problems.    How  are  they  solved  ? 

By  the  estimate  of  the  situation  method,  already  explained. 
In  each  new  situation,  large  or  small,  a  clear  mental  concep- 
tion of  the  mission  must  first  be  achieved ;  then  a  clear  concep- 
tion of  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  attaining  the  mission,  and 
a  clear  conception  of  the  facilities  or  means  available  for  over- 
coming the  difficulties.  After  these  three  steps  have  been 
taken,  the  fourth  step  is  taken :  the  decision  is  made. 

Warfare  of  Positions. — It  has  often  happened,  especially 
during  long  interv^als  of  peace,  that  ideas  about  warfare  have 
become  crystallized,  and  strategy  has  come  to  be  regarded  like 
a  game  of  chess,  in  that  the  numerical  power  and  positions  of 
forces  have  been  considered  to  be  the  decisive  factors  in  gain- 
ing a  result.  Foch,  in  his  book  ''The  Principles  of  War," 
quotes  Marshal  Saxe  as  saying  of  war:  "I  am  sure  that  a 
clever  general  can  wage  it  as  long  as  he  lives  without  being 
compelled  to  battle ; ' '  and  Foch  devotes  most  of  a  chapter  to 
proving  the  erroneous  nature  of  this  declaration,  and  of  like 
declarations,  as  well  as  of  operations  in  accordance  with  them. 

It  is  a  fact,  of  course,  that  in  such  a  theory,  as  in  most 
theories,  there  is  a  considerable  element  of  truth.  It  is  a  fact 
that  a  large  force  has  an  advantage  over  a  small  force,  that  a 
force  on  the  top  of  a  hill  has  an  advantage  over  a  force  at  the 
bottom  of  the  hill,  that  a  force  on  a  flank  of  an  enemy  has  an 
advantage,  that  a  force  well  armed  and  equipped  has  an  ad- 
vantage over  a  force  poorly  armed  and  equipped,  etc.  In  the 
latter  part  of  the  eighteenth  century,  in  the  interval  between 
the  wars  of  Frederick  the  Great  and  those  of  Napoleon,  the 
warfare-of-positions  theory  secured  great  vogue,  and  this  is 
one  of  the  reasons  for  the  early  successes  of  Napoleon.  For 
Napoleon  demonstrated,  as  Thutmose  III  and  Alexander  and 
others  had  done  before  him,  that  strategy  differs  from  chess 
in  the  fact  that,  while  the  factors  on  the  chess-board  are  dead, 
the  factors  on  the  war-board  are  alive.  On  the  chess-board, 
one  king  is  as  good  as  another,  and  so  is  any  other  piece  as 


360  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

good  as  a  similar  piece  on  the  board,  except  in  so  far  as  posi- 
tion may  favor  it  or  the  reverse.  Napoleon  showed  that  on  the 
war-board  the  human  "pieces"  differed,  though  the  chess 
I)ieccs  did  not;  and  that,  while  positions  were  valuable,  the 
ability  to  think  correctly  and  act  vigorously  was  also  val- 
uable. 

It  is  true  that  many  a  force  has  compelled  another  force  to 
retreat,  and  sometimes  to  surrender,  by  simply  taking  up 
positions  with  reference  to  the  enemy  that  made  the  posi- 
tions of  the  enemy  untenable.  It  is  true  also  that  a  com- 
mander, being  caught  in  an  untenable  position,  may  very 
properly  retreat  without  fighting,  knowing  that  fighting  would 
injure  his  force  more  than  it  would  the  enemy.  It  is  true  also 
that  manoeuvering  to  get  good  positions  is  a  very  important 
feature  in  strategical  and  tactical  operations,  and  that  ability 
to  take  up  such  positions  quickly  and  with  good  judgment  is  a 
great  quality  in  a  commander.  Nevertheless,  the  taking  up 
of  such  positions,  unless  fighting  is  afterward  done  from  these 
positions,  is  only  a  threat,  and  a  threat  that  would  have  no 
value  if  military  force  were  not  available  to  back  it  up.  It  is 
a  little  like  getting  the  judgment  of  a  court  against  a  man. 
In  ordinary  life  we  are  apt  to  regard  the  judgment  of  a  court 
as  the  real  act  that  compels  a  man  to  do  anything  that  the 
court  directs;  for  instance,  to  pay  a  bill.  But,  in  fact,  the 
judgment  of  the  court  does  not  compel  him  to  pay  the  bill  or 
do  an^lhing  else :  it  is  the  executive  power  of  the  government 
to  put  a  man  by  force  into  jail,  or  to  do  other  violence  to  him, 
that  compels  him  to  pay  the  bill. 

Thus  the  introduction  of  the  human  element  into  warfare, 
as  illustrated  by  the  operations  of  Napoleon  and  others,  has 
prevented  strategy  from  becoming  like  a  game  of  chess. 
Another  thing  that  has  prevented  it  in  as  great  a  degree,  and 
probably  in  a  greater  degree,  has  been  the  continual  change 
of  weapons,  especially  the  increase  in  their  number  and  efifec- 
tiveness;  for  some  of  the  most  disastrous  defeats  have  been 


STRATEGY  IN  WAE  361 

caused  by  inactivity  in  not  continually  devising  new  methods 
to  meet  new  weapons. 

Until  within  the  last  few  years,  the  most  important  single 
change  in  the  circumstances  and  methods  of  warfare  in  re- 
corded history  was  made  by  the  invention  of  the  gun ;  but  now 
we  see  that  even  greater  changes  will  certainly  be  caused  by 
the  invention  of  the  airplane.  For  the  gun  was  merely  an 
improvement  over  the  cross-bow,  in  propelling  a  projectile 
with  greater  velocity,  and  therefore  over  a  greater  range  and 
with  a  greater  penetrating  power.  Its  principal  effect  was  to 
increase  the  distances  at  which  troops  engaged.  But  the  air- 
plane introduces  the  third  dimension  into  warfare,  and  com- 
pels forces  to  move  not  only  backward  and  forward  and  to  the 
right  and  left,  but  also  up  and  down.  It  revolutionizes  scout- 
ing by  giving  a  means  of  observation  and  a  speed  of  movement 
immeasurably  greater  than  those  of  cavalrj^;  a  means  of  cor- 
recting gun-fire,  especially  distant  gun-fire,  very  much  better 
than  any  known  before ;  and  a  means  of  sending  instructions 
and  information  incomparably  superior  to  the  horse  or  even 
to  motor-cars.  But  all  these  changes  fade  into  insignificance 
beside  the  fact  that  the  airplane,  if  armed,  is  of  itself  an  offen- 
sive weapon  in  the  first  rank  of  power  and  excellence,  though 
few  people  have  yet  realized  it. 

Let  us  not  forget  that  the  whole  object  of  sending  a  division 
of  troops,  or  a  vessel,  to  a  certain  point  is  that  when  the  divi- 
sion or  vessel  gets  to  that  point,  it  may  destroy  something,  or 
threaten  to  destroy  it.  Now,  airplanes  can  do  this  very  much 
more  quickly  than  can  a  division,  or  even  a  ship.  Further- 
more, a  division  or  a  ship  operates  on  the  surface  of  the  land 
or  water,  and  its  projectiles  are  practically  restricted  to  a 
horizontal  direction  and  an  attack  on  vertical  structures,  such 
as  walls  and  the  bodies  of  men,  for  which  very  ancient  methods 
of  protection  are  in  use.  But  the  airplane  attacks  from  above, 
from  a  direction  against  which  little  protection  has  been  yet 
devised;  or,  in  the  case  of  the  torpedoplane,  from  below  and 


362  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

on  the  iinder-water  bodies  of  ships,  their  most  vulnerable  part. 
Furthermore,  the  cheapness  of  airplanes,  in  comparison  with 
their  speed  and  bomb-carrying  power,  and  their  extreme  mo- 
bility, permit  of  their  being  constructed  and  manoeuvered  in 
large  numbers  and  with  a  facility  and  speed  that  the  older 
agencies  of  warfare  cannot  even  approximate. 

It  would  be  foolish,  of  course,  at  the  present  moment  to  pre- 
dict what  will  be  the  future  of  aeronautics  in  warfare,  and 
therefore  its  influence  on  strategy ;  but  it  is  obvious  that  it  will 
be  so  great  as  to  compel  the  modification  of  all  existing  strate- 
gical and  tactical  methods  on  both  land  and  sea.  A  peculiar 
element  is  that  an  airplane  or  airship  can  be  converted  almost 
instantly  from  a  peaceful  carrier  of  commercial  commodities 
into  a  powerful  instrument  of  war,  by  merely  attaching  a 
bomb  for  use  on  shore,  or  a  torpedo  for  use  on  sea.  It  may  be 
that  this  ease  of  conversion  is  due  to  the  fact  that  special- 
ized types  of  aircraft  for  naval  and  military  use  have  not  yet 
appeared,  and  that  it  will  vanish  later,  when  special  types  are 
developed,  as  ships-of-war  were  developed  from  ordinary  ships 
on  which  guns  had  been  placed.  It  is  probable  that  specialized 
types  will  be  developed;  in  fact,  a  specialized  type  was  devel- 
oped during  the  war,  in  the  sense  that  light  armor  was  built 
in  certain  airplanes  to  protect  certain  parts.  The  future  use- 
fulness of  aircraft  in  warfare,  however,  is  not  dependent  neces- 
sarily on  specialization;  for  airplanes  that  exist  to-day,  and 
others  that  are  being  built,  are  of  a  power  and  speed  and 
radius  of  action  that  compel  the  anxious  attention  of  the  strat- 
egist. 

At  the  present  moment  it  seems  probable  that  the  tactics  of 
aircraft  will  be  more  like  those  of  armies  than  of  navies,  for 
the  reason  that  the  greatest  dimension  of  an  airplane  is  per- 
pendicular to  its  direction  of  movement,  as  in  an  army's ;  while 
a  ship 's  greatest  dimension  is  in  the  direction  of  its  movement. 

There  are  those  who  prophesy  that  warfare  in  the  air  will 
in  time  become  more  important  than  warfare  on  either  land 
or  sea  or  both  together ;  by  reason  mainly  of  the  great  speed 


STRATEGY  IN  WAK  363 

that  can  be  attained,  the  freedom  of  aircraft  from  hindrance 
by  shoals  or  rivers  or  unfavorable  elements  of  the  ground,  and 
the  great  vulnerability  of  cities  and  harbors  and  troops  and 
ships  to  airplane  and  torpedoplane  attack.  This  is  an  inter- 
esting prophecy;  but  whether  it  will  be  fulfilled  or  not,  it  is 
probably  better  to  leave  to  prophets  for  decision.  It  does  not 
need  a  prophet,  however,  to  predict  with  confidence  that,  in- 
asmuch as  airplanes  and  other  aircraft  are  merely  weapons, 
their  utilization  in  war  will  be  directed  by  the  same  agency  as 
directs  and  always  has  directed  the  utilization  of  weapons — 
strategy. 

Speed  of  Thought. — In  speaking  of  speed,  one  naturally 
thinks  of  the  speed  of  the  material  units;  that  is,  of  the  ships 
or  the  troops.  But  there  is  another  kind  of  speed — the  speed 
of  thought.  The  victories  of  Caesar,  Frederick,  and  Napo- 
leon are  instances  of  the  value  of  speed.  This  speed  is  mainly 
evidenced  by  the  quickness  with  which  their  troops  arrived 
at  certain  points.  The  reason  usually  given  for  the  quickness 
of  their  arrival  is  the  speed  at  which  they  marched ;  but  let  us 
not  overlook  the  super-important  fact  that  antedating  the 
speed  of  their  marching  was  the  quickness  of  their  starting, 
and  that  this  was  due  wholly  to  the  speed  of  thought  of  their 
great  commanders. 

Strategy  and  Imagination. — In  the  mutual  cooperation  of 
strategy  with  logistics  and  tactics,  and  although  they  merge 
one  into  another,  with  no  precise  dividing  lines,  it  is  apparent 
that  if  we  visualize  the  functions  of  the  three  we  will  see  that 
strategy  differs  from  the  other  two  mainly  in  the  fact  that  it 
uses  and  requires  imagination.  Strategy  looks  ahead  into  the 
dim  beyond,  and  pictures  to  itself,  in  everj'  situation,  what  the 
situation  can  be  made  to  bring  forth.  To  do  this  requires,  of 
course,  a  sufficient  knowledge  of  the  details,  nature  and  scope 
of  logistical  factors  and  tactical  factors,  to  get  a  true  picture 
of  the  situation  as  it  really  exists,  and  a  correct  estimate  of 
what  must  be  done,  logistically  and  tactically,  to  turn  the  sit- 
uation to  the  best  account.     If  guided  properly  by  strategy, 


364  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

the  logistical  or  tactical  officer  does  not  require  special  fore- 
sight, and  therefore  does  not  need  much  imagination.  A  logis- 
tical officer  needs  mainly  clear  common  sense,  good  judgment, 
exact  knowledge,  and  great  energy;  a  tactical  officer  needs 
these  and  besides  great  rapidity  of  decision,  strong  nerves,  and 
high  courage.  A  strategical  officer  needs  all  of  these,  but  pos- 
sibly in  not  so  great  a  degree ;  but  what  he  does  require  pre- 
eminently is  foresight,  and  a  clear  and  accurate  imagination. 
The  French  have  a  proverb:  ''No  imagination,  no  great 
general. ' ' 

By  the  words  "great  general"  the  saying  probably  means 
great  strategist;  for  it  is  not  clear  that  much  imagination  is 
needed  to  make  a  great  tactician ;  while  it  is  inconceivable  that 
a  man  could  be  a  great  strategist  without  having  a  great  imag- 
ination. Certain  it  is  that  Alexander,  Caesar,  Frederick  the 
Great,  and  Napoleon  had  imaginations  as  great  and  as  fine  as 
can  be  found  in  history,  even  among  the  poets,  in  which  class 
Frederick  the  Great  and  Napoleon  certainly  were,  and  even 
among  the  inventors,  of  whom  one  in  the  highest  rank  was 
Julius  Caesar. 

The  sine  qua  non  of  the  strategist  is  imagination.  He  must 
foresee  the  circumstances  under  which  the  next  great  conflict 
will  be  fought,  and  prepare  plans  and  appliances  of  the  high- 
est order  of  completeness  and  novelty  to  meet  them  with  suc- 
cess. It  is  well  to  study  the  campaigns  of  the  great  command- 
ers of  the  past,  but  not  exclusively. 

The  war  that  the  strategist  must  win  is  not  the  last  war,  but 
the  next  war. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

STRATEGY  AS  RELuVTED  TO  STATESMANSHIP 

STRATEGY  is  the  servant  of  statesmanship.  The  great 
strategists,  whose  work  has  been  briefly  outlined  in 
these  pages,  were  statesmen  also,  and  their  ultimate 
aim  seems  to  have  been  to  accomplish  achievements  in  the  line 
of  statesmanship  rather  than  in  the  line  of  strategy,  and  to 
use  strategy  merely  as  a  means  to  an  end.  Clearly,  unless 
strategy  does  serve  some  end  of  statesmanship,  it  cannot  serve 
any  definite  purpose.  If  this  be  true,  it  must  also  be  true  that 
some  aim  of  policy  or  statesmanship  must  precede  the  aim  of 
strategy  in  each  case ;  in  other  words,  the  end  to  be  fought  for 
must  precede  the  idea  of  fighting  for  it. 

It  is  obvious  of  course,  that  man  was  originally  a  savage, 
that  a  great  part  of  the  population  of  the  world  have  always 
been  savages,  or  at  the  best  barbarians  or  semi-barbarians,  and 
that  they  are  so  to-day.  A  fraction  of  the  population  of  the 
world  have  now  advanced  to  a  degree  of  civilization  which  we 
consider  very  high,  and  which  may  or  may  not  be  actually 
better  than  savagery.  Whether  it  is  or  not  we  do  not  know ; 
but  we  do  know  that  there  is  some  force  that  has  impelled  us 
to  struggle  out  of  a  condition  of  savagery,  and  that  it  is  the 
general  opinion  of  the  civilized  world  that  a  condition  of  civi- 
lization is  better  than  one  of  savagery.  The  following  remarks 
are  based  on  the  supposition  that  this  opinion  is  correct. 

The  history  of  peoples  whose  doings  are  recorded  shows  a 
gradiTal  rise  in  every  case  from  a  lower  order  of  civilization 
that,  in  its  turn,  had  risen  from  savagery.  History  is  largely 
a  record  of  conflicts  between  the  forces  that  tended  to  civiliza- 
tion and  the  forces  that  resisted  it.  Before  these  conflicts  be- 
gan, however,  another  conflict  had  been  waged:  a  conflict 

365 


366  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

between  men  and  beasts.  The  men  triumphed ;  not  because  of 
superior  strength  or  courage,  but  because  of  a  certain  mental 
capacity  that  enabled  them  to  make  and  use  weapons. 

The  wild  beasts  having  been  subdued,  the  race  was  free  to 
start  on  its  upward  course.  But  some  men  were  antagonistic 
to  this  course.  Only  a  small  fraction  desired  civilization,  or 
had  the  mental  capacity  to  see  its  benefits  and  work  for  it. 
Savages,  and  later  barbarians,  resisted  the  progress  of  civiliza- 
tion with  force.  They  had  to  be  answered  with  force.  The 
result  was  many  wars. 

If  we  look  at  history  analytically,  we  see  that,  while  there 
were  many  wars  that  seem  to  have  been  waged  for  no  special 
reason  and  to  have  had  no  special  result,  yet  many  of  the  wars, 
especially  the  great  wars,  were  a  part,  directly  or  indirectly, 
of  the  conflict  between  civilization  and  barbarism.  This  does 
not  mean  that,  in  each  one  of  these  cases,  there  was  a  civilized 
nation  on  one  side  and  a  savage  or  barbarian  tribe  on  the  other 
side,  such  as  there  were  in  the  conflict  between  Rome  and 
Alaric;  but  it  does  mean  that  on  one  side  was  a  cause  whose 
triumph  would  benefit  the  progress  of  civilization,  while  on  the 
other  side  was  a  cause  whose  triumph  would  hinder  or  impair 
it.  Such  was  the  war  between  the  North  and  the  South  in 
1861-1865;  such  was  the  war  between  the  United  States  and 
Spain ;  such  was  the  World  "War  just  finished. 

Civilization  does  not  mean,  of  course,  a  condition  in  which 
there  are  merely  great  wealth  and  great  material  comfort ;  for 
it  means  also  a  condition  in  which  the  physical,  moral,  and 
spiritual  well-being  of  the  individual  is  intelligently  cared  for. 
History  shows  that  all  these  things  can  be  accomplished  only 
when  large  communities  live  together  under  laws  that  not  only 
are  wise  but  are  strictly  observed.  The  instinct  of  the  savage 
and  the  barbarian  revolts  at  this.  Bearing  this  in  mind,  we  see 
a  distinct  connection  between  the  barbarian  outside  of  a  nation 
and  the  anarchist  inside;  one  is  a  barbarian  outside,  and  the 
other  is  a  barbarian  inside.  As  both  have  the  same  feeling 
regarding  civilization,  they  both  resist  it  in  the  same  man- 


STRATEGY  AS  RELATED  TO  STATESMANSHIP   367 

ner — with  force ;  and  it  is  only  with  force  that  the  barbarian 
and  the  anarchist  can  be  subdued. 

We  thus  see  that,  up  to  the  present  time,  the  influence  of 
war  on  history  has  been  not  only  favorable  to  civilization,  but 
essential  to  it.  Of  itself,  war  has  not  directly  contributed  to 
civilization,  though  it  has  done  so  indirectly  in  some  ways. 
Its  main  accomplishments  have  been  first  to  assist  a  healthy 
civilization  to  triumph  over  barbarism,  and,  second,  to  cause 
the  destruction  by  healthy  peoples  of  every  nation  that  had 
become  over-civilized  and  effete. 

It  may  be  argued  that  the  world  has  at  last  reached  such  a 
height  of  civilization  that  war  is  no  longer  needed.  But,  as 
war  has  always  existed,  there  are  no  data  on  which  to  base  such 
an  argument.  If  wars  were  to  cease,  the  human  race  would 
find  itself  embarked  on  an  unknown  sea,  for  which  the  records 
of  the  past  would  furnish  no  chart  or  compass.  Exactly  what 
would  happen  to  the  race,  we  do  not  know.  We  have  records, 
however,  that  extend  over  a  period  of  more  than  five  thousand 
years ;  and  these  records  show  that  the  combination  of  wealth 
and  long-continued  peace  has  been  not  only  harmful  but  dis- 
tinctly ruinous  to  every  nation  that  has  been  subjected  to  its 
influence. 

In  judging  whether  or  not  civilization  has  now  reached  a 
stage  in  which  the  past  may  be  ignored,  let  us  remind  our- 
selves that  the  number  of  individual  human  beings  that  are 
really  civilized  by  education  and  character  is,  even  now,  only 
a  small  fraction  of  the  people  of  the  earth.  The  majority  are 
held  in  subjection  by  the  minority.  But  the  barbarians  were 
long  held  in  subjection  by  Rome,  and  much  more  firmly 
than  barbarians  are  held  now.  The  barbarians  ultimately 
triumphed  over  Rome ;  and  as  the  antagonism  between  barbar- 
ism and  civilization  is  as  great  as  it  ever  was,  and  is  increased 
by  the  ostentatious  luxuriousness  of  the  rich,  the  barbarians 
(or  anarchists  or  bolshevists)  may  triumph  again.  The  reason 
that  the  barbarians  were  able  to  triumph  over  Rome  was  that 
Rome  became  luxurious  and  neglected  the  military  arts.    If  we 


368  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

neglect  the  military  arts,  the  barbarians  (or  anarchists  or 
bolshevists)  may  triumph  over  us — and  probably  will. 

If  one  takes  a  general  view  of  the  progress  of  development 
of  the  human  race,  he  can  hardly  fail  to  come  to  the  opinion 
that,  although  human  beings  seem  to  us  to  be  the  best  things 
that  the  Almighty  has  created,  and  although  the  human  mind 
seems  to  be  the  best  part  of  the  human  being,  nevertheless  the 
human  mind  is  an  exceedingly  imperfect  contrivance.  One 
becomes  amazed  in  noting  that  the  great  body  of  mankind  have 
been  almost  inert  in  the  march  of  progress,  that  a  very  great 
number  have  forcibly  resisted  it,  and  that  the  progress  of  the 
world  has  really  been  initiated  and  forced  through  by  a  com- 
paratively few.  The  benefactors  who  seem  to  have  been  the 
most  powerful  in  this  work  have  been  those  individual  geni- 
uses who  have  made  the  inventions,  and  written  the  poems,  and 
painted  the  pictures,  and  carved  the  statues,  and  sung  the 
songs,  and  said  the  things  that  stimulated  men's  intelligence 
and  enabled  them  to  triumph  in  a  practical  way  over  the  harsh 
difficulties  of  their  natural  surroundings.  The  men  who  in- 
vented the  wheel  and  the  screw  are  unknown  to  history,  and 
so  are  the  men  who  sang  the  songs  that  inspired  primeval  tribes 
to  rise.  But  it  was  those  men  and  men  like  them  that  started 
and  maintained  the  race  on  its  upward  march. 

The  men  next  in  importance  seem  to  have  been  the  statesmen 
and  the  strategists.  If  all  the  men  and  women  in  the  world 
could  be  made  into  one  vast  organism,  like  the  human  body, 
then  all  the  parts  would  work  together  solely  for  the  good  of 
the  organism.  But  this  is  not  the  actual  condition.  The 
actual  condition  is  that  each  man  and  woman  in  the  world  is 
himself  an  organism,  covered  with  a  skin  that  isolates  him 
from  all  the  rest  of  the  universe.  It  is  only  by  sympathy,  and 
by  an  intelligent  appreciation  of  the  good  results  of  coopera- 
tion that  any  human  organism  comes  into  any  touch,  except 
hostile  touch  with  other  human  organisms.  But  by  means  of 
sympathy,  which  the  various  religions,  especially  the  Chris- 
tian religions,  have  inculcated,  a  great  deal  of  fellow  feeling 


STRATEGY  AS  RELATED  TO  STATESMANSHIP   369 

has  been  engendered  among  people  who  come  in  contact  with 
one  another.  Naturally,  this  fellow  feeling  is  at  its  greatest 
among  people  whose  interests  are  in  common,  especially  when 
they  are  bound  together  by  ties  of  affection,  particularly  fam- 
ily affection.  Heredity  has  a  curious  and  powerful  effect; 
and  so  have  natural  surroundings. 

From  these  causes  it  has  resulted  that  tribal  organizations 
came  into  existence  even  in  the  earliest  times;  and  that  in 
countries  like  Greece,  in  which  small  localities  were  separated 
from  others  by  chains  of  mountains,  or  rivers,  or  other  natural 
divisions,  intense  tribal  feeling  has  been  brought  about.  In 
most  cases,  and  in  most  places,  tribal  organizations  have  con- 
tinued without  much  change  for  long  periods;  but  in  some 
cases,  such  as  those  well  known  in  Greece,  Rome,  France,  etc., 
tribes  possessing  greater  energy  and  ability  than  others  have 
subdued  them,  and  nations  large  and  small  have  resulted. 
In  virtually  all  nations  that  have  lived  long,  the  hereditary  tie 
has  been  strong:  empires  that  have  consisted  of  many  kinds 
of  people,  not  having  strong  hereditary  ties,  have  usually  not 
lived  long.  The  best  example  is  the  short-lived  empire  of  Alex- 
ander. 

Now,  in  the  relations  of  all  these  tribes  and  nations  to  the 
rest  of  the  world  we  see  evidence  of  cooperation  among  the 
individuals  of  the  tribe  or  nation,  and  of  competition  between 
each  tribe  or  nation  and  the  other  tribes  and  nations  with 
which  it  came  into  contact.  The  action  and  interaction  of 
competition  and  cooperation  seem  to  have  been  almost  a  neces- 
sity of  progress,  and  even  of  efficiency. 

Numberless  illustrations  may  be  cited,  even  in  the  affairs  of 
every-day  life.  A  simple  one  is  that  of  baseball  teams.  We 
cannot  even  imagine  an  efficient  baseball  condition  unless 
there  be  excellent  cooperation  among  the  individuals  of  a  team, 
and  intense  competition  among  the  teams.  So,  in  the  larger 
affairs  of  nations,  and  all  through  history,  the  progress  of 
civilization  has  been  accompanied  with  cooperation  among  the 
individuals  of  each  nation,  and  competition  among  the  nations 


370  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

themselves.  These  two  factors  are  not  antagonistic  tj3  each 
other,  but  rether  mutually  stimulating.  That  is,  the  more  in- 
tense the  esprit  de  corps  in  any  organization,  the  greater  the 
cooperation  of  its  members,  the  higher  the  efficiency  of  the  or- 
ganization and  the  greater  its  spirit  of  competition  as  regards 
other  organizations;  and,  equally,  the  greater  the  spirit  of 
competition  among  organizations,  the  greater  the  esprit  de 
corps,  and  the  consequent  efficiency,  of  each  organization. 

It  seems  to  be  a  fact,  therefore,  that,  were  it  not  for  the 
existence  of  competing  tribes  and  nations,  the  world  would  not 
have  progressed  as  it  has.  It  is  true,  of  course,  that  this  com- 
petition has  often  brought  on  wars  that  caused  great  misery 
and  bloodshed.  But  it  must  he  plain  that  the  misery  and 
bloodshed  have  caused  suffering  to  a  comparatively  small 
number  of  individuals,  and  that  the  whole  human  race  has 
benefited. 

Now,  in  order  that  in  the  various  tribes  and  nations  the 
elements  of  cooperation  and  competition  should  be  wisely 
directed,  certain  policies  have  had  to  be  followed,  and  these 
have  been  under  the  direction  of  statesmanship.  The  wars 
that  have  resulted  have  (in  wisely  governed  nations)  been 
waged  under  the  direction  of  strategy,  not  only  in  the  actual 
fighting,  but  in  the  preparations  beforehand.  During  the 
actual  fighting  strategy  has  been  practically  in  full  control, 
with  statesmanship  awaiting  the  issue ;  while  in  times  of  peace 
statesmanship  has  been  in  full  control.  Yet,  if  the  statesman- 
ship has  been  wise,  it  has  always  worked  in  cooperation  with 
strategy,  even  in  times  of  peace,  in  order  to  maintain  a  con- 
dition of  national  strength,  sufficient  to  repel  attack  from  out- 
side or  from  inside. 

The  aims  of  statesmanship  have  sometimes  been  distinctly 
good  and  sometimes  distinctly  bad,  sometimes  wise  and  some- 
times foolish ;  though,  like  all  the  other  activities  of  men,  they 
have  usually  been  in  the  great  middle  ground  between.  But, 
whatever  the  goodness  or  badness  or  wisdom  or  folly  of  those 
aims,  it  has  been  the  endeavor  to  carry  out  those  aims  that  has 


STRATEGY  AS  RELATED  TO  STATESMANSHIP   371 

been  the  cause  of  virtually  all  the  wars.  The  responsibility 
for  wars,  therefore,  rests  on  statesmen  and  not  on  strategists ; 
and  this  remark  is  true  even  in  cases  in  which  the  statesman 
and  the  strategist  have  been  the  same  man.  In  other  words, 
it  was  Alexander  the  statesman  who  was  responsible  for  Alex- 
ander's  wars,  and  not  Alexander  the  strategist. 

Inasmuch  as  a  most  powerful  factor  in  bringing  the 
nations  of  the  world  into  their  present  condition  of  civiliza- 
tion has  been  war,  and  inasmuch  as  the  consensus  of  civilized 
opinion  seems  to  be  that  this  condition  is  better  than  our  orig- 
inal condition  of  savagery,  one  is  led  to  question  the  correct- 
ness of  the  assumption  so  generally  held  that  war  is  an  evil. 
The  question  involved  is  too  profound  to  be  reasonably  en- 
tered into  in  a  book  of  this  .kind ;  but  in  the  interest  of  truth 
the  fact  must  not  be  overlooked  that,  while  peace  is  a  much 
pleasanter  phase  of  life  than  war  is,  yet  the  record  of  history 
for  more  than  five  thousand  years  shows,  with  no  exception 
whatever,  that  long-continued  periods  of  peace  and  prosperity 
have  always  brought  about  the  physical,  mental,  and  moral 
deterioration  of  the  individual.  It  may  also  be  pointed  out 
that,  while  the  Savior's  teachings  inculcated  kindness  and 
good  will  as  among  individuals,  they  never  condemned  war 
among  nations  or  disparaged  warriors.  They  seem  to  show  a 
recognition  of  the  fact,  that,  in  a  good  cause,  one  ought  to  fight 
if  necessary.  In  other  words,  they  seem  to  preach  that  neither 
right  nor  vjronq  exists  in  fighting  itself;  the  right  or  the  wrong 
is  concerned  in  the  cause  fought  for.  The  Savior  himself  com- 
mitted an  act  of  violence  when  he  overturned  the  tables  of  the 
money-changers  in  the  temple. 

As  both  statesmanship  and  strategy  have  been  necessary  to 
the  advance  of  civilization,  it  would  be  as  idle  to  discuss  which 
is  the  more  important  as  it  would  be  to  discuss  which  are  the 
two  most  important  links  of  a  chain,  or  which  is  the  more 
important  of  any  two  things  that  are  absolutely  essential. 
The  curious  fact  may  be  pointed  out,  however,  that  in  virtu- 
ally every  tribe  and  nation,  from  the  earliest  times  to  the 


372  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

present  day,  men  have  been  educated  and  trained  from  boy- 
hood for  the  military  and  naval  professions;  but  not  in  any 
tribe  or  nation  in  history'  do  we  see  any  record  of  men  being 
trained  in  any  equal  degree  for  statesmanship.  During  the 
last  half  century,  this  condition  of  what  may  be  called  neg- 
ligence has  been  aggravated  in  nations  where  representative 
governments  exist,  and  especially  in  the  United  States.  Why 
this  should  be  so,  it  might  be  indelicate  for  a  naval  officer  to 
discuss.  The  fact  seems  to  be,  however,  that,  while  for  the 
army  and  navy  young  men  are  selected  in  boyhood,  after  pa.ss- 
ing  rigid  phj^sical  examinations,  are  trained  all  their  lives 
thereafter  along  a  very  strict  system,  and  are  not  promoted 
from  any  grade  to  another  until  after  passing  rigid  physical, 
moral,  and  mental  examinations,  yet  for  the  most  important 
civil  positions  under  the  government,  including  even  those  of 
ambassador  and  cabinet  officer,  no  training  whatever  is  under- 
taken, and  men  are  appointed  without  examinations  of  any 
kind. 

In  the  last  few  hundred  years  a  number  of  nations,  notably 
France,  Great  Britain,  Germany,  the  United  States,  Italy  and 
Japan,  have  reached  a  very  great  height  in  civilization,  intel- 
ligence and  wealth.  Accompanying  the  advance  in  these  mat- 
ters, there  has  been  an  increase  among  the  individuals  of  the 
nations  of  a  desire  for  the  individual  to  express  himself  as  an 
individual,  and  a  consequent  diminution  of  the  autocratic  pow- 
ers of  the  governments.  In  most  of  the  nations,  constitutions 
have  been  adopted  that  define  the  mutual  rights  and  privileges 
of  the  government  on  one  side  and  of  the  individual  on  the 
other.  In  time  of  peace  the  provisions  of  the  various  constitu- 
tions have  been  observed  with  considerable  closeness;  but  in 
every  war  it  has  been  found  necessary  to  increase,  at  least  tem- 
porarily, the  powers  of  the  governments,  and  to  decrease  cor- 
respondingly the  right  and  privileges  of  the  individual. 

The  movement  toward  constitutional  government,  which  in 
most  of  the  great  nations  carries  with  it  the  right  of  the  people 
to  be  represented  in  the  government,  especially  in  the  legisla- 


I 


STRATEGY  AS  RELATED  TO  STATESMANSHIP   373 

tive  part,  is  unquestionably  a  movement  that  is  for  the  well-be- 
ing of  the  people  as  a  whole ;  for  it  cannot  be  questioned  that 
all  through  history  there  can  be  plainly  seen  the  tendency  of 
men  in  power  to  oppress  the  people  below  them,  often  to  the 
point  of  harshness  and  even  cruelty.  As  the  principal  means 
of  oppression  by  rulers  has  been  military  force,  there  has  nat- 
urally come  about  an  intense  distrust  of  military  force,  and  a 
desire  in  every  nation  to  cut  down  the  military  force  to  as  low 
a  point  as  is  consistent  with  the  safety  of  the  country  from 
attack  by  foes  outside  and  by  lawless  elements  inside. 

In  other  words,  in  every  country  there  has  been  a  con- 
test around  the  question  of  how  much  military  force  the  coun- 
try should  support,  and  how  much  importance  should  be 
given  to  the  military  element.  In  Great  Britain,  France,  and 
the  United  States,  the  military  and  naval  activities  have  been 
subordinated  to  the  more  peaceful  activities  of  the  nation; 
whereas  in  Germany  and  Japan  the  military  has  been  in  the 
ascendant,  and  the  most  vital  factor  in  the  national  life  has 
been  held  to  be  its  ability  to  sustain  itself  against  outside 
attack. 

Previous  to  the  World  War,  the  greatest  nations  of  the 
world  were  Great  Britain,  France,  and  the  United  States  as 
exponents  of  representative  government,  and  Germany  as  the 
exponent  of  hereditary'  autocratic  government.  In  Germany 
the  general  system  of  government,  especially  the  military  part, 
was  highly  efficient ;  and  the  safety,  health,  and  general  well- 
being  of  the  individual  were  more  carefully  guarded  than  in 
any  other  country,  though  his  personal  liberty  was  much  re- 
stricted. In  Great  Britain,  France,  and  the  United  States, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  governments  were  not  so  efficient  (es- 
pecially the  military  part)  and  the  personal  health,  safety, 
and  well-being  of  the  individual  were  not  carefully  looked  out 
for;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  personal  liberty  of  the  indi- 
vidual was  great. 

It  has  been  said  that  in  the  World  War  the  two  systems 
were  tried  in  competition;  and  that,  as  Germany  was  beaten 


374  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

in  tlie  war,  the  systems  of  government  of  Great  Britain, 
Franco,  and  the  United  States  were  proved  to  be  better  than 
the  German. 

Does  the  fact  that  Germany  was  beaten  prove  that  her  sys- 
tem was  not  so  good  as  that  of  her  opponents?  Before  we 
answer  this,  let  ns  realize  that  the  wealth,  and  population  of 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  the  United  States  were  greater 
than  those  of  Gefrmany,  and  that  Germany  seems  to  have  lost 
mainly  because  of  her  comparative  inferiority  in  material  re- 
sources (logistics). 

It  is  not,  of  course,  the  purpose  of  this  book  to  try  to  prove 
the  inferiority  of  the  system  of  government  of  his  own  coun- 
try to  that  of  Germany ;  for  it  is  his  intense  conviction  that 
the  system  of  govenunent  of  the  United  States,  and  in  a  less 
degree  the  systems  of  Great  Britain  and  France,  are  much  bet- 
ter than  that  of  Germany.  It  is  his  conviction,  however,  that 
in  these  three  countries  something  occurred  that  ought  not  to 
have  occurred,  and  that  almost  brought  about  their  ruin  at 
the  hands  of  Germany. 

The  thing  that  occurred,  according  to  his  conviction,  is  that 
the  idea  of  personal  liberty,  with  its  consequent  fear  of  the 
military,  was  carried  to  an  undue  extreme ;  and  that,  like 
every  other  idea  that  has  been  carried  to  an  undue  extreme, 
it  jeopardized  the  continuance  of  the  idea  itself.  The  distrust 
of  the  military  was  carried  to  such  an  extreme  in  Great  Brit- 
ain, France,  and  the  United  States,  largely  through  the  influ- 
ence of  the  pacifists  and  German  propagandists,  that  those 
countries  got  into  a  condition  that  a  man  is  in  when  he  has  not 
enough  iron  in  his  blood.  Those  countries  seem  to  have  lost 
their  national  physical  strength,  by  lapsing  into  a  condition 
of  comparative  effeminacy.  This  was  due  probably  to  being 
beguiled  into  forgetfulness  of  the  fact  that  no  nation  has 
ever  yet  maintained  itself  except  by  military  force,  and  that 
the  culminating  disaster  in  every  nation  that  has  ever  fallen 
has  been  a  defeat  in  battle. 

The  distrust  of  the  military  in  each  of  these  three  nations 


STRATEGY  AS  RELATED  TO  STATESMANSHIP   375 

has  been  shown  most  clearly  by  the  fact  that  men  without  any 
military  or  naval  trainin<^-  whatever  have  been  placed  at  the 
head  of  the  arm}^  and  the  navy,  intermediate  between  the  army 
and  the  navy  and  the  ruler  of  the  nation.  In  every  nation,  of 
course,  the  ruler  (be  he  emperor,  king,  or  president)  is  the 
commander-in-chief  of  the  army  and  the  navy.  As  command- 
er-in-chief of  the  army  and  the  navj'-,  he  is  in  a  position  toward 
them  not  different  from  his  position  toward  all  the  other  de- 
partments of  the  government;  for,  though  he  is  the  head  of 
the  army  and  the  navy,  he  is  equally  the  head  of  every  other 
department  of  the  government.  He  is  the  head,  for  instance, 
of  the  Finance  Department,  the  Post  Office  Department,  and 
the  Department  of  Foreign  Relations.  The  fact  of  being 
ruler  makes  him  automatically  the  head  of  each  department  of 
the  executive  branch  of  the  government,  and  makes  the  imme- 
diate heads  of  those  departments  merely  his  ministers;  or,  as 
they  are  called  in  the  United  States,  secretaries. 

Considerable  confusion  exists  in  the  public  mind  on  this 
matter,  largely  because  of  the  expression  "the  military  must 
be  subordinate  to  the  civil  authority."  Of  course  it  must  be; 
every  hranch  of  the  government  must  he  subordinate  to  the 
civil  authority.  The  civil  authority  is  the  authority  of  the 
government,  and  all  the  branches  of  the  government  must 
necessarily  be  subordinate  to  the  government  as  a  whole.  In 
this  particular,  the  men  who  belong  to  the  army  and  the  navy 
are  in  a  category  no  different  from  that  in  which  are  the  offi- 
cials of  the  Treasury  Department,  the  State  Department,  or 
any  other  department  of  the  government.  The  only  difference 
between  the  men  in  the  army  and  navy  and  the  men  in  the 
other  branches  of  the  government  is  that  those  in  the  army  and 
navy  wear  uniforms ;  and,  in  the  case  of  commissioned  officers, 
hold  their  positions  during  good  behavior.  They  form  no 
special  class,  are  drawn  from  no  special  class,  and  have  no  spe- 
cial privileges. 

Because,  however,  of  a  cautious  distrust  of  the  military 
(which  is  perfectly  proper  provided  it  be  kept  within  reason- 


376  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

able  bounds),  the  people  in  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  have  insisted  that  civilians  only  be  put  in  immediate 
charge  of  the  army  and  navy,  intermediate  between  them  and 
the  ruler.  In  France  there  has  been  no  such  absolute  insist- 
ence, with  the  result  that  the  head  of  the  army  or  the  navy 
has  sometimes  been  a  civilian  and  sometimes  an  army  or  a 
navy  officer.  That  the  civilian  system  can  result  in  as  great 
an  efficiency  in  those  services  as  in  nations  that  exact  that 
those  services  be  managed  solely  by  trained  men,  it  would 
be  idle  to  discuss;  for  the  plain  fact  is  that  in  every  other 
branch  of  the  government,  and  in  virtually  every  other  great 
organization  of  every  kind  in  every  country,  the  men  at  the 
head  of  those  organizations  are  men  trained  to  perfect  famil- 
iarity with  the  work  they  have  to  do.  Certain  it  is  that  the 
World  War  has  proved  beyond  any  possibility  of  doubt  that 
the  German  army  and  navy,  managed  hy  men  trained  in  army 
and  navy  iwrk,  were  more  efficient  than  the  armies  and  navies 
of  Great  Britain,  France,  and  the  United  States,  managed  hy 
men  untrained  in  such  work. 

The  question  seems  to  be,  therefore,  whether  or  not  we 
should  accept  the  necessary  inefficiency  resulting  from  un- 
trained men  guiding  the  affairs  of  the  army  and  the  navy,  in 
exchange  for  the  supposed  immunity  given  us  against  undue 
encroachments  by  the  military.  Before  we  answer  this,  let 
us  realize  that  the  real  head  of  the  army  or  navy  in  any  coun- 
try is  not  the  Minister  of  War  or  of  Marine,  the  Secretary 
of  War  or  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  but  the  ruler  of  the 
country — the  king  or  president.  Let  us  also  realize  that 
the  cause  of  the  distrust  of  the  army  and  navy  is  really 
based  on  the  use  that  rulers  have  sometimes  made  of  the  army 
and  navy  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  the  people,  or  of  ag- 
grandizing or  perpetuating  their  own  power:  so  that  the  dis- 
trust should  not  be  directed  toward  the  army  or  the  navy,  but 
toward  the  ruler.  History  is  full  of  the  deeds  of  oppression 
of  rulers,  exercised  through  the  medium  of  the  military; 
though  there  are  a  very  few  cases  in  very  effete  countries: 


STRATEGY  AS  RELATED  TO  STATESMANSHIP   377 

such  as  in  the  Roman  Empire  in  its  days  of  degeneracy,  when 
the  prffitorian  guard  couki  influence  and  sometimes  dictate  the 
choice  of  emperors,  and  even  kill  an  emperor.  The  fact  that 
praetorian  guards  have  acquired  and  abused  such  power  is  a 
reason  for  not  allowing  praetorian  guards  to  exist  again,  and 
an  argument  against  excessive  militarism  in  general.  Never- 
theless, let  us  guard  ourselves  against  confusion  of  thought, 
and  realize  that  the  real  trouble  w^as  not  the  power  of  the 
praetorian  guard,  or  even  of  the  military  element,  but  the 
abominable  corruption,  profligacy,  and  effeminacy  of  the  peo- 
ple themselves.  In  the  bad  condition  in  which  the  Roman 
Empire  was  when  the  praetorian  guard  was  in  full  bloom,  the 
great  power  of  the  military  was  not,  in  fact,  an  evil,  but 
a  benefit ;  because  without  it  the  government  could  not  have 
h^ld  together  at  all,  and  Rome  would  have  fallen  before  the 
sword  and  torch  of  the  barbarian.  In  fact,  it  was  the  weak- 
ening of  the  military  power  of  Rome  that  later  caused  the  fall 
of  Rome  and  the  sacking  of  the  city. 

The  intention  of  every  nation  in  maintaining  an  army  or  a 
na\'y  is  that  it  shall  protect  the  country ;  and  the  man  who  is 
charged  with  this  responsibility  is  the  emperor,  king,  or  presi- 
dent. In  Germany  and  Japan  he  controls  the  army  and  the 
navy  no  more  absolutely  than  does  the  ruler  of  Great  Britain, 
France,  or  the  United  States;  but  he  deals  directly  with  the 
trained  experts  at  their  heads,  and  handles  the  army  and  navy 
through  the  medium  of  those  experts ;  whereas  in  Great  Brit- 
ain, France,  and  the  United  States  he  deals  with  non-experts, 
and  handles  the  army  and  navy  through  the  medium  of  those 
non-experts. 

The  result  has  been  that  in  Germany  and  Japan  the  army 
and  navy  have  been  well  handled,  and  a  very  great  degree  of 
effectiveness  has  been  obtained  in  exchange  for  the  money  ex- 
pended by  the  people ;  whereas  in  Great  Britain,  France,  and 
the  United  States  the  army  and  navy  have  not  been  well 
handled,  and  great  effectiveness  has  not  been  obtained  in  ex- 
change for  the  monc}'  expended  by  the  people. 


378  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

Any  man  can  manage  an  army  or  a  navy ;  but,  in  the  same 
sense,  any  man  can  manage  a  railroad  company,  or  paint  a 
picture,  or  sing  a  song,  or  fill  a  tooth.  No  man,  however,  can 
do  any  of  these  things  well  unless  he  is  an  expert  in  the  art. 
The  competition  in  all  classes  of  endeavor  in  daily  life  as- 
sures that  the  men  who  manage  the  railroad  companies,  and 
paint  the  pictures,  and  sing  the  songs,  and  fill  the  teeth,  are 
experts.  But,  during  the  long  periods  of  peace  that  fortu- 
nately now  prevail,  there  is  no  observable  competition  among 
the  armies  and  navies  of  the  various  nations,  and  there  is  no 
means,  therefore,  of  knowing  their  relative  conditions  of  effi- 
ciency. It  is  possible,  therefore,  in  Great  Britain,  France, 
and  the  United  States  (as  has  been  proved)  for  the  armies 
and  navies  to  go  on  for  many  years  without  any  real  knowl- 
edge on  the  part  of  anybody,  except  the  officers  of  each  army 
or  navy,  as  to  what  is  its  condition  of  efficiency  or  ineffi- 
ciency. True,  this  is  found  out  when  war  takes  place;  hut 
then  it  is  too  late. 

The  British  Army,  for  instance,  continued  for  many  years 
in  a  state  of  inefficiency  that  was  thoroughly  realized  by  the 
officers  themselves,  but  by  no  one  else,  until  the  Boer  War 
broke  out  in  1899 ;  and  then  the  awful  slaughter  of  the  Brit- 
ish soldiers,  and  the  terrible  expenditures  of  money  that  fol- 
lowed, brought  the  real  condition  of  affairs  before  the  public. 
It  is  true  that  Great  Britain  finally  whipped  the  Boers ;  but  it 
is  also  true  that  it  cost  her  an  amount  in  lives  and  suffering 
and  money  that  was  wholly  unnecessary,  and  that  cannot  be 
balanced  by  an}^  advantage  that  is  discernible.  It  ivas  caused 
hy  inefficiency  solely;  and  the  inefficiency  was  due  fundamen- 
tally to  the  fact  that  the  British  army  was  inefficient  in  the 
place  where  most  inefficient  organizations  are  inefficient — at 
the  head. 

But  a  condition  that  is  more  serious,  if  possible,  than  the  in- 
efficiency of  an  army  and  navy  because  of  unskilled  control  is 
that  the  ruler  and  his  ministers,  and  the  public  itself,  cannot 
have  the  knowledge  of  its  conditions  and  its  needs  that  it  ought 


STRATEGY  AS  RELATED  TO  STATESMANSHIP   379 

to  have.  It  has  been  pointed  out  several  times  in  these  pages 
that,  in  order  to  secure  good  results,  the  statesmen  and  the 
strategist  should  frequently  and  intimately  confer.  But  how 
can  they  do  this,  when  the  strategist  is  put  off  by  himself,  and 
the  statesmen  manage  the  affairs  of  the  country  without  pay- 
ing any  attention  to  him  ?  One  of  the  main  reasons,  if  not  the 
main  reason,  why  Germany  forged  ahead  so  rapidly  from 
1864  to  1870  was  that  King  William,  Bismarck,  and  Moltke 
were  in  continual  conference  with  one  another.  Bismarck 
embodied  the  statesuianship  of  Germany,  Moltke  embodied  the 
strategy,  and  the  king,  because  he  was  the  ruler,  embodied 
both. 

In  Great  Britain,  France,  and  the  United  States,  for  many 
years  previous  to  the  World  War,  the  strategist,  while  not 
exactly  discredited,  was,  to  use  an  expressive  colloquialism, 
told  to  "go  'way  back  and  sit  down  and  keep  quiet."  In 
those  countries  the  strategists — in  fact,  all  navy  and  army  of- 
ficers— knew  the  dangerous  condition  of  affairs,  and  did  all 
they  could  to  rouse  their  governments  to  a  realization  of  the 
danger;  but  their  own  governments,  instead  of  listening  to 
them,  ignored  them  in  effect,  and,  when  they  tried  to  inform 
the  people  directly,  ordered  them  to  keep  quiet. 

If,  now,  at  the  head  of  each  a.rmy  and  navy  in  those  three 
countries  there  had  been  a  trained  man,  immediately  respon- 
sible to  the  king  or  president,  and  holding  the  same  position 
relatively  to  the  army  or  navy  as  the  head  of  the  Treasury  or 
Post  Office  Department  holds  relatively  to  that  Department, 
the  king  or  president  and  his  ministers,  because  of  the  fre- 
quent and  intimate  relationship  that  then  would  have  existed, 
would  have  been  fully  informed  of  the  whole  military  and 
naval  situation,  not  only  at  home  but  in  other  nations;  the 
public  would  have  learned  of  it  also,  and  the  deplorable  con- 
dition of  unpreparedness  in  which  Germany  caught  those 
three  countries  would  have  been  entirely  prevented.  The 
reason  why  Germanj^  went  to  war  in  1914  was  the  same  reason 
as  that  for  which  she  went  to  war  in  1864,  1866,  and  1870 — 


) 

380  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

the  reason  that  she  was  thoroughly  prepared  and  her  enemies 
were  unprepared.  If  the  people  of  Great  Britain,  France, 
and  the  United  States  had  been  informed  of  the  actual  situa- 
tion, and  had  prepared  to  a  degree  even  approximating  that  in 
which  every  sensible  man  maintains  himself  in  regard  to  the 
dangers  of  ordinary  life,  Germany  would  no  more  have  at- 
tacked France  than  a  thug  would  attack  a  man  whom  he  saw 
to  be  adequately  armed  and  ready. 

There  seems  to  he  no  escape  from  the  conviction  that  Great 
Britain,  France,  and  the  United  States  had  allowed  them- 
selves to  drift  into  a  condition  of  unpreparedness  to  which 
the  word  "disgraceful"  can  he  applied  with  perfect  reason- 
ahleness  and  propriety,  rememhering  how  unnecessary  it  was, 
and  what  frightful  suffering  it  caused. 

It  is  instructive  to  note  in  this  connection  that,  of  the 
twenty-eight  presidents  of  the  United  States,  nine  have  been 
men  who  had  seen  active  service  at  the  front  in  actual  war. 
Of  these,  Washington,  Jackson,  Harrison,  Taylor,  and  Grant 
were  distinctly  military  men;  Hayes  and  Garfield  had  served 
during  nearly  the  entire  Civil  War  of  four  years,  and  had 
risen  to  the  rank  of  Brigadier-General ;  IMcKinley  had  reached 
the  rank  of  Major  in  the  Civil  War,  and  Roosevelt  had  served 
with  distinction  as  colonel  in  the  Spanish  War.  It  has  been 
said  on  occasions  that  some  of  the  purely  military  men  did 
not  make  as  good  presidents  as  others  whose  training  had  not 
been  mainly  military;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  has  never 
been  said  that  any  of  them  ever  made  as  inefficient  presidents 
as  some  of  the  others  did. 

As  the  duties  of  President  of  the  United  States  (or  of  ruler 
of  any  country)  require  expert  direction  of  all  the  multi- 
tudinous affairs  of  the  government,  it  is  obvious  that  there 
are  many  and  very  reasonable  objections  against  making  a 
purely  military  man  the  President ;  but,  inasmuch  as  nine  of 
our  presidents  out  of  twenty-eight  have  been  military  men, 
and  as  the  man  who  seems  at  the  present  moment  to  be  ap- 
proved of  the  most  widely  for  our  next  President  is  Major- 


STRATEGY  AS  RELATED  TO  STATESMANSHIP   381 

General  Leonard  Wood,  it  is  evident  that  no  overwhelming 
popular  sentiment  condemns  it.  It  is  pertinent,  therefore, 
to  point  out  the  unreasonableness  of  putting  a  military  man 
in  actual  command  of  the  army  and  the  navy,  as  well  as  of  all 
the  other  agencies  of  the  government,  and  then  balking  at 
putting  a  military  man  as  merely  the  assistant  to  the  President 
in  managing  the  army  and  the  War  Department,  and  a  naval 
man  as  merely  the  assistant  to  the  President  in  managing  the 
navy  and  the  Navy  Department.  It  is  an  excellent  illustra- 
tion of  "straining  at  a  gnat  and  swallowing  a  camel." 

Much  confusion  of  thought  has  arisen  from  the  fact  that  the 
people  of  the  country  fancy  that  the  main  task  of  the  man  at 
the  head  of  im  army  or  a  navy  is  to  provide  the  necessary 
material  for  it  to  use,  in  the  way  of  munitions,  supplies,  etc. 
This  confusion  of  thought  is  easily  explainable  by  the  fact 
that,  in  nearly  all  the  daily  life  of  an  individual,  and  in  nearly 
all  the  daily  life  of  any  nation,  the  question  of  material  sup- 
plies, of  the  wherewithal  to  support  life,  of  food  and  clothing 
and  shelter,  is  the  paramount  consideration;  and  in  every  na- 
tion the  duty  of  the  government  is  so  to  administer  affairs, 
by  means  of  the  various  administrative  departments,  in  obedi- 
ence to  financial  and  economic  laws,  that  the  individuals  of  the 
country  shall  have  abundance  of  all  material  necessities.  To 
employ  a  word  used  ordinarily  only  in  armies  and  navies,  one 
may  say  that  the  main  factors  in  the  life  of  every  individual 
and  every  nation  are  "logistical."  Nevertheless,  it  is  obvi- 
ous that  when  a  national  defense  machine  is  to  be  designed, 
built,  and  operated  as  a  machine  to  protect  a  nation,  it  must 
be  designed,  built,  and  operated  to  do  a  certain  strategical 
work;  and  that  therefore  strategy,  and  not  logistics,  must 
control  its  design,  building,  and  operation — if  the  best  results 
are  to  be  secured. 

This  means  that,  although  in  the  conduct  of  ordinary  busi- 
ness, even  the  business  of  government,  logistics  is  the  prime 
factor,  yet  in  the  conduct  of  an  army  or  navy  strategy  is  the 
prime  factor  and  logistics  the  subordinate.     If  a  War  or  a 


382  THE  ART  OF  FIGHTING 

Navy  Department  were  merely  an  agency  for  handling  money 
and  securing  supplies  and  materials  of  all  sorts,  then  a  man 
trained  in  the  handling  of  large  business  interests  would  be 
the  ideal  man  to  put  in  charge  of  it.  But  a  War  Department 
or  a  Navy  Department  is  not  anything  like  that.  It  is  an 
agency  for  designing  and  preparing  an  army  machine  or  a 
navy  machine  in  time  of  peace,  and  for  operating  it  in  time 
of  war. 

It  is  sometimes  urged  that  even  a  man  wholly  untrained  in 
naval  and  military  matters,  if  he  would  follow  the  advice  of 
the  best  professional  experts,  could  design,  prepare,  and  handle 
an  army  or  a  navy  with  perfect  efficiency.  Whether  this 
could  be  done  or  not  (supposing  an  indefinite  amount  of 
time  to  be  available)  it  would  be  idle  to  conjecture.  It  may 
be  declared  with  confidence,  however,  that  no  such  achieve- 
ment has  ever  yet  been  accomplished,  or  even  approximated. 

The  reason  is  that  a  military  machine,  or  a  naval  machine, 
is  more  complicated,  powerful  and  rapidly  moving  than  any 
other  machine  the  world  contains;  that  even  a  small  and 
slowly  moving  machine  requires  knowledge  and  skill  in  its 
director;  and  that  the  more  powerful  and  rapidly  moving  a 
machine  is,  the  more  urgently  it  needs  knowledge  and  skill 
in  its  director. 

The  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  in 
peace  as  well  as  in  war,  must  continually  make  decisions  upon 
matters  involving  ultimately  the  lives  of  thousands  of  men, 
the  expenditure  of  millions  of  dollars  and  the  safety  of  the 
nation.  It  is  my  mature  and  profound  conviction  that  no 
man  untrained  in  the  principles  and  the  technique  of  strategy 
would  dare  to  accept  either  position,  if  he  really  understood 
the  responsibilities  he  was  assuming  and  the  dangers  he  was 
courting. 


THE  END 


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